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Abstract
This thesis has three aims. First, to develop the theoretical perspectives necessary for  
the evaluation o f local bus service deregulation in Britain (excluding London).
Second, to identify the effects o f deregulation i f  external subsidy to the bus industry 
had not been reduced. Third, to estimate a number o f the externalities, particularly 
the environmental effects, associated with substitution o f bus for car travel.
Criticism o f local bus service deregulation has focused on the welfare loss arising 
from wasteful competition “on the road”. This view is based on the public interest 
theory o f regulation, which assumes that market failures such as wasteful competition 
can be remedied by regulators acting to increase social welfare. But the public 
interest theory is not sufficient to provide an appropriate evaluation framework. 
Alternatives are public choice theory, Austrian theory and contestable market theory. 
The thesis provides a fu ll discussion of these alternatives and their relevance to the 
local bus service market. It concludes that the local bus service market is relatively 
contestable, although the existence of strategic and non-strategic entry barriers 
implies a continuing supervisory role for the Office o f Fair Trading and the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
A major empirical problem in the evaluation o f local bus service deregulation is that 
government macroeconomic policy caused significant reductions in external subsidy 
to the bus industry concurrent with deregulation itself. The thesis uses an econometric 
model to disentangle the long term effects of subsidy reduction and deregulation on 
bus fares and patronage for both the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The 
focus on the long-term effects is an important addition to the research literature on 
local bus service deregulation, since previous quantitative studies have been able to 
deal with the short to medium-term effects only. The econometric model shows that, i f  
subsidy reduction had not occurred, deregulation would have resulted in a decrease 
in bus fares and an increase in bus travel. The associated overall welfare gain is in 
the region o f £6 to £10 million per annum for the period 1986-97.
Part o f the increase in bus travel would come from people substituting bus for car 
travel. Given the well-publicised and researched external costs o f car use, it is 
important to know the extent to which these costs are reduced as people transfer from  
car to bus. The thesis uses a simulation model developed by the author to provide a 
number o f monetary estimates in this under-researched area. Particidar attention is 
given to the environmental effects, that is air pollution and global warming, arising 
from bus for car travel substitution. The simulation model shows that, for bus load 
factors in the range of 35 to 55 per cent, the total cost reductions from changes in the 
externalities vary from £640 to £1,234 per annum (1995 prices) for every car ceasing 
to travel. Exhaust emission costs increase, however, because o f the large amounts o f 
particulate matter emitted by bus diesel engines. The policy implication is that bus for  
car substitution should be encouraged, but particulate emissions from bus engines 
reduced by improved engine design and the use o f low-sulphur fuels.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Aims of the Thesis
The deregulation of local bus services in Britain (excluding London) in October 1986 
created considerable controversy. There was general agreement amongst those involved 
in the deregulation debate that the regulated system introduced by the 1930 Road Traffic 
Act needed reform, but considerable disagreement about the means of achieving this aim. 
This disagreement should not be surprising, given the unique characteristics of the local 
bus service market. Bus travel is, to use the economist’s unfortunate terminology, an 
“inferior” good. Real disposable incomes in Britain in the post-war period increased 
substantially, with the result that car travel increased at the expense of bus travel. The 
decline in the demand for local bus services locked the industry into a spiral of falling 
revenue, increasing subsidies from the taxpayer, rising fares and further falls in demand.
Bus operators were also required by the Traffic Commissioners to provide a 
comprehensive service network of profitable and unprofitable services. For many people 
living on low incomes or in rural areas, bus travel is the only travel option. In effect, the 
industry had a public service obligation to meet as well as the usual commercial criteria. 
The Traffic Commissioners overcame this dilemma by granting bus operators territorial 
monopolies from which they could cross-subsidise from profitable to unprofitable 
services. The basic problem with this system, at least as administered by the Traffic 
Commissioners, was that it stifled competition and innovation. Operators wishing to start 
a service in competition with an incumbent operator found it very difficult to obtain the 
requisite Road Service Licence.
From the economist’s viewpoint, however, the debate is not just about whether local bus 
services should be provided on a competitive or non-competitive basis. There are wider
issues that should also be addressed. A key issue is the theoretical perspective from 
which competition (or the lack of it) is evaluated. A number of arguments against 
deregulation centre on the welfare loss from wasteful competition. If competition is 
viewed as a process, however, the concept of “wasteful” competition becomes 
problematic. Similarly, traditional approaches that measure the extent of competition 
solely in relation to the structure of the industry may not be appropriate if the market is 
contestable. There is also a practical issue to resolve. Fare increases after deregulation 
were not caused primarily by a lack of competition but, as this thesis argues in 
subsequent chapters, by the very large reductions in external subsidy to the industry. Any 
attempt to evaluate “deregulation” must therefore disentangle the effects of deregulation 
per se and those of subsidy reduction.
Deregulation was also accompanied by privatisation of the industry. This was not 
privatisation en bloc, but a process of splitting up the larger companies into smaller ones. 
Subsequently, a number of companies merged to create an industry that was oligopolistic 
in structure. This fragmentation and subsequent merger activity raises the issue of what 
happened to economies of scale, scope and density in the industry. This is important not 
only in terms of company cost structures but also in terms of market contestability, since 
scale and other economies may create entry barriers.
The local bus service market is subject to a number of externalities. Attention has tended 
to focus on the Mohring effect, where increased service frequencies generate external 
benefits for passengers. Less attention has been given to the externalities associated with 
the substitution of bus for car travel that might have occurred if deregulation had not been 
accompanied by subsidy reduction. These externalities include the costs of congestion, 
exhaust emissions, noise, fuel and road accidents. The monetary valuation of exhaust 
emission costs is particularly difficult in view of the different types of exhaust emissions 
from different types of engine, and the interaction effects between these emissions.
Accordingly, the aims of this thesis are to:
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• Develop the theoretical perspectives necessary for the evaluation of deregulation
• Establish the outcome of deregulation without subsidy reduction
• Estimate the externalities associated with substitution of bus for car travel.
1.2 Thesis Structure
The thesis develops the theoretical perspectives in the context of the chronological 
development of the local bus service market. This historical approach is adopted because 
it is sometimes easier to understand the rationale for policy changes if one has some 
knowledge of the preceding policy regime. Policy is rarely made in a vacuum, and policy 
evaluation must take account of the economic and non-economic constraints faced ex 
ante by policy makers.
Chapter two describes the development of the highly regulated system inaugurated by the 
1930 Road Traffic Act, and the three principles of priority, protection and public need 
that guided the Traffic Commissioners in their administration of this system. The way in 
which the Commissioners interpreted the principle of public need was particularly 
important since it lead to the provision of profitable and unprofitable services, the latter 
cross-subsidised from the monopoly profits earned on the former. This system had to 
operate against the backdrop of rapidly increasing car use and decreasing fare revenues, 
so that cross-subsidy had eventually to be augmented by rapidly increasing external 
subsidy. The 1980 Transport Act deregulated the express coach or long-distance market, 
and introduced deregulation of local bus services in a small number of trial areas. It 
marked the beginning of the transition to further deregulation of local bus services under 
the 1985 Transport Act.
Chapter three discusses the theoretical rationale for the regulated system described in 
Chapter two. This rationale is based on the public interest theory of regulation, which 
assumes that the effects of market failure can be remedied by regulators acting to increase 
social welfare. The concept and measurement of social welfare is discussed in the context
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of Pareto efficiency. Market failures in local bus service provision are identified and 
discussed, with particular attention given to the idea of wasteful competition.
Chapter four discusses the deficiencies of the public interest theory of regulation, and 
introduces alternative theoretical frameworks within which to analyse the local bus 
service market. These alternatives are public choice theory, Austrian theory and 
contestable market theory. The idea of a contestable market is particularly important, 
since it shifts the emphasis away from market structure towards the existence of entry and 
exit barriers. If these barriers do not exist, then the re-emergence of local monopolies, 
together with increased market concentration via mergers in the deregulated bus industry, 
is not incompatible with a competitive market outcome. The Buses White Paper (1984) 
claim that the industry is highly contestable is given extensive discussion, since this claim 
is central to the policies of deregulation and privatisation introduced in the 1985 
Transport Act.
Chapter five moves the thesis away from theoretical perspectives and towards the specific 
background and actual effects of the 1985 Transport Act. These effects differed 
substantially between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. One reason for this 
difference is the relatively large reduction in external subsidy that occurred in the 
metropolitan areas. A number of performance indicators are analysed to illustrate the 
different outcomes in these areas. These outcomes are set within an analytical framework 
that distinguishes between the short, medium and longer-term effects of deregulation. A 
number of short to medium term issues specific to local bus service deregulation in 
Britain are discussed. These include changes in market structure, profitability, costs and 
employment, vehicle seating capacity and size, investment, contestability and subsidy.
The issue of subsidy is crucial to the evaluation of local bus service deregulation. If 
subsidy had not fallen so sharply, the long run outcome of deregulation might have been 
substantially different. Chapter six develops and estimates an econometric model to 
identify what might have happened in this counter-factual situation, as well as the 
possible outcomes associated with a continuation of the regulated system. An important
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issue to be resolved is the direction of causation between fare increases and subsidy 
reductions: did fare increases enable subsidies to be reduced, or did subsidy reductions 
force operators to increase fares? The model is estimated on time series data for 1953 to 
1997, and thus allows for the long run deregulation effects identified by the analytical 
framework developed in the previous chapter. Time series estimation has become 
increasingly complex because of the desire to avoid the problem of spurious regression 
when dealing with trended variables. This problem can be reduced by the use of 
cointegration methodology, which forms the basis for the estimation procedures in 
Chapter six. The estimation of the long run demand curve for bus travel enables a welfare 
evaluation of deregulation with subsidy replacement to be made.
The results of Chapter six imply that deregulation with subsidy replacement would have 
caused an overall reduction in bus fares over the period 1985 to 1997. Although this 
decrease is small it is not unreasonable to assume that bus travel would have increased, 
and that some of this increase would have occurred as a result of car users transferring to 
bus. Since car use creates a number of external costs, bus for car substitution will 
generally increase social welfare because of the reduction in these costs. Chapter seven 
identifies and places a monetary value on these costs. The case of exhaust emission costs 
is particularly interesting, since these costs depend not only on monetary valuations of the 
direct effects, but also on interaction effects, load factors, type of vehicle and emission 
standards. The treatment of the external effects from bus for car substitution is an area 
that appears to be under-researched, and the results of Chapter seven, whilst certainly not 
providing a definitive analysis, do at least open up new avenues for research. These 
results are not just relevant to the area of bus deregulation, but also to the continuing 
public debate about the benefits of bus as opposed to car travel.
Chapter eight provides an overview of the main conclusions from Chapters two to seven.
1.3 Appendices
Appendices are contained in a separate volume. Although not essential to the thesis 
arguments developed in Volume I, they provide further details of the local bus service 
market that may be of interest to the reader. Appendix one provides an account of the 
legislative and structural changes in the regulated local bus service market from 1947 to 
1985. Appendix two contains discussion of the author’s suggestions regarding the 
prevention of strategic entry deterrence in the form of schedule matching and predatory 
pricing in the deregulated market. The details of the methodological procedures used to 
derive the monetary valuations of exhaust emissions contained in Chapter seven are given 
in Appendix three. This also contains an example of the spreadsheet model CarBus 
developed by the author to facilitate the calculations of the monetary valuations.
Appendix four presents the details of the variables used in the econometric analysis of 
Chapter six, together with the observations for the data set from 1953 to 1997. Finally, 
Appendix five contains the results of an alternative econometric analysis to the one used 
in Chapter six. The purpose of this alternative modelling strategy is to use Granger 
causality tests to establish the direction of causation between bus fares and external 
subsidy.
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CHAPTER 2
Regulation of Bus Services 1930-1985
Before 1930 regulatory control of the omnibus service industry was fragmentary. The 
industry developed quickly, as did the number of accidents associated with it. The 1930 
Road Traffic Act introduced systematic quality and quantity regulation of the industry, 
and this system survived virtually intact until the 1980 and 1985 Transport Acts. This 
chapter describes the background to the 1930 Road Traffic Act, and the ways in which 
the regulatory system developed under the administration of the Traffic Commissioners. 
The reasons for the eventual demise of this system are discussed, together with the effects 
of the partial deregulation introduced by the 1980 Transport Act. Section 2.1 discusses 
the background to the 1930 Road Traffic Act, in particular the concerns over safety and 
the subsequent widening of these concerns to cover unfair competition. The provisions 
and implementation of the 1930 Act are described in Section 2.2, especially the way in 
which the Traffic Commissioners interpreted the principle of “public need” to provide 
profitable and unprofitable services through internal cross-subsidy. The effects of the 
1930 Act are discussed in Section 2.3, whilst Section 2.4 provides an account of the 
development of the post-war bus industry over the period 1945-79. Section 2.5 describes 
the changes to the industry introduced by the 1980 Transport Act, which deregulated 
coach services and introduced partial deregulation for local bus services in the form of 
the Trial Areas.
2.1 The Background to the 1930 Road Traffic Act
The dominant feature of the transport sector in Britain in the early twentieth century was 
the rise of road motor transport, both passenger and freight. Its evolution started with the 
development of the first internal combustion engine, attributed to Jean Lenoir of Paris in 
1860, and progressed to the announcement by Henry Ford in 1909 that he intended to 
produce a motor car for the masses - the model "T". In Britain the Motor Car Act of 1903
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gave legal recognition to the motor car, introduced a maximum speed limit of 20 miles 
per hour, and set regulations on licensing, driving standards, vehicle identification and 
maximum weight.
The first motor omnibuses appeared in Britain about 1898 and, despite suffering from 
mechanical unreliability, expanded rapidly in number, particularly in London. In 1905 
there were twenty motor buses in operation in London, by 1911 there were 3000. Road 
freight transport also expanded rapidly, particularly after the First World War, when a 
large increase in railway rates in September 1920 coincided with the sale of some 20,000 
surplus vehicles at very low prices by the Ministry of Munitions. The growth of the 
railway industry, virtually uninterrupted throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
slowed and was then reversed by the competition from road motor transport. From 1923 
to 1930 railway receipts fell by 17%. A similar story applies to the tramway companies.
The motor omnibus industry developed in London in the early 1900s, in other cities such 
as Birmingham from about 1912, and in rural areas from the early 1920s. The structure 
and performance of the industry during this period is difficult to establish precisely, since 
before 1930 there were no adequate statistics available for buses and coaches classified 
according to size of operator. The overall trends in the road and rail sectors are 
summarised in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Number of road vehicles and rail passengers in Britain: selected years 
1904-34
Year Flackneys, 
Buses, 
Coaches (a)
Goods
Vehicles
Private Cars Railway 
Passengers 
(millions) (b)
1904 5345 4000 8465 1142.3
1914 51167 82000 132015 1199.3
1924 94153 203156 473528 1236.2
1934 45689 413320 1308425 829.7
Source: Basic Road Statistics (various), British Road Federation, columns 2. 3 and 4.
Railway Returns (various). Railway Companies (Returns and Accounts Act 1911) column 5.
Notes: (a) Figures from 1904 - 1924 are for hackneys, and include taxi-cabs. The figure for 1934 is for
buses and coaches, including trolleybuses.
(b) Figures exclude season ticket holders: the first two figures shown are for 1900 and 1913 
respectively, and are for Britain; the remaining two are for the UK.
8
The rapid growth of road traffic was accompanied by a rise in the number of road 
accidents, some of which were associated with omnibus travel. There is evidence to 
suggest that conduct in the industry, particularly in the early phase of development, was 
characterised by some dubious practices. In a contemporary account of services outside 
London and the municipalities, Garcke (1923) distinguishes four types of omnibus 
operator: firstly, the provincial owner with a sizeable fleet and offering a stable set of 
services; secondly, smaller companies, perhaps owned on a family or individual basis, 
allegedly seeking short term profits which were often at the expense of customer 
goodwill; thirdly, owners pursuing "blackmail" tactics by running services in the territory 
of an established operator with the intention of forcing the operator into a takeover; 
finally, "pirate" owners who took advantage of established operators' service networks by 
running buses just ahead of their scheduled times.
Competition in the rapidly expanding omnibus industry also resulted in "on-the-road" 
problems such as "racing", where rival drivers would speed against each other in order to 
reach a bus stop first, and "nursing", where one bus would closely accompany a rival bus 
in order to divert passengers away from it. A variant of this was "blanketing", where two 
buses would nurse the rival bus, one in front and one behind. If the blanket were tucked 
tightly enough, the rival bus would be unable to pull out and overtake. Passenger demand 
in the pre-1930s industry tended to be very dense, so that the number of buses on a 
particular route was usually very high: this gave considerable opportunity, at least by 
contemporary standards, for these practices. Birch (1971) provides an account of London 
omnibus operations in the 1920s, and Jenson (1971) describes the development of 
omnibus services in Birmingham in the latter half of the nineteenth century. An 
indication of the problems associated with the development of the (horse drawn) omnibus 
is given in the following extract from the 1836 prospectus of the Midland Omnibus 
Company:
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"The glaring misconduct of both drivers and conductors together with the terrifying effect 
and often fatal consequences arising from careless and furious driving, prevent many 
(especially females) from availing themselves of those facilities which, otherwise, they 
might feel desirous to embrace..."
(Jenson, op. cit., p. 115)
Occasionally competition manifested itself in more overtly dangerous forms: it was not 
unknown, for example, for drivers to attempt to force their rivals into a convenient 
roadside ditch (Foster and Golay, 1986). Although the extent of these practices is open to 
dispute, the number of accidents involving omnibuses rose rapidly between 1918 and 
1930 (Glaister and Mulley, 1983). The problem of dangerous driving was not confined 
solely to omnibuses, however, but to all vehicles, especially in London. In the minutes to 
the Royal Commission on London Government (1923) there are numerous references to 
driving behaviour which, by current standards, would probably be illegal. Compounding 
the general lack of control on driver behaviour was the growing problem of urban road 
congestion, caused by the increase in freight as well as passenger traffic.
Prior to 1930 local authorities were empowered to regulate omnibuses under the Town 
Police (Clauses) Acts of 1847 and 1889. The first Act applied to hackney carriages, 
whilst the second extended these powers to (horse-drawn) omnibuses. The provisions of 
these Acts were also applied to the motorised omnibuses introduced in Britain at the turn 
of the century, but they were not amended to take into account the greater speeds and 
distances of these motorised vehicles. Local authorities could license vehicles, drivers 
and conductors, and pass bye-laws to regulate vehicle safety standards, stopping places, 
and the conduct of owners and their omnibus crews.
Although the potential for regulatory control was considerable, there was no statutory 
obligation on the local authorities to use these powers. Consequently, there was little 
uniformity in the extent to which local authorities exercised them. Implementation was 
complicated by the exemption of privately hired vehicles from the scope of the Acts, so
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that vehicles which were unable to satisfy the conditions for omnibus licensing could 
simply be transferred to alternative uncontrolled uses in the private hire trade. 
Additionally, vehicle licensing applied only to the vehicle itself, so that no restrictions 
could be placed within the licence on fares or service routes and frequencies.
Rural authorities were also required to obtain a special Order under section 276 of the 
Public Health Act 1875 before they could use their powers under the Town Police 
Clauses Acts: this probably explains why, in the great majority of rural areas, it was 
possible to start an omnibus service without any licence at all. Of the total 644 rural 
district authorities, only 65 possessed licensing powers. Where authorities did exercise 
their licensing powers, there was no requirement to observe impartiality: Birmingham 
Corporation, for example, reached an agreement with the Midland Red Company in 1914 
whereby its own buses were given a monopoly of local services within Birmingham, 
whilst those of Midland Red were given a near monopoly of services from outside into 
the city. An account of the pre-1930 licensing system is given in the Report of the 
Committee on the Licensing of Road Passenger Services (“Thesiger” Report, 1953). 
Overall, it appears that the degree of competition varied considerably from place to place: 
in some areas freedom of entry was complete, and competition was sometimes fierce; in 
others, freedom of entry was impossible and competition non-existent.
Another dimension to the problem was the attitude of the railway companies, who 
frequently argued that road users were not paying the full costs of road use, in contrast to 
rail users. The growing competition between these two modes was thus unfairly biased in 
favour of road transport. This argument was supported by the cost to revenue ratio for 
road finances in the period up to 1930: in 1911 total government spending on the road 
network was some fourteen times higher than its revenue from fuel tax and licences, 
although by 1930 the ratio had fallen to 1.6:1. From 1933 onwards, however, revenues 
began to exceed costs. The question of inter-modal equity was examined in the Report on 
the Conference of Rail and Road Transport ("Salter" Report, 1932). Meanwhile the 
government had attempted to assist the railway companies by the Railway (Road 
Transport) Acts of 1928, which gave them powers to operate their own road services. By
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1928, however, the Conservative government had decided to appoint a Royal 
Commission on Transport, under the chairmanship of Sir Arthur Griffith Boscawen, with 
the following terms of reference:
"To take into consideration the problems arising out of the growth of road traffic 
and, with a view to securing the employment of the available means of transport in Great 
Britain (including transport by sea coastwise and by ferries) to the greatest public 
advantage, to consider and report what measures, if any, should be adopted for their 
better regulation and control, and, so far as is desirable in the public interest, to promote 
their co-ordinated working and development."
(Royal Commission on Transport, Final Report, 1930, Cmnd. 3751, p. vii)
The Commission published three reports between 1929 and 1931. The second report of 
the Royal Commission was published in October 1929 and its recommendations formed 
the basis of parts IV and V of the 1930 Road Traffic Act. In its second report, the 
Commission unanimously came to the conclusion that:
"... as modern road passenger transport has grown to such importance ... the 
present chaotic system of licensing must disappear and be replaced by an entirely 
different system more suited to present-day needs".
(Royal Commission on Transport, Second Report, 1929, Cmnd. 3416)
The 1930 Road Traffic Act inaugurated a comprehensive and remarkably durable 
regulation of the British bus service industry. The reasons given for the quantity licensing 
aspect of this piece of legislation have generally been the prevention of wasteful 
competition and pressure from railway and tram interests to protect their markets from 
motor vehicle competition. Mulley (1983) has questioned this view, arguing that the 
original cause was purely concern for public safety beginning in the early 1920s. This 
reinterpretation stems from the availability of new sources of information, namely the
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original Ministry of Transport files of both the Hackney Vehicle Committee and the 
Royal Commission, as well as the Cabinet Papers of the 1920s. Whilst examining the 
case for regulation on safety grounds, the discussions were subsequently extended to 
cover "unfair" competition, both within the road transport sector and between it and the 
railway and tram interests. The progression from quality to quantity licensing occurred 
during one of the Sub-Committee meetings of the Hackney Vehicle Committee 
(convened in 1922), where it was suggested that quantity licensing should be used to 
compensate incumbent operators for the expense of higher safety standards by protecting 
them from competition. The rationalisation of quantity licensing on the grounds of 
"unfair competition" came from later submissions.
Mulley (1983) argues that the Ministry of Transport's evidence to the Royal Commission 
was heavily influenced by the report of the Hackney Vehicle Committee, which in turn 
was considerably influenced by Frank Pick who represented the interests of the larger 
incumbent omnibus operators. The evidence to the Commission about the undesirability 
of competition was based on:
"... the predominant fallacy of the era - that "unfair" and "free" competition were 
synonymous."
(Mulley, 1983, p. 7)
The resulting legislation, based on quantity as well as quality licensing, tended to protect 
these vested interests rather than promote the public interest, which would:
"... undoubtedly have benefited from the wider choice of services under the 
unregulated system at lower fares than might otherwise have been offered."
(Mulley, 1983, p. 16)
Pursuing this line of argument, Mulley observes that:
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"No real evidence was put before the Royal Commission ... to justify the quantity 
licensing subsequently incorporated in its second report and which formed the basis of 
the Road Traffic Act."
(Mulley, 1983, p. 17)
and concludes that:
"The most remarkable aspect of the 1930 quantity licensing legislation is the way 
in which it lasted, despite the faulty premises underpinning it, almost without change for 
fifty years."
(Mulley, 1983, p. 17)
Presumably the "real evidence" referred to would be evidence based on an economic 
analysis of competition, particularly the benefits of competition from the smaller 
operators. Whilst the argument that the Commission did not hear such evidence may be 
correct, it would be dubious to conclude that it was unaware of the economic debate over 
the costs and benefits of competition. Sir Arthur Boscawen was familiar with American 
legislation against unrestricted competition and the reasons for it, as an earlier quote 
demonstrates (p. 12). Academic debate on unrestricted competition, particularly in the 
USA, was well advanced. Hotelling's classic article on the problems associated with 
competition, for example, was published in 1929. Whilst the members of the Commission 
may not have been practising economists, a lack of contact with the academic literature 
would not preclude them from a general knowledge of the economic issues involved.
Nonetheless, the success of the incumbent operators in extending regulation from safety 
to entry conditions does indicate that regulatory "capture" (see Section 4.1.2) occurred at 
an early stage in the deliberations of the Royal Commission. This early capture is not 
surprising, given the potential rewards to incumbent operators from a system of quantity 
licensing. As Yarrow (1986) has observed:
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"... while it is possible to conceive of institutional arrangements that impede capture by 
interest groups, the point at which the regulatory process is most susceptible to these 
pressures is when institutions and policies are first being established. At that moment, 
politicians are necessarily the decision makers and the stakes are high for all concerned."
(Yarrow, 1986, p. 349)
The Thesiger Report (1953) later identified the main objectives which the architects of 
the 1930 Road Traffic Act sought to achieve in a licensing system for road passenger 
services: firstly, licensing should be service, rather than vehicle, based; secondly, road 
passenger services should be classified into types, with no competition between types; 
thirdly, the licensing authority should be impartial; fourthly, a licensing area should be 
large enough to allow for a review of public transport as a whole; fifthly, municipal 
authorities should not have to seek special powers from Parliament whenever they wished 
to make small changes to their services; finally, there should be uniformity of practice 
between the different licensing authorities. The next section describes how these 
objectives were translated into the 1930 Road Traffic Act.
2.2 The Provisions and Implementation of the Road Traffic Act 1930
The Act replaced the existing licensing legislation and divided Britain into thirteen 
Traffic Areas. There were eleven areas for England and Wales (reduced to ten on January 
1st 1934) and two for Scotland. Each Area had three Traffic Commissioners (apart from 
the Metropolitan Area, which had one). The Chairman was appointed by the Minister of 
Transport and was a full-time, paid official. He was assisted by two part-time officials 
who were appointed by the Minister of Transport from a list of names supplied by local 
authorities. There were three types of licence which the Commissioners were empowered 
to grant: the Public Service Vehicle (PSV) Licence, the Drivers' or Conductors' Licence, 
and the Road Service Licence.
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Every public service vehicle was required to have a Certificate of Fitness and a PSV 
licence. The former was granted subject to the vehicle satisfying, after an inspection by a 
qualified examiner, detailed requirements under the Act relating to its construction and 
suitability. Once the Certificate of Fitness had been obtained, the PSV licence could be 
issued subject to the vehicle owner being a "fit and proper" person to hold such a licence. 
Details of these procedures are provided by Chester (1936). Drivers were required to pass 
a driving test before gaining their Drivers' Licence. The Act also placed a limit on the 
number of hours which drivers of buses and coaches (as well as goods vehicles) could 
remain continuously on duty, and incorporated a "Fair Wages Clause" for bus crews.
Most services on which separate fares were charged required a Road Service Licence 
(RSL). By granting or withholding these licences the Traffic Commissioners could 
regulate entry into the bus service industry. An RSL was required for stage carriage and 
express carriage services (where the legal distinction between them was that the latter 
charged a minimum fare of one shilling or more), excursions and tours. Contract carriage 
services did not require a road service licence: these were services where either no 
separate fare was paid or, if it was, the vehicle was used to transport a private party on a 
special occasion. This definition, however, was unclear in the 1930 Act and, in spite of 
clarification in the 1934 Road Traffic Act, remained difficult to interpret in a legal 
context (Thesiger Report, 1953, Chapter X and Appendix II). In the granting of a licence, 
the Act required the Traffic Commissioners to take into account:
(a) the suitability of the routes on which a service may be provided under the licence;
(b) the extent, if any, to which the needs of the proposed routes or any of them are 
already adequately served;
(c) the extent to which the proposed service is necessary or desirable in the public 
interest;
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(d).the needs of the area as a whole in relation to traffic (including the provision of 
adequate, suitable and efficient services, the elimination of unnecessary services and 
the provision of unremunerative services), and the co-ordination of all forms of 
passenger transport, including transport by rail.
(Road Traffic Act, 1930, Part IV, Section 72 (3))
They were also given wide powers to attach conditions to the licence. The nature of these 
conditions was determined by the four criteria above and additionally that:
(a) the fares shall not be unreasonable;
(b) where desirable in the public interest the fares shall be so fixed as to prevent wasteful 
competition with alternative forms of transport, if any, along any route or any part 
thereof, or in proximity thereto;
(c) copies of the time-table and fare-table shall be carried and be available for inspection 
in vehicles used on the service;
(d) passengers shall not be taken up or shall not be set down except at specified points or 
shall not be taken up or shall not be set down between specified points; and generally 
for the securing of the safety and convenience of the public.
(Road Traffic Act, 1930, Part IV, Section 72 (4))
The application for a road service licence was heard by the Traffic Commissioner at a 
public sitting in a semi-judicial Traffic Court. The applicant was normally expected to 
provide evidence of public need for the service. Objections to the application, as well as 
other representations, were also heard in the Court. Where objections were raised, the 
onus of proof lay with the applicant. Most applicants employed legal experts to present 
their case, often provided by their Trade Association. It was customary (although not
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statutory) for road service licences to be granted for three years, after which a new 
application had to be submitted. The licence could be revoked or suspended if the 
Commissioner judged that a serious breach of the conditions attached to it had occurred.
Appeals against the Commissioners' decisions could be made to the Minister of 
Transport, who would normally appoint an Inspector to conduct a hearing into the appeal. 
The Inspector would then provide a report to the Minister, who would take the final 
decision as to whether the appeal be upheld or not. The Inspector's task was to judge, on 
the basis of the evidence heard by the Commissioners, whether they had reached the right 
decision. Accordingly, new evidence was only allowed in exceptional circumstances. The 
close relationship between the Minister and the Commissioners, together with the 
difficulty of introducing new evidence, provoked criticism of the appeals procedure on 
the grounds that it contained a bias towards the rejection of appeals. Between 193 1 and 
1934, the Minister upheld nearly 40% of appeals, and rejected nearly 40%. Some 23% of 
appeals were withdrawn prior to a decision, although it could be argued that these were in 
anticipation of a rejection (Chester, 1936, p. 80).
In granting the licences, the Traffic Commissioner had to take into account a number of 
local conditions that were specific to that service. Consequently it was difficult to 
formulate general principles within the Act which could guide the Commissioner in 
specific decisions. Nevertheless, given the decisions of the Commissioners and the appeal 
hearings in the years immediately following the Act, Chester (1936) identified three 
principles on which these decisions appeared to be based: priority, protection, and public 
need.
The principle of priority meant that existing operators of a service were given preference 
to new applicants in the granting of a licence, particularly if they could demonstrate a 
satisfactory record in the running of the service. There were problems in the 
implementation of this principle in the years immediately following the Act because 
of the large number of operators who had set up in business shortly before the Act 
became effective. Where more than one operator had been running a service, and where
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the Commissioner considered that all of them had an equal claim to running the service, 
the solution was to allow each operator to continue to provide the service on a rota basis. 
In general, however, the Commissioners adopted the approach of "one operator, one 
route". This rationing device was particularly important in the 1930s since the Great 
Depression was causing a fall in the demand for bus services and a consequent over­
capacity in the industry.
The principle o f protection was applied at an intra and inter-industry level. Within the 
industry, protection was given to local bus services against long distance services. This 
was usually in the form of restrictions on picking up and setting down points for long 
distance services operating within the territory of a local service, or the stipulation of a 
(relatively high) minimum fare for the local section of the long distance service. Local 
services were also protected against excursion services, usually by fare, scheduling or 
vehicle number restrictions on the excursion service. Outwith the industry, protection was 
given to alternative forms of transport, namely local tramways, trolleybuses and railway 
services. Long distance railway services, for example, were usually protected against 
competition from long distance express coach services by restricting their duplication at 
peak time periods of travel. The inter-industry protection enabled the Commissioners to 
fulfil their duty under section 72 of the 1930 Act to consider the "co-ordination o f all 
forms of public transport".
The principle of public need came directly from section 72 of the 1930 Act. Applications 
could be divided into three categories: the continuation of an existing service, the 
alteration of an existing service, and the provision of a new service. In the first category 
an operator had to provide statistical evidence of vehicle loadings, costs and profits. In 
the absence of other factors, poor vehicle loadings or unprofitability might be interpreted 
by the Commissioners as a lack of public need for the service. For the other two 
categories such statistical evidence might be more difficult to provide: instead the 
operator could gather support from other sources such as local residents, ratepayers' 
associations, local authorities and local societies in order to prove public need. Proof was
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needed before the licence was granted, and in all applications the Commissioners were 
required to consider the implications for alternative forms o f transport.
Although there was no statutory requirement on them to do so, the Commissioners later 
commonly interpreted "public need" to mean that operators should provide unprofitable 
as well as profitable services (Thesiger Report, 1953, p. 39). Operators were granted a 
road service licence on condition that they supplied both types of service, using part of 
their profits to provide a subsidy to the loss-making parts of the network. In this way the 
practice of internal cross-subsidisation became a fundamental part of the post-1930 bus 
industry. In order to prevent competition from eroding profits and undermining the 
system of cross-subsidisation, operators were usually given a territorial monopoly by the 
Traffic Commissioners. The system had the advantages of simplicity and cheapness, 
since the operator was in effect used as a surrogate tax collector.
2.3 The Effects of the 1930 Road Traffic Act
The quality licensing in the 1930 Act secured an improvement in safety and operating 
standards that was generally welcomed by both operators and passengers. The average 
age of PS Vs fell as older vehicles were less likely to obtain a Certificate of Fitness, and 
driving standards improved. In the first years after the Act, some 25% of applicants failed 
to obtain a driving licence (Chester, 1936).
Changes in the structure of the industry as a result of quantity (i.e. road service) licensing 
are more difficult to assess because of the lack of comprehensive data on buses and 
coaches before 1930 and the effect of the Depression on the industry. Between 1930 and 
1933 there was a continuous fall in the number of buses and coaches in Britain, from 52, 
648 to 45,656. The number of PSV operators fell from 6,486 in 1931 to 4,789 in 1937. 
This was mainly as a result of the 1930 Act, which forced less reliable operators out of 
business as well as creating entry barriers for potential operators, although the Depression 
was also a contributory factor. The average number of vehicles per operator rose from
7.1 in 1931 to 10.4 in 1937. Over the same period, the percentage of buses and coaches
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owned by operators with less than 10 vehicles fell from around 29 to 22, whilst the 
percentage owned by operators with 100 or more vehicles rose from around 47 to 61 
(Savage, 1966).
The increase in industry concentration after 1930 occurred because many small operators 
went out o f business or were taken over by larger firms, and also because of the increase 
in amalgamations between the larger firms. This tendency towards large scale operations 
cannot be attributed solely to the 1930 Act, since it provided protection to both small and 
large operators. Arguably, without the Act, the tendency would have been even more 
pronounced. Although amalgamation was sometimes encouraged by the Commissioners 
as a means of promoting the co-ordination of services, there were no provisions in the 
Act which allowed them to enforce amalgamation. The railway companies played a 
significant part in this process, since they used their powers under private Acts to buy a 
financial interest in some 40% of the largest bus companies, and then implemented a 
policy o f amalgamation and rationalisation (Chester, 1936). Another factor was the 
London Passenger Transport Act of 1933, which created the London Passenger Transport 
Board. The Board was an amalgamation of all the transport agencies in the London area. 
Prior to the creation of the Board, passenger transport services were provided in its area 
by a combination of (at least) 5 railway companies, 14 municipally owned tramway 
undertakings, 3 company-owned tramway undertakings, and 61 companies, firms or 
individuals running bus services (Savage, 1966). The purpose o f the Board was:
"To secure the provision of an adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger 
transport for the London Passenger Transport Area ... and ... while avoiding the provision 
of unnecessary and wasteful competitive services, to take from time to time such steps as 
they consider necessary for extending and improving the facilities for passenger transport 
in that area in such a manner as to provide most efficiently and conveniently for the needs 
thereof."
(London Passenger Transport Act, Section 3)
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The process of amalgamation and takeovers created a situation where route monopolies 
conferred by the Traffic Commissioners were converted into territorial monopolies. By 
1939 over two-fifths of the British bus industry was controlled by three groups: Thomas 
Tilling, Scottish Motor Traction and British Electric Traction (Savage, 1985). As 
administered by the Commissioners, the 1930 Road Traffic Act created a system of 
territorial monopolies in which preference and protection were given to established 
operators, in return for improved safety standards and the provision o f a service network 
underpinned by internal cross-subsidisation. Although the Act did not explicitly require 
them to do so, the Commissioners generally tried hard to implement uniform fare scales 
both within and between Traffic Areas (Glaister and Mulley, 1983). In addition to its 
intrinsic simplicity for administrative and operational purposes, standard charging was 
often favoured by the Commissioners as a method of establishing "proper" competition 
between competing operators on the same route. The problem with the system was that 
competition and innovation were stifled by the entry barriers (Hibbs, 1975). The extent of 
these barriers is noted by Chester (1936), who observes that the licensing system made it:
"... extremely difficult for new concerns to enter the industry."
(Chester, 1936, p. 181)
Opinions on the effects of the 1930 Act differ. Chester (1936) argues that:
"The direct effects of the Road Traffic Act have probably been of a negative rather than 
of a positive character ... There have been a few new entrants ... but certainly not as many 
as there would have been without the licensing system."
(Chester, 1936, pp. 181-82)
and concludes that the Act benefited incumbent small operators:
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"On the whole, however, the small operator, especially where he operates regular 
services, has gained by the Road Traffic Act. It has given him a security which he did not 
previously possess. The large operator, by virtue of his greater financial resources and his 
capacity to flood the route with vehicles, could and did eliminate many smaller operators 
prior to 1931. Now, if he desires to obtain a route, almost the only method is by buying 
out the existing operator at a price at least consistent with the value of his service."
(Chester, 1936, p. 184)
Savage (1966) concludes that:
"The consequences for the travelling public of the 1930 system of public regulation of 
road passenger transport were, on balance, probably beneficial. On the one hand, safer, 
more reliable services ... replaced the spasmodic unreliable services .... Stricter 
supervision o f fares and facilities, together with greater stability, was achieved in the 
industry as a whole."
(Savage, 1966, p. 162)
There is a note of caution, however:
"On the other hand, the protection of existing operators in their little monopolies, the 
barring o f entry to new-comers, the necessity of establishing the existence of public need 
before a new service might be run instead of allowing the normal criterion o f profitability 
to operate - all these things tended to benefit established operating interests and to that 
extent worked against the public advantage. ... it can be argued that the Act over­
emphasised stability at the expense o f new enterprise."
(Savage, 1966, p. 162)
Dyos and Aldcroft (1969) are less equivocal:
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"... when account is taken of the improvement in facilities which occurred in the 1930's it 
is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that the public secured a net gain from the 
licensing system."
(Dyos and Aldcroft, 1969, p. 360)
Glaister and Mulley (1983) take a different view, arguing that the effects of the Act were 
detrimental because:
"From the economic and social point of view the principles on which it was based were, 
in our view, not carefully considered nor were they entirely sound. This was compounded 
by the strong line that the Traffic Commissioners took in the early days in interpreting the 
legislation."
(Glaister and Mulley, 1983, p. 134)
Hibbs (1975) argues that the Act benefited the bus operators (large and small), as well as 
the railway companies, to the detriment of the consumer by the stifling of the competitive 
process:
"Thus, we may conclude that the main beneficiaries of the route licensing system were 
the transport operators, including the railways... What the system did was virtually to 
prohibit the entry of new capital and initiative to the field of regular service operation."
(Hibbs, 1975, p. 54)
2.4 The Post-war Bus Industry 1945-1979
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe the development of the post-war bus industry in terms of 
two contrasting time periods. The first period from 1945-79 (Section 2.4) is characterised 
by the attempts of Labour governments to increase co-ordination and planning in the
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transport sector. The second period from 1980-85 (Section 2.5) is dominated by the 
laissez-faire attitudes of the newly elected Thatcher government of 1979, which 
deregulated both the bus and coach sectors during this period.
Road passenger transport in the period 1945-79 was affected by four major influences: 
the increase in car ownership, the decrease (from the mid 1950s) in local bus travel, the 
desire by Labour governments to exert greater public control over the transport sector, 
and the reorganisation of local government under the 1972 Local Government Act. This 
section examines the role of the first two influences: the legislative and structural changes 
are described in Appendix one.
B u s  U se  a n d  C a r  O w n e r s h ip
The 1930 Road Traffic Act was implemented in a period of rapid growth in demand for 
motorised road transport, particularly bus and coach services. Although the number of 
buses and coaches in Britain declined in the period 1930-1933 as a result o f quantity 
licensing and the Depression, from 1934 to 1953 their numbers increased continuously 
from 45,689 to nearly 80 thousand. Although one in five public transport journeys by 
road in 1950 were still by tram, the use of this mode of transport was declining rapidly 
(Pickup e t  a i ,  1991).
From its highpoint in 1953 the bus (and coach) industry entered a period of long term 
decline which lasted until the mid-1980s. The number o f passenger kilometres travelled 
by bus and coach users in Britain declined in both absolute and relative terms: from 1953 
to 1983 they more than halved from 82 billion to 40 billion, whilst the industry's share of 
total passenger transport slumped from 42% to 8%. This was in a period when total 
passenger kilometres travelled by all modes increased by 154%. Bus fares rose at a much 
faster rate than the costs of private transport: between 1972 and 1983 local bus service 
fares increased by roughly 30% in real terms, compared to an increase in motoring costs 
of only 3%. Over a similar period, expenditure on subsidies and grants at current prices 
rose from £71 million to £897 million, an increase of 238% in real terms (Buses White
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Paper, 1984). This occurred because of the rise in costs, particularly labour costs. 
Excluding fuel tax, the direct costs of bus operation per vehicle mile increased by some 
3% per annum in real terms during the 1960s and early 1970s. The bus industry is 
relatively labour-intensive, and the rise in unit costs reflected the inability o f operators to 
secure increases in labour productivity sufficient to offset the rise in real wages 
(Gwilliam and Mackie, 1975). The industry became locked into a cycle o f falling demand 
and higher fares, with the gap between revenue and cost filled by subsidy from the public 
purse.
The main reason for the decline in bus use was the rise in car ownership. Between 1961 
and 1971 the number of passenger kilometres travelled by car more than doubled. Car 
ownership has continued to increase, albeit at a slower rate, since 1971. There are two 
key economic factors that account for the increase in car ownership: the increase in real 
personal disposable incomes after 1945 and the decrease in the relative price of car to bus 
travel. Between 1953 and 1987 personal disposable income per capita in Britain rose 
from £239 to £4,860, an increase of 118% in real terms. The change in relative price has 
been referred to in the previous paragraph. In addition, technological improvements and 
the exploitation o f significant economies of scale in car manufacturing were instrumental 
in the process of containing unit cost increases in the car industry.
Social factors have also influenced the shift from bus to car travel in the post-war period, 
although the extent to which they influenced, rather than were influenced by, increasing 
car use is difficult to determine. Some people have preferred to live further from their 
place o f work, increasing their journey to work distances and making bus travel less 
attractive. Residence in some rural areas may necessitate car use for the journey to work 
if there are no suitable bus services. There has also been a tendency for people to shop, as 
well as reside, further from the city centre. The growth of large out-of-town retail 
developments has generally encouraged car rather than bus use. Leisure time has 
increased because o f shorter working hours, and this has changed social habits:
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“The 1950s pattern of social visits at weekends and evening trips to theatre, cinema and 
bingo has been largely replaced by a wider variety of car-based journeys. Demand for 
cinema seats has been superseded by television thus reducing demand for evening bus 
and train services ...”
(Cole, 1998, p. 27)
It has been estimated that in 1964, taking into account other factors such as the change in 
average household size, each additional car reduced bus patronage by about 380 bus trips 
per annum. By 1976, when car ownership was higher and bus patronage lower, the figure 
was still in the region of 300 bus trips per annum (Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory (TRRL), 1980, p. 95). The substitution of car for bus travel occurred amongst 
higher income groups, leaving bus travel as a predominantly lower income transport 
mode and thereby making it more difficult for bus operators to raise revenue by 
increasing fares. There were other important socio-economic changes associated with this 
substitution. In 1965, 83% of total car mileage was driven by men of working age, whilst 
73% of bus passenger miles were travelled by women, the young and the old 
(Department of Transport, 1967). This age and gender imbalance was another factor 
constraining operators from raising fares, since women, the young and the old were less 
likely to have paid employment. This gender imbalance has persisted into the 1990s: 
excluding central London, only 5% of bus passengers on average are males between 20 
and 65 years old (Cole, 1998, p. 201).
It is sometimes argued that car users misperceive the full costs of car and bus travel, 
where such costs would include not only the running costs of motoring (petrol, oil, 
maintenance etc.) but also indirect or implicit costs such as depreciation and travel time. 
Quarmby (1967), for example, noted that characteristics of the choice between bus and 
car use made sense if car users were only taking into account their petrol costs. The 
greater the extent to which car users fail to perceive the full costs of their travel, the 
greater the substitution of car for bus travel over the period.
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The decline in the demand for bus travel also had significant implications for the system 
of cross-subsidisation that had developed in the post-1930 industry. Arguably, the system 
had worked reasonably well when the demand for bus travel was generally healthy from 
1930 to the mid-1950s: after this period, declining demand caused a squeeze on profits 
which rendered cross-subsidisation increasingly difficult.
2.5 Fundamental Change
The election o f the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979 marked a 
radical departure from the "Keynesian consensus" economic policies of previous post­
war Labour and Conservative governments. The failure of Keynesian demand- 
management policies to deliver economic growth and price stability in the 1960s and 
1970s was instrumental in creating a shift towards "supply-side" policies designed to 
increase competition and efficiency. Product and factor markets were to be set free from 
restrictions by a range of policies including privatisation, deregulation, cuts in direct 
taxation and legislative changes curtailing trade union powers. One manifestation o f this 
new approach was the Transport Act of 1980, which deregulated the coach (or express) 
sector and introduced important changes to local bus services. Details of the purpose and 
provisions of the Act are given in Appendix one, Section 1.7.
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2 .5 .1 .1  E x p r e s s  S e r v ic e  F a r e s  a n d  W elfa re  C h a n g e s
Evidence suggests that fares on express services fell in real terms by an average o f 40% 
between 1980 and 1983, and that 700 new services were introduced (Buses White Paper, 
1984, p. 11). A significant proportion of this increase in demand, however, perhaps as 
much as 40%, took place at the expense of British Rail (Robbins and White, 1985). 
Douglas (1987) concludes that, if the loss of rail revenue is taken into account, the first- 
year effects of deregulation caused an overall fall in social welfare in the region o f £1.5m 
to £2.0m. This figure changes dramatically, however, if it is assumed that deregulation
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caused the subsequent decrease o f rail fares via the introduction of the "London Saver". 
The resulting increase in rail user benefit was estimated at £36m, producing an overall 
increase in social welfare of roughly £34.0 to £34.5m. Although the White Paper uses the 
experience o f the long distance market to support deregulation o f local services, there are 
important differences. The price elasticity of demand is significantly lower for local 
services, subsidy is much greater, and rail competition much less. C e te r i s  p a r ib u s ,  the 
expected benefits from local service deregulation will be less.
Kilvington and Cross (1986) also conclude that, overall, there were net benefits from the 
1980 Act. Their evaluation of costs and benefits is qualitative rather than quantitative, 
and shows that both coach and rail users experienced an overall benefit from the 1980 
Act, mainly from the lower average fares which resulted from the competition between 
National Express and British Rail on the major trunk routes. National Express was a 
subsidiary of the publicly owned National Bus Company. In general, this competition 
was won by National Express. Froml980 to 1982, National Express patronage increased 
by 75% and its profit rose from £0.1 million to £1.6 million. Bleasdale (1983) estimates 
that British Rail losses on its Inter-City network were in the region of £12 million in 
1981, increasing to £15 million in 1982 (although this should be placed in the context of 
an annual turnover of roughly £450 million). The performance of independent coach 
operators was generally disappointing, especially on express services to London where 
the larger service network of market leader National Express and fierce price competition 
created a difficult operating environment: the most notable casualty in this group was the 
British Coachways Consortium. A significant exception was the performance of the 
Perth-based Stagecoach group, which expanded rapidly after the 1980 Act. Some 
independent operators preferred to remain with their existing markets and avoid 
competition, and some entered into joint agreements with National Express. The only 
sector in which coach users suffered a net disbenefit was that of secondary route express 
services, mainly because of the National Express strategy of concentrating resources on 
the major trunk routes.
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2 .5 .1 .2  E n tr y  D e te r r e n c e
Further analyses of the post-deregulation express sector are given in Davis (1984), Jaffer 
and Thompson (1986), and Vickers and Yarrow (1988, pp. 372-7). Their conclusions are 
similar to those above. In particular, they focus on the use of market power by National 
Express to deter competition from other express operators. This market power derived 
from its existing advantages in national marketing, the development of computerised 
booking systems, predatory pricing, and its control over terminals or hubs such as 
Victoria Station. National Express refused entry to new operators to these travel 
interchanges, and also barred operators who had been using them prior to 1980 if they 
were considered to be in competition with National Express. Its market behaviour is 
summarised as follows:
"Given the nature of its incumbent advantages, it is not surprising that National Express 
responded aggressively ... before its rivals could build up goodwill and customer 
awareness. The entrants' pockets could not withstand the effects o f the incumbents' sharp 
price cutting strategy for very long and National Express had good reason to believe that 
short-run revenue losses would soon be recouped by the return of its market dominance."
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, p. 374)
These practices had important implications for the subsequent deregulation of local bus 
services, the main one being that deregulation (i.e. the removal of road service licensing) 
does not necessarily lead to competition. As Beesley (1992) comments:
30
"In summary, the case of the UK's long-distance bus operations has further lessons for the 
analyst of deregulation ... the quantity restrictions were indeed inhibiting the market, but 
their removal did not lead to a successful challenge to the incumbent. On my 
interpretation, the incumbent used other, underlying impediments to entry to maximise 
sales, with scarce attention to profit making."
(Beesley, 1992, p. 204)
2 .5 .1 .3  T r ia l  A r e a s
The evidence for the "trial areas", which covered mainly rural areas within the local 
authorities concerned, is more difficult to interpret. Although fares generally fell, there is 
a suspicion of predatory pricing in some cases. In Hereford, for example, Midland Red 
West, a subsidiary of the National Bus Company and the largest single operator in the 
City of Hereford, lowered fares and then raised them once rival operators had ceased to 
provide a competing service1. Other problems associated with this company were 
schedule matching and, on occasion, the provision of free services. In a case-study o f the 
Hereford area, Evans (1988) concludes that the company's post-deregulation strategy was 
characterised by: first, the provision of high frequency services to deter route entry by 
potential competitors or to force out existing competitors; second, increasing fares where 
it had a route monopoly, but not on competitive routes: third, a reduction in operating 
costs to improve competitiveness. In general, the lesson from the experience of Hereford 
is that "Deregulation is likely to give higher frequencies and higher fares than are 
optimal." (Evans, 1988, p. 305). This conclusion is reinforced by the results of the 
theoretical analysis o f route competition in Evans (1987).
There were also problems concerning the quality standards of operators competing in 
Hereford (Buses White Paper, 1984). Fairhead and Balcombe (1984) conclude that, 
whilst fares fell and service frequencies increased in Hereford and on some inter-urban
1 See the report by J. Tucker in the Sunday Times. 17.2.85. Note that Hereford is the largest town in the 
trial areas.
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routes, deregulation appeared to have little effect in the rural areas. The 1984 White 
Paper reaches a similar conclusion for the trial areas2, but adds an important caveat in 
anticipation of the 1985 Transport Act:
"Deregulation has not been sufficient to halt the overall decline in rural bus services, but 
neither has it worsened the situation ... The effects of deregulation are more discernible in 
urban areas and on inter-town routes ... Under present conditions, deregulation in itself 
may not be sufficient to allow small operators, however efficient, to compete successfully 
with established operators with greater resources."
(Buses White Paper, 1984, p. 79)
2.5 .1 .4  L ic e n s in g  C h a n g e s
The White Paper also discusses the effects of the licensing changes introduced in the 
1980 Transport Act on the provision of local bus services. It concludes that, although in 
theory the Act made it easier for operators to obtain a road service licence, in practice this 
was not generally the case. The first problem concerns the interpretation of "public 
interest" by the Traffic Commissioners, in the case of objections from established 
operators that the granting of a licence would allow revenue abstraction from their routes 
and thus reduce their ability to cross-subsidise socially desirable but loss-making 
services. In the early months after the Act, the Commissioners tended to attach greater 
importance to the interests of those gaining from the cross-subsidy than to other interests 
such as tax and ratepayers and those gaining from the proposed new services. This 
emphasis in the interpretation of "public interest" made it difficult for new operators to 
obtain an RSL in response to an objection by an established operator. This emphasis was 
re-appraised by the Commissioners, who began to take a more balanced view o f the 
"public interest" and, in particular, required objectors to support their case in "a more 
analytical and quantitative manner" (Buses White Paper, 1984, p. 73). The second 
problem was that, in the small number of cases where operators succeeded in obtaining 
the licence to enable them to compete with established operators, they were faced with
2 The section on Trial Areas in the 1984 While Paper is based on the preliminary findings of the Fairhead
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"formidable" resistance in the form of predatory pricing, increased service frequencies 
and other practices. As a result of these problems, operators wanting to provide new 
services were restricted to the relatively small number of profitable routes not covered by 
existing operators.
2 .5 .1 .5  F a r e  C o n tr o ls
The 1980 Act removed the power of the Commissioners to control fares for local bus 
services except in special circumstances but, again, the change did not generally cause 
significant variations in fares. In particular, by January 1983 there were no cases in which 
the Commissioners had intervened to prevent overcharging, and only a few where they 
had intervened to control the terms of competition.
2 .5 .1 .6  S u m m a r y
The 1980 Act produced net benefits in the express service sector, although the dominance 
of National Express meant that the full benefits of deregulation were not realised. In the 
local bus service sector the Act, in spite of its intentions, did not encourage significant 
entry to the industry. The main lesson for policy makers was that deregulation via the 
removal o f quantity licensing was not, in itself, sufficient to produce a competitive 
industry. Other measures, such as reducing the market power of incumbent operators, 
were necessary. With these objectives in mind, the Conservative government produced 
the 1984 "Buses" White Paper that culminated in the Transport Act o f 1985.
2.6 Conclusions
The 1930 Road Traffic Act was introduced in response to problems over safety, unfair 
competition and co-ordination between road, rail and tram interests. It initiated a fifty 
year period of comprehensive regulatory control in the bus service industry, underpinned 
by the creation of area monopolies and cross-subsidisation. This underpinning was not a 
necessary consequence of the Act but a result of the way in which the Traffic
and Balcombe (1984) study, which was published shortly after the White Paper.
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Commissioners chose to administer the system of road licensing. The theoretical rationale 
for this regulated system is discussed in Chapter three.
The system that developed was criticised because it stifled competition and innovation, 
although the Thesiger Report (1953) concluded that there should be no change in the 
licensing system. But reform was made inevitable by the post-war rise in car ownership, 
coupled with changes in social conditions, which caused a sustained decline in the 
demand for local bus services. Between 1953 and 1980 local bus service passenger 
journeys in Britain fell by 60%, whilst fares increased by 86% in real terms. But costs 
rose faster than revenue, so that the industry became increasingly dependent on subsidies 
and grants. In 1969, the year in which revenue support and concessionary fares were 
introduced, total subsidies and grants were £24 million. Eleven years later this figure had 
climbed to £570 million, an increase of 511% in real terms (inflation adjustment based on 
the consumer price index). Comparisons o f performance measures indicate significant 
differences between public sector operators, and between the public and private sectors.
In particular, labour productivity appears much higher for private sector operators, 
although this conclusion is based on data for both bus and coach operations.
The experience of the 1980 Transport Act indicated net benefits from the deregulation of 
coach services, and encouraged the Conservative government to extend deregulation to 
all local bus services in Britain (excluding London) in the 1985 Transport Act. The 
background to the 1985 Act, together with its provisions and effects, is discussed in 
Chapter five.
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C H A P T E R  3
T h eoretica l P ersp ectives I: 
m ark et fa ilu re  and the ca se  for  regu lation
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework within which to analyse 
the economic rationale for the regulatory system discussed in Chapter two. In particular, 
it develops a classification of the ways in which market failure can occur in the local bus 
service market. The discussion is based on the public interest theory of regulation, which 
assumes that market failure can be corrected by regulators acting to increase social 
welfare. This is in contrast to public choice theory, which emphasises that regulation may 
occur for reasons other than the public interest. The implications of using public choice 
theory as a basis for analysis are examined in Chapter four, along with other refinements 
to the basic theoretical framework developed in this chapter.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the meaning o f social 
welfare and the Pareto efficiency conditions on which it is based. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 
deal with the causes and instances of market failure, and relate the theory to specific 
occurrences in the local bus service market. Section 3.4 provides a summary and 
conclusions.
3.1 Pareto Efficiency and Welfare
Welfare economics is a branch of general equilibrium theory that endeavours to 
determine whether one economic situation is better than another. Vilfredo Pareto (1848- 
1923) regarded social welfare as a function of individual utility levels (W = f(Uj, ...,
Un)), where the individual is the only legitimate evaluator of his or her own welfare. This 
implies that the individual cannot determine whether a change leaves him better or worse 
off than someone else, or whether it increases or decreases someone else's utility. If
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dW/dUj > 0, according to the evaluation of individual i, then social welfare will rise. This
approach marked a movement away from the use of interpersonal utility comparisons in 
welfare economics.
A situation is defined as Pareto-efficient if it is impossible to make at least one person 
"better off' without making someone else "worse off'. The quotation marks are intended 
to emphasise the difficulties associated with words such as better and worse, which 
embody value-judgements that some economists would prefer to avoid. Pareto efficiency 
depends on achieving technological, distributional and allocative efficiency. These "first 
order" conditions must be satisfied simultaneously, and have received extensive 
discussion (Reder, 1947, Bator, 1957, Little, 1957, Winch, 1971). The concept of Pareto 
efficiency is developed within the neoclassical tradition of a static framework that allows 
comparisons to be made between alternative equilibrium positions. A perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, for example, is Pareto-efficient, whereas a monopoly 
equilibrium is not. Monopoly, in the neoclassical tradition, is an example of market 
failure in need of government intervention to correct this failure. An alternative approach, 
that of the Austrian School, stresses the importance of the dynamics of the market 
process and the role of the entrepreneur in discovering new opportunities. The Austrian 
approach, together with other refinements, is discussed in Chapter four.
The Pareto criterion implies that social welfare increases when a Pareto improvement is 
made, that is when someone is made better off without making anyone else worse off. 
Since many proposed changes in real life would not satisfy this criterion, it has been 
criticised as being ideologically non-neutral:
"The Paretian approach must be viewed as conservative, offering intellectual support to 
those who would maintain the status quo."
(Peacock and Rowley, 1975, p.10)
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Peacock and Rowley develop this theme, arguing that Paretian welfare economics is 
incompatible with liberalism, which is defined as freedom from coercion {op. cit., p. 78).
The criterion also embodies an individualistic welfare ethic, since it is based on the 
assumption that the individual is the "best" judge of his or her welfare. Conventionally, 
the Pareto-efficiency conditions have been derived on a number of assumptions, 
including that of no externalities in production or consumption. One implication is that 
the individual's utility function must be independent of those of others i.e. interdependent 
utility functions are ruled out. This results in a situation of ethical solipsism, where 
individuals have no regard to the welfare of others:
"Each individual's preference ordering over states of the economy is characterised by 
selfishness ... on this assumption [i.e. no externalities in consumption] neither 
malevolence nor benevolence is recognised as having any relevance for individual 
welfare."
(Peacock and Rowley, 1975, p. 11)
Hochman and Rodgers (1969) argue that, even if there are externalities in consumption, a 
Pareto-efficient outcome can still be achieved, although it may require a redistribution of 
income. If the rich are concerned about the welfare of the poor, for example, there may 
be a case for progressive taxation in order to effect an appropriate income transfer from 
rich to poor. Interestingly, this conclusion mirrors that of Pigou and some other welfare 
economists, although their results are based on the cardinalist notion of the diminishing 
marginal utility of income, which requires interpersonal utility comparisons to be made. 
The welfare arguments for and against progressive taxation are discussed in Blum and 
Kalven (1953). The importance of the Hochman and Rodgers result is that it enables 
Paretian welfare economics to escape from the "straightjacket" of ethical solipsism. It can 
be shown, given certain assumptions, that income redistribution from rich to poor will 
leave some better off and no-one worse off. In effect, the concept of vertical equity is 
contained within the Paretian concept of efficiency.
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There are problems with these results, however. First, it can be shown that it is the 
preferences of the rich which determine the Pareto-efficient income transfer, whilst the 
preferences of the poor are ignored. Second, the analysis assumes that the institutional 
framework precludes the possibility of the free-rider problem, where individuals may 
intentionally undervalue their utility from income transfers. The absence of the free-rider 
problem allows the analysis to be generalised from a two-person economy. Musgrave 
(1970) criticises this assumption, arguing that, in practice, the free-rider problem is likely 
to increase as the number of people increases. The existence of a free-rider problem 
implies that a Pareto-efficient income transfer cannot be achieved.
Given these limitations, one might reasonably ask why the Pareto criterion is used at all. 
There are two main reasons. First, it avoids the problems of making interpersonal utility 
comparisons that characterised the "old" welfare economics. Interpersonal utility 
comparisons were strongly criticised by Lord Robbins (1932) as being inconsistent with 
scientific methodology. Second, it can be shown that perfect competition (subject to 
certain assumptions such as no externalities in production or consumption, non­
increasing returns to scale and no indivisibilities) will lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome. 
This is an appealing property since perfect competition can then be used as a benchmark 
for the analysis of market structure, conduct and performance.
It should be noted that perfect competition is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition 
for Pareto-efficiency. Socialist systems (Lange, 1936, Lerner, 1944) or perfectly 
discriminating monopolists (Pigou, 1932) can result in a Pareto-efficient outcome. 
Hurwicz (1960) has constructed a model in which a "greed process" can also lead to a 
Pareto-efficient outcome, even in the presence of indivisibilities and increasing scale 
returns.
The outcome generated by perfect competition will depend on the initial income 
distribution, which in turn depends on the initial distribution of human abilities, human 
capital and financial wealth. This implies that, given a perfectly competitive economy, 
the role of government could be confined to expressing the value judgements of society
38
by an appropriate redistribution of income and wealth to achieve society's preferred 
Pareto-efficient outcome. Pareto efficiency would be promoted by the workings of 
perfectly competitive markets, whilst equity would be determined by the government. 
Governments could alter the distribution of income and wealth by taxes and welfare 
benefits, but should not intervene in the competitive process itself.
This argument depends on the assumption that there is no market failure. If markets fail, 
then there is a case for government intervention. This view is sometimes referred to as the 
public interest theory of regulation. In this view, government intervention to correct for 
market failure is justified as a means of promoting the public interest. Essential to this 
view is the role of the regulators, who are regarded as serving the public interest, rather 
than their own self-interest. The next section identifies the causes of market failure.
3.2 Market Failure and its Causes
Market failure occurs when the market outcome is Pareto-inefficient. This section deals 
with the underlying causes of market failure and its manifestations. Market failure is 
traditionally analysed in terms of the existence of monopoly, externalities and public 
goods (Bator, 1958). It can be argued that these represent instances of market failure, 
rather than its underlying causes. The existence of monopoly, for example, is not in itself 
sufficient to produce a Pareto-inefficient outcome, since the monopolist could practise 
perfect price discrimination. A more fundamental cause of market failure is related to 
problems over property rights (Coase, 1960, Demsetz, 1964).
A market can be viewed as a set of arrangements through which buyers and sellers 
exchange not only goods and services, but also the property rights to use them in certain 
ways. A car can be purchased and driven on the public highway, but not through your 
neighbour's garden. Labour can be hired to undertake certain tasks over a certain time 
period, although there is no (legal) right to specify slavery as one of its uses. Markets 
determine both the ownership and use of resources, where use is specified in the property 
rights associated with the resource. Market failure represents a Pareto-inefficient outcome
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in which it is possible to leave at least one person better off without leaving anyone else 
worse off: the causes of this failure can then be interpreted as the reasons why such a 
change is not implemented. These reasons depend on the nature of the property rights 
involved. They involve three considerations: insufficient control, information costs and 
the indeterminacy of the bargaining process. Their existence may prevent potentially 
advantageous trades or production from taking place.
Insufficient control over property rights might arise because of imperfect excludability or 
imperfect transferability. Imperfect excludability occurs when property rights are vested 
in a group of individuals, rather than in a single individual. Common grazing land is an 
example of such an arrangement, and the problem with it is that there will tend to be 
over-grazing (Demsetz, 1967). Exclusion of individuals who over-graze may be legally 
impossible, or may involve prohibitively high exclusion costs. Even if property rights are 
vested in a single individual, and exclusion costs are low, there may be restrictions on the 
transfer of the property rights. An extreme example would be that of squatters, who might 
have the right to use unoccupied land or property without the consent of the owner, but 
do not have the right to sell it. In the labour market, contracts can incorporate agreements 
on hours and pay, but not on slavery i.e. the individual can sell his labour, but not 
himself. The existence of regulations in areas such as price and trading hours can also 
reduce transferability.
The existence of information costs will tend to reduce the number of advantageous 
exchanges. Decision-making generally requires information on the price, availability and 
quality of goods, as well as the reputation of buyers and sellers. It may also require 
validation of the property rights attached to an asset. In some cases the advantages of 
the exchange may be outweighed by the costs of acquiring information on it.
Finally, it may not be possible to agree on the terms of exchange because of a multiplicity 
of potential exchanges. Even if a potential exchange leaves both parties better off, the 
distribution of the gains between the parties depends on the outcome of the bargaining 
process. This process can be very complex, depending on the number of parties involved,
4 0
the characteristics of those parties, and the uncertainties regarding their reactions to 
proposals and counter-proposals. This process may be further complicated by the 
problem of sequential acceptances when more than two parties are involved (Olsen,
1970). Bargains involving an open-access resource (such as international fisheries) and 
sequential acceptance will produce a free-rider problem, which is an example of the more 
general problem of opportunism in contracting (Williamson, 1979).
Although this section has concentrated on the role of property rights in market failure, 
another possibility is to view the existence of imperfect property rights as creating 
increased transactions costs. It is then the existence of transactions costs that may give 
rise to market failure, rather than property rights per se. Coase (1960) has shown that, if 
transactions costs are zero, the assignment of property rights does not affect the Pareto- 
efficient outcome. If transactions costs are not negligible, then the outcome will be 
affected by the property rights assignment. The view that transactions costs are the 
generic factor in causing market failure is argued by Arrow (1970a), where transactions 
costs are defined as the costs of running the economic system.
The transactions cost approach has subsequently been extended by Williamson (1975), in 
conjunction with the concepts of bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) and opportunism in 
the presence of uncertainty, to explain how hierarchies (firms) develop in response to 
organisational failure (market failure in particular). The firm emerges because of its 
ability to reduce transactions costs associated with the market. A precursor to the 
transactions cost approach is Coase (1937), although Coase used the term "marketing 
costs". More recently, Coase (1991) has adopted the term "transactions costs" and used it 
to explain the relationship between law and the economy.
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3.3 Instances of Market Failure
3.3.1 M onopoly
Suppose that a perfectly competitive industry is transformed into a multi-plant 
monopolist, and that there are no economies of scale resulting from this. If we also 
assume that the industry is subject to constant costs, it is possible to compare the price 
and output combinations of the two types of market structure in Figure 3.1 below:
MC=AC
Output
Figure 3.1: A comparison of perfect competition and monopoly
The perfectly competitive industry will supply Qc units at a price of Pc per unit. If the 
industry is monopolised, the multi-plant monopolist will supply Qm units at a price of 
Pm per unit. The area PmacPc represents the amount of consumer surplus which is
appropriated by the monopolist in the form of supernormal profit, whilst the area abc 
represents the amount of consumer surplus which is lost as a result of the decreased 
output. Area abc can be used to measure the loss of welfare arising from the 
monopolisation of a perfectly competitive industry, subject to the qualifications noted in 
the preceding paragraph. This measure of welfare loss forms the basis for the analysis of 
the welfare effects of bus deregulation in Chapter six.
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The monopoly situation is Pareto-inefficient, since there are potential gains to both 
consumers and producers from changing to perfect competition. Consumers could 
contract with the monopolist to produce output Qc at a price of Pc. If this change occurs,
consumers gain the area PmabPc, whilst the monopolist loses the area PmacPc. By 
striking an appropriate bargain, consumers could return area PmacPc to the monopolist, 
plus some part of area abc. Both parties would be better off
This potentially advantageous exchange might not occur because of the property rights 
problems discussed in Section 3.2. The parties may be unable to agree on the distribution 
of area abc, or how the burden of the lump-sum payment PmacPc to the monopolist
should be shared between the consumers. There may be a free-rider problem with this 
lump-sum payment, since it might not be possible to exclude those consumers who refuse 
to contribute to it from enjoying the benefits of the lower output price. Even if exclusion 
is possible, the costs might be prohibitively high.
The above analysis assumes that there are no economies of scale available to the 
monopolist. If there are, then the monopoly argument has relevance to the pre-1930 
omnibus industry in that the production technology of the industry may give rise to the 
characteristics of a natural monopoly. Because of these economies which accrue to a 
monopoly producer, but not to a number of smaller producers, competition will not be 
sustainable. In this case, public policy could allow the monopoly to continue in order to 
take advantage of lower costs, but regulate it in order to prevent the exploitation of 
monopoly power. There is some evidence that, at least from the USA, this view was 
influential in determining public policy towards the regulation of urban bus transit:
"In the past public policy has treated urban mass transit as if it were a natural monopoly. 
The roots of this policy can be traced to the consolidation of competing transit systems 
within a city in the late 1800s and early 1900s."
(Windle, 1988, p. 122)
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It is unlikely that economies of scale were a significant source of cost economies in the 
early days of the motorised omnibus, since as Windle notes:
"The motor bus was self powered and required no large capital investment. Despite these 
facts, the regulatory framework of monopoly was retained to the present day."
(Windle, 1988, p. 123)
An explanation of this anomaly is the existence of significant economies of density in the 
provision of bus services. It is the density, rather than scale, economies that give bus 
services on individual routes the declining unit cost characteristic of a natural monopoly. 
But Windle argues (1988, p. 135) that this does not justify regulation, since density 
economies arise through the existence of fixed costs that are not sunk. As long as the 
market is contestable, a single operator on a given route will earn only normal profit.
The assumption of contestability weakens the argument for regulation on the grounds of 
natural monopoly, irrespective of whether the monopoly arises from economies of scale 
or density. If a market is perfectly contestable, regulation is unnecessary since the threat 
of entry will force the incumbent to earn normal profit only. In the absence of 
contestability, regulation can be justified as a means of reducing monopoly profits. The 
consideration of issues such as sunk costs and contestability, together with the distinction 
between scale and density (and scope) economies, open up a much wider area of 
discussion which is considered more fully in Chapter four.
Monopoly is also relevant to the post-1930 industry because, under the 1930 Road Traffic 
Act, the Traffic Commissioners were obliged to take into account the traffic needs of 
their area, including the provision of unremunerative services. Operators were given a 
road service licence on condition that they would provide unprofitable as well as 
profitable services through a system of cross-subsidisation. In order to protect profits 
from the effects of competition, the operator was effectively granted a territorial 
monopoly by the Traffic Commissioners. Whether or not the bus industry is a natural
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monopoly, the post-1930 industry became, by virtue of the way in which the Traffic 
Commissioners administered the system, a protected monopoly.
Monopolies, especially protected ones, may also generate another form of welfare loss 
that Liebenstein (1966) referred to as “X-inefficiency”. Lack of the “competitive stick” 
implies that managers do not have to minimise costs, so that the cost curve for the 
monopolist in Figure 3.1 could be higher than the one drawn. In effect, there will be an 
additional welfare loss equal to the area bounded by the vertical axis, the two cost curves 
and the demand curve. This area could be substantially larger than the welfare loss 
triangle abc arising from allocative inefficiency. The provision of substantial external 
subsidies to the regulated local bus service industry, and the associated problem of 
“subsidy leakage” (see Section 5.1.4.1), would be another source of “X-inefficiency”. 
Liebenstein (1980) argues that a “back of the envelope” calculation suggests that the 
production sector in the USA is only 70 per cent as efficient as it could be. Stigler (1976) 
and De Alessi (1983) dispute this calculation, arguing that some of the “X-inefficiencies” 
identified by Liebenstein can be explained as the result of institutional and other 
constraints and transactions costs.
As noted earlier, the analysis of the welfare effects of monopoly presented above is based 
on a comparative static framework. It does not take account of dynamic factors such as 
the reasons for the evolution of the monopoly, or the justification of monopoly profit as a 
necessary reward for entrepreneurial initiative. These issues are also deferred until 
Chapter four.
3.3.2 Externalities
Perfect competition fails to produce a Pareto-efficient outcome if the costs and benefits of 
producers and consumers are not reflected in market prices. This can occur if there are 
external costs (benefits) which the producer (consumer) does not pay for. The concept of 
an externality forms the basis for the welfare analysis of the substitution of bus for car 
travel in Chapter five. It is possible to stipulate a further condition, namely that the
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externality should be incidental, although this condition may create ambiguities in certain 
cases (Mishan, 1971, p. 2). The definition of an externality is not unproblematic, since it 
can be approached from a number of viewpoints (Papendreou, 1994). Following the 
analytical framework developed by Pigou, an externality creates a divergence between 
the private and social costs of production, where social costs consist of both private and 
external costs. The outcome is Pareto-inefficient, as shown in Figure 3.2 below:
Revenue
Costs
Figure 3.2: Divergence between private and social cost
Assuming, for simplicity, that the good is produced in a perfectly competitive market, 
firms set price equal to the marginal private cost (MPC) of production and produce Qj
units at a price of Pj per unit. If firms pay for both the private and external costs of
production, they set price equal to the marginal social cost (MSC) of production, 
producing Q2  units at a price of P2  per unit. In order to do this, Pigou argued that the
government could levy a tax on producers in such a way that their marginal private costs 
become equal to the marginal social costs of production.
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It follows that, if externalities are not taken into account, price is too low in relation to the 
socially optimal price P2  and output (and pollution) is too high. The welfare loss arising
from the price-output combination Pj,Qi can be measured by the area abc, since output 
levels above Q2  have a marginal social cost greater than their marginal benefit. The 
outcome Pi,Qi is Pareto-inefficient, since it is possible to increase price to P2  and
distribute the resulting gain in welfare to producers and consumers in such a way that 
both are better off.
If property rights can be established, Coase (1960) showed that voluntary bargaining 
between the parties concerned might also achieve the Pareto-efficient outcome, 
irrespective of the allocation of property rights. This has the advantage of avoiding 
government intervention in the form of the Pigovian tax solution mentioned earlier in this 
section. One implication of the Coase Theorem is that the role of government should be 
limited to facilitating the establishment of property rights in the activities concerned. The 
inadequacy of existing property rights as a cause of externalities, rather than "market 
failure", had been noted by von Mises (1949a). Following the Austrian School of thought 
in which von Mises played a prominent role, Block (1979, 1980) has argued that the 
problem of road congestion could be remedied by private, rather than public, ownership 
of roads.
But the Pareto-efficient outcome might not arise for reasons similar to those discussed in 
the case of monopoly. The parties may not be able to agree on the distribution of the 
welfare gain, or it may be difficult to exclude consumers who do not pay the higher price 
from enjoying the benefits of reduced pollution. Property rights may not be clearly 
defined e.g. do smokers have a right to smoke in a restaurant, or do non-smokers have a 
right to clean air? Establishing and enforcing such property rights by legal process may 
be very costly.
In terms of the pre-1930 omnibus industry, an important form of externality would be 
that of inadequate safety. This could arise through deficiencies in vehicle maintenance or 
from dangerous driving practices (see Section 2.1). Both factors could cause harm not
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only to the fare paying passengers, but also to parties not involved in the initial 
transaction. A loose handbrake, or wheel-nuts, or poorly trained drivers, for example, 
could all result in accidental injury to other road users or pedestrians. Even where injuries 
are confined to the driver and passengers, there would be external costs arising from the 
delay to other road users. It may be argued that all parties should have insurance that 
covers this type of contingency, and that these "external" costs would be effectively 
internalised by the insurance market. But the insurance market is subject to the problems 
of moral hazard and adverse selection, both of which make it harder and more expensive 
to obtain insurance (Arrow, 1970b, Pauly, 1974).
Given these considerations, the problem of safety can also be analysed as a form of 
market failure occurring through imperfect information. In particular, where suppliers 
have more information than consumers, the "lemon principle" (Akerlof, 1970) may cause 
inferior quality products to be offered to consumers. As an example, if consumers do not 
know the quality of a good until after they have purchased it, then there may be no 
incentive for firms to offer a high-quality product. High-quality products cost more to 
produce, but if consumers cannot detect whether or not the product really is of high 
quality, then the firm has an incentive to provide a low-quality product at a low cost. It 
seems reasonable to assume that most bus passengers would be unaware of anything 
other than the most basic safety defects of the vehicle concerned, and so this argument 
may have some relevance in the short term. Over time, however, one would expect 
passengers to become more aware of these problems.
Bargaining between passengers and bus operators over appropriate safety standards 
would be possible but unlikely, given that only a single bus may be provided for 
passengers with many different views on safety standards, and that passengers may not be 
able to co-ordinate their views effectively. Transactions costs are likely to be lower in 
these circumstances if safety regulation is imposed by the government rather than 
negotiated between passengers and operators. One possible problem with safety 
regulation is that its introduction e.g. compulsory car seatbelts, may actually increase 
accidents because drivers think they can go faster more safely (Peltzman, 1975). Another
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problem is that safety regulation, as opposed to the use of Pigovian taxes or subsidies, 
will force firms to adopt inefficient price and output combinations (see Section 4.1.1).
Mulley (1983) argues that it was concern for safety which was the original cause not only 
of the safety regulations introduced in the 1930 Road Traffic Act, but also the quantity 
licensing regulations. Between 1918 and 1930 the number of omnibus accidents rose 
rapidly (Glaister and Mulley, 1983), against a background of increasing urban road 
congestion (see Section 2.1).
Congestion and pollution are other forms of externalities. Prior to 1930, increasing urban 
road congestion, as a result of rising volumes of passenger and freight transport on a 
slowly expanding road network, was another source of market failure. Although not a 
major factor in the deliberations of the Royal Commission set up in 1928, increasing 
congestion would have provided a further impetus towards regulation.
As far as pollution from vehicle exhaust fumes was concerned, there is no evidence to 
suggest that this formed any part in the deliberations of the Royal Commission. With the 
rise of car ownership and travel from the 1950s, however, the situation regarding 
pollution from buses has changed. Whilst a pre- 1930s motorised omnibus was 
undoubtedly more harmful to the environment in terms of toxic exhaust emissions than, 
say, a hackney, the volume of bus emissions relative to those from car traffic has 
decreased over time. Bus travel may offer environmental (and other unpriced) benefits 
when compared with the effects of transporting the same number of people by car, 
although this conclusion depends on the monetary valuations attached to exhaust 
emissions and other parameters such as load factors. These issues are analysed in detail in 
Chapter seven.
The preceding discussion has focused on external costs. The provision of bus services is 
subject to external benefits, since increasing service frequencies in response to increased 
demand will reduce waiting times for existing bus users (Mohring, 1972). Given the 
existence of these external user benefits, there is a case for subsidising bus services to
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achieve Pareto-efficiency. These benefits appear greatest at low to medium passenger 
densities (Gwilliam, 1987, p. 12; Mackie and Preston, 1996, chapter two).
There is another externality that exists in the production of services, since the provision 
of a service by one operator may raise or lower the value of another operator's service. If 
these externalities cannot be internalised in a free market, then market failure will occur. 
Nash (1982) uses the following example:
"... suppose that the fare from Bradford to Leeds is 30p and from Leeds to London is £5. 
A single operator of two connecting services will pay close attention to the needs of 
through passengers, since their loss represents a loss of £5.30. An independent operator 
from Bradford to Leeds, on the other hand, would regard these passengers as no more 
important than local passengers, since all pay him 30p. Unless the Leeds-London 
operator makes a side payment to the local operator to improve connections, journeys 
involving interchange may be hampered. The situation would be even worse if the Leeds- 
Bradford operator also operated a Bradford-London direct service. He would have a 
strong incentive to prevent connections into and out of the Leeds-London service, for fear 
of passengers diverting from his own long distance service. Common control of services, 
or a regulatory body to co-ordinate timetables, would seem to have considerable 
justification in such cases."
(Nash, 1982, pp. 69-70)
A number of comments can be made about this example. First, it seems unlikely that the 
independent Bradford-Leeds operator would be indifferent to the needs of through 
passengers. The closer he schedules his service to that of the Leeds-London operator, the 
more passengers will travel with him and the greater his revenue. Secondly, it seems 
likely that bargaining over a side payment between the operators would reach a 
satisfactory outcome, since only two parties are involved. Thirdly, if the Bradford-Leeds 
operator runs a direct Bradford-London service, it is difficult to see why anyone would 
travel from Bradford to Leeds in order to travel to London, given that Bradford and Leeds
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are roughly equal distances from London. The problem of passenger diversion would 
simply not occur. If Bradford and Leeds were significantly different distances from 
London, then the two direct services would not be in competition with each other so that 
the problem of passenger diversion again becomes irrelevant. The overall point to be 
made here is that competition does not necessarily lead to a loss of co-ordination between 
services: indeed, competition may actually promote co-ordination as operators seek ways 
of increasing profitability (Ponsonby, 1969).
An example is the provision of through (or integrated) ticketing schemes such as 
travelcards, which may not be provided by competitors even if social benefits exceed 
costs. Although there was a reduction in the number of these schemes in the short to 
medium-term post-deregulation period, there are indications that in some areas operators 
are co-operating to provide this facility:
“There are now signs of improved inter-operator co-operation making it possible to 
relaunch travelcards in other conurbations (such as Manchester).”
(White, 1997, p. 15)
The problem can occur not only within a transport mode, but also between them (Nash, 
1988, pp. 114-5). As in the case of integrated services, however, it is not entirely clear 
why the market will fail to provide such a facility. If social benefits, which consist mainly 
of time savings to existing users and consumer surplus to generated and diverted 
passengers, are significant, then there is no reason why operators should not increase the 
price of travelcards in order to internalise these external benefits. The argument that price 
increases will reduce patronage and benefits and therefore tend to prevent the 
introduction of travelcards (Nash, 1988, p. 115) is only partly true: if benefits exceed 
costs at the higher price, and those benefits can be internalised, then a travelcard will be 
introduced by competing operators.
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Thus a free market may fail to take account of the external benefits associated with 
connecting services and through ticketing. In the case of bus services, however, the 
transactions costs associated with the internalisation of these externalities do not seem 
particularly significant. If transactions costs do prevent internalisation, then a planned 
network may be able to co-ordinate (or integrate) services in such a way that these 
external benefits are realised. Cottham (1986) estimates that the benefits of integrated 
ticketing, information and route planning in West Yorkshire were in the order of £15 
million per annum, or 20 per cent of operating costs. Research in this area is 
comparatively limited, however, and it is not clear to what extent the problem of 
regulatory failure may affect this type of result.
Integration or co-ordination also avoids the problem of wasteful competition, which is 
discussed in the following section. Co-ordination was an important part of the terms of 
reference of the 1928 Royal Commission: implicitly, its inclusion was an acceptance that 
the unregulated nature of the pre-1930 system had failed to achieve the most desirable 
outcome. Although the pre-1930 system may have suffered from a lack of co-ordination, 
it is not necessarily the case that the post-1986 bus service industry need also suffer from 
the same problem. Operating conditions were different, and the pre-1930 industry was at 
a much earlier stage of development. It is interesting, then, that the lack of co-ordination 
via externalities argument was expressed more recently by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (1994):
"Although competition may help to stimulate innovation and efficiency, the choices to be 
made cannot be left entirely to market forces to determine because of the external costs 
unavoidably generated by transport, and because of the benefits lost if networks fragment 
under unrestrained competition."
(Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1994, para. 13.8)
This is not a recommendation for central government planning, however, but a 
recognition that service provision must be devolved to the appropriate level:
52
"The choices are also too complex to be decided by central government acting alone. A 
more fruitful model would be for decisions to be taken, openly and following full 
consultation, as close to the point of use as possible but within a framework, set by 
central government, which enables proper account to be taken of the full complexity of 
transport issues."
(Royal Commission, op. c it., para. 13.8)
The Royal Commission recommends the creation of additional PTAs and PTEs, 
including one for London, to "ensure the provision of a co-ordinated and efficient system 
of public transport throughout their areas" (op. cit., para. 13.24). This recommendation 
contrasts with the philosophy of the 1985 Transport Act, which removed the powers of 
PTEs and local authorities outside PTA areas to provide bus services and co-ordinate 
fares and services.
But the Act does empower them (although not oblige them) to promote the availability of 
public transport (sections 57(2) and 63(6)). This includes the publication of timetables 
and the administration of through ticketing (e.g. travelcard) schemes. In fact, since 
deregulation, all-operator travelcard schemes existed in every former metropolitan county 
in England. Five of these schemes were administered by the Passenger Transport 
Executive, and one in Tyne and Wear by a specially formed company of operators. This 
latter development is particularly significant since it demonstrates that private sector 
operators can internalise the external benefits associated with these schemes, as suggested 
earlier in this section. Multi-operator travelcard schemes also exist in a number of 
English shire counties. These schemes must ensure fair competition between operators: 
an individual operator cannot be unfairly excluded from such a scheme, or allowed to 
participate only on unfair terms. Timetable information is also provided by local 
authorities, although there is a considerable variation in quality (see Section 3.3.4).
To conclude this section, there is a strong case for regulation on safety grounds because it 
is difficult to internalise the externalities associated with safety problems. As far as
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externalities arising from the provision of related services and through ticketing are 
concerned, the evidence for regulation is less compelling.
3.3.3 Wasteful Competition
The concept of "wasteful" competition is a troublesome one. Although it can be given a 
clear interpretation in the market failure framework discussed in this chapter, the concept 
becomes problematic if the dynamics of the competitive process are considered. Indeed, 
competition can never be wasteful for some Austrian School economists. This view is 
typified by Schumpeter (1950), who referred to the competitive process as “a perennial 
gale of creative destruction”. This approach to competition is discussed in Chapter four. 
The emphasis in this chapter is on the static efficiency conditions associated with the 
neoclassical school, and the ways in which market outcomes might violate these 
conditions. Within this static framework there appear to be three contexts in which 
economists, either explicitly or implicitly, use the term "wasteful" competition: these are 
natural monopoly, product differentiation and loss of integration.
3.3.3.1 Natural Monopoly
A natural monopoly exists if economies of scale are so large in relation to market demand 
that only one supplier can profitably serve the market. The existence of two or more 
suppliers would not be sustainable, and would in any event involve higher average costs 
than those of a single supplier. The situation is rather more complex in the case of bus 
services, since economies can also arise from scope and density (see Sections 3.3.1, 4.5.2 
and 4.5.3) although the same conclusion would apply.
But it is possible to think of a situation in which, even for a natural monopoly, 
competition may be a necessary part of the formation of the monopoly and, for that 
reason, cannot be thought of as wasteful. Suppose the production technology is new, as in 
the case of the introduction of the motorised omnibus in the early 1900s, and firms do not
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have accurate information as to how the costs of production vary with output. A number 
of these firms decide to take the risk of entering the market and compete with each other. 
After a time it becomes apparent that significant economies exist, and firms either merge 
or leave the market. Incomplete information (a type of market failure) makes competition 
a part of discovering the costs of production and the eventual establishment of a 
monopoly supplier.
Once the costs of production are known accurately, however, then further competition 
would be difficult to justify if there are significant cost economies. Since the motorised 
omnibus started in London in the early 1900s, and was operating even in rural areas by 
the early 1920s, there would appear to be sufficient time to have ascertained the extent of 
these economies prior to the regulation introduced in the 1930 Road Traffic Act. If, de 
fac to , the industry is subject to significant cost economies, then regulation to avoid 
wasteful competition is justified in terms of the natural monopoly argument, subject to 
the caveat that the market is not contestable.
3.3.3.2 Product Differentiation
In order to clarify the concept of wasteful competition in terms of product differentiation 
for bus services, it is necessary to distinguish between horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation. In the first case, services are differentiated in terms of departure times: 
ceteris paribus, passengers will choose the bus which arrives closest to their preferred 
departure time. In the second, differentiation occurs in terms of journey time: ceteris 
paribus, passengers will choose the fastest service. An example of vertical differentiation 
would be the provision of faster or more frequent minibuses in competition with slow or 
infrequent double decker buses.
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H orizonta l P roduct D ifferentia tion
The seminal article of horizontal product differentiation is that of Hotelling (1929) which 
uses Cournot's (1838) original example of two sellers of mineral water to demonstrate 
that, given spatial differentiation in a competitive duopoly, the sellers will eventually 
cluster together at the centre of the market. Using total transport costs as a proxy measure 
for social disutility, the cluster equilibrium maximises transport costs and thus social 
disutility. A uniform distribution of sellers would minimise transport costs and social 
disutility. Given the assumptions of Hotelling's model, competition is wasteful because 
social welfare is not maximised. Although the model uses spatial differentiation, 
temporal differentiation would produce the same result. The general implication is that 
competition, whether spatial or temporal, leads to a restricted choice for consumers:
"Buyers are confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness ... So general is this 
tendency that it appears in the most diverse fields of competitive activity, even quite apart 
from what is called economic life."
(Hotelling, 1929, p. 54)
The Hotelling result implies that, in the context of temporal differentiation such as bus 
timetabling, two operators will tend to schedule their rival services close together. In 
particular, one operator will always have an incentive to timetable his service before that 
of his rival in order to increase market share, since passengers will usually catch the first 
bus to arrive. This practice is referred to as "headrunning", and was one of a number of 
practices characteristic of the pre-1930 omnibus market. This form of competition will be 
wasteful because a uniform temporal distribution of passengers (analogous to the uniform 
spatial distribution of consumers in the Hotelling model) implies that passengers would 
prefer buses to be uniformly spaced in time rather than arriving together. The analogy 
between spatial and temporal differentiation is not exact, however, since location on 
either side of one's rival can be profitable in spatial competition, but not in temporal: 
arriving before your rival's bus will increase profits, but arriving after it will not.
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The assumptions of the Hotelling model, however, are very restrictive. In particular, the 
assumptions of totally inelastic demand and the non-consideration of a rival's response to 
a relocation decision are very strong. Smithies (1941) shows that clustering is unlikely if 
these two assumptions are relaxed. If the analysis is extended to more than two sellers 
there is a tendency to disperse rather than cluster, since each seller will try to avoid being 
caught as "piggy in the middle" (Eaton and Lipsey, 1975, Rothschild, 1976). If the 
market is modelled as a competitive duopoly serving a circular area rather than a straight 
line, dispersal will occur in order to provide sheltered markets for the sellers 
(Devletoglou, 1965). Given the assumptions of the Hotelling model, d'Aspremont et cil. 
(1979) show that there is a logical inconsistency in the result claimed by Hotelling. 
Additionally, if transport costs are modelled as rising with the square of distance (as 
opposed to the linear assumption in Hotelling's model) then the principle of minimum 
differentiation is replaced by that of maximum differentiation: in order to maximise 
profit, duopolists locate as far apart as possible (d'Aspremont et a l, 1979, Capozza and 
Van Order, 1982). Some studies have sought to justify Hotelling's result in terms of 
consumers' imperfect information and a corresponding desire to economise on search 
costs (Stuart 1979, Wolinsky, 1983). The basic idea is that suppliers locate together (e.g. 
clothes shops in shopping centres) to reduce consumers' search costs for clothes and 
thereby increase the probability that consumers buy clothes rather than some other 
product.
Foster and Golay (1986) use a model of temporal, rather than spatial, differentiation to 
examine the nature of competitive equilibrium in bus timetabling. The model builds on 
that of Novshek (1980), where the concept of modified zero conjectural variations 
(MZCV) is developed. Zero conjectural variations (ZCV) are where "each firm views the 
strategies of all other firms as fixed, regardless of its own strategy": this is the assumption 
used in Hotelling's model. MZCV are where "Each firm views the strategy of other firms 
as fixed so long as its own strategy does not cause its delivered price to match or 
undercut any other firm's price at that other firm's own location ... and that other firms 
will reduce price if they are undercut at their own locations" (Novshek, 1980). The effect 
of the MZCV assumption is to reduce the likelihood of direct competition (because of
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retaliation) and increase the likelihood of deriving a competitive equilibrium that is 
symmetric i.e. where frequencies and fares are uniform. The process of entry into the 
market is modelled on that of Hay (1976), where sequential entry occurs and, because of 
the spatial (or temporal) location of the entrants, further entry is discouraged.
Where demand is reasonably predictable and there is no substantial congestion, Foster 
and Golay conclude that headrunning will not occur. Given a market characterised as the 
circumference of a circle, the competitive equilibrium will be symmetric: fares and 
headways will be the same for all buses. As noted in the preceding paragraph, this 
conclusion is unsurprising given the assumption of MZCV: operators will be much more 
likely to schedule buses at even intervals between their rivals' services, since headrunning 
would invite retaliation. Even if there is unpredictable demand and congestion, a 
timetable which is spaced will still be more profitable than one which is subject to 
clustering, provided that "gaming" behaviour (e.g. cutting in) by bus drivers can be 
prevented.
Fares may be higher under competition than under monopoly because the higher service 
frequency implies that load factors will be lower. But the loss of consumer surplus from 
higher fares will be more than offset by the increase in consumer surplus arising from the 
reduction in rescheduling disutility. Foster and Golay emphasise that "This is in principle 
the main economic benefit of bus deregulation" (1986, p. 204), although no evidence is 
provided to support this statement. It may be the case, for example, that the benefits of 
reduced costs or innovation arising from competition are greater than those from the 
reduction in rescheduling disutility.
Although this competitive equilibrium avoids the wasteful clustering which characterises 
the Hotelling model, Evans (1987) demonstrates that it is not an optimal equilibrium. If 
fares and service frequencies are set by omniscient planners, rather than the free market, 
it is possible to increase net economic benefit. In effect, lack of integration in the setting 
of fares and frequencies causes a loss of social welfare. This view is discussed in the 
following section.
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Vertical P roduct D ifferentiation
Wasteful competition under vertical product differentiation occurs when consumers are 
offered an excessive choice between different qualities of a given product. Excessive 
choice implies a loss of social welfare arising from a provision of different product 
qualities which are not the most preferred by consumers. Shaked and Sutton (1982) 
develop a model of a noncooperative oligopolistic market in which firms decide 
sequentially whether to enter, what quality to produce, and what price to charge for a 
given quality. Consumers have different incomes, with higher income consumers 
choosing higher quality products. The range of consumer incomes determines the number 
of firms in the market: if maximum income is not greater than four times minimum 
income, then there will be at most two firms in the market; if the maximum is not greater 
than eight times the minimum, there will be at most three firms in the market, and so on. 
Shaked and Sutton show that, provided income differences are sufficiently large, more 
than one quality will be produced in the noncooperative equilibrium. In the two-firm 
case, given certain restrictions on relative quality, the first entrant will produce the lowest 
possible quality level and the second entrant the highest. In general, both firms earn 
supernormal profit, and the high-quality firm earns more profit than the low-quality firm.
Empirical results for city-centre bus services in London and Aberdeen respectively 
(Glaister, 1985a, 1986a) support the view that competition (arising from deregulation) 
will increase vertical product differentiation. In particular, small buses would have an 
important role to play: they would tend to offer higher frequencies at higher fares than 
large buses, and carry a higher proportion of passengers with high time values. In high 
flow areas, large buses would offer lower fares but lower frequencies than small buses. 
Thus vertical product differentiation in high flow areas would allow both high and low 
value of time passengers to achieve their desired fare/quality combination. In low flow 
areas, however, the number of low fare large buses might be "very substantially reduced" 
(Glaister, 1985a, p. 79) so that welfare for lower income groups would decrease. In some 
circumstances, only small buses would serve low flow areas.
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Nash (1985) questions some of the model parameter values used in Glaister (1985a): in 
particular, he argues that the assumption of a mean large bus load of 40 is too high so 
that, even with high frequencies, many buses are full and waiting times correspondingly 
long in the regulated system. Lower load factors would reduce the strength of the 
argument in favour of deregulation: "... the model presented in Glaister's paper is so 
unrealistic that its predictions should not be taken seriously" (Nash, 1985, p. 316). In a 
rejoinder Glaister (1985b) argues that the model parameter values are not unrealistic and 
that, in a more detailed study of the Aberdeen area (not then published), conclusions 
similar to those of his 1985 study had been reached.
Galvez (1986) criticises the modelling of the boarding and alighting of passengers in 
Glaister (1985a), arguing that the boarding process significantly over-estimates the 
number of passengers choosing small buses: this implies that, for stops at the end of a 
high flow route and with assumed breakeven fares at loads of 40 and 7 passengers for 
large and small buses respectively, large buses must make losses and small ones must 
make profits. The alighting process over-estimates the average trip length and causes an 
upward bias in the number and frequency of both large and small buses. This bias is even 
greater if buses miss out some stops and, since small buses are more likely to do this, the 
bias significantly increases the relative profitability of small buses. The overall effect of 
these modelling procedures is to over-emphasise the importance of small buses.
Using amended modelling procedures for boarding and alighting, Galvez (1986, p. 104) 
concludes that, in the case of unregulated competition (i.e. competitive costs and zero 
subsidy) between large and small buses on high flow routes, the competitive equilibrium 
contains only 92 large buses. This is completely different from Glaister's (1985a, p.73) 
result of a mixture of large and small buses (40 and 222 respectively). Although small 
buses can displace large buses on low flow routes, there is a reduction in welfare for 
nearly all the users (mainly because of higher fares) rather than the gains predicted in 
Glaister (1985a). In a rejoinder, Glaister (1986a) asserts that his conclusions are similar 
to those of Galvez (1986), namely that high flows tend to favour large buses and vice 
versa. In other words, the differences in the model results are quantitative rather than
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qualitative. A further study (Glaister, 1986b) using detailed data on bus services in 
Aberdeen, and incorporating refinements to the modelling procedures, generally 
confirmed the results in Glaister (1985a). In a study of the potential effects of minibus 
competition against existing London Transport services, Bly and Oldfield (1986) also 
concluded that small buses would generally be able to compete against large buses, 
although the modelling procedures were different to those in Glaister (1985a, 1986b).
It is the view of the Buses White Paper that deregulation would encourage innovation 
(i.e. the introduction of higher quality services) and increase social welfare. The opposing 
view is that the benefits of innovation were overstated, and that many passengers, 
particularly the poorest, would be worse off through lower quality, but higher priced, bus 
services (Gwilliam et al., 1985a, 1985b, Nash 1985). Dodgson and Katsoulacos (1988a, 
1988b) use the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model of quality competition to examine the 
welfare implications of bus deregulation. Welfare comparisons are made between a 
regulated monopolist and a deregulated competitive bus industry, using appropriately 
specified cost and utility functions. The impact of deregulation on welfare depends on the 
weight given by the regulated monopolist to retained profits relative to consumer surplus, 
and the behaviour of total unit costs relative to changes in consumers' willingness to pay 
for higher quality services.
If the regulated monopolist acts as a welfare maximiser i.e. a weight of zero is given to 
profit maximisation, then low income consumers may lose welfare after deregulation, 
since they are likely to face lower quality services at a higher fare. High-income 
consumers will gain welfare if total unit cost increases at a slower rate than their 
willingness to pay. In this case the welfare effect is equivocal since, without weightings 
for low and high-income consumers' welfare changes, it is not possible to know whether 
the welfare gain by high-income consumers outweighs the welfare loss of low-income 
consumers. If total unit cost increases more rapidly than willingness to pay of high- 
income consumers, however, then high-income consumers lose welfare as well. In this 
case, the welfare effect is unequivocal: all consumers suffer a welfare loss as a result of 
deregulation. By analogy, it is possible for low-income consumers to gain from
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deregulation and for high-income consumers to lose, or for all consumers to gain from 
deregulation.
The results of Dodgson and Katsoulacos (1988a, 1988b) are qualitatively similar to those 
of Glaister (1985a, 1986b): a competitive long run equilibrium can exist in which 
different quality services are provided at different prices, but where the welfare effects 
may be equivocal. It should be noted that the specification of the Dodgson and 
Katsoulacos {op. cit.) model is less favourable to deregulation, since it does not allow for 
cost reductions as a result of competition. The empirical evidence shows that there was a 
very rapid growth of minibus services in the period immediately after deregulation 
(Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1987, pp. 71-86), although it was usual for competition to 
take place at similar fare levels (Dodgson and Katsoulacos, 1988b, p. 280).
Unfortunately, the coexistence of small and large buses with similar fare levels is 
incompatible with the models of vertical product differentiation discussed above. A 
possible explanation is that the theoretical models of Shaked and Sutton {op. cit.) and 
Dodgson and Katsoulacos {op. cit.) depend on the existence of Nash market equilibria, 
where firms determine equilibrium prices on the assumption that all other firms' prices 
remain fixed. Given the existence of an oligopolistic market, however, it seems more 
likely that any form of price determination will depend on the reaction of rival firms, so 
that price competition becomes less likely. In other words, the actual outcome of 
deregulation is consistent with the traditional prediction of oligopoly theory that 
competition, if it occurs, will be non-price competition.
Implicitly, the concept of wasteful competition is applied to actual competition. The 
introduction of potential competition adds a minor complication to the wasteful 
competition argument. It seems reasonable to enquire whether potential competition can 
ever be wasteful. In general, the answer would appear to be "no". If the actual 
competition is not wasteful, it is hard to think of reasons why any associated potential 
competition should be wasteful. If actual competition were wasteful, as in the case of the 
natural monopoly argument above, potential competition would force the monopolist to
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behave as if it were in a competitive market. Once again, it is difficult to find a reason 
why this form of competition should be wasteful.
To summarise, there can be no presumption that competition is necessarily wasteful in 
either the natural monopoly or product differentiation cases. In the latter case the 
existence of wasteful competition under horizontal product differentiation depends on a 
number of restrictive assumptions, particularly the assumption that firms do not consider 
the reactions of rivals to any change in product differentiation. If rival reactions are taken 
into account, a competitive equilibrium characterised by clustering is much less likely to 
occur. For vertical product differentiation, competition can result in welfare gains or 
losses, depending on the nature of the cost and utility functions. In the case of natural 
monopoly, competition can be justified as a transitory stage in the discovery of the nature 
of the industry's cost structure: if, and when, significant cost economies are identified, 
further competition implies that average costs of production will be higher than under a 
single supplier. Actual competition will then be wasteful because of the technological 
inefficiency it creates. In the case of a known natural monopoly, therefore, there is a 
much stronger case for the argument that actual competition is wasteful. But regulation of 
the natural monopoly may not be necessary if the industry is contestable.
3.3.3.3 Loss o f  Integration
Section 3.3.2 dealt with problems arising from externalities in the provision of bus 
services. Some of these externalities imply a loss of integration. Although integration (or 
co-ordination) is commonly thought of in terms of connecting timetables and through 
ticketing arrangements, it is possible to take a much broader view:
"...the argument over public transport integration really is the traditional one of central 
planning versus the market. In a system which is not integrated, individual routes, modes 
and services are planned separately by a variety of operators and authorities ... By 
contrast, in an integrated system, a single authority takes an overview of fares and
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services throughout the area, and seeks to plan these to achieve its objectives best subject 
to the constraints it faces."
(Nash, 1988, p. 99)
Evans (1987) compares the equilibrium fares and frequencies under four alternative 
possibilities: competition, breakeven maximum net economic benefit (MNEB), 
monopoly, and unconstrained MNEB. Net economic benefit is measured as social surplus 
i.e. consumer plus producer surplus. In terms of the discussion about integration, and the 
losses arising from not achieving it, the first two possibilities are of interest. It is assumed 
that firms have identical cost functions, buses have unlimited capacity, passengers are 
uniformly distributed with identical demand functions along an infinitely long day, and 
that all agents have full information. Using an exponential demand model in order to 
make tractable the estimation of consumer surplus, the demand function of a 
representative bus in an infinitely long day is given by:
c
where q = number of actual passengers
L = number of potential passengers
v = mean valuation of passenger journeys
c= cost of rescheduling time
fl = fare of representative bus
f2 = fare of next bus
h = headway (or service frequency)
L, v and c are determined exogenously. In perfect competition, fl, f2 and q are 
determined simultaneously in order to derive the competitive equilibrium. The operator 
of the representative bus chooses its departure time and fare in order to maximise profit, 
on the assumption that the departure times and fares of other buses are given. The 
departure time will occur midway between neighbouring buses, and entry will occur until 
profit is reduced to normal (or breakeven). Under an integrated transport system,
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however, a single authority is assumed to set fl and £2 equal to each other, prior  to 
deriving the maximisation conditions, in such a way that MNEB is achieved subject to a 
breakeven constraint. This latter objective is by definition the optimal combination of 
fare and frequency to achieve normal profit. The conclusion is that, for levels of demand 
that are high enough to avoid subsidy, competition results in higher fares and frequencies 
than the breakeven MNEB, so that competition must be sub-optimal by comparison. 
Competition causes excessive service frequencies, so that the declining load factors result 
in excessively high fares. The reduction in net economic benefit from competition 
relative to breakeven MNEB is in the order of 10 to 12 per cent over a wide range of 
parameter values.
There are a number of problems with this comparison. Firstly, and probably less 
critically, there is the analytical problem of how to specify the length of the market in 
temporal competition. In the case of a finite line, it may not be possible for normal profits 
to be made: a finite number of buses have to be fitted into a finite timetable, so that fares 
and frequencies will not be continuously divisible. Supernormal profit may exist with n 
buses, but n+1 buses may cause losses to be made. Given a solution with integer values 
only, supernormal profit may continue to exist, so that a long run competitive equilibrium 
becomes impossible to achieve. Another difficulty is that there must always be a first and 
a last bus, so that a symmetric equilibrium cannot be achieved. These problems are 
overcome if the market is modelled as an infinite line, but then it is difficult to give a 
realistic interpretation of this assumption in the context of bus departure times.
Evans (1987) considers the less unrealistic case of a finite line with the end joined to the 
beginning, thereby circumventing the first and last bus problem. For MNEB, the finite 
line assumption does not affect the results qualitatively when compared to the infinite 
line case. But competition is associated with supernormal profits which, on average, can 
be up to 22 per cent of costs. Offsetting this gain in net economic benefit is a further loss 
of consumer surplus relative to the maximum under the infinite line case: typically, it is 
of the same order of magnitude as the 10 to 12 per cent mentioned above. Additionally, at 
low levels of demand there will be a tendency towards monopoly rather than competition:
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at very low demand levels the finite time cycle results in a natural monopoly, as opposed 
to the competition which would have existed in the infinite line case. As Evans concedes, 
there are significant differences between the finite and infinite line competitive equilibria:
"The analysis and results for competition are qualitatively different... It would take 
another paper and perhaps a different, game-theoretic, approach to deal with it properly."
(Evans, 1987, p. 27)
Secondly, the assumption of identical cost curves rules out the possibility that producer 
costs will be lower under competition. The Buses White Paper, for example, argues that 
costs would fall by up to 30 per cent as a result of competition, and this prediction is 
supported by the fact that costs have fallen significantly since the deregulation of local 
bus services. Beesley and Glaister (1985) argue that the cost reductions, together with the 
innovation associated with competition, will outweigh the welfare losses from sub- 
optimal fares and frequencies.
Thirdly, the existence of full information assumes away one of the fundamental problems 
with an integrative agency, namely the costs of obtaining such information. In 
competition decision-making is decentralised so that operators are more likely to know 
the characteristics of their particular market, and consequently the costs of obtaining 
information will be lower than those associated with a (presumably) centralised 
integrative agency. In the market for taxis, for example, it is argued that the information 
requirements for an integrated approach are so demanding that regulators will not 
improve on the market outcome (Beesley and Glaister, 1983). In addition, there is no 
guarantee that the agency will actually operate in the public interest. There is a 
substantial literature, generally referred to as public choice theory, which suggests that 
regulators may be strongly influenced by factors other than the public interest. In these 
circumstances, it may be the case that the costs of regulatory failure outweigh those 
associated with the market. These theories are discussed in Chapter four. Kay and 
Vickers (1990) conclude that:
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"Although the case for regulation to restrict undesirable or destructive competition cannot 
always be dismissed out of hand, the private interest in it is almost invariably far greater 
than the public interest. There is a very heavy burden of proof on those who seek to 
advance this case, and they should be treated with great suspicion."
(Kay and Vickers, 1990, p. 228)
3.3.3.4 Unstable Competition
Although Hotelling's (1929) model is often used to illustrate the concept of wasteful 
competition, its primary aim is to determine whether the competitive equilibrium of the 
Cournot duopoly is stable or not. In non-spatial economic analysis, a stable market is one 
in which the market price converges to its equilibrium value. If there are multiple price 
equilibria, a particular equilibrium price may be unstable, although the market itself may 
be stable. A market is locally stable if it tends to equilibrium from a starting point close to 
that equilibrium, and globally stable if it tends to equilibrium from wherever it starts. But 
even if a market is globally stable in the sense above, there may be a perception that the 
fluctuations in equilibrium price are excessive because they produce too much 
uncertainty for market participants.
There are a number of additional complications in the case of bus services. Both fares and 
frequencies are decision variables for operators so that, given an objective such as 
breakeven, there will be a number of different fare and frequency combinations which 
satisfy it (Nash, 1978). For global stability, both price and service quality must converge 
to their respective equilibria. In spatial, or analogously, temporal competition, the 
location of suppliers must tend towards an equilibrium. This implies that, for bus 
departure times, the timetable must remain fixed in equilibrium.
It follows that a market can be unstable for a number of reasons. Firstly, shifts in the 
demand or supply curves can be rapid and unpredictable, causing significant variations in 
equilibrium price. An example is the market for foreign exchange where, although market
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clearing is very fast, fluctuations in the equilibrium exchange rate cause uncertainty for 
traders and a case for central bank intervention to smooth, or remove entirely, such 
fluctuations. Thus, even if a market is globally stable, the existence of price fluctuations 
per se may be considered an undesirable aspect of competition. The Bretton Woods 
system of managed exchange rates lasted nearly thirty years, and was an attempt to 
overcome the uncertainties associated with freely floating exchange rates. But whilst 
exchange rates can fluctuate considerably in a floating system, there seem to be few, if 
any, parallels with the price of bus services. Whatever the criticisms of the pre-1930 
omnibus market, price instability does not appear to be one of them. Neither does price 
instability seem to be a feature of the post-1986 deregulated market: indeed, where actual 
competition has occurred, the extent of price changes has been limited (Evans, 1990).
An alternative source of uncertainty in bus operations could arise where high frequency 
services mean that passengers will arrive randomly at bus stops. Failure to catch a 
particular bus would not result in an unacceptably long wait for the next one. An 
operator scheduling her bus at 8.00 hrs might find that every passenger caught the rival 
bus at 8.10 hrs. If arrivals are random then, ceteris paribus, both operators would expect 
to take half the market on average over time. The practical problem from the operators' 
view is that, on any given day, supply may not be matched with demand: a large bus may 
run empty, a small bus may have to turn passengers away. A lack of competition 
manifested in low service frequencies would not produce the same problem of 
uncertainty. If services run every two hours, rather than ten minutes, passengers would be 
most unlikely to arrive randomly because of the possibility of very long waiting times if 
they narrowly miss a bus.
Foster and Golay (1986) examine the competitive stability of situations in which demand 
for bus services is either predictable or unpredictable. A stable equilibrium is defined as 
one where "... the buses operating a route, the timetables and the fares change only if 
there are corresponding changes in the external environment: in demand, relative prices, 
bus technology or bus costs." {op. cit., p. 192). Where demand is predictable, and there is 
no congestion, there is a stable equilibrium. Where demand for bus services is dense and
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unpredictable i.e. passengers arrive at random, there will be a tendency towards a stable 
equilibrium if certain "curious old practices" such as missing stops and hanging back are 
allowed. If a bus cannot carry all the passengers at a particular stop, it will simply miss 
out further stops until some passengers wish to alight and thereby allow new ones to 
board. No-one is worse off from this practice, since there was no space anyway for those 
passengers left behind. The passengers who did board the bus are better off, since they 
will arrive earlier. There seems to have been little objection to this procedure from either 
passengers or the Traffic Commissioners: the practice of missing out bus stops, if the bus 
was full, was common and accepted practice both before and after the 1930 Road Traffic 
Act.
Where demand is less than expected, so that buses are running below their expected load 
factor, there is an incentive for buses to hang back until a peak in the traffic distribution is 
reached, after which hanging back will reduce or stop. It is argued that this will be an 
efficient way of adjusting to changes in the pattern of demand because "Individuals may 
lose through having to wait longer than they planned, but more on balance will wait a 
short time than if the bus service had not adjusted." {op. cit. p. 210). But the fact that 
some individuals do lose from this practice casts doubt on the existence of a stable 
equilibrium, since the timetable is effectively being rewritten by the bus drivers to the 
detriment of some passengers. Foster and Golay acknowledge this difficulty by arguing 
that it may be inefficient to insist on a fixed timetable in these circumstances. But this 
would violate the stability condition above, so that the case of hanging back would 
appear to be neither stable nor an equilibrium.
Evans (1987) concludes that competitive instability is more likely when the market is 
characterised by a finite, rather than an infinite, line. Potential entrants base their entry 
decision on the post-entry equilibrium fares and frequencies. In the case of a finite line 
market, the entry of a new bus causes step, rather than infinitesimal, changes in these 
variables. The difference between pre and post-entry fares and frequencies may thus be 
substantial, so that the attainment of a competitive equilibrium requires greater foresight
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by potential entrants than in the infinite line case. If  this foresight is lacking, there can be 
no guarantee that the market will converge to equilibrium.
Where competition results in greater vertical product differentiation e.g. small and large 
buses on a given route, then the instabilities associated with horizontal differentiation on 
that route will tend to be reduced (Shaked and Sutton, 1983). Given the distinct quality 
characteristics of vertically differentiated products, their substitutability of demand will 
be reduced, thus increasing the likelihood of a stable equilibrium under horizontal 
differentiation (Foster and Golay, 1986).
Another case of market instability is where a time lag on the price variable is assumed to 
exist in the demand or supply functions. Although the functions themselves may be 
stable, the existence of a time lag causes price to fluctuate either towards or away from 
the equilibrium price. A  commonly used example is that of the "cobweb model" which 
can be specified as:
D, = a - b P t
S, = —C + dPt l
D, = S,
(a ,b ,c ,d  > 0)
If  d  > b i.e. the supply curve is steeper than the demand curve, then the price adjustment 
path will not converge to the equilibrium price at the intersection of the demand and 
supply curves. The market will be unstable, and some form of regulation may be 
justified. It is sometimes argued (e.g. Gravelle and Rees, 1981, p. 278) that the 
expectations formation process implicit in the model is naive, since it implies that 
producers expect a high price in the current period to prevail in the next. But this view 
seems to miss the essential justification of this model specification: where the product is 
non-storable, as in many agricultural markets, the entire output must be placed on the 
market in a given time period. It is not so much the naivety of producers, but the nature of 
the product, which justifies the supply lag. The model thus has some applicability to the 
provision of bus services, since empty seats on a given service cannot be stored.
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In order to assess the degree of applicability of the model it would be necessary to have 
information on the slope parameters <7 and b . But research work typically gives estimates 
of own-price demand, rather than supply elasticities and, in any event, elasticity values 
are generally not the same as slope values. There may also be a shortage of suitable data 
over which to estimate the model, since the assumption of market clearing would be valid 
only for the pre-1930 and post-1986 periods. As a very rough procedure, suppose own- 
price (compensated) demand elasticities of -0.35 and -0.87 are assumed for the peak and 
off-peak periods respectively (Glaister and Lewis, 1978), and that these values are used 
as proxies for the slope parameter b . The peak value suggests that peak demand is 
relatively inelastic i.e. the peak demand curve is fairly steep over the relevant price range. 
In this case, it is less likely that the supply curve will have a steeper slope and thus more 
likely that a stable equilibrium exists. The off-peak value of -0.87 is less inelastic, as 
economic theory would suggest, and it is more likely that the supply curve will have a 
slope which is greater than the off-peak demand curve. Overall, the very tentative 
conclusion is that the likelihood of a stable competitive equilibrium is greater in the peak 
than in the off-peak period, although there is no particular reason to suppose that there 
will be an unstable equilibrium in the off-peak.
Overall, the conclusion from the theoretical literature discussed so far is that there are no 
compelling reasons to suggest that competition between bus operators will necessarily be 
subject to instability. But the validity of this conclusion depends critically on the 
assumption of modified zero conjectural variations, which implies that an operator will 
not compete directly with a rival because of retaliation. Chapter two provides evidence to 
show that direct competition did occur in the pre-1930 bus market, and Chapter five also 
provides similar examples for the post-deregulation period. The Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (1994) identified instability of bus services as a problem after 
deregulation. In particular it found little evidence to suggest that changes in services were 
a result of the market responding to changes in demand. Instability was a problem 
because:
71
"... stability matters, since people's decisions about where to live, work and shop, and 
how to travel, depend on confidence that the bus service they enjoy now will still be 
there in six month's time."
(Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1994, para. 150)
But the problem of instability may be overstated. Inspection of the registration figures 
from traffic area offices (see Table 3.1) shows that, after an initial period of instability, 
the pattern o f new and altered registrations becomes relatively stable:
Table 3.1: Number of registrations accepted by traffic area offices
Year New Variations Cancellations
1985/86 14987
85/87 14981 11794 1945
87/88 7412 22860 5653
88/89 6761 17775 5771
89/90 7605 17096 7288
90/91 6030 15734 5503
91/92 6621 15726 5127
Source: House of Commons Transport Committee, First Report, 1995. Vol. Ill, p. 266. 
Note: Figures are for Britain excluding London.
Given that the number of new and changed registrations in May and June 1987 was 
approximately double the corresponding figures for 1984 (Balcombe el al., 1988), it is 
clear that post-deregulation stability was not as great as that of the pre-deregulation 
period. This is hardly surprising, given the scale of the structural changes taking place in 
the industry. Nonetheless, the figures for 1988/89 onwards are not indicative of an 
industry suffering from significant instabilities, although they are not conclusive because 
there is no comparable data for the pre-deregulation period.
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3.3.3.5 Unfair Competition and the Problem of Second Best
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has investigated a number of cases of alleged unfair 
competition in the bus service market. Some cases, such as problems involving operator 
access to bus terminals, are relatively easy to identify and rectify. Others, particularly 
predatory pricing, are much more problematic. Over the five year period following 
deregulation, the OFT received 105 complaints relating to predatory behaviour in the bus 
service market, but investigated only four of them. Two complaints were justified, but the 
OFT dismissed the other two (Elliot, 1991). Predatory pricing is often associated with 
situations in which a large company attacks a smaller company, using its greater financial 
reserves to sustain a loss-making price: the so-called "long purse" hypothesis (Benoit,
1984). A  full discussion of predatory pricing is deferred until Section 4.6.3, where it is 
treated as one of a number of entry deterrence strategies. Although predatory pricing has 
occurred in the bus service industry, it has done so against the background of a general 
reluctance on the part of operators to compete in terms of price: instances o f price "wars" 
in the industry have tended to be spasmodic and isolated.
Unfair competition is also interpreted as a situation in which a competitor does not pay 
the full costs of the service provided. This can arise in two ways: firstly, a government 
may decide to subsidise a domestic industry in order to protect it from international 
competitors or other domestic industries; secondly, historical or fiscal factors may result 
in a situation where a firm or industry avoids certain costs imposed on its competitors. It 
is the second case that is of relevance to bus services.
Section 2.1 has already mentioned the argument expressed by the railway companies in 
the pre-1930 period, namely their view that road users did not pay the full costs o f road 
use so that competition between road and rail was conducted on unfair terms. Another 
example of differential treatment can be found in the revenue to cost ratios between bus 
and car use. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1994, p. 100) estimated 
revenue to public cost ratios for 1994/95 of 1.0:1 for buses (including coaches) and 4.5:1 
for cars (including light goods vehicles (LGVs)). Public costs do not include
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environmental costs, so the Commission also provides an estimate of environmental 
costs. Taking public and environmental costs together, and estimating upper and lower 
bounds for environmental costs, the revenue-to-cost ratios become 1.0 -1.5:1 for cars and 
LGVs. Unfortunately, on the basis of the figures given in the Royal Commission Report, 
it is not possible to derive precisely the corresponding ratio for buses and coaches, 
although it is likely to be slightly below the 1.0 :1  figure above.
These revenue-to-cost ratios do not include congestion costs, which the Royal 
Commission argues are not external to road users as a group and should therefore not be 
included in the costs of road use:
"Although an individual user o f the transport system may be said to impose external costs 
by contributing to congestion ..., the costs of congestion ... can be regarded as both 
imposed and borne by the relevant group of transport users;"
(Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1994, p. 99)
Whilst this view may be true in relation to car users imposing congestion costs on other 
car users, it is difficult to see why it would apply to the situation where car users impose 
congestion costs on bus users, which is generally the case in peak period urban traffic. 
Since the costs of congestion caused by road transport in the U K  in 1991 have been 
estimated as high as £17.5 billion (Peirson et a l., 1994), it is likely that the congestion 
costs imposed by car users on bus users are of a considerable magnitude. Inclusion of 
these congestion costs, as well as environmental costs, would produce a revenue-to-cost 
ratio for cars and LG V s significantly below the 1.0 - 1.5:1 figure above. Although some 
congestion has been caused by buses after deregulation, the Traffic Commissioners are 
empowered under Section 7(4) of the 1985 Transport Act to impose traffic regulation 
conditions. This power has been infrequently used, with only twelve traffic regulation 
conditions imposed between 1986 and 1993.
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Another way in which the relationship between car and bus use is distorted is the large 
subsidy given to company car users. This subsidy was estimated to be between £1000 and 
£2000 million (current prices) per annum in 1984, the latter figure being larger than the 
combined subsidies given to the PTEs, the bus industry and British Rail. These subsidies 
make car users insensitive to changes in the relative cost of bus and car use, and make it 
more difficult to persuade car users to switch to bus use. The problem was particularly 
acute in London, where some 72% of motorists travelling in Central London were 
financially assisted with their journey (House of Commons Transport Committee, Second 
Report, 1985, p. 13).
Thus it can be argued that bus services compete at an unfair disadvantage to car travel, 
since car users do not appear to pay the full cost of their car use. If  this is the case, there 
will be market failure via allocative inefficiency since price will be below marginal social 
cost for car users. This raises the question of how to improve allocative efficiency. In a 
first best world, price would be equal to marginal social cost in every market. The first 
best solution to the above problem would thus be to bring price into line with marginal 
social cost for car users. But suppose this option is not available, perhaps because of 
political constraints or powerful pressure groups. Given the continuing existence of 
allocative inefficiency in a market, the problem of the second best is how to determine 
the allocation of resources in other markets. Intuitively, one might expect that the best 
policy is to achieve as many efficiency conditions as possible in these other markets. 
Surprisingly, second best theory shows that, once one efficiency condition is violated, a 
better outcome is achieved by violating other efficiency conditions (Lipsey and 
Lancaster, 1956).
Suppose that bus and car travel are substitutes, and that the price of car travel is less than 
its marginal cost i.e. Pc < M C c. It can be shown that the second best pricing policy for
bus travel is to set P5  < MC^. Assuming that this condition is not satisfied by the bus
industry creating its own externalities, then the implication is that bus use must be 
subsidised. In general, for two outputs i and j, and for small changes in the price of i, the 
second best pricing policy can be approximated as:
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5Q:
P = MC, - — ^-(P, - M C ,) 
' 1 dQ J J
where dQj /  dQ-t is a measure of the relationship between i and j. If  Pj = MCj, or if 
dQj /5Qj -  0 (i.e. zero cross elasticity between i and j), then Pj = MCj. I f  dQj / d Q t < 0 
(i.e. i and j are substitutes) and Pj > MCj, then Pj > MCj, or if Pj < MCj, then Pj < MCj.
If  5Qj /SQ; > 0 (i.e. i and j are complements) and Pj > MCj, then Pj < MCj, or if Pj < 
MCj then Pj > MCj.
If  markets are independent of each other (dQj / dQ, = 0) then, if Pj does not equal MCj, 
the second best pricing policy is also the first best i.e. set Pi = MCi. In practice, however, 
markets such as bus and car travel are not independent, and some knowledge of the cross­
elasticity would be needed in order to determine the second best price. If  such knowledge 
is available, then it might be possible to devise a second best pricing policy for bus travel, 
bearing in mind that such a change would also have impacts on other markets related to 
bus travel. Pricing policy in these other markets would have to be changed, depending on 
the extent of the cross-elasticities. This "piecemeal" approach to the second best problem 
is developed in detail by Davis and Whinston (1965).
The importance of the relationship between buses and cars was stressed in the evidence 
given to the House of Commons Transport Committee (1993):
"... the effect of deregulation will be determined above all by the conditions of 
competition between buses and cars, not between one bus company and another. If  it 
were the case that the relative price of buses and cars included the congestion and 
environmental costs of their use, and that the road space allocated to buses and cars 
reflected the efficiency of their use of that space, then buses would be faster and cheaper 
than cars. Passenger attitudes, and the outcome of competition, would be radically 
different."
(House of Commons Transport Committee, 1993, Vol. II, p. 14)
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But McKee and West (1981, 1984, 1987) argue that the second best problem is not really 
a problem at all, since a second best situation can be viewed as the outcome of public 
policy action rather than as an obstacle to it. To the extent that the outcome is a product 
of market processes, where these processes include the influence of politicians and other 
public policy makers, it can be regarded as first, rather than second best. As an example, 
if information is non-excludable it might reduce the incentive to innovate. The public 
policy response to this problem might be to introduce patent rights to protect innovators. 
Given that patent rights confer monopoly powers on their holders, it would be 
inappropriate to interpret this monopoly as a distortion requiring a second best solution. 
The monopoly outcome is part of a process in which public policy makers are pursuing 
efficiency improvements. In general, monopoly and other types o f market failure are not 
necessarily distortions in need of offsetting corrections, but should be viewed "as part of 
the Paretian solution and their existence constitutes part of the first best allocation." 
(McKee and West, 1984, p. 250).
This view is representative of the public choice approach to economic problems, which 
takes a different perspective from that of the more traditional market failure approach 
discussed in this chapter. The next chapter examines this approach, together with other 
alternative perspectives to the traditional approach.
3.3 .4  Public G oods
A  pure public good has two characteristics: non-rivalry in consumption and non­
excludability. It is doubtful that a pure public good exists, but impure examples might 
include national defence, lighthouses and radio and TV  broadcast signals. Consumption 
of lighthouse services will be non-rivalrous up to a point, since consumption by one ship 
will not usually reduce the light available to another. It is possible to envisage a situation, 
however, where there are so many ships that visibility might be obscured. Similarly, 
whilst it might be very difficult to exclude some ships from consumption, it might not be 
impossible e.g. the extension of property rights further out to sea. In a sense, public goods 
can be regarded as a particular type of beneficial externality, since provision of a public
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good for one person will make it available to others at no extra cost (Hirschleifer and 
Glazer, 1992, p. 461).
The characteristic of non-excludability gives rise to the "free-rider" problem i.e. it may be 
difficult to exclude consumers who do not pay for the public good from enjoying its 
benefits. I f  this is the case, then consumers may be deterred from paying anything at all, 
reasoning that as long as someone else pays for it then they will still be able to benefit 
from it. I f  all consumers think like this, a perfectly competitive market may not provide 
the good at all, even though its provision would bring net benefits. Allied to the free-rider 
problem is that of undervaluation in the revealing of consumer preferences. Attempts to 
discover whether the public good should be provided may founder on the incentive to 
understate the willingness-to-pay for the good, since some consumers may rely on others 
to pay for the good. Although various mechanisms have been developed to discover the 
"true" preferences (Clarke, 1971,1972, Groves, 1970, 1973, 1976), a serious difficulty 
with such mechanisms is the lack of incentive to give any valuation at all in large number 
situations (Tideman and Tullock, 1977).
Information about bus services can be thought of as having public good characteristics. If  
a timetable is displayed at a bus stop, then the information service it provides will be non- 
rivalrous and non-excludable. Given the free-rider problem above, bus passengers may 
not be willing to pay for the benefits of this type of information and bus operators may 
not provide it or, if it is provided, the information may be incomplete or out-of-date. This 
latter problem of low quality information is likely to be particularly relevant to a 
competitive environment where services and frequencies may be changing rapidly. The 
free-rider problem may also extend to operators themselves, since one operator's 
publicity concerning services may generate benefits for other operators.
In a study of low-income families in Tyne and Wear, availability of information was 
considered to be the service characteristic that had deteriorated most after deregulation 
(Bradshaw and Holmes, 1988). There is also some evidence to suggest that the 
deterioration in information availability was a more general problem:
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"In spite of the increased need for up to date, reliable information about services and 
fares, bus users have reported that there has been a decline, rather than general 
improvement in the already poor levels of information provided at the bus stop and on the 
bus."
(Buswatch, 1988, p. 107)
"Unfortunately, too many existing operators failed abjectly to publicise and promote their 
networks whilst many newcomers to the local bus market have been content to ride on 
the coat-tails of the larger companies ..." 1
(British Bus Industry, 1994, p. 6 )
The problem is further compounded by the decline in comprehensive timetable 
information after deregulation. Prior to deregulation, local authorities provided 
information to bus passengers relating to the services of all operators. In a competitive 
environment, an operator will be reluctant to provide information about rival services 
(unless he can arrange for compensating payments from his rivals). But the lack of 
comprehensive timetables is really a question of the loss of integration through 
competition, as discussed in Section 3.3.2, rather than public goods p e r  se:
"Competition actually has negative effects on both commercial and supported services 
because it promotes a fragmentation rather than integration of information and services. 
This makes it difficult for the passenger to plan his or her journey without reference to 
more than one timetable and faretable and may involve changing buses that do not 
necessarily connect smoothly with each other."
(BusWatch, 1988, p. 109)
1 Quotation from “Deregulation -  has the customer benefited?'’, paper bv C. Moyes. Commercial Director, 
Go-Ahead Group pic., delivered to a seminar on the British Bus Industry: Ten Years of Change (1994).
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In a study of the metropolitan areas, Tyson (1990) concludes that co-ordination in terms 
of timetables, fares and passenger information decreased significantly after deregulation, 
particularly in its immediate aftermath. On the other hand, the study acknowledges that 
co-ordination has subsequently improved, although it estimates that this improvement 
was insufficient to offset the earlier welfare losses.
An interesting question concerns the limited appearance after deregulation of private 
sector companies specialising in the provision of services such as passenger information 
and through ticketing schemes2. If  the types of information discussed above have private 
good characteristics, one would expect to observe the development of such specialist 
companies. The fact that they have not appeared on any large scale tends to reinforce the 
view that bus service information is, in part at least, a public good. Timetable and other 
information has been supplied by local authorities since deregulation, but the quality of 
such information has varied considerably between authorities since they have no statutory 
obligation under the 1985 Transport Act to provide it. As noted in Section 3.3.2, 
however, there are more recent indications that operators are beginning to co-operate to 
relaunch facilities such as travelcards (White, 1997, p. 15).
Samuelson (1955) demonstrated that the Pareto-efficient provision of a public good 
occurs when the "top-level" condition is reformulated as
2  M RS*x y  ~ M R P T x y
i = \
where X  is a public and Y  a private good, and n is the number of consumers. This 
condition will not be satisfied if there is a problem with free-riding or undervaluation of 
consumer preferences, in which case a competitive market will provide less than the 
Pareto-efficient amount. It can then be shown that, by appropriate bargaining, it is 
possible to leave at least one consumer better off without leaving anyone else worse off
2 Comment by W.J. Tyson in a paper delivered to the seminar on the British Bus Industry: Ten Years of 
Change (1994).
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(Buchanan, 1968). As with monopoly and externalities, however, the costs of arranging 
and enforcing contracts may be prohibitively high, so that the market continues to 
provide a Pareto-inefficient amount of the public good.
It is extremely difficult to place a valuation on the extent of Pareto-inefficiency with 
respect to bus passenger information. Benefits and costs are not easily measurable, and 
there is also the problem of possible bias in bus passenger responses to "watch-dog" 
groups such as BusWatch: dissatisfied passengers are more likely to respond than 
satisfied ones. There is the additional problem that, even before deregulation, the 
provision of service information left much to be desired (BusWatch, 1988, p. 13). This 
may have caused bus passengers to form an unrealistically high expectation of the 
benefits which competition would bring in terms of improved information. Although 
information problems might be expected to decrease after the initial changes caused by 
deregulation, more recent studies of passenger attitudes towards the effects of 
deregulation confirm that a lack of information was still a problem (Steer Davies Gleave, 
1991, Transport Advisory Service, 1992). In some areas, over 80% of residents were 
unaware of the basic details of their local bus service and more than 40% were uncertain 
about how to obtain information on bus services. Additionally, whilst county and regional 
councils usually published timetables about public transport services, only 50% of them 
published timetables about all services (Transport Committee First Report, 1995, Vol. Ill, 
p. 297).
3.3.5 Common G oods
A common good is one that is non-excludable but rivalrous in consumption. Access to 
the resource may be uncontrolled, as in the case of some ocean fisheries, or limited to a 
number of individuals who satisfy certain eligibility conditions. An example of the latter 
would be a lake in which only community members have the right to fish. The basic 
problem in both cases is that, in the absence of agreement to restrict fish catches, 
overfishing will occur because there will always be an incentive for an individual 
fisherman to increase his catch (Demsetz, 1967, Cheung, 1970). Essentially, if you don't
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catch the fish, then someone else will. This outcome is Pareto-inefficient, since it is 
possible to show that social welfare could be increased by restrictions on the right to fish. 
There will also be other sources of inefficiency. Investment in the resource may not 
occur, or the resource may be used to extinction, since a single individual cannot prevent 
others from enjoying the benefits of investment or conservation even though they may 
contribute nothing towards them. Although total net benefits from such policies may be 
positive, the free-rider problem means that a competitive market will not provide the 
Pareto-efficient amount of investment or conservation.
Although the distinction between public and common goods is conceptually clear, in 
practice the boundaries are often blurred, as in the case of bus stations. Following access 
difficulties experienced by some operators after the 1980 Transport Act, the 1985 
Transport Act made bus stations subject to the Fair Trading Act 1973 and the Restrictive 
Practices Act 1976. This makes it illegal to refuse access to rival operators, so that bus 
stations now possess a common good element. Given the right of access for all operators, 
together with rivalry in consumption3, they may be subject to the problems above. It 
could be argued that, since operators must pay a fee to the facility owner for their use of 
it, they are in fact private goods i.e. excludable and rivalrous in consumption. But access 
to a private good can be prevented, since ownership of the good includes the right to 
exclude others from consuming it. Access to a bus station cannot be legally prevented, 
since ownership no longer confers the right of exclusion.
But the owner of the bus station has a right to charge a (non-discriminatory) fee for the 
use of its services. If  the fee is flat-rate rather than use-related, the common good 
problems of overuse and underinvestment may occur. If  the fee is use-related, the 
problem of overuse will not be as great. Given non-excludability, however, there will still 
be a free-rider problem so that investment may continue to be sub-optimal. Rather than 
pursue these arguments further, however, it is worth noting that deregulation has not 
generally led to large numbers of new entrants to the industry so that, at an operational
3 Rivalry in consumption seems a reasonable supposition, given the limited space available in built-up areas 
where bus terminals tend to be located.
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level, the common good problem associated with bus stations does not seem to have 
caused significant difficulties overall. A bigger common goods problem, however, may 
be associated with on-street bus stops where buses impose costs on each other and on 
other traffic.
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
Social welfare is maximised when the Pareto efficiency conditions are satisfied. The 
resulting Pareto optimum is one of a number of possible optima, depending on the initial 
distribution of income. Although the Pareto optimum is efficient, society may consider it 
inequitable. Market failure occurs when the Pareto efficiency conditions are not satisfied, 
so that social welfare is not maximised. Given market failure, the public interest approach 
argues that there is a case for regulation to increase social welfare. The fundamental 
cause of market failure is the existence of transactions costs that are sufficiently high to 
prevent the implementation of Pareto improvements. Instances of market failure include 
monopoly, externalities, wasteful competition, unstable competition, unfair competition, 
public goods and common goods. These categories are not always mutually exclusive.
The local bus service market is subject, in varying degrees, to each of these instances of 
market failure. In the case of safety, there is a general consensus that regulation is 
justified. The improved safety measures of the 1985 Transport Act met with little or no 
opposition from either pro or anti-market factions. Evidence shows that bus safety and 
maintenance standards have not fallen since deregulation (Astrop e ta l., 1991, Transport 
Committee First Report, 1995, Vol. Ill, p. 289).
It is much more difficult to evaluate the other market failures. Critics of the 1985 
Transport Act have emphasised the wasteful and unstable competition aspects of 
deregulation, but neither the actual outcome of deregulation, nor the theoretical work on 
wasteful and unstable competition discussed in Section 3.3.3, presents a compelling case 
for significant market failure in these areas. The case becomes less compelling when 
alternative theoretical perspectives to the public interest approach are considered.
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A  problem often cited in relation to deregulation is the loss of co-ordination in areas such 
as timetable information and travelcards. Problems over comprehensive timetable 
information have increased after deregulation, although information provision was not 
particularly good before it. This problem has a relatively easy solution, however, which is 
to place a statutory obligation on local authorities to provide comprehensive information. 
The use of travelcards did reduce in the short to medium term after deregulation, but 
there are signs that operators are beginning to reinstate them. Another form of market 
failure which may be significant is the “Mohring effect”, although this appears to 
diminish at relatively high service frequencies.
Even if one were to conclude that market failure is significant enough to justify 
regulation, however, it is important to remember that the analytical framework of this 
chapter has been used to provide a starting point for the discussion of local bus service 
deregulation. In particular, it has not considered the problem of regulatory failure. The 
fundamental question is not whether market failure exists but whether its costs outweigh 
those associated with regulatory failure. This chapter has focused only on the ways in 
which market failure affects the local bus service industry. The next chapter redresses this 
imbalance by considering the problem of regulatory failure in the industry. It also 
introduces some other refinements to the theoretical apparatus used so far.
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CHAPTER 4
Theoretical Perspectives II: 
regulatory failure and the case for a market solution
Chapter three developed a theoretical framework built on the idea of Pareto efficiency. 
The general conclusion from this analysis is that where markets fail to provide a Pareto- 
efficient outcome, policy makers should intervene to correct for market failure. This 
traditional or "public interest" approach fails to take account of three important factors: 
first, it implicitly assumes that government intervention is unproblematic; second, it is 
based on a static analysis of efficiency; third, market structure is used as an indicator of 
market failure. This chapter discusses alternatives to the public interest approach, and 
examines their relevance to the U K  local bus service market.
Section 4.1 discusses the public choice approach and its emphasis on the process  o f 
decision making, including the concepts of regulatory capture and regulatory failure. 
Section 4.2 discusses the Austrian school approach and its emphasis on the p ro cess  of 
competition, in which monopoly can confer benefits through gains in dynamic efficiency, 
as well as its emphasis on entry and exit barriers to markets. The theme of entry and exit 
barriers is developed in Section 4.3, which deals with the concept of contestability. Entry 
and exit barriers within the context of the local bus service market are identified and 
evaluated in Section 4.4. Innocent entry barriers arising from economies of scale, density, 
scope, network effects and experience are discussed in Section 4.5. Deliberate attempts to 
deter entry, or strategic entry barriers, are dealt with in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 
summarises and concludes.
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4.1 The Public Choice Approach
4.1.1 Introduction
The public choice approach emphasises the process  of economic decision-making, rather 
than its outcome. Buchanan (1986) has criticised the traditional approach of deriving 
efficiency conditions based on the assumption of constrained maximisation by economic 
agents. In particular, he argues that greater attention should be paid to the interactions 
between individuals in the process of exchange. The flavour of his views is contained in 
the following quotation:
"What should economists do? M y 1962 as well as my 1982 response to this question was 
to urge that we excise the maximising paradigm from its dominant place in our tool kit, 
that we quit defining our discipline, our "science", in terms of the scarcity constraint, that 
we change the very definition, indeed the very name of our "science", that we stop 
worrying so much about the allocation of resources and efficiency thereof, and, in place 
of this whole set of ideas, that we commence concentrating on the origins, properties and 
institutions of exchange, broadly considered ... The approach to economics that I have 
long urged and am urging here was called "catallactics", the science of exchanges, by 
some nineteenth century proponents ... This approach to economics, as the subject matter 
for inquiry, draws our attention directly to the process  of exchange, trade and agreement, 
or contract."
(Buchanan, 1986, p.20)
Wiseman (1985) characterises the traditional approach as one concerned with outcome 
efficiency, whilst the public choice approach is concerned with process efficiency. The 
central question is not whether the outcome is efficient, but whether the decision-making 
process is efficient i.e. could some other process have produced a better outcome? The 
role of the government and public sector agencies in this process is crucial. The 
traditional approach assumes that government intervention will reduce market failure
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w i t h o u t  c r e a t i n g  p r o b l e m s  o f  i t s  o w n ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  p u b l i c  c h o i c e  a p p r o a c h  e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  c r e a t e d  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  b y  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  
r e g u l a t o r s  w h o  m a y  h a v e  t h e i r  o w n  i n t e r e s t s  t o  c o n s i d e r .  I n d e e d ,  r e g u l a t o r y  f a i l u r e  m a y  
b e  j u s t  a s  m u c h  a  p r o b l e m  a s  m a r k e t  f a i l u r e .
T h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a p p r o a c h  c a n  b e  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  
d i s c u s s e d  in  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 2 .  G i v e n  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  e x t e r n a l i t y ,  t r a d i t i o n a l  w e l f a r e  
c r i t e r i a  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t a x e s  o r  s u b s i d i e s  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  c o r r e c t  t h i s  f o r m  o f  m a r k e t  
f a i l u r e .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  u s e  o f  t a x a t i o n  w i l l  b e  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  t h a n  r e g u l a t i o n ,  s i n c e  
r e g u l a t i o n  i s  a  b l u n t  i n s t r u m e n t  t h a t  a f f e c t s  a l l  f i r m s  e q u a l l y ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  
i n d i v i d u a l  d e m a n d  a n d  c o s t  c o n d i t i o n s .  T h e  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  f o r c e s  f i r m s  t o  
c h o o s e  i n e f f i c i e n t  p r i c e  a n d  o u t p u t  c o m b i n a t i o n s  ( B u c h a n a n  a n d  T u l l o c k ,  1 9 7 5 ,  S h o n e ,  
1 9 8 1 ,  R o s e n ,  1 9 8 8 ) .
B u t  a s  K a y  ( 1 9 9 0 ,  p . 4 0 )  h a s  n o t e d ,  " w h a t e v e r  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  e c o n o m i c  a n a l y s i s ,  
p o l i c y  m a k e r s  h a v e  t e n d e d  t o  p r e f e r  r e g u l a t i o n  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  f i s c a l  p o l i c y . "  T h e  p u b l i c  
c h o i c e  a p p r o a c h  c a n  p r o v i d e  a  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  in  t e r m s  o f  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p  
i n t e r e s t s .  S u p p o s e  t h a t ,  in  a  p e r f e c t l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n d u s t r y ,  e a c h  f i r m  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  
p r o d u c e  t h e  s a m e  a m o u n t  o f  o u t p u t  s u c h  t h a t  t o t a l  o u t p u t  f a l l s  b e l o w  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  I n  t e r m s  o f  F i g u r e  3 .1  ( r e p r o d u c e d  b e l o w  a s  F i g u r e  4 . 1 ) ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  
q u o t a  r e g u l a t i o n  w i l l  b e  t o  r e s t r i c t  o u t p u t  f r o m  Q c  t o  Q m , r a i s e  p r i c e  f r o m  P c  t o  P m , a n d
e n a b l e  t h e  i n d u s t r y  t o  e a r n  s u p e r n o r m a l  p r o f i t .  E x i s t i n g  f i r m s  w i l l  n o t  b e  in  e q u i l i b r i u m  
in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e y  h a v e  a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  i n c r e a s e  o u t p u t  t o  i n c r e a s e  p r o f i t s ,  a n d  
t h e  r e g u l a t o r  m u s t  m o n i t o r  t h e m  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  o u t p u t  q u o t a s  a r e  n o t  v i o l a t e d .  T h e  
r e g u l a t o r  m u s t  a l s o  e n s u r e  t h a t  n e w  f i r m s  d o  n o t  a t t e m p t  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y  in  
r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s u p e r n o r m a l  p r o f i t .  T h e  e f f e c t  i s  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  a l l o w s  
e x i s t i n g  f i r m s  t o  a c t  l i k e  a  c a r t e l  a n d  e n j o y  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r  ( B u c h a n a n  
a n d  T u l l o c k ,  1 9 7 5 ) .
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Figure 4.1: A comparison of perfect competition and monopoly
T h e r e  m a y  a l s o  b e  a d v a n t a g e s  f o r  t h e  r e g u l a t o r .  G i v e n  t h e  n e e d  t o  m o n i t o r  a n d  e n f o r c e  
t h e  q u o t a  r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h e r e  m a y  b e  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  e x p a n d  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  s p h e r e  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  a n d  p r e s t i g e  b y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  a g e n c y ' s  b u d g e t  a n d  n u m b e r  o f  s t a f f .  E m p i r i c a l  
e v i d e n c e  c o l l e c t e d  b y  E c k e r t  ( 1 9 7 3 )  o n  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t a x i c a b s  s u p p o r t s  t h i s  v i e w .
S u c h  b e h a v i o u r  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  p a r t  o f  a  m o r e  g e n e r a l  d e s i r e  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  b u r e a u c r a t s  t o  
e n h a n c e  t h e i r  o w n  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  N i s k a n e n  ( 1 9 6 8 ,  1 9 7 1 )  h a s  d e v e l o p e d  m o d e l s  in  w h i c h  
t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  b u r e a u c r a c y  c a n  p r o d u c e  a  P a r e t o - i n e f f i c i e n t  o u t c o m e ,  a l t h o u g h  B o h m  
( 1 9 8 7 )  h a s  q u e s t i o n e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  b u r e a u c r a c i e s  a r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n e f f i c i e n t .  C a r e e r  
a d v a n c e m e n t ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  m a y  b e  f a c i l i t a t e d  b y  r e d u c i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s i z e  
o f  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t ' s  f i e f d o m .
4. L 2 Regulatory Capture
S t i g l e r  ( 1 9 7 5 )  a n a l y s e s  t h e  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  " r e g u l a t o r y  c a p t u r e " ,  w h e r e b y  p r o d u c e r  
g r o u p s  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  t o  p r o m o t e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  p r o d u c e r  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
c o n s u m e r .  I n  t h i s  w a y ,  r e g u l a t i o n  m a y  b e  w e l c o m e d  b y  p r o d u c e r s  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  a v o i d i n g  
c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  c r e a t i n g  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r .  M u l l e y  ( 1 9 8 3 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
t h e  l o c a l  b u s  s e r v i c e  i n d u s t r y  a f t e r  1 9 3 0  w a s  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  s t r o n g  i n f l u e n c e
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w h i c h  t h e  l a r g e r  i n c u m b e n t  b u s  o p e r a t o r s  e x e r t e d  in  t h e  e v i d e n c e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  R o y a l  
C o m m i s s i o n  o n  T r a n s p o r t  s e t  u p  in  1 9 2 8 .  T h e  r e s u l t i n g  1 9 3 0  R o a d  T r a f f i c  A c t  m a d e  it  
" e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t "  f o r  n e w  f i r m s  t o  e n t e r  t h e  i n d u s t r y  ( C h e s t e r ,  1 9 3 6 ,  p . 1 8 1 ) .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e  w a y  in  w h i c h  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  i n t e r p r e t e d  " p u b l i c  n e e d "  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a  s y s t e m  o f  l o c a l  m o n o p o l i e s ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e r e  w a s  n o  s t a t u t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  
o n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  d o  s o .
M o r e  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  r e g u l a t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  e c o n o m i c  l a w s  
( S t i g l e r ,  1 9 7 1 ) .  R e g u l a t i o n  m a y  b e  s u p p l i e d  b y  a  g o v e r n m e n t  i f  i t s  m i n i s t e r s  g a i n  u t i l i t y  
p r o p o r t i o n a t e  t o  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  r e s o u r c e s  t h e y  c o n t r o l .  D e m a n d  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n  m a y  c o m e  
f r o m  f i r m s  w h o  p e r c e i v e  b e n e f i t s  in  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  a n  u n r e g u l a t e d  i n d u s t r y  ( P o s n e r ,  
1 9 7 4 ) .  I n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  c o n s u m e r  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  a r e  l a r g e  a n d  d i f f u s e ,  s m a l l  a n d  
t i g h t l y  k n i t  g r o u p s  ( g e n e r a l l y  t h o s e  o f  p r o d u c e r s )  w i l l  t e n d  t o  d o m i n a t e  ( P e l t z m a n ,  1 9 7 6 ) .  
I f  p r o d u c e r s  e x p e n d  r e s o u r c e s  in  t r y i n g  t o  a c h i e v e  r e g u l a t i o n  in  o r d e r  t o  c a p t u r e  
m o n o p o l y  r e n t s  ( T u l l o c k ,  1 9 6 7 ,  P o s n e r ,  1 9 7 5 ) ,  t h e  c o s t s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  w i l l  b e  h i g h e r  t h a n  
t h e  d e a d w e i g h t  l o s s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  m o n o p o l y .  T h e s e  e x t r a  c o s t s  a r e  s o m e t i m e s  t e r m e d  
t h e  " T u l l o c k - P o s n e r "  ( T P )  c o s t s .  T h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  o f  a  m o n o p o l y  c r e a t e d  
b y  r e g u l a t i o n  m a y  b e  m u c h  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  i d e n t i f i e d  in  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a p p r o a c h  
d i s c u s s e d  in  S e c t i o n  3 . 1 .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  " p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t "  m o d e l  a n d  t h e  
" e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  o f  r e g u l a t i o n "  m o d e l  w i t h i n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n t e x t  o f  U K  t r a n s p o r t  a r e  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  R o w l e y  a n d  M u l l e y  ( 1 9 8 3 ) .
4.1.3 Coalitions
T h e  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h e  c a p t u r e  t h e o r y ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  P e l t z m a n ' s  ( 1 9 7 6 )  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  i t ,  i s  
t h a t  it  a s s u m e s  t h e r e  a r e  n o  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  a n d  t h u s  n o  r e a s o n  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n  in  t h e  
p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  ( K e e l e r ,  1 9 8 4 ) .  It a l s o  f a i l s  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  c y c l e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  p o l i c y  in  
t h e  U K  l o c a l  b u s  s e r v i c e  m a r k e t ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  d i s m a n t l i n g  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  s y s t e m  in  
t h e  1 9 8 5  T r a n s p o r t  A c t .  B u t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  t h e o r y  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  t a k e s  n o  a c c o u n t  o f  
t h e  w a y s  in  w h i c h  r e g u l a t o r s  m a y  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  p r o d u c e r s .  A  m o r e  g e n e r a l  m o d e l  
b a s e d  o n  g a m e  t h e o r y  ( S h a r k e y ,  1 9 8 3 )  c a n  i n c o r p o r a t e  b o t h  t h e  c a p t u r e  a n d  p u b l i c
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i n t e r e s t  t h e o r i e s  a s  s p e c i a l  c a s e s .  I n  t h i s  m o d e l ,  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  c o n s u m e r s  f o r m  c o a l i t i o n s  
in  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a n d  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  r e g u l a t i o n .  I f  t h e  " w i n n i n g  
c o a l i t i o n "  c o n s i s t s  o n l y  o f  p r o d u c e r s ,  t h e n  t h e  m o d e l  r e d u c e s  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  c a p t u r e  t h e o r y .  
I f  t h e  w i n n i n g  c o a l i t i o n  c o m p r i s e s  o n l y  c o n s u m e r s ,  it  r e d u c e s  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  
t h e o r y .  M o r e  g e n e r a l l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o a l i t i o n s  w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  b o t h  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  c o n s u m e r s  
in  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s ,  a n d  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  a n d  m o t i v a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  c o a l i t i o n s  m a y  c h a n g e  
o v e r  t i m e .
B u t t o n  ( 1 9 8 9 )  a p p l i e s  t h i s  m o d e l  t o  t h e  U K  b u s  i n d u s t r y ,  w h e r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  g r o u p s  a r e  
i d e n t i f i e d :
1 . o r i g i n a l  b u s  o p e r a t o r s
2 .  r a i l w a y s
3 .  b u s  m a n u f a c t u r e r s
4 .  p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t  u n i o n s
5 .  p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t s  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y
6 .  t r a v e l l i n g  p u b l i c
7 .  t a x / r a t e p a y e r s
8 .  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c .
I n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 2 0 s  o n l y  g r o u p  5  w a s  o p p o s e d  t o  r e g u l a t i o n .  G r o u p s  1 t o  4  p e r c e i v e d  
r e g u l a t i o n  t o  b e  in  t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  w h i l s t  g r o u p s  6  t o  8  f a v o u r e d  r e g u l a t i o n  o n  t h e  
g r o u n d s  o f  n e t w o r k  s t a b i l i t y ,  i n t e r n a l  c r o s s - s u b s i d i s a t i o n  a n d  i m p r o v e d  s a f e t y  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h i s  w i n n i n g  c o a l i t i o n  m a n a g e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  n o t  o n l y  t h e  1 9 3 0  R o a d  T r a f f i c  
A c t  b u t  a l s o  t h e  1 9 6 8  T r a n s p o r t  A c t ,  in  s p i t e  o f  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  
s u b s i d i e s .  B y  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  b e g a n  t o  f r a g m e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  r a p id  
i n c r e a s e  in  t h e s e  s u b s i d i e s  a n d  a  m o r e  g e n e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  t r e n d  t o w a r d s  s u p p l y - s i d e  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  e m p h a s i s e d  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n .  I n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s  t h e  w i n n i n g  c o a l i t i o n  
c h a n g e d  t o  c o m p r i s e  g r o u p s  6  t o  8  w i t h  s o m e  s u p p o r t  f r o m  3 .  T h e  t h e o r y  o f  c o a l i t i o n s  
c a n  t h u s  e n c o m p a s s  n o t  o n l y  t h e  c a p t u r e  a n d  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a p p r o a c h e s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  
r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  p o l i c y .
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4.1.4 The Durability o f the Regulated System
A n  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n  n o t  e x p l o r e d  in  d e t a i l  b y  B u t t o n  ( 1 9 8 9 )  i s  w h y  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  
s y s t e m  s u r v i v e d  f o r  s o  l o n g .  T h e r e  s e e m s  l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  i t s  i n c e p t i o n  w a s  s t r o n g l y  
i n f l u e n c e d  b y  p r o d u c e r  i n t e r e s t s ,  a n d  t h a t  m a n y  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  e n t r y  ( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
s a f e t y )  r e g u l a t i o n  i n t r o d u c e d  in  t h e  1 9 3 0  R o a d  T r a f f i c  A c t  a c c r u e d  m a i n l y  t o  i n c u m b e n t  
o p e r a t o r s  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  2 . 3 ) .  I t  i s  s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  c o n s u m e r s  ( i . e .  g r o u p s  6  t o  8 )  
a c q u i e s c e d  f o r  s o  l o n g  in  a  s y s t e m  o f  q u a n t i t y  l i c e n s i n g  w h i c h  p r o m o t e d ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  d i d  
n o t  d i m i n i s h ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  i n c u m b e n t  p r o d u c e r s .  W h i l s t  t h e  c h a o t i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  
o m n i b u s  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  1 9 2 0 s  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  f r e s h  in  t h e  m i n d s  o f  c o n s u m e r s  i n  t h e  
1 9 3 0 s  a n d  4 0 s ,  a n d  p r o v i d e d  a  s t r o n g  i m p e t u s  t o  m a i n t a i n i n g  q u a n t i t y  l i c e n s i n g ,  t h e r e  
s e e m s  l i t t l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  v i e w  in  t h e  1 9 5 0 s  a n d  6 0 s .  T h e  i n i t i a l  g r o w t h  s p u r t  o f  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  h a d  d i s a p p e a r e d ,  a n d  m a n y  r o u t e s  n o  l o n g e r  h a d  t h e  s a m e  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  
p a s s e n g e r  d e n s i t y  a s  in  t h e  1 9 2 0 s .  N a t u r a l l y ,  c o n s u m e r s  m a y  h a v e  b e e n  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  t h e  
v i e w s  o f  p r o d u c e r s ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  s u c h  v i e w s  w e r e  j u s t i f i e d .  A s  l a t e  a s  t h e  m i d - 1 9 7 0 s ,  a  
d i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  B u s  C o m p a n y  w a s  e x p r e s s i n g  t h e  v i e w  t h a t :
" .. .  w i t h o u t  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  1 9 3 0  R o a d  T r a f f i c  A c t  p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t ,  
m u n i c i p a l ,  " n a t i o n a l i s e d "  a n d  p r i v a t e l y  o w n e d  c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  i n t o  t h e  o r d e r l y  
s y s t e m  a s  w e  k n o w  i t  t o d a y . . . " 1
I t  i s  a l s o  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c r o s s - s u b s i d i s a t i o n  p r o m o t e d  b y  t h e  T r a f f i c  
C o m m i s s i o n e r s  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 3 0  A c t  d id  n o t  e n g e n d e r  e a r l i e r  c r i t i c i s m  b y  c o n s u m e r s .  T h e  
a i m  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  w a s  t o  p r o v i d e  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  s e r v i c e  n e t w o r k  b y  e n a b l i n g  o p e r a t o r s  
t o  u s e  p r o f i t s  f r o m  t h e i r  p r o t e c t e d  m o n o p o l i e s  t o  s u b s i d i s e  l o s s - m a k i n g  s e r v i c e s .  T h e  
s y s t e m  a v o i d s  t h e  u s e  o f  e x t e r n a l  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  s o  t h a t  it  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  
a n  a t t r a c t i v e  o p t i o n  t o  g r o u p  7 .  Y e t  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  o p e n  t o  a  n u m b e r  o f  s t r o n g  o b j e c t i o n s .  
F i r s t ,  in  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  b o t h  d e m a n d  a n d  c o s t  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s ,  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  p r i c e  
f r o m  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o n  p r o f i t a b l e  a n d  u n p r o f i t a b l e  s e r v i c e s  c a u s e s  a l l o c a t i v e  i n e f f i c i e n c y .  
S e c o n d ,  a  p r o t e c t e d  m o n o p o l y  m a y  b e  l i a b l e  t o  p r o d u c t i v e  ( o r  " X " )  i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  a s  w e l l
1 Quoted in footnote 26 o f  Button (1989, p. 501)
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a s  d y n a m i c  i n e f f i c i e n c y  i . e .  a  l a c k  o f  i n n o v a t i o n .  T h i r d ,  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  c r o s s - s u b s i d y  
m a y  b e  i n e q u i t a b l e  i f  i t  r u n s  f r o m  l o w  t o  h i g h - i n c o m e  c o n s u m e r s .  F o u r t h ,  d e c i s i o n s  o n  
c r o s s - s u b s i d y  a r e  n o t  a c c o u n t a b l e  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  v i a  P a r l i a m e n t  o r  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a s  
w o u l d  g e n e r a l l y  b e  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  a n  e x t e r n a l  s u b s i d y .
I t  w a s  n o t  u n t i l  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 0  t h a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  B u s  C o m p a n y  ( N B C )  i n s t r u c t e d  i t s  
s u b s i d i a r i e s  t o  c l o s e  l o s s - m a k i n g  r u r a l  s e r v i c e s ,  u n l e s s  e x t e r n a l  s u b s i d y  w a s  f o r t h c o m i n g .  
T h i s  d e c i s i o n  f o l l o w e d  f r o m  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  1 9 6 8  T r a n s p o r t  A c t ,  w h i c h  r e q u i r e d  t h e  
N B C  t o  a c t  a s  a  c o m m e r c i a l  e n t e r p r i s e .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s ,  c r o s s - s u b s i d y  d i d  n o t  d i s a p p e a r  
f r o m  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  t h e  N B C  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  i t s  c r o s s - s u b s i d i e s  a m o u n t e d  t o  r o u g h l y  
t w i c e  i t s  e x t e r n a l  s u b s i d i e s  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  5 . 1 . 4 . 2 ) .
T h e  c o n t i n u e d  q u i e s c e n c e  o f  c o n s u m e r s  t o  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  q u a n t i t y  l i c e n s i n g  s y s t e m  
w a s  d u e  in  p a r t  t o  r e g u l a t o r y  c a p t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  t h e  e a r l i e r  s t a g e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n ,  b u t  
m o r e  l a t t e r l y  a n d  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  t o  t h e  p e r v a s i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  " K e y n e s i a n  c o n s e n s u s "  
w i t h i n  t h e  U K .  K e y n e s '  w o r k  h a d  a r t i c u l a t e d  t h e  c a s e  f o r  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  t h e  
e c o n o m y ,  a n d  b o t h  L a b o u r  a n d  C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t s  f r o m  t h e  l a t e  1 9 3 0 s  t o  t h e  l a t e  
7 0 s  w e r e  b r o a d l y  in  a g r e e m e n t  o n  t h e  e f f i c a c y  o f  d e m a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  p o l i c i e s  a s  a  
m e a n s  o f  a c h i e v i n g  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t .  N a t u r a l l y ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  d i f f e r e d  o n  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  
d e s i r a b l e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  i t s  f u n d a m e n t a l  r a t i o n a l e .  W h a t e v e r  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  m e a n i n g  o f  K e y n e s '  " G e n e r a l  T h e o r y " ,  t h e  K e y n e s i a n  m e s s a g e  t h a t  p e r m e a t e d  t o  
p o l i c y - m a k e r s  w a s  t h a t  t h e  m a r k e t  m e c h a n i s m  c o u l d  n o t  b e  r e l i e d  u p o n  t o  a c h i e v e  f u l l  
e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  s t a b l e  g r o w t h .
T h e  r e s u l t  w a s  a n  e m p h a s i s  o n  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  t o  a c h i e v e  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  
s t a b l e  g r o w t h  w i t h i n  a  r e g u l a t e d  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h e  u s e  o f  m i c r o e c o n o m i c  ( o r  s u p p l y - s i d e )  
p o l i c y  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  v i a  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  p l a y e d  a  l e s s e r  r o l e  in  
e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y - m a k i n g .  T h e r e  f o l l o w e d  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  a  p r o t e c t e d  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  in  
w h i c h  t r a n s p o r t ,  a n d  t r a n s p o r t  p o l i c y ,  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  a s  p a r t  o f  a  r a n g e  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  
m e a s u r e s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  g r o w t h .  T h e  e t h o s  o f  b u s  a n d  r a i l  t r a n s p o r t  a s  a  
" p u b l i c  s e r v i c e " ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  o n e  t h a t  s h o u l d  b e  o p e r a t e d  u n d e r  c o m p e t i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s ,
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g a i n e d  a  p o w e r f u l  h o l d  o n  c o n s u m e r s  a n d  p r o d u c e r s  a l i k e .  I t  w a s  n o t  u n t i l  t h e  T h a t c h e r  
a n d  R e a g a n  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f  t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  e a r l y  1 9 8 0 s  t h a t  p o l i c y m a k i n g  s h i f t e d  
d e c i s i v e l y  t o w a r d s  t h e  s u p p l y - s i d e  a p p r o a c h .  W i t h  t h i s  s h i f t  c a m e  a  r e n e w e d  e m p h a s i s  o n  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  c o n s u m e r s  r a t h e r  t h a n  p r o d u c e r s .
T h e  p u b l i c  c h o i c e  a p p r o a c h  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a n o t h e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  l o n g  
d u r a t i o n  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  in  t h e  U K  b u s  m a r k e t .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  a p p r o a c h  p r o v i d e s  a  s t r o n g  
a r g u m e n t  a g a i n s t  r e g u l a t i o n ,  i t  a l s o  i m p l i e s  t h a t ,  o n c e  r e g u l a t i o n  i s  in  p l a c e ,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  
a  t e n d e n c y  f o r  i t  t o  p e r s i s t  ( M c C o r m i c k  et a l . , 1 9 8 4 ) .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  o n c e  t h e  " T u l l o c k -  
P o s n e r "  ( T P )  c o s t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  r e n t - s e e k i n g  b e h a v i o u r  a r e  i n c u r r e d ,  t h e y  b e c o m e  
s u n k .  A l t h o u g h  d e r e g u l a t i o n  m a y  r e c o v e r  t h e  " H a r b e r g e r "  ( H )  c o s t s  ( i . e .  a r e a  a b c  in  
F i g u r e  4 . 1 )  ( H a r b e r g e r ,  1 9 5 4 ) ,  t h e  T P  c o s t s  c a n  n e v e r  b e  r e c o v e r e d .  I n  e f f e c t  t h e y  
r e p r e s e n t  w a s t e d  r e s o u r c e s .  I f  t h e  H  c o s t s  a r e  s m a l l ,  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  d e r e g u l a t e  w i l l  b e  
w e a k e r  a n d  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  l o n g e r .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  d e p e n d s  o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  T P  
c o s t s  a r e  a  o n e - o f f  e x p e n d i t u r e  o r  m u s t  b e  i n c u r r e d  o n  a  c o n t i n u i n g  b a s i s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
s i z e  o f  t h e s e  c o n t i n u i n g  c o s t s .  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  a n d  s i z e  o f  t h e s e  c o n t i n u i n g  T P  
c o s t s ,  t h e  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  it  w i l l  b e  f o r  p r o d u c e r s  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  s y s t e m .  G i v e n  
t h e  f a v o u r a b l e  p o l i c y  b a c k g r o u n d  t o  p r o d u c e r  i n t e r e s t s  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  
l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e s e  c o n t i n u i n g  c o s t s  f o r  U K  b u s  o p e r a t o r s ,  i f  i n d e e d  a n y  e x i s t e d ,  w e r e  
r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l .
4.1.5 Regulatory Failure
R e g u l a t o r y  f a i l u r e  o c c u r s  w h e n  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  c r e a t e s  a  l o w e r  l e v e l  o f  s o c i a l  
w e l f a r e  t h a n  t h a t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  m a r k e t  s o l u t i o n .  O n e  e x a m p l e  i s  w h e r e  r e g u l a t o r s  a r e  
" c a p t u r e d "  b y  p r o d u c e r s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  n o  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  t h e  U K  b u s  i n d u s t r y ,  
L u b u l w a  ( 1 9 9 0 )  q u a n t i f i e s  t h e  c o s t s  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  f a i l u r e  in  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  r a i l  a n d  r o a d  
f r e i g h t  i n d u s t r i e s  u s i n g  P o s n e r ' s  ( 1 9 7 5 )  m e a s u r e  o f  w e l f a r e  l o s s .  I f  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  p r i c e  i s  
t h e  s a m e  a s  t h e  m o n o p o l y  p r i c e ,  t h i s  w e l f a r e  l o s s  c a n  b e  m e a s u r e d  a s  t h e  d e a d w e i g h t  l o s s  
( =  a b c  in  F i g u r e  4 . 1 )  plus the m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t  P m a c P c . T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  a s s u m e s  t h a t  t h e
w a s t e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  i n c u r r e d  in  s e e k i n g  m o n o p o l y  r e n t  c a n  b e  m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  a m o u n t  o f
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m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t  e a r n e d .  R e n t  s e e k e r s  a r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  c o m p e t e  f o r  m o n o p l y  r e n t ,  s o  t h a t  
t h e  w i n n e r  w i l l  p a y  a n  a m o u n t  u p  t o  t h e  a r e a  P m a c P c  in  F i g u r e  4 . 1 .  T h e  p r i n c i p l e  w o u l d  
b e  t h e  s a m e  f o r  a n y  r e g u l a t e d  p r i c e  ( =  P r)  b e t w e e n  P c  a n d  P m , w i t h  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  
a p p r o a c h i n g  z e r o  a s  P r a p p r o a c h e s  P c . A s s u m i n g  a  l i n e a r  d e m a n d  c u r v e ,  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  
L  c a n  t h e n  b e  e s t i m a t e d  a s :
L  =  R r ( l - k )  +  0 . 5  R r ( l - k ) e ( l - k )
( T P  c o s t s )  ( H  c o s t s )
w h e r e  R r =  F r . Q r =  r e v e n u e  u n d e r  r e g u l a t i o n  
k  =  F b / F r
F r  =  r a i l  f r e i g h t  r a t e  u n d e r  r e g u l a t i o n
F ^  =  b e n c h m a r k  f r e i g h t  r a t e  i . e .  t h e  r a t e  c h a r g e d  u n d e r  c o m p e t i t i o n  
e  =  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e  o f  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  d e m a n d  e v a l u a t e d  a t  F r ,Q r .
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t e d  r a i l  f r e i g h t  i n d u s t r y ,  L u b u l w a  ( 1 9 9 0 )  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  t h e  s i z e  
o f  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  f r o m  w a s t e f u l  r e n t - s e e k i n g  a c t i v i t i e s )  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  j u s t i f y  d e r e g u l a t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  a r e  p r o b l e m s  in  o b t a i n i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e  
d a t a  i n  s o m e  c a s e s .  T h e  c a s e  o f  r o a d  f r e i g h t  d e r e g u l a t i o n  i s  m o r e  a m b i g u o u s ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  
e s t i m a t e d  w i t h i n  a  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f r a m e w o r k  w h e r e  t h e  g a i n s  a n d  l o s s e s  a r e  
u n e v e n l y  d i s t r i b u t e d .  T h e  m o d e l  a l s o  p r o d u c e s  t h e  c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  r e s u l t  t h a t  
d e r e g u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r e a l  w a g e  ( L u b u l w a ,  op. cil ., p . 9 2 ) .
A  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h i s  T P  a p p r o a c h  i s  t h a t  it  m a y  o v e r s t a t e  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  f r o m  m o n o p o l y  
s i n c e  t h e  t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  c a u s e d  b y  r e n t  s e e k i n g  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  l e s s  t h a n  m o n o p o l y  
p r o f i t .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e n t  s e e k i n g  i s  n o t  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  s o  t h a t  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t  
w i l l  n o t  b e  c o m p l e t e l y  d i s s i p a t e d  b y  r e n t  s e e k i n g  f i r m s  ( F i s h e r ,  1 9 8 5 ) .  U n c e r t a i n t y  m a y  
a l s o  c a u s e  r e n t  s e e k i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e s  t o  b e  l o w e r  t h a n  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t s .  I f  r e n t  s e e k i n g  i s  
c o n d u c t e d  i n  a  m u l t i - t i m e - p e r i o d  m o d e l ,  t h e  f i r m  h a s  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  
p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  a  s t r e a m  o f  u n c e r t a i n  f u t u r e  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t s .  G i v e n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
u n c e r t a i n  p r o f i t s ,  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  t e n d  t o  r e d u c e  i t s  r e n t  s e e k i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  
t h e  u s u a l  a n a l y t i c a l  c a s e  o f  a  s i n g l e  t i m e  p e r i o d  m o d e l  w h e r e  p r o f i t s  a r e  k n o w n  w i t h  
c e r t a i n t y  ( J a d l o w ,  1 9 8 5 ) .  B y  c o n t r a s t ,  W e n d e r s  ( 1 9 8 7 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  T P  a p p r o a c h
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s i g n i f i c a n t l y  u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  m o n o p o l y ,  s i n c e  it  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  r e n t  
d e f e n d i n g  c o s t s .  I f  t h e s e  c o s t s  a r e  i n c l u d e d ,  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  m o n o p o l y  m a y  b e  m o r e  
t h a n  d o u b l e  t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  T P  a p p r o a c h .
T o  c o n c l u d e ,  t h e  p u b l i c  c h o i c e  a p p r o a c h  o f f e r s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e  f r a m e w o r k  t o  
t h a t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a p p r o a c h  d i s c u s s e d  in  C h a p t e r  t h r e e .  I t  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  e x p l a i n  
n o t  o n l y  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  d e r e g u l a t i o n .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  it  
s t r e s s e s  t h a t  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  m o n o p o l y  m a y  b e  m u c h  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  s t a t i c  a l l o c a t i v e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o f  C h a p t e r  t h r e e .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  h a s  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e l e v a n c e  f o r  t h e  p o s t - 1 9 3 0  b u s  i n d u s t r y ,  w h e r e  r e g u l a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  p r o t e c t e d  t e r r i t o r i a l  m o n o p o l i e s .
4.2 The Austrian Approach to Market Efficiency
4.2.1 Introduction
T h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  e m p h a s i s  o n  s t a t i c  e f f i c i e n c y  c o n d i t i o n s  w a s  n o t  s h a r e d  b y  A d a m  S m i t h  
a n d  o t h e r  c l a s s i c a l  w r i t e r s ,  w h o  r e g a r d e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  a s  a  p r o c e s s  o f  r i v a l r y  w h i c h  t o o k  
p l a c e  o v e r  t i m e  ( M c N u l t y ,  1 9 6 7 ) .  T h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  c o m p e t i t i o n  a s  a  d y n a m i c  p r o c e s s  h a s  
b e e n  d e v e l o p e d  in  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  A u s t r i a n  S c h o o l ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  
e n t r e p r e n e u r  in  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s  ( M e n g e r ,  1 8 7 1 ,  H a y e k ,  1 9 4 8 ,  v o n  M i s e s ,  1 9 4 9 b ,  
S c h u m p e t e r ,  1 9 5 0 ,  K i r z n e r  1 9 7 3 ,  1 9 7 9 ) .  S c h u m p e t e r ' s  {op. cit.) c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  
c o m p e t i t i o n  a s  " a  p e r e n n i a l  g a l e  o f  c r e a t i v e  d e s t r u c t i o n "  e m p h a s i s e s  b o t h  t h e  d y n a m i c  
n a t u r e  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r  in  s e e k i n g  o u t  n e w  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
t h a t  c a u s e  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  s o m e  f i r m s  a n d  t h e  e x t i n c t i o n  o f  o t h e r s .
T h e  d i s t i n c t i v e  a p p r o a c h  o f  t h e  A u s t r i a n  S c h o o l  c a n  b e  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  i t s  a n a l y s i s  o f  
m o n o p o l y .  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  i n f l u e n t i a l  p a p e r  b y  H a r b e r g e r  ( 1 9 5 4 ) ,  t h e  s t a n d a r d  v i e w  o f  
m o n o p o l y  w a s  t h a t  it  g e n e r a t e d  a  ( s t a t i c )  w e l f a r e  l o s s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a r e a  a b c  i n  F i g u r e  4 . 1 .  
A l t h o u g h  H a r b e r g e r ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  f r o m  m o n o p o l y  w a s  v e r y  s m a l l ,  a  
s u b s e q u e n t  s t u d y  b y  C o w l i n g  a n d  M u e l l e r  ( 1 9 7 8 )  f o u n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  w e l f a r e  l o s s e s .
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F o l l o w i n g  T u l l o c k  ( 1 9 6 7 )  a n d  P o s n e r  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  C o w l i n g  a n d  M u e l l e r  i n c l u d e d  n o t  o n l y  t h e  
w e l f a r e  l o s s  f r o m  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  w e l f a r e  l o s s  f r o m  t h e  
w a s t e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  i n v o l v e d  in  t r y i n g  t o  a c h i e v e  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r .
T h e  A u s t r i a n  v i e w  w o u l d  r e i n t e r p r e t  t h e  m o n o p o l y  s i t u a t i o n  in  F i g u r e  4 .1  a s  
c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  a n  e n t r e p r e n e u r  w h o  h a s  d i s c o v e r e d  a n d  s o l d  a  n e w  
p r o d u c t  ( L i t t l e c h i l d ,  1 9 8 1 ) .  F o r  t h e  m o m e n t ,  h e  e n j o y s  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r  s i n c e  h e  i s  t h e  
o n l y  s e l l e r  o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t .  B u t  t h i s  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  w e l f a r e  
l o s s ,  s i n c e  " t h e  r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  h i s  a c t i o n  i s  n o  p r o d u c t  a t  a ll"  ( L i t t l e c h i l d ,  op. c it ., 
p . 3 5 8 ) .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  a  n e w  p r o d u c t  g e n e r a t e s  a  w e l f a r e  gain  e q u a l  t o  
t h e  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t  P m a c P c  p l u s  t h e  c o n s u m e r  s u r p l u s  a b c .  I n  s o  f a r  a s  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r
e n a b l e s  t h e  p r o d u c t  t o  b e  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  a t  a n  e a r l i e r  d a t e  t h a n  w o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  h a v e  
b e e n  t h e  c a s e ,  t h e r e  i s  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  w e l f a r e  g a i n .  A s  r i v a l s  e n t e r  t h e  m a r k e t  a n d  c o m p e t e  
a w a y  t h e  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t  b y  e x p a n d i n g  o u t p u t  t o  Q c ,  s o c i e t y  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  t h e  e a r l i e r  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h e  e x t r a  o u t p u t  Q c  -  Q m  b y  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  t h e  c o n s u m e r  s u r p l u s  o n  t h i s
o u t p u t  i . e .  a r e a  a b c .  T h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n e w  p r o d u c t s  i . e .  i n n o v a t i o n ,  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  
d y n a m i c  e f f i c i e n c y .  T h e  i n c r e a s e  in  d y n a m i c  e f f i c i e n c y  f r o m  m o n o p o l y  s h o u l d  b e  
c o n t r a s t e d  w i t h  t h e  s t a t i c  e f f i c i e n c y  l o s s e s  d i s c u s s e d  in  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 1 .
4.2.2 Monopoly, Mergers and Restrictive Practices
T h e  p r o c e s s  a b o v e  a s s u m e s  t h a t  e n t r y  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y  b y  r i v a l  f i r m s  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  
a p p e a r ,  s o  t h a t  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r  i s  t r a n s i t o r y .  G i v e n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  
m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  a c c u r a t e l y  t e r m e d  " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  p r o f i t "  b y  t h e  
A u s t r i a n  S c h o o l ,  s i n c e  it  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  a  n e w  i d e a .  A s  l o n g  
a s  c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e  subsequently, m o n o p o l y  per se s h o u l d  n o t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  
c a u s i n g  a  w e l f a r e  l o s s .  I t  i s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  ( t e m p o r a r y )  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  p r o f i t  t h a t  
p r o v i d e s  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  t o  u n d e r t a k e  i n v e s t m e n t .  T h i s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r  r o l e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  n o t  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  m o n o p o l y ,  b u t  t o  
e n s u r e  f r e e d o m  o f  e n t r y  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  T h e  A u s t r i a n  S c h o o l  w o u l d  t h u s  o p p o s e  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  p r o t e c t e d  m o n o p o l i e s  ( s u c h  a s  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  l o c a l  m o n o p o l i e s  w h i c h  t h e
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T r a f f i c  C o m m i s s i o n e r s  e n c o u r a g e d  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 3 0  R o a d  T r a f f i c  A c t )  a n d  t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  
p a t e n t  r i g h t s  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  I t  w o u l d  a l s o  t e n d  t o  o p p o s e  p o l i c i e s  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  
m e r g e r s :
" I f  a  s i n g l e  f i r m  in  a n  i n d u s t r y  i s  n o t  u n d e s i r a b l e  per se, n o r  i s  a  m e r g e r  t o  c r e a t e  o n e .  
I n d e e d ,  m e r g i n g  i s  o n e  o b v i o u s  w a y  o f  c o m p e t i n g .  T o  p r e v e n t  m e r g e r s  i s  t o  p r o t e c t  o t h e r  
f i r m s  f r o m  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  p e r h a p s  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  s o m e  n e w  t e c h n i q u e  o r  m o d e  
o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a n d  t h e r e b y  t o  i m p e d e  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s . "
( L i t t l e c h i l d ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p. 5 0 )
T h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  d e r e g u l a t e d  b u s  i n d u s t r y ,  w h e r e  a  n u m b e r  
o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  m e r g e r s  b e g a n  t o  o c c u r  s o m e  t h r e e  t o  f o u r  y e a r s  a f t e r  d e r e g u l a t i o n  ( s e e  
S e c t i o n  5 . 4 . 1 ) .  B y  1 9 9 4  t h e  i n d u s t r y  w a s  d o m i n a t e d  b y  s i x  m a j o r  c o m p a n i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
B a d g e r l i n e  a n d  G R T  ( G r a m p i a n  R e g i o n a l  T r a n s p o r t )  B u s .  In  A p r i l  1 9 9 5  t h e s e  t w o  
c o m p a n i e s  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e y  h o p e d  t o  m e r g e  t o  f o r m  F i r s t B u s ,  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  c o m p a n y  
w o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  e x p a n d  b y  a c q u i s i t i o n .  O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  r e a s o n s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  F i r s t B u s  f o r  t h e  m e r g e r  w a s  t h a t  t h e  m e r g e d  c o m p a n i e s  w o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  
b e n e f i t  f r o m  i t s  " c r i t i c a l  m a s s "  in  c e n t r a l i s e d  p u r c h a s i n g  f r o m  i t s  m a j o r  s u p p l i e r s  .
T h i s  t y p e  o f  m e r g e r  i s  a  p r o b l e m  f o r  t h e  M M C  in  t h a t ,  w h i l s t  t h e  m e r g e r  m a y  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a  v a l i d  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  u n i t  p u r c h a s i n g  c o s t s  
a r e  r e d u c e d ,  t h e r e  i s  a  d a n g e r  t h a t  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r  m a y  b e  c r e a t e d  in  p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a s .  
B a d g e r l i n e  h a d  n o  o p e r a t i o n s  in  S c o t l a n d ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  b a s e  o f  G R T .  G R T  h a d  
n o  o p e r a t i o n s  in  s o u t h - w e s t  E n g l a n d ,  W a l e s  o r  e i t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  P e n n i n e s ,  a l l  o f  w h i c h  
h a d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  B a d g e r l i n e  p r e s e n c e .  A l t h o u g h  b o t h  c o m p a n i e s  o w n e d  s u b s i d i a r i e s  in  
t h e  M i d l a n d s ,  i t  w a s  in  t h e  E a s t  A n g l i a  a r e a  w h e r e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m o n o p o l y  p o w e r  w a s  
g r e a t e s t .  B a d g e r l i n e  a n d  G R T  o w n e d  E a s t e r n  N a t i o n a l  a n d  E a s t e r n  C o u n t i e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
b o t h  o f  w h i c h  w e r e  m a j o r  c o m p a n i e s  in  E a s t  A n g l i a .
2 Reported in the T im es Newspaper, 5 .4 .95.. p. 21.
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B u t  m a r k e t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  in  a  g i v e n  a r e a  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  g o o d  i n d i c a t o r  o f  m a r k e t  
p o w e r .  I f  t h e  m a r k e t  i s  c o n t e s t a b l e ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  F i r s t  B u s  t o  e a r n  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t s  i n  
E a s t  A n g l i a  w i l l  b e  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e .  T h e  c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  i s  
t h u s  n o t  t h e  m e r g e r  i t s e l f ,  b u t  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  i t  m i g h t  r e d u c e  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y .  T h e  i s s u e  
o f  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y  i s  d i s c u s s e d  s e p a r a t e l y  in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n .
T h e  A u s t r i a n  a p p r o a c h  t o  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  a l s o  e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  e n t r y  
c o n d i t i o n s  t o  t h e  m a r k e t :
" R e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  p o s e  a  d i l e m m a .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  m a n y  p r a c t i c e s  s u c h  a s  e x c l u s i v e  
d e a l i n g  b e t w e e n  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  a n d  s u p p l i e r s  o r  d i s t r i b u t o r s  a r e  u n d o u b t e d l y  i n t e n d e d  t o  
p r e v e n t  n e w  e n t r y .  T h e y  t h e r e b y  i m p e d e  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  i t  w o u l d  s e e m  t h a t  
c u r r e n t  l a w s  a g a i n s t  t h e m  m i g h t  b e  s t r e n g t h e n e d .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t  m a y  b e  a r g u e d  
t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e i r  v e r y  m e r i t .  P r o t e c t i o n  f r o m  c o m p e t i t i o n  p r o v i d e s  a n  i n d u c e m e n t  t o  m a k e  
l a r g e  a n d  r i s k y  i n v e s t m e n t s  w h i c h  o t h e r w i s e  w o u l d  n o t  b e  m a d e .  O n  b a l a n c e ,  m o s t  
A u s t r i a n s  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  n o t  f a v o u r  l a w s  a g a i n s t  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r a c t i c e s ,  r e l y i n g  f o r  
p r o t e c t i o n  o n c e  a g a i n  o n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  n e w  e n t r y  w o u l d  o v e r c o m e  s u c h  b a r r i e r s ."
( L i t t l e c h i l d ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p .  5 1 )
F o r  t h e  A u s t r i a n  S c h o o l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  " m a r k e t  f a i lu r e "  d o e s  n o t  d e r i v e  f r o m  d e f e c t s  in  t h e  
m a r k e t  m e c h a n i s m  per se, b u t  r a t h e r  f r o m  t h e  d e f e c t s  in  t h e  l e g a l  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
f r a m e w o r k  w i t h i n  w h i c h  t h e  m a r k e t  o p e r a t e s .  T h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  t o  s u p p o s e  t h a t  
g o v e r n m e n t  c a n  i m p r o v e  u p o n  t h e  m a r k e t ,  s i n c e  it  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  
t h e  m a r k e t  p r o v i d e s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  t o  i t s  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  G o v e r n m e n t  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  
s h o u l d  b e  d i r e c t e d  n o t  t o  r e p l a c i n g  t h e  m a r k e t ,  b u t  t o  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  e n t r y  b a r r i e r s  a n d  
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  in  o r d e r  t o  c r e a t e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h i n  w h i c h  
t h e  m a r k e t  w i l l  f u n c t i o n  e f f i c i e n t l y .
T h e  e c o n o m i c  a r g u m e n t s  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e  s h o u l d  b e  s e e n  in  t h e  w i d e r  c o n t e x t  o f  a  d e s i r e  
t o  r e m o v e  g o v e r n m e n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  h u m a n  a c t i v i t y  a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e .  T h e  A u s t r i a n
98
a p p r o a c h  t o  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  p a r t  o f  t h e  m a i n s t r e a m  n e o c l a s s i c a l  a p p r o a c h  
a n d  i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w e l f a r e  e c o n o m i c s ,  h a s  e n j o y e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e v i v a l  in  t h e  U S A  a n d  
U K .  M o s t  n o t a b l y ,  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t  u n d e r  M a r g a r e t  T h a t c h e r  
in  1 9 7 9  m a r k e d  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  a n  e x t e n s i v e  p r o g r a m m e  o f  p r i v a t i s a t i o n  a n d  
d e r e g u l a t i o n .  I n  1 9 8 0  t h e  T r a n s p o r t  A c t  i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  f i r s t  p r i v a t i s a t i o n  o f  a  p u b l i c  
e n t e r p r i s e  ( t h e  N a t i o n a l  F r e i g h t  C o n s o r t i u m )  a n d  t h e  f i r s t  d e r e g u l a t i o n  o f  a  s t a t e  
m o n o p o l y  ( t h e  e x p r e s s  c o a c h  s e c t o r ) .  A s  K a y  a n d  T h o m p s o n  ( 1 9 9 1 )  o b s e r v e ,  " T r a n s p o r t  
c a n  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  c r a d l e  o f  p r i v a t i s a t i o n  -  o r  m o r e  g e n e r a l l y  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  r e f o r m  -  in  
t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m . "  {op. cit ., p. 1 9 ) .
T o  c o n c l u d e ,  t h e  A u s t r i a n  a p p r o a c h  t a k e s  a  D a r w i n i a n  p e r s p e c t i v e  t o w a r d s  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s .  T h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  a  m o n o p o l y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  f i t t e s t  
f i r m ( s ) ,  a s  l o n g  a s  e n t r y  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  p o s s i b l e .  U n l i k e  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a p p r o a c h ,  
w h i c h  r e g a r d s  m o n o p o l y  a s  a n  i n s t a n c e  o f  m a r k e t  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  A u s t r i a n  a p p r o a c h  
e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  a c c r u e  f r o m  m o n o p o l y .  B u t  p r o t e c t e d  m o n o p o l i e s ,  s u c h  a s  
t h o s e  c r e a t e d  in  t h e  U K  b u s  i n d u s t r y  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  1 9 3 0  R o a d  T r a f f i c  A c t ,  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r o c e s s  a n d  c a n n o t  b e  j u s t i f i e d .  T h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  e n t r y  t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  p o s s i b l e .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  e n t r y  ( a n d  e x i t )  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r m s  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  m o r e  r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  in  i n d u s t r i a l  e c o n o m i c s .  T h i s  i s  
t h e  t h e o r y  o f  c o n t e s t a b l e  m a r k e t s ,  w h i c h  i s  d i s c u s s e d  in  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .
4.3 Contestable Markets
4.3.1 Introduction
A  m a r k e t  i s  c o n t e s t a b l e  i f  e n t r y  ( a n d  e x i t )  b a r r i e r s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l o w  t o  e n a b l e  f i r m s  t o  
e n t e r  a n d  e x i t  q u i c k l y :
" T h e  c r u c i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  a  c o n t e s t a b l e  m a r k e t  i s  i t s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  h i t - a n d - r u n  e n t r y ."
(Baumol, 1982, p. 4)
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More precisely:
" W e  d e f i n e  a  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e  m a r k e t  a s  o n e  t h a t  i s  a c c e s s i b l e  t o  p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t s  
a n d  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t w o  p r o p e r t i e s :  F i r s t ,  t h e  e n t r a n t s  c a n ,  w i t h o u t  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  s e r v e  t h e  
s a m e  m a r k e t  d e m a n d s  a n d  u s e  t h e  s a m e  p r o d u c t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  a s  t h o s e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  
i n c u m b e n t  f i r m s  . . .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t s  e v a l u a t e  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  e n t r y  a t  t h e  
i n c u m b e n t  f i r m s '  p r e - e n t r y  p r i c e s ."
( B a u m o l  elal . ,  1 9 8 2 ,  p . 5 )
T h e  m a i n  p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  in  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  m a r k e t  b e h a v i o u r  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h o u l d  s e e k  t o  i n f l u e n c e  e n t r y  a n d  e x i t  
c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h i n  a  m a r k e t  r a t h e r  t h a n  i t s  s t r u c t u r e .  T h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m o n o p o l y  i s  n o t  in  
i t s e l f  a n  i n d i c a t o r  t h a t  m o n o p o l y  p r o f i t s  a r e  b e i n g  e a r n e d :  i f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  p e r f e c t l y  
c o n t e s t a b l e ,  h i t - a n d - r u n  e n t r y  w i l l  f o r c e  p r i c e  a n d  o u t p u t  t o  t h e  l e v e l s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  
p e r f e c t l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n d u s t r y .  I t  i s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  t h e  m a r k e t ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f i r m s  w i t h i n  i t ,  w h i c h  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  f o c u s  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .
4.3.2 Natural Monopoly
C o n t e s t a b i l i t y  t h e o r y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l i e s  m a y  b e  f o r c e d  t o  p r i c e  a t  
c o m p e t i t i v e  l e v e l s  i f  t h e  m a r k e t  i s  c o n t e s t a b l e  ( B a u m o l  et a / . ,  1 9 8 2 ,  p . 2 0 9 ) .  T h i s  i n s i g h t  
w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  in  t h e  d e b a t e  c o n c e r n i n g  a i r l i n e  d e r e g u l a t i o n  in  t h e  U S A  
( W a t e r s o n ,  1 9 8 8 ,  p . 3 6 ) .  A l t h o u g h  a  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  c a n  b e  d e f i n e d  in  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  
w a y ,  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  d u e  t o  B a u m o l  et a i  ( 1 9 7 7 ) :
" B y  a  natural monopoly w e  m e a n  a n  i n d u s t r y  w h o s e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  i s  s u c h  t h a t  n o  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l  f i r m s  c a n  p r o d u c e  a n  i n d u s t r y  o u t p u t  v e c t o r  a s  c h e a p l y  a s  i t  c a n  
b e  p r o v i d e d  b y  a  s i n g l e  s u p p l i e r " .
(Baumol e t a l . ,  1977, p. 350)
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A necessary and sufficient condition for a natural monopoly is (strict) subadditivity i.e.
C ( Y )  <  £c(y,); Y  =  £ y , ,  i =  1, 2 ,  . . .  k ;  k  >  2 .
I f  t h e  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e ,  c o n t r o l s  o n  p r i c e  a r e  s u p e r f l u o u s :  
g o v e r n m e n t  p o l i c y  s h o u l d  a i m  t o w a r d s  p r e s e r v i n g  f r e e  e n t r y  a n d  e x i t .  W e i t z m a n  ( 1 9 8 3 )  
a r g u e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  B a u m o l  et al. r e l a t i n g  t o  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  c o n t a i n s  
a n  i n t e r n a l  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  I n  a  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e  m a r k e t ,  s c a l e  e c o n o m i e s  m u s t  a r i s e  
t h r o u g h  f i x e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  s u n k  c o s t s ,  s i n c e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s u n k  c o s t s  w i l l  c r e a t e  e x i t  
b a r r i e r s  t h a t  v i o l a t e  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  p e r f e c t  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y .  W e i t z m a n  c l a i m s  t h a t  
w i t h o u t  s u n k  c o s t s  t h e r e  c a n n o t  b e  f i x e d  c o s t s ,  a n d  w i t h o u t  f i x e d  c o s t s  t h e r e  c a n n o t  b e  
s c a l e  e c o n o m i e s .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u n k  c o s t s ,  m a r k e t  e n t r y  ( h o w e v e r  b r i e f )  c a n  o c c u r  a t  
m i n i m u m  e f f i c i e n t  s c a l e  a n d ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e  p r o d u c t  i s  s t o r a b l e ,  a l l  p r o d u c t i o n  w i l l  t a k e  
p l a c e  a t  m i n i m u m  e f f i c i e n t  s c a l e .  B u t  i f  t h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e ,  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e  a r e  i n  e f f e c t  
c o n s t a n t .  A n  e x a m p l e  w o u l d  b e  a  c o n s o r t i u m  o f  f i r m s  b u y i n g  a n  o p t i m a l  s i z e  c o m p u t e r  
a n d  t h e n  t i m e  s h a r i n g  i t s  f a c i l i t i e s .  W e i t z m a n ’ s  a r g u m e n t  d e p e n d s  o n  h o w  s u n k  c o s t s  a r e  
d e f i n e d ,  h o w e v e r .  S o m e  d e f i n i t i o n s  d o  n o t  p r e c l u d e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  b o t h  z e r o  s u n k  c o s t s  
a n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  f i x e d  c o s t s .  B a u m o l  et al. ( 1 9 8 2 ,  p p .  2 8 0 - 1 )  d i s c u s s  v a r i o u s  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  
s u n k  c o s t s .
A  f u r t h e r  p r o b l e m  i s  t h a t  n o t  a l l  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l i e s  a r e  s u s t a i n a b l e .  
F a u l h a b e r  ( 1 9 7 5 )  s h o w s ,  in  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  a r i s i n g  f r o m  e c o n o m i e s  o f  
s c o p e  in  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  w a t e r ,  t h a t  f r e e d o m  o f  e n t r y  c a n  d e s t r o y  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  t h e  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  i s  n o n -  
s u s t a i n a b l e .  A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  n o n - s u s t a i n a b l e  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  i s  w h e r e  a  n a t u r a l  
m o n o p o l y  in  t h e  p u b l i c  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t r a n s p o r t  i s  u n d e r m i n e d  b y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e n t r y  o f  
p r i v a t e  t r a n s p o r t  ( v o n  W e i z s a c k e r ,  1 9 8 4 ) .
T h e  m o d e l  o f  c o n t e s t a b l e  m a r k e t s  a s s u m e s  t h a t  e n t r a n t s  a r e  p r i c e  t a k e r s ,  in  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  
t h e i r  e n t r y  d e c i s i o n  i s  m a d e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  g i v e n  m a r k e t  p r i c e .  T h e  e n t r a n t  i s  n o t  
p e r m i t t e d  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  i n c u m b e n t s '  r e a c t i o n s ,  a n d  m u s t  a s s e s s  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f
e n t r y  a t  t h e  p r e - e n t r y  m a r k e t  p r i c e .  T h i s  r u l e s  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a l l o w a n c e  f o r  
s t r a t e g i c  e n t r y  d e t e r r e n c e  ( e . g .  p r e d a t o r y  p r i c i n g )  b y  t h e  i n c u m b e n t .  T h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  
p r i c e - t a k i n g  b e h a v i o u r  i s  p l a u s i b l e  w h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  s e l l e r s ,  b u t  l e s s  s o  
f o r  t h e  c a s e  o f  s m a l l  n u m b e r s  ( F r i e d m a n ,  1 9 8 2 ,  p p .  5 2 7 - 8 ) .  In  i n d u s t r i e s  s u b j e c t  t o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  s c a l e  e c o n o m i e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  c a s e  a b o v e ,  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y  
t h e o r y  m a y  h a v e  l i m i t e d  r e l e v a n c e .  B a u m o l  et al. a r g u e  t h a t  t h e i r  m o d e l  w i l l  s t i l l  b e  
r e l e v a n t  in  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  e n t r a n t s  a r e  n o t  p r i c e  t a k e r s ,  i f  t h e y  c a n  n e g o t i a t e  p r e - e n t r y  
l o n g  t e r m  c o n t r a c t s  w h i c h  p r o t e c t  t h e m  f r o m  p r i c e  r e t a l i a t i o n  b y  i n c u m b e n t s .  A s  
S h e p h e r d  ( 1 9 8 4 )  h a s  n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  p r e - e n t r y  c o n t r a c t i n g  w i l l  a l s o  b e  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  i n c u m b e n t s ,  w h o  c o u l d  d e f e a t  t h e  e n t r a n t s '  s t r a t e g y  b y  p r o m i s i n g  t o  
" u n d e r c u t  a n y  l e g i t i m a t e  p r i c e "  ( p .  5 7 6 ,  f n .  1 2 ) .
4.3.3 Imperfect Contestability: the role o f actual and potential competition
I f  a  m a r k e t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e ,  t h e n  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  h a v e  n o  e f f e c t  o n  m a r k e t  
p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e  t h r e a t  o f  e n t r y  w i l l  f o r c e  e v e n  a  ( s u s t a i n a b l e )  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  t o  s e t  
p r i c e  a n d  o u t p u t  a t  p e r f e c t l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  l e v e l s .  I f  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  d o e s  i n f l u e n c e  
p e r f o r m a n c e ,  t h e n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  c a n n o t  b e  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e .  A  n u m b e r  o f  e m p i r i c a l  
s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  d e r e g u l a t e d  U S A  a i r l i n e  i n d u s t r y  h a v e  f o u n d  a  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t o r s  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  ( G r a h a m ,  K a p l a n  a n d  S i b l e y ,  1 9 8 3 ,  C a l l  
a n d  K e e l e r ,  1 9 8 5 ,  M o o r e ,  1 9 8 6 ) .  U s i n g  s i m i l a r  m e t h o d o l o g i e s ,  B a i l e y  a n d  P a n z a r  ( 1 9 8 1 )  
c o n c l u d e  t h a t  in  s o m e  c a s e s  t h e r e  i s  n o  c o r r e l a t i o n ,  a n d  a t t r i b u t e  t h i s  t o  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t i o n .
B u t  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y  i s  n o t  a n  a l l - o r - n o t h i n g  c o n c e p t .  It i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  b o t h  p o t e n t i a l  a n d  
a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  s o m e  m e a s u r e  
o f  p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t i o n .  W i t h o u t  a  m e a s u r e  o f  p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  s t u d i e s  w h i c h  f i n d  
a  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e  m a y  s u f f e r  f r o m  a  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  e r r o r :  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o n  t h e  m a r k e t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  v a r i a b l e  w i l l  b e  b i a s e d  
u p w a r d s  i f  i t  c a p t u r e s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  p o t e n t i a l  a s  w e l l  a s  a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t i o n .  M o r r i s o n  
a n d  W i n s t o n  ( 1 9 8 7 )  s p e c i f y  a  m o d e l  o f  t h e  d e r e g u l a t e d  U S A  a i r l i n e  m a r k e t  in  w h i c h  b o t h
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a c t u a l  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  c h a n g e s  in  m a r k e t  p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  s o c i a l  
w e l f a r e .  T h e  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  e a c h  a d d i t i o n a l  a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t o r  r e d u c e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  o p t i m a l  a n d  a c t u a l  w e l f a r e  p e r  p a s s e n g e r  b y  $ 0 . 0 0 4 4  p e r  m i l e ,  w h i l s t  e a c h  
a d d i t i o n a l  p o t e n t i a l  c o m p e t i t o r  r e d u c e s  i t  b y  $ 0 . 0 0 1 5  p e r  m i l e .  T h r e e  p o t e n t i a l  
c o m p e t i t o r s  t h u s  h a v e  r o u g h l y  t h e  s a m e  i m p a c t  o n  w e l f a r e  a s  o n e  a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t o r .  
T h e s e  r e s u l t s  s u p p o r t  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  d e r e g u l a t e d  U S A  a i r l i n e  m a r k e t  i s  i m p e r f e c t l y  
c o n t e s t a b l e .
T h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  a l s o  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  s h i f t  in  o p i n i o n  a m o n g  p r o p o n e n t s  o f  
c o n t e s t a b i l i t y ,  w h o  o r i g i n a l l y  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  d e r e g u l a t e d  U S A  a i r l i n e  m a r k e t  w a s  a  c l o s e  
a p p r o x i m a t i o n  t o  a  p e r f e c t l y  c o n t e s t a b l e  m a r k e t .  I n  1 9 8 1 ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  B a i l e y  a n d  P a n z a r  
o b s e r v e d  t h a t :
" .. .  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n ,  a priori, t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  s h o u l d  l e a d  t o  
s u b s t a n t i a l  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y  in  t h e  a i r l i n e  i n d u s t r y  b e c a u s e  a i r l i n e  c a p i t a l  c o s t s ,  w h i l e  
s u b s t a n t i a l ,  a r e  n o t  sunk costs . . .  t h e  m a j o r  p o r t i o n  [ i . e .  a i r c r a f t ]  c a n  b e  " r e c o v e r e d "  f r o m  
a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  m a r k e t  a t  l i t t l e  o r  n o  c o s t .  . . .  T h u s ,  d e s p i t e  s u b s t a n t i a l  n a t u r a l  m o n o p o l y  
a t t r i b u t e s ,  m o s t  a i r l i n e  m a r k e t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  r e a d i l y  contested. T h i s  f a c t  e n s u r e s  t h a t ,  
even i f  a c t u a l l y  o p e r a t e d  b y  a  s i n g l e  f i r m ,  t h e i r  p e r f o r m a n c e  s h o u l d  a p p r o a c h  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  n o r m  .. ."
( B a i l e y  a n d  P a n z a r ,  1 9 8 1 ,  p p .  1 2 8 - 9 )
B y  1 9 8 6  t h i s  v i e w  h a d  b e e n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  m o d i f i e d :
" In  t h e  i n i t i a l  e n t h u s i a s m  w i t h  w h i c h  w e  d e s c r i b e d  c o n t e s t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  w e  . . .  m o r e  
t h a n  o n c e  c i t e d  t h e  a i r l i n e  i n d u s t r y  a s  a  c a s e  in  p o i n t . . .  R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  h a s  l e d  u s  t o  
a d o p t  a  m o r e  q u a l i f i e d  o p i n i o n  o n  t h i s  s c o r e  . . .  t r u c k s  a n d  b u s e s  d o  n o t  f a c e  t h e  h e a v y  
s u n k  c o s t s  i n v o l v e d  in  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a i r p o r t s  o r  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  g a t e s  a n d  l a n d i n g  
s l o t s  a t  b u s y  a i r p o r t s  . . ."
(Baumol and W illig, 1986, p. 24)
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Nonetheless, it is clear from this quotation that the bus industry is regarded as highly 
contestable. The next section discusses the evidence for the assumption of contestability 
in the bus industry by examining the nature of its entry and exit barriers.
4.4 E ntry and Exit Barriers in the Bus Service Industry
The dominant theme of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 is the importance of entry and exit barriers in 
determining market behaviour. For the Austrian school, monopoly profit is a reward for 
exploiting new opportunities, but freedom of entry will erode these profits. The 
contestable markets theory emphasises both entry and exit barriers as determinants of 
market behaviour. This section examines the nature of the entry and exit barriers that 
exist in the bus service industry generally, and the UK bus service industry in particular. 
Section 4.4.1 discusses the general nature of entry barriers, whilst Section 4.4.2 deals 
with a number of refinements to the concept of entry barriers. Section 4.4.3 deals with 
sunk costs and the asymmetry they cause between incumbent and entrant.
4.4.1 Entry Barriers: the Bain approach
Following Bain (1956, p. 10), an entry barrier exists when the incumbent has a cost 
advantage over entrants. This cost advantage can be measured by the difference between 
the competitive price and the entry-inducing price. The greater the cost advantage, the 
higher the incumbent can raise price above the competitive price without inducing entry. 
Entry barriers are determined by economies of scale, product differentiation and absolute 
cost advantages.
Economies of scale form an entry barrier if the minimum efficient scale of production is 
large relative to market demand. In the limiting case, the industry may consist of one 
seller only i.e. a natural monopoly. A potential entrant with access to the same production 
technology as the incumbent firm(s) has two unpleasant choices. First, entry could take 
place at a level of output sufficiently high to produce at minimum efficient scale, but this 
could depress the market price and may leave the entrant unable to make a profit. Large
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scale entry may also incur retaliation from the incumbent. Second, entry on a small scale 
would leave the entrant operating at a cost disadvantage to the incumbent.
Product differentiation, via advertising and the promotion of brand loyalty for example, 
may act as an entry barrier because the unit costs associated with entry into a number of 
different sub-markets are likely to be higher than those for entry into the one market only. 
It should be emphasised that the product differentiation discussed here is not the same as 
that in Section 3.3.3.2, where differentiation occurs not through advertising but through 
genuine differences in either schedule times or product quality. An advertising campaign 
for a single undifferentiated brand will spread fixed costs over a relatively large output. 
This will not be the case where separate campaigns are needed for each of the relatively 
small differentiated product markets. Schmalensee (1978) cites and models the example 
of the USA ready-to-eat breakfast cereal market, where there is considerable product 
differentiation by incumbent firms, but where successful entry by new firms is rare. More 
recent models of product differentiation (Farrell, 1986, Bagwell, 1990) emphasise the 
role of imperfect information about different product characteristics in creating entry 
barriers.
Absolute cost advantages occur where the incumbent has a lower cost curve than the one 
facing the entrant. This could occur because the incumbent has patent rights, access to 
lower cost suppliers or sources of finance, or the advantage of the lowest cost location. In 
these circumstances, an entrant will always be at a cost disadvantage irrespective of the 
scale of entry.
4.4.2 Entry Barriers: alternative approaches
The problem with Bain's definition of an entry barrier is that it includes cases where entry 
could still be possible if incumbent and entrant have access to the same post-entry cost 
curve. In the case of economies of scale, for example, entry could occur at the same level 
of output as the incumbent so that both entrant and incumbent will have the same unit
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costs. Even if entry were to reduce market price, this would affect both entrant and 
incumbent equally. Stigler (1968) prefers to restrict the definition of an entry barrier:
"A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of 
output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne 
by firms already in the industry."
(Stigler, op. cit., p. 67)
Under this definition, economies of scale and product differentiation are only entry 
barriers if the entrant's post-entry cost curve is higher than the incumbent's. One reason 
why the entrant may have a higher post-entry cost curve than the incumbent is that 
entrants may have a systematically higher cost of capital. Incumbents have a trading 
record against which financial markets can assess the probability of success, whereas no 
such benchmark exists for entrants. In effect, financial markets are faced with a "lemons" 
problem (Akerlof, 1970), so that the cost of capital will be higher for entrants than 
incumbents. This differential cost of capital argument may be one reason for the tendency 
of operators with little or no track record to enter the subsidised part of the UK local bus 
service network in the post-deregulation period. If the contract is awarded on a full cost 
basis (see Appendix one, Section 1.9.4) the trading risk is borne by the tendering 
authority rather than the operator. The operator then avoids the lemons problem above.
Although it is not possible to reduce risk in this way in the competitive part of the market, 
the lemons problem may be overstated. This is because "new" entry often comes from 
experienced operators. At a national level, Stagecoach's switch from coach to bus 
operation is an obvious example. At a local level, an existing operator of schools 
contracts may enter the competitive sector or vice versa, or expand into another 
geographical area. Financial markets can thus make some assessment of trading risk for 
this type of entry.
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Entry barriers from product differentiation via advertising may also be overstated, since 
advertising forms a relatively small part of total expenditure in the UK local bus service 
market. Similarly, absolute cost advantages are not likely to be a significant entry barrier. 
Road infrastructure is provided to all bus operators on equal terms, and operators have 
non-discriminatory access to bus terminals under the provisions of the 1985 Transport 
Act. Some operators, however, may have an absolute cost advantage in terms of depot 
location. This could be a significant factor in areas such as London, where potential 
entrants face very high land costs.
An implication of the Stigler definition is that fixed costs do not constitute an entry 
barrier where the post-entry cost curve is the same for entrant and incumbent, since the 
entrant can always achieve the same unit costs as the incumbent. In this case, the 
existence of fixed costs per se does not impose any extra costs on the entrant relative to 
the incumbent.
Demsetz (1982) argues that the traditional emphasis on the cost aspects of entry barriers 
is misleading, because their costs may not be defined correctly. Some entry barriers may 
be socially desirable if they represent costs that have arisen from situations such as 
building up a good reputation or bearing the risk of innovation:
"Licensure, trademark, copyright, patent, entitlement to the fruits of past investment, 
including the investment in an honorable history ... may or may not be desirable, 
depending on how these broad implications are valued.”
(Demsetz, 1982, p. 56)
The concept of social desirability implies that both the costs and benefits of entry barriers 
should be taken into account. Von Weizsacker (1980) develops a model in which the 
welfare effects of entry barriers can be estimated from the specification of appropriate 
demand and cost curves. An entry barrier in this model is defined as a higher cost of
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production incurred by an entrant but not by the incumbent (following Stigler's (1968) 
definition), and which implies "a distortion in the allocation of resources from a social 
point of view." (von Weizsacker, 1980, p. 400). Although fixed costs create a welfare 
distortion in this model, they are the same for entrants and incumbents and so do not 
qualify as an entry barrier. Ceteris paribus, it is the existence of sunk costs that creates an 
entry barrier i.e. those costs that cannot be recovered if a firm exits from the market. It 
can be shown that, using a Cournot equilibrium model, a dominant strategy for a potential 
entrant in a two-stage game where sunk costs exist is for no entry to occur (von 
Weizsacker, 1980, Martin, 1993, pp. 180-1)
4.4.3 Sunk Costs
The von Weizsacker model provides a rationalisation of the important asymmetry 
between incumbent and potential entrant in terms of sunk costs. In a market where no 
entry has yet occurred, all potential entrants must take into account the possibility that 
some of their costs may not be recoverable on exit. In this sense, all potential entrants 
face the same problem. Once entry occurs, the incumbent firm or group of firms incurs 
sunk costs which will no longer influence its future decisions. But this is not the case for 
firms that are still considering entry. The possibility (rather than the actuality) of sunk 
costs must still be taken into account in the entry decision. Ceteris paribus, potential 
entrants will always face higher costs than incumbents where the latter has incurred sunk 
costs. Another aspect of this asymmetry is that, having incurred sunk costs, the 
incumbent's incentive to stay in the industry is likely to be greater than the incentive to 
enter it:
"The difference between incumbent firms and entrants is that incumbent firms own plant 
and equipment specific to this industry and thereby are committed to continue in this 
industry, whereas this is not the case for a potential entrant. It is thus not just simple 
economies of scale which may cause a barrier to entry, but rather economies of scale in 
combination with irreversible capital commitments."
(von Weizsacker, 1980, p. 401)
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The extent to which costs are "sunk" is determined by factors such as the transferability 
of capital equipment from one market to another (e.g. from short to long distance bus 
service work) and the existence of a developed second hand market in which that capital 
equipment can be sold. Interestingly, a study of USA manufacturing industry concluded 
that investment in machinery and equipment appears to be more "sunk" than investment 
in buildings (Kessides, 1990). This implies that investment in machinery and equipment 
is more likely to be industry specific than investment in buildings. The "fixity" of the 
investment, however, is not always a reliable guide to whether it is sunk or not: as 
always, much depends on the specific circumstances for which it is made. A supplier of 
water may have to undertake earthworks for which, in the event of exit from the industry, 
there may be few, if any, alternative uses (Waterson, 1988, p. 146). Sunk costs can 
include not only the costs of capital equipment, but also the costs of building up 
knowledge, reputation, goodwill and human capital in areas such as job training.
A development that involves building up a reputation and a corresponding sunk cost is 
that of quality partnerships in the local bus service market. The Transport Bill (Dec. 1st,
1999) states that:
“A local transport authority, or two or more such authorities acting jointly, may make a 
quality partnership scheme if they are satisfied that the scheme will to any extent 
implement the policies set out in their current bus strategy or strategies and will- (a) 
improve the quality of local services provided in the whole or any part of their area, or 
combined area, by bringing benefits to persons using those services, or (b) reduce or limit 
noise or air pollution.”
(Transport Bill, Dec. 1st, 1999, Section 96)
Typically, quality partnerships involve agreement with operators on quality of service in 
exchange for local authority initiatives to improve the operating environment for buses, 
such as better bus stops and shelters and measures to give priority to bus traffic. At the 
time of writing, the exact nature of the partnership depends on the local authority and is 
non-statutory. The Transport Bill introduces various proposals, such as a minimum
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period of five years for the partnership and the introduction of quality contracts, which 
will formalise to a greater extent the structure of such agreements. An important aspect of 
these arrangements is the synergy that such partnerships (or contracts) may provide: co­
operation may provide a better outcome than that associated with local authorities and 
operators working independently of each other.
But these partnership (or contract) arrangements may reduce contestability. Once an 
operator has invested to meet the standards set in the partnership (or contract), then 
potential entrants face the asymmetric entry cost problem identified earlier in this section. 
In addition, smaller operators may not be able to afford the standards specified in the 
quality partnerships. This situation could arise because small operators cannot take 
advantage of the type of economies discussed in the previous section, or because large 
operators have implemented a deliberate strategy to raise their rivals’ costs. This latter 
case is an example of a strategic entry barrier and is discussed further in Section 4.6.2.
The Buses White Paper considers that the bus service market is "highly contestable", 
citing the reasons that:
a) costs of entry are low
b) sunk costs are comparatively small in relation to operating costs
c) economies of scale are limited .
But these criteria seem to refer to non-strategic entry barriers. Even if the three conditions 
above are satisfied, a market may not be contestable if there is strategic entry deterrence 
on the part of incumbent firms. This form of incumbent firm behaviour is discussed in 
Section 4.6.
3 In contestability theory, economies of scale do not create an entry barrier provided the product is storable. 
Bus services are non-storable (i.e. scats unoccupied on a given journey cannot be resold at a later dale) and 
economies of scale will constitute an entry barrier. For a discussion of this point, sec M.C. Sawyer. The 
Economics of Industries and Finns, 2nd.cd.. p. 251.
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To conclude, economies of scale and product differentiation do not create entry barriers if 
entrant and incumbent have access to the same post-entry cost curve. This is an important 
point, because scale economies and product differentiation have often been cited as 
necessarily creating entry barriers. In practice, however, it is unlikely that both incumbent 
and entrant will have the same post-entry cost curves, so that these features may act to 
some extent as an entry barrier. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that, in 
the absence of sunk costs, the entrant's costs are very much higher than the incumbent's, 
so that the extent of entry barriers may not be significant. In any event, it is unlikely that 
product differentiation (via advertising) or absolute cost advantages are significantly 
large to act as entry barriers in the UK local bus service market.
The critical determinant of entry barriers is the existence of sunk costs. The existence of 
sunk costs introduces an asymmetry between incumbent and entrant that acts as an entry 
barrier. In effect, sunk costs raise the entrant's post-entry cost curve above that of the 
incumbent. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 review the evidence on non-strategic (or innocent) and 
strategic entry barriers respectively.
4.5 Innocent Entry Barriers in the Bus Industry: the em pirical evidence
Salop (1979) distinguishes between innocent and strategic entry barriers. Economies of 
scale are an innocent entry barrier, since they are determined by the nature of a firm's 
production function rather than as a result of a deliberate act by a firm. Absolute cost 
advantages may be innocent: existing firms may already have located in the least-cost 
sites, for example. On the other hand, firms may have undertaken investment or research 
and development specifically aimed at the prevention of entry. Such costs may be sunk. If 
they are, this acts as a further deterrent to entry, since the incumbent firm has announced 
a commitment to stay in the industry. A strategic entry barrier is one that is deliberately 
created by a firm to deter entry. The remainder of this section discusses the various forms 
of innocent entry barrier that may exist in the bus industry. Strategic entry barriers are 
discussed in Section 4.6.
I l l
Section 4.4.3 concluded that economies of scale could act as an innocent entry barrier to 
the bus industry. Section 4.5 examines the evidence on economies of scale (and other 
types of cost economies that are possible entry barriers), and sunk costs in the bus 
industry.
4.5.1 Economies o f Scale
In terms of scale economies, empirical studies of the bus transit industry provide a mixed 
set of results. McGillivray et aL (1980) find evidence of constant returns to scale in bus 
transit operations in the USA, a result supported by the findings of Williams (1981).
Other studies (Viton, 1981, Williams and Dalai, 1981, Obeng, 1985) find evidence of 
scale economies. A major problem in comparing these studies is the differences which 
exist in their model specification, the measures of output used, the measurement of factor 
prices, the use of short or long run analysis, the econometric tests conducted, and the type 
of data used (Berechman, 1987). A review of developments in transportation cost 
function research is provided by Oum and Waters (1997), who emphasise the difficulties 
of discriminating between economies of scale and economies of density.
In a study of the Israeli bus transit sector Berechman (1987) concludes that the sector as a 
whole is subject to scale economies, although constant returns to scale may.exist for 
specific segments and measures of output e.g. intra-urban trips using vehicle-kilometres 
as the output measure. A further finding of this study is that the price-elasticity of the 
demand for labour was low and that the amount of labour employed was unresponsive to 
the decline in total vehicle-kilometres. This implies that the possibilities for labour cost 
savings are relatively small in this industry. Given that the production technology of the 
bus transit industry is labour intensive, this result underlines the difficulties faced by bus 
operators in controlling costs.
The empirical evidence on the existence of scale economies in UK bus operations is also 
mixed. In a cross-sectional study of 44 UK municipal bus operators, Lee and Steedman 
(1970) reach the general conclusion that returns to scale were constant, although they did
112
not rule out the possibility of scale economies in larger undertakings such as the 
(proposed) Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs). They argue that the main source of 
unit cost reductions lay in the extension of one person operation (OPO), rather than 
amalgamation via the creation of PTAs, because of the high proportion of labour to total 
costs in bus operations. According to Button (1989, p.75), it would appear that the White 
Paper on Buses implicitly used the results of this study in arguing the case for limited 
scale economies in UK bus operation. The importance of OPO as a source of unit cost 
reduction is also supported in a study by Brown and Nash (1972), which estimated a 13.7 
percent cost saving from its introduction. If the production technology of UK and Israeli 
bus transit is similar, then these arguments are contradicted by the results of Berechman's 
(1987) study.
Wabe and Coles (1975) find evidence of diseconomies of scale with respect to the size of 
bus fleet, although their study does not include variables on peak/off-peak differences, 
factor price differences, congestion and differences between types and sizes of vehicles. 
There may also be a problem of multicollinearity in the model specification, since bus 
fleet size and bus fleet mileage are both included as explanatory variables. Button and 
O'Donnell (1985) investigate the cost structure of British urban bus services using a 
flexible functional form (the transcendental or translogarithmic function) which does not 
impose restrictions on the shape of the firm's unit cost curve. This is in contrast to most 
of the earlier studies mentioned. Whilst there is evidence of scale diseconomies for some 
of the larger district bus undertakings, there is also evidence to suggest that smaller 
operators enjoyed scale economies.
Another source of economies of scale in bus operations is the size of vehicle4. Ceteris 
paribus, the larger the vehicle the lower the cost per seat-mile. Webster (1968) estimates 
that increasing the size of vehicle from 10 to 20 seats reduces the cost per seat-mile by 40 
to 50 percent. Further increases in vehicle size continue to yield cost reductions, although 
by less substantial amounts. This is unlikely to create an entry barrier, however, since
A Strictly speaking, the economies are those of density rather than scale, since it is implicitly assumed that 
the size of the network remains fixed as vehicle size increases.
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different sized vehicles are readily available to all operators: they can be purchased new 
or second-hand, leased, or transferred from other services.
More recently, Stagecoach Holdings has claimed that its costs are at least 20% lower than 
most operators because of economies of scale. One significant source is the access to 
cheaper equity finance following its listing on the London Stock Exchange in April 1993, 
as well as lower rates for bank borrowing, insurance, and bulk buying of fuel and spare 
parts. This claim was used to justify its "competitive" pricing policies, although some of 
its competitors claimed that it was practising predatory pricing (Transport Committee 
First Report, 1995, Vol. Ill, p. 358).
Mohring (1976) argues that the main economies associated with urban public transport 
are the savings in passenger waiting times that accrue from high service frequencies. 
These user cost reductions arise when service frequencies are so high that passengers do 
not try to catch a particular service, but arrive at a bus stop in the knowledge that any 
waiting time will be relatively short. Given a ten-minute headway and random arrival of 
passengers, expected waiting time per passenger will be five minutes. If service 
frequency and the number of passengers is doubled (thus maintaining a constant queue 
length) operators' unit costs will remain roughly constant, assuming constant returns to 
scale on the production side. But each pre-existing passenger will now have an expected 
waiting time of only two-and-a-half minutes, and so receives an external benefit from the 
increase in service frequencies. Since these user cost reductions do not affect production 
costs, however, the "Mohring effect" will not act as an entry barrier (although it is an 
instance of market failure).
To conclude, the evidence on scale economies is mixed. One highly plausible explanation 
for this indeterminacy is the failure to distinguish adequately between economies of scale 
and economies of density. The next section examines the evidence for economies of 
density in bus transit, and how the evidence for scale economies is affected if density 
economies are taken into account in the model specification.
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4 .5 .2  E c o n o m ie s  o f  D e n s ity
A problem with many studies on economies of scale in bus operations is that they fail to 
make an important distinction between economies of scale and economies of density.
This failure has created an inconsistency between many of the results of empirical studies 
and the actions of public policymakers (Windle, 1988). Scale economies arise as a result 
of falling average costs when output increases and more of all factor inputs are employed 
(strictly speaking, the increase in factor inputs should be equi-proportionate). Economies 
of density are associated with falling average costs resulting from increased factor 
utilisation. In particular, testing for economies of scale using bus miles as a measure of 
output fails to control for changes in the density of service. Bus miles tend to be used as 
an output measure because of the difficulty in obtaining data on passenger miles.
Using passenger miles as a measure of industry output, returns to scale arise where the 
size of the network (i e. route miles) increases equi-proportionately to passenger miles, 
whereas returns to density occur when passenger miles are increased within a fixed 
network. Economies of density can arise either from an increase in the number of 
passengers on existing buses and routes, or from an increase in the number of buses on 
existing routes (or, alternatively, increased capacity through larger buses). More 
precisely, for a cost function defined in terms of the following variables:
C -  f(Q,Pj,Zk)
where C = total cost
Q = output (passenger miles)
Pj = input prices
Zk = output characteristics (e.g. load factor, average vehicle speed, average 
length of trip, number of route miles)
then, assuming a translog functional form (Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau, 1973), 
returns to scale (RTS) can be defined as the relationship between costs and changes in 
passenger miles and network size, holding load factor, average vehicle speed, average 
trip length and input prices constant.
RTS = <?(lnC) <^ (lnC)
^(lnQ) + ^(ln Z M)
where M = route miles. Returns to network density (RND) are defined as the relationship 
between costs and passenger miles, where changes in passenger miles arise from changes 
in the number or capacity of buses, holding load factor, average vehicle speed, average 
trip length, input prices and network size constant:
RND = <9(lnC)
<?(lnQ)
Returns to passenger density (RPD) are defined as the relationship between costs and 
passenger miles, where changes in passenger miles result from changes in the number of 
passengers on a given number of buses and network size, holding average vehicle speed, 
average trip length and input prices constant:
RPD = <9(lnC) <9(lnC)
<?(lnQ) <?(lnZL)
where L = load factor. Evaluated at the sample means, Windle (1988, p. 130) estimates 
RTS = 1.03, RND = 1.25 and RPD = 3.13. These results imply constant returns to scale, 
significant economies of network density, and large economies of passenger density for 
urban bus transit in the USA.
The absence of significant scale economies is supported in a study by Hensher (1988), 
although this study had to use passenger revenue rather than passenger miles as the 
measure of output. Hensher {op. cit.) also finds that total operating costs for public sector 
operators were 64% higher than those of private operators, and that driver costs were 
over twice as great. These results are qualitatively similar to those of Windle (1988), 
which finds that Federal capital grant subsidies have created over-investment in capital
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equipment and substantial excess capacity: in order to minimise costs a reduction of 50% 
in capital would be required.
The empirical finding of constant scale returns in bus operations implies that unit costs 
would not increase as the level of output falls. This is contradicted by the experience of 
the USA bus transit industry where, between 1945 and 1972, patronage fell by 55 percent 
and real fares rose by 200 percent. In view of the number of bus company failures over 
this period, it is likely that real unit costs rose even more rapidly than real fares. This 
experience is consistent with the view that the industry is characterised by economies of 
scale, and this is the view (whether valid or not) that has motivated public policy:
"The lack of credibility of the constant returns finding is reflected in public policy which 
has dealt with the bus industry as if it were a natural monopoly."
(Windle, 1988, p. 120)
Windle's results reconcile the anomaly between empirical results and public policy 
towards urban bus transit. Returns to scale are constant, but economies of density are not. 
As passenger numbers and bus miles fall at a faster rate than network size, unit costs will 
increase because of decreasing density of service. These results certainly have relevance 
to the British local bus service sector where, between 1953 and 1980, passenger journeys 
fell by 60% and bus miles by 18%. Although figures are not available for route miles i.e. 
network size, it is unlikely that they contracted as fast as passenger journeys, since the 
Traffic Commissioners generally attempted to maintain a network which included both 
profitable and unprofitable routes (see Section 2.2). Although fares over this period rose 
by 86% in real terms, unit costs rose by an even greater amount, as demonstrated by the 
increase in subsidies and grants of 511% in real terms from 1969 to 1980.
To conclude, the existence of economies of density implies that individual routes within a 
network have the declining unit cost characteristic of a natural monopoly. This 
characteristic results from the presence of costs that are fixed but not necessarily sunk. If
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there are no sunk costs, then the route is contestable and regulation is unnecessary. The 
estimated values for economies of density, particularly that for passenger density, imply 
that long run equilibrium on an individual route will be associated with a small number of 
operators (possibly only one).
The existence of constant scale returns (i.e. where an X% increase in both passenger 
miles and network size will increase total costs by X%) provides further support for a 
market approach to urban bus transit. Public policy was based on the view that bus transit 
was subject to significant economies of scale, so that regulation was necessary to 
overcome the entry barriers created by these scale economies. This view was mistaken on 
two counts: first, there are no significant scale economies in bus transit (although there 
are significant economies of density); second, even if scale economies existed, it is the 
presence of sunk, not fixed costs which create the entry barriers.
4.5.3 Economies o f Scope
The discussion so far has been based on the concept of a single product industry. The 
analysis needs to be extended in the case of bus services, where more than one product 
can be supplied by a firm. Economies of scope may arise from increasing the number of 
products that a firm provides (Panzar and Willig, 1975, Bailey and Friedlander, 1982).
An example of multi-output production would be the provision of local (bus) services and 
long-distance (coach) services by a single firm instead of two specialist firms5. The 
importance of the links between bus and coach operation is shown in the Trial Areas, 
where entry into the local bus service market was invariably by established coach 
operators (Savage, 1985, p. 42). At the time of writing, at least one bus company was 
considering diversifying into the provision of privatised rail services in the UK. A bus 
operator could also provide subsidised services e.g. schools contract services, in 
conjunction with commercial services. Another example from the transport sector would 
be the provision of passenger and freight services by a railway company. Although
5 The acquisition of NBC subsidiaries by the Perth-based Stagecoach company is an illustration of this 
point. Stagecoach started in the express market and diversified into the bus market.
outward and return journeys are sometimes cited as multi-output production, they are 
really a case of joint supply where production of one output generally necessitates the 
production of the other. It would seem preferable to restrict the concept of economies of 
scope to the case of outputs that are voluntarily provided by the firm.
Economies of scope are conceptually distinct from economies of scale, which arise from 
the increase in output of a given product. Scope economies exist if the minimum cost (= 
C) of producing output quantities ql and q2 of goods 1 and 2 is lower in combined rather 
than separate production i.e.
C(ql,q2)<C(ql,0) + C(0,q2)
Economies of scope arise because different outputs may have shareable inputs that can be 
used more efficiently by a multi-product firm. One of the most important sources of 
scope economies within bus operations is probably that of scheduling efficiency, since 
computerised techniques have been developed to allow operators to schedule services 
more efficiently over different routes e.g. profitable and unprofitable (Rousseau, 1985).
In order to test for economies of scope, a generalised translog function allowing for a 
Box-Cox transformation on the output variables can be used (Zarembka, 1974). The Box- 
Cox transformation allows for the inclusion of zero output levels in the cost function i.e.
Yj = Y,m  /XJorX, * 0, and 
Y, = InY, for = 0.
In a study of USA railroads, Kim (1987) concludes that it is subject to mild overall 
economies of scale, but significant product-specific economies of scale with respect to 
passenger and freight services. Surprisingly, there are diseconomies of scope with respect 
to their joint production. One reason is that the different speeds of passenger and freight 
services can cause serious scheduling problems. Another is that track must be heavy
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enough to withstand freight traffic, and smooth and straight enough to ensure passenger 
comfort. Such track can be very expensive.
The existence of multiproduct firms will increase the degree of contestability for any 
particular market. Cairns and Mahabir (1988) argue that entry is most likely to occur 
from firms with sunk assets in related markets, and suggest that contestability theory is 
best suited to the analysis of competition among multiproduct firms. It should be noted 
that the analysis of a multiproduct natural monopoly is more complex than that of a 
single product monopoly. Achieving economies of scope may imply losing economies of 
scale for individual products. Additionally, there will be a number of ways in which a 
multiproduct firm can set price equal to marginal cost on average, and each combination 
of prices will have different implications for social welfare (Waterson, 1988, pp. 19-20).
4.5.4 Cost Economies, Network Effects and Mergers
Empirical studies on the existence of scope economies in UK bus operations seem rare 
(perhaps non-existent). Nonetheless, the development of service networks by a small 
number of large bus operators after deregulation (see Section 4.6.1) provides some 
evidence for the presence of scope, as well as density economies in the industry. The role 
of scope and density economies in the evolution of a service network is illustrated by the 
development of "hub and spoke" operations in the airline industry (Brown, 1991). In 
Figure 4.2 below, the hubs are the large cities of X and Y, and the spokes are the smaller 
cities of a, b, c, d and e. Flights between X and Y are profitable because of the high 
traffic densities. There are no direct flights between the spokes because the low traffic 
densities imply relatively high costs of operation. These costs may be sufficiently high to 
render some direct inter-spoke flights (e.g. a to b) unprofitable. By channelling this traffic 
via the hubs, where traffic densities are much higher, load factors can be increased. 
Alternatively, larger aircraft can be used, where their cost per seat mile is generally lower 
than that of smaller aircraft. This "feeder" system enables economies of scope and density 
to be obtained, so that a connecting flight from a to b via X, for example, may become 
viable within a network system. The hub acts like a warehouse in a retail distribution
120
system, collecting bundles of passengers from different places and matching them to 
destinations.
The increase in load factors provides economies of passenger density. The use of larger 
aircraft provides economies of network density. Economies of scope arise at the hubs 
from a more intensive use of sharable inputs by different types of traffic: one example 
would be the use of expensive computer systems for flight scheduling. Although the 
deregulated USA airline industry is often cited as an example of a hub-and-spoke system, 
it has appeared in other transport systems such as European shipping and UK inter-city 
bus services. In the latter case, Victoria Coach Station in London acts as the hub for the 
express coach network. The development of these service networks is not contingent on 
regulation: in each of the cases mentioned, the network has developed in a deregulated, 
competitive environment. Thus regulation is not necessary for the provision of an 
integrated service network, where integration here refers to the provision of connecting 
services (see Section 3.3.2).
a
d
Figure 4.2: A hub and spoke system
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There are parallels with local bus services, where the spokes could be regarded as part of 
a low density network, possibly outlying rural areas, and the hubs as part of the high 
density urban network. An implication of the move towards such systems is that market 
concentration over the total network will increase, since the economies of density and 
scope mentioned above will only accrue to large firms. One example is that of Fife, an 
extensive rural area with a few large hub towns, where roughly ninety percent of buses 
are operated by Fife Scottish, the Stagecoach subsidiary. Stagecoach has argued that its 
near monopoly position can be justified by its provision of a comprehensive network of 
services, which could not be maintained if other operators entered the market (see Section 
4.6.1).
Mergers have been a significant feature of the post deregulation bus market, and the 
network argument above provides one plausible explanation for this. The deregulated 
USA airline industry also experienced considerable merger activity: by 1988, the 8 
largest airlines had gained effective control over 48 of the 50 largest regional carriers. A 
significant factor in this merger activity was the desire to take advantage of network 
effects (Fawcett and Farris, 1989). The importance of network effects should not be over­
emphasised, however. Even in the context of the USA airline hub-and-spoke system, 
Viton concludes that:
"In the context of optimality, it was found that although the influence of networks of 
different extents was perceptible, it was not great."
(Viton, 1983, p. 609)
One reason may be that diseconomies of scope or density can arise through increased use 
of hubs: congestion has increased at USA hub airports during peak hours (Fawcett and 
Fawcett, 1988).
Another way of rationalising the merger activity is to view it as a method of 
internalisation within the market failure paradigm discussed in Chapter three.
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Competition between many small operators will be Pareto-inefficient if the external 
benefits of connecting services (and through ticketing) are not taken into account. Merger 
activity will enable the resulting large firms to provide, via networks such as the hub and 
spoke system, connecting services that thereby internalise and remove the externalities.
The creation of fewer, larger firms by merger activity is sometimes regarded as anti­
competitive, since larger firms may prevent entry by smaller firms. The issues raised by 
strategic entry deterrence, together with its practicability, are considered in Section 4.6. 
This section has shown that, even if economies of scale from a merger are not significant, 
there are likely to be benefits in terms of network effects. It may also be the case that the 
conditions for entry by smaller firms are enhanced. Merger activity, together with the 
development of the hub and spoke system in the USA airline industry, caused larger 
carriers to focus on high density routes and enabled smaller carriers to enter the market 
and offer specialised services (such as intrastate commuter services) on lower density 
routes. The result was an improved match between the supply of and demand for aircraft 
(Fawcett and Farris, 1989).
4 .5 .5  E con om ies o f  E xperience
Another possible source of declining average costs is that of economies of experience, 
which are closely related to the cost savings from "learning-by-doing" (Button, 1989). 
Economies of experience are time related, whilst the learning curve relates costs to 
cumulative production. The existence of economies of experience may create an entry 
barrier that reduces the contestability of the industry:
"Firms already in a market have gained experience in both the problems of serving that 
market and the specifics of the demand conditions confronting suppliers ... New entrants 
require similar experience but know that this can only be done at a cost which cannot be 
recovered if market entry results in a financial loss."
(Button, 1989, pp. 91-2)
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New entrants will have higher costs than the incumbent in any given time period, because 
they lack the same level of experience and thus the ability to achieve cost reductions 
arising from this experience. One example of an experience economy might be a more 
efficient organisation of the firm. If the amount of experience necessary to achieve such 
economies is finite, one would expect the cost differential to diminish over time, as the 
entrant approaches the incumbent's level of experience. It could be argued that the costs 
associated with the acquisition of experience are sunk costs, since they will not be 
recoverable if the firm exits from the industry. In this case the sunk cost nature of the 
experience economies will reinforce the entry barrier created by the cost differential.
Experience, or lack of it, will also be a factor in the consumption, as well as the 
production process. Incumbent firms may have advantages over entrants because bus 
services are "experience goods", in the sense that their quality cannot be ascertained prior 
to consumption (Nelson, 1970). Incumbents may have built up a high quality reputation 
with consumers which entrants cannot easily duplicate, thereby creating another entry 
barrier (Button, 1989). Evidence for experience economies in the bus industry is limited, 
and is considered in the next section in conjunction with the evidence on sunk costs.
To summarise the findings of Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.5, there is no strong evidence to 
support the view that there are significant economies of scale in the bus industry, 
particularly if density economies are taken into account. There is evidence to suggest, 
however, that economies of scope and density, particularly density economies, provide 
perceptible cost advantages within a service network. Debate about the cost 
characteristics of the industry, together with public policy towards it, has sometimes been 
confused by a failure to distinguish between these cost economies. Although merger 
activity in the deregulated bus industry has increased significantly, this is not necessarily 
an anti-competitive development. It may be the result of a desire to increase efficiency 
via network effects rather than to deter entry.
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4 .5 .6  The E x ten t o f  In n o cen t Sunk C o s ts  in the U K  B u s In d u stry
Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 have examined the innocent entry barriers created by cost 
differentials arising from various cost economies. Essentially, these cost economies arise 
through a more efficient utilisation of fixed factors. But the existence of fixed costs does 
not in itself imply the existence of entry barriers. The critical consideration, as Section
4.4.3 emphasises, is whether these fixed costs are also sunk costs. If they are, then they 
will form an exit barrier and reduce the contestability of the industry.
The discussion of sunk costs has so far been concerned with those arising from innocent 
entry barriers. These "innocent" sunk costs do not appear to be a significant factor in the 
UK bus industry. There is an established second hand market for vehicles, as well as the 
possibility of using vehicles in other markets such as schools contracts and private hire. 
The multiproduct nature of the bus industry increases the transferability of vehicles and 
thereby reduces the incidence of sunk costs. Vehicle leasing is also well established, and 
enables operators to match supply and demand without a commitment to vehicle 
ownership.
Although the provision of "fixed" assets such as garage facilities may appear to give rise 
to sunk costs, a study of bus operations in eastern England concluded that there was a 
direct linear relationship between garage size and costs (Glaister and Mulley, 1983). In 
effect, fixed costs are relatively small, so that the possibility of sunk costs is reduced.
This finding is consistent with the results of the Kessides (1990) study of USA 
manufacturing industry mentioned earlier in Section 4.4.3, where the fixity of an asset 
does not imply the existence of sunk costs. Indeed, the study concluded that fixed assets 
such as buildings were likely to incur fewer sunk costs than those associated with 
machinery and equipment.
Economies of experience may constitute a sunk cost, although it is difficult to quantify 
this effect. The costs of building up a reputation or goodwill may also be sunk, depending 
on whether these "intangibles" can be sold. Presumably, it would be more difficult to sell
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a reputation than a vehicle, particularly if, as is likely, exit from the industry is caused by 
a poor trading performance. In view of the relatively low levels of advertising within the 
industry6, however, the role of factors such as reputation and goodwill are not likely to be 
particularly significant.
One plausible explanation for these low levels of advertising is that bus travel tends to be 
an "experience" good. Experience goods are those that are purchased frequently e.g. soap, 
so consumers can experience their qualities without the need for high levels of 
advertising. "Search" goods are those which are purchased infrequently e.g. cars, so that 
advertising is necessary in order to provide information about the qualities of the product 
(Nelson, 1974). The fact that in practice heavy advertising occurs for many experience 
goods is related to market structure, rather than the nature of the product: the market for 
soap, for example, is oligopolistic, so that non-price competition tends to occur in the 
form of advertising.
It may be argued that the bus industry since deregulation is oligopolistic, so that one 
might expect higher levels of advertising than those observed. In the case of the bus 
industry, however, non-price competition has generally taken the form of higher service 
frequencies rather than increased levels of advertising. The reason for this relates to the 
temporal dimension of the industry: passengers will generally take the first bus to arrive, 
irrespective of the firm that supplies it7. Expenditure on advertising existing services may 
or may not increase demand, but expenditure on increased services almost certainly will.
6 In a letter (10.5.94) to the author. Professor John Hibbs commented on the "extraordinary reluctance of 
die majority of companies to engage in serious marketing management" and identified this as the "big 
unanswered question" associated with the industry.
7 Professor John Hibbs, in evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee, 1993. (Session 1992- 
93) makes the contradictory comment that:
"I know of cases where people who preferred the buses of one Finn to another on the same route 
found out die times they ran. and went out to catch them.''
(Fourth Report. Volume III. p. 373)
One suspects, however, that such people arc in a minority.
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Sunk costs may be significant where large scale infrastructure investments must be made 
by firms. This is not the case for the bus service industry, however, where the road 
network is provided by central government, and where non-discriminatory access to bus 
terminals is provided under the provisions of the 1985 Transport Act. This also implies 
that "first-mover" advantages are unlikely to be significant. These refer to the situation in 
which significant sunk costs have been incurred by the incumbent, usually through 
infrastructure or other large scale investments, but not by the potential entrant (see 
Section 4.4.2).
Sunk costs may also occur where operators invest in improved service provision e.g. new 
vehicles, as part of a quality partnership (or contract) arrangement (see Section 4.4.3), but 
much depends on the type of arrangement between the local authority and the operator. If 
it is for a relatively short duration, then the operator can exit and use the new vehicles on 
other routes. There is also the empirical difficulty of establishing whether the operator 
has invested specifically for the partnership arrangement, or whether the investment 
would have occurred anyway.
To conclude, the empirical evidence tends to suggest that the sunk costs arising from 
innocent (or non-strategic entry barriers) are not likely to be significant for the bus 
service industry. If these were the only sunk costs to consider, then the industry would be 
highly contestable. But sunk costs may also arise through strategic entry barriers. For 
example, a firm may install excess capacity in order to deter entry. If entry does occur, 
then incumbent firms retaliate with increased service frequencies. A pre-commitment of 
this type will create sunk costs. This, and other types of strategic entry deterrence, are 
discussed in the next section.
4.6 Strategic Entry Barriers
The last section emphasised the importance of sunk costs, rather than fixed costs, in 
determining the contestability of a market. The sunk costs discussed in that section arose 
as a result of factors such as capital indivisibilities and the development of knowledge
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and reputation, rather than as a deliberate attempt to deter entry. But strategic behaviour 
by incumbent firms is another important determinant of market contestability. Strategic 
behaviour could include the deliberate creation of sunk costs by incumbent firms wishing 
to deter entry. This section discusses the different types of strategic entry barrier, and 
identifies those that appear most relevant to the UK local bus service market.
4.6.1 Excess Capacity
Spence (1977) develops a model in which entry is deterred by the installation of excess 
capacity that is only used if actual entry occurs. In the event of actual entry, the 
incumbent firm will use its excess capacity to expand output to the point at which the 
entrant cannot make a profit. This pre-commitment by the incumbent firm to expand 
output may or may not be a credible threat, depending on whether or not the entrant 
perceives the strategy to be profitable for the incumbent. A large number of models of 
entry deterrence via excess capacity have been developed, of which Spence {op. cv'/.), 
Dixit (1980) and Schmalensee (1981) are seminal. In general, the studies mentioned tend 
to support the view that excess capacity as an entry deterrent strategy is unlikely, since 
other strategies may be more effective. This conclusion, however, is sensitive to the 
model specification. Given uncertain demand, for example, coupled with the minimum 
output constraint assumed in the Schmalensee model, the effectiveness of the excess 
capacity strategy is increased in comparison to the results of the Spence model (Perrakis 
and Warskett, 1986).
In the context of local bus service deregulation, it is not easy to test the validity of this 
theory since excess capacity could arise as a result of strategic entry deterrence or from 
an increase in competition. One of the most notable cases of excess capacity in the post­
deregulation period was in Greater Glasgow, where the number of peak period buses 
nearly doubled in the month after deregulation (see Table 4.1):
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Table 4.1: Greater Glasgow peak period buses (Union Street south of St. Vincent 
Street)
Before deregulation After deregulation
Operator Buses Operator Buses
PTE/Strathclyde Buses 143.5 PTE/Strathclyde Buses 136
SBG and Independents 4.0 SBG and Independents 144
Total: 147.5 Total: 280
Source: Scottish Transport Studies Group, Newsletter No. 7, November, 1986.
In this case, however, it is clear that the excess capacity resulted from increased 
competition rather than entry deterrence, since the capacity provided by the (highly) 
dominant incumbent operator prior to deregulation actually fell in the post-deregulation 
period. Excess capacity was produced by entrants, not by incumbents.
Even if excess capacity can be attributed to the incumbent firm, it would still be 
necessary, in order to demonstrate the validity of the excess capacity theory, to show that 
the excess capacity was installed by the incumbent prior to entry and was a. genuine 
increase in capacity, rather than a diversion of resources from one area to another e.g. 
from off-peak to peak services. Given the heterogeneity of services typically provided by 
bus (and coach) operators, it could be difficult for this second condition to be satisfied in 
relation to excess capacity on part (as opposed to the whole) of a network.
In spite of the theoretical problems, there is evidence to support the view that excess 
capacity, in the form of excessive bus numbers on given routes, has been used as a 
strategy to punish entrants. In the year after deregulation, service provision by a dominant 
incumbent in some of the metropolitan areas, particularly Greater Manchester, was very 
high:
"Where competition has emerged, incumbent operators have found the resources to 
retaliate mainly by "route swamping"."
(Oxford Transport Studies Unit, 1987a, p. 27)
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The view that a dominant incumbent is able to effectively respond to entry by this 
method also appears to be widely shared by operators:
"A commonly held belief was that larger companies could more readily respond to entry 
by reallocation of buses to the newly competitive routes. Spread over a large operation, 
these reallocations had little effect on general service levels whilst permitting formidable 
opposition to the entrant on his chosen routes."
(Price Waterhouse, 1990, p. 34)
Further support for the route swamping view comes from the experience of local bus 
service operation in the Trial Areas after the 1980 Transport Act. Savage (1985, p.39) 
notes that swamping, in the form of increasing services on a route such that it becomes 
unprofitable, occurred in nearly a quarter of the cases in which an incumbent reacted to 
an entrant's timings.
A more recent example of entry deterrence via excess capacity occurred in April 1995 
when Yellow Buses, a Bournemouth municipal operator, replaced approximately 12 
Fleetline double-deckers with 12 Dennis Dart midibuses. The double-deckers were not 
sold, but retained in order to discourage potential rivals:
"We are mothballing them for possible use should any competitor appear."8
This statement provides clear evidence of the genuine, pre-entry excess capacity referred 
to earlier. Nevertheless, one might ask whether such a strategy is sustainable or even 
desirable from the incumbent's point of view. On the conservative assumption that each 
Fleetliner would have an average resale value of £20,000, the company is foregoing a 
capital sum of about a quarter of a million pounds. If the opportunity cost of this sum is 
measured in terms of the interest obtainable from it on a risk-free 5 year UK government
8 Quotation from Mr. E. Reid (Managing Director of Yellow Buses) in Coach and Bus Week. No. 162. 
8.4.95.
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bond (about 8% in April 1995), then the cost of this strategy to Yellow Buses is in the 
region of £20,000 per annum. There are also the costs associated with the storage and 
care maintenance of the vehicles. Given a total fleet size of only 105, including the 
Fleetliners, the total costs arising from the excess capacity would represent a significant 
proportion of annual operating costs. There is the paradoxical possibility that in following 
an excess capacity strategy the company may make itself less competitive and thus more 
prone to rival entry than would otherwise be the case.
It may be argued that the strategy is more likely to be successful where the incumbent 
operator is large, or has access to funds from a large parent company. In this case the 
costs of a local campaign will be relatively small in relation to total costs, and the 
campaign can thus be pursued for a longer time period. One possible example is that of 
Fife Scottish (owned by Stagecoach Holdings pic), which dominates the provision of bus 
services in Fife, a large and relatively rural area. Registration of new services by other 
operators was immediately matched by Fife Scottish, which timetabled the duplicate 
services a few minutes in front of their rivals'. In every case the entrant soon withdrew, 
one of the main reasons being that entrants perceived the battle to be against Stagecoach, 
not just Fife Scottish. The area Traffic Commissioner did not feel able to prevent the 
practice of duplication, but described it as a "grey area" in which Fife Scottish had taken 
full advantage of the deregulated environment9.
Stagecoach responded to the allegations of predatory practices by issuing a full page 
newspaper statement, part of which is reproduced below:
"Stagecoach was born in 1980 as a result of the new deregulated environment and was 
itself a small company for many years experiencing the severest of competition from 
large state and privately owned companies. We survived the experience because our new 
routes and ideas were popular with passengers and our operations were significantly more 
efficient than that of our competitors. Most of the competitors referred to in this [TV]
9 This practice, together with allegations of predatory pricing on the part of Fife Scottish, were the subject 
of an investigative television programme ("Frontline". BBC Scotland. 27.4.95).
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programme were neither innovative nor particularly efficient but simply creamed off 
traffic from our busiest routes at the best times using life expired vehicles. Stagecoach 
provides a comprehensive network of quality bus services at all times of the day and 
throughout the weekend but such benefits can only be sustained if we retain our market 
share on our profitable routes."10
This statement is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it illustrates the earlier 
discussion of the Austrian view that competition is a process in which small firms grow 
large as a result of their ability to satisfy new patterns of demand at low cost. Whilst the 
public interest view of Chapter three would regard the resulting size of the firm as a 
problem because of possible market failure, the Austrian view of Chapter four would 
interpret the firm's growth as a natural outcome of the competitive process. As such, the 
size of the firm acts as a measure of its success within this competitive process. Secondly, 
the threat of entry does not disappear with the emergence of the large firm: having grown, 
the firm then itself becomes subject to predation through new entry. In the case above 
new entry by smaller firms was unsuccessful, but there is nothing inevitable about this 
outcome as demonstrated by the initial evolution of Stagecoach. The problem of "cream- 
skimming" by smaller firms using low quality vehicles has also been documented by 
South Yorkshire Transport11, which accounts for approximately two-thirds of bus 
passenger journeys in South Yorkshire. Thirdly, the statement implies that cross-subsidy 
is still practised in the deregulated industry (at least by Stagecoach). If the industry is 
perfectly contestable, then this practice would not be possible. If, as is much more likely, 
the industry is imperfectly contestable, then cross-subsidy is still possible.
This leads to the question of why a commercial company should provide loss-making 
services on a sustained basis (assuming that this is, de facto, the case). The answer would 
appear to be related to the network system argument discussed in Section 4.5.4. Whilst 
some routes may be considered as unprofitable on a stand-alone basis, a company large
10 Quote from Brian Souter. Executive Chairman of Stagecoach Holdings pic. in Scotland on Sunday. 
30.4.95.
11 Evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee. 1993. (Session 1992-93). Fourth Report, Vol. 
II, pp. 204-9.
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enough to obtain benefits from scope and density economies may be able to provide such 
services as part of a network system. The advantage of a network system is that revenue 
and cost interdependencies between services can be exploited. Some passengers may not 
use a profitable 8.00 hrs service if an unprofitable 20.00 hrs service is not available. It 
may be the case that if the second service is not provided, then the first becomes 
unprofitable. This situation is a variant of the "feeder" economies arising in a network 
system. As the number of services increases, there will be more opportunities to take 
advantage of service interdependencies: the number of possible links between four 
services is likely to be more than twice the number associated with two services.
The above argument applies to a service network on a given day. There may also be 
interdependencies arising from the provision of different services over time. Although the 
revenue from a weekday service is unlikely to be affected by the provision of a Sunday 
service, for example, a Monday service may still be affected by the provision of other 
weekday services. If a Friday service is not provided, the passenger may have to buy a 
car to make his journey. This may then lead to a decision to travel by car on all 
weekdays. Cost interdependencies through time are likely to be greater than for revenue. 
The provision of a Sunday service will always reduce average fixed costs, although 
higher variable (probably wage) costs may also have to be taken into account in this 
particular instance.
Whether one treats the reduction in unit costs as arising from economies of scope (i.e. 
provision of services differentiated in terms of time across a given network) or from 
economies of density (increased provision of the same service across a given network 
irrespective of the time period) is a matter of choice. The end result is the same: 
interdependencies across the network will enable the provision of some services which, 
on a stand-alone basis, would not be provided. Small firms cannot provide large 
networks, and cannot take advantage of service interdependencies to the same extent as 
large firms. Consequently, there will be a tendency to fewer, larger firms, particularly 
where the region concerned has a mix of high and low density routes.
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It may be objected that firm expansion has little to do with serving the needs of the 
market in the ways outlined above, but is a device, via excess capacity strategies, to 
restrict competition. Excess capacity strategies are expensive, however, and there is no 
guarantee that they will be successful. Large firms may be able to finance a campaign in 
a given area for a longer period, but they also have a larger territory to defend. There 
appears to be some evidence from operators that "gap-filling" has occurred in the 
deregulated market in order to deter entry, but since this expansion has been on profitable 
routes (Mackie, Preston and Nash, 1995, p. 233) there seems no reason to presume that 
the strategy of filling profitable gaps in the network is not a legitimate part of the 
competitive process. But “gap-filling” has also occurred on unprofitable routes, where 
additional services are provided but then withdrawn as competition or threatened 
competition recedes.
Nonetheless, the current situation relating to service duplication is unsatisfactory, since 
there are no guidelines with which to prevent unscrupulous operators exploiting the “grey 
areas” referred to above. In an attempt to provide a simple guideline for these cases, the 
author has developed a “half-headway” rule (see Appendix two).
4.6.2 Raising Rivals' Costs
The excess capacity strategy involves an increase in the incumbent firm's costs and a 
decrease in short-run profit for the firm. Long run profit may be higher, depending on the 
success of the strategy. An alternative entry deterrence strategy is to attempt to raise entry 
costs. For example, in an industry where common wage rates are centrally negotiated and 
enforced, a capital-intensive incumbent firm could force higher average costs on labour- 
intensive entrants by agreeing to pay higher wages prior to entry (Williamson, 1968).
One method by which a bus operator could raise rivals' costs is to provide integrated 
ticketing arrangements such as travelcards, which usually entitle the holder to unlimited 
transfer between buses, or even between bus and rail, for a fixed initial payment. Such 
schemes will be profitable if the revenue gained from generated patronage exceeds the
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lost revenue from the existing patronage. They also have the effect of increasing 
customer loyalty.
Prior to deregulation, the West Midlands PTE operated a Travelcard scheme which 
accounted for some 40% of passenger journeys. Similar schemes existed in Tyne and 
Wear and South Yorkshire. The problem for a new entrant is that it would not be likely to 
have a sufficiently large service network to make its own "travelcard" relatively 
attractive, but without such a card it may be difficult to persuade passengers away from 
the incumbent (Oxford TSU, 1987b, p.29). In general, the smaller the service network, 
the higher the cost per passenger of providing travelcards. Administration and advertising 
costs, which tend to be fixed, will be spread over a smaller number of passengers.
Advertising may be used as an entry deterrence strategy (Cubbin, 1981, Schmalensee, 
1982). If advertising by the incumbent has created a stock of goodwill or reputation 
which affects market demand, then an entrant will not be able to gain market share unless 
he has a higher level of advertising per unit of output than the incumbent. Ceteris 
paribus, the entrant's average costs will be higher than those of the incumbent. This 
argument does not seem to be significant in bus operations, where advertising, if it occurs 
at all, tends to be on a small-scale local rather than a national level. Although some 
operators have attempted to build up a brand image, there has traditionally been a limited 
use of advertising within the industry, both in the pre and post-deregulation periods (see 
Section 4.5.5). In evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee (Session 
1992-93), Professor Hibbs remarked in relation to the provision of customer information 
that:
"The industry's performance in this vital activity was appallingly bad before 1985 ... It 
has since become markedly worse ..."
(House of Commons Transport Committee, Fourth Report, Volume III, p. 369)
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Where an incumbent has control over terminal facilities, an entrant may experience 
difficulty in gaining access to those facilities. Incumbent airlines can make it difficult to 
gain access to airport resources such as landing and take-off slots, boarding gates, check­
in areas and lounge facilities. Access problems occurred after the 1980 Transport Act 
deregulated express services, when National Express refused access to some competitors 
(see Section 2.5.1.2). Even where access is allowed, terminal charges may be higher for 
the entrant, or the entrant may be assigned to parts of the terminal which are difficult to 
reach and manoeuvre in. If access is not allowed then, assuming the incumbent has 
already located in the least-cost site, the entrant will be forced to pay higher terminal 
costs if he decides to buy or rent alternative facilities.
Although the Buses White Paper states that "major bus stations should be operated .... on 
a commercial basis under arrangements which will provide for all operators to have equal 
opportunity of gaining access to them" (op. ev'/., Ch. 5, para. 5.16), there was evidence to 
suggest that, in the short term, this was not the case in certain areas12. Nevertheless, the 
number of complaints regarding bus station access is relatively small, and does not seem 
to have significantly increased in the longer term (see Table 4.2).
The development of quality partnerships (or contracts) in the deregulated market (see 
Section 4.4.3) could also provide an opportunity for strategic behaviour by large 
operators. They could put a case to the local authority for service standards that are too 
high for smaller operators to afford, with the (covert) intention of creating entry barriers 
to the market. Under the provisions of the Transport Bill (Dec. 1st, 1999), however, 
potential entrants will be able to object to the provisions of quality partnerships (and 
contracts). There is also the problem that raising entry costs in this manner will be 
expensive for the large operator, and this expense will increase with the duration of the 
partnership. The Transport Bill, for example, proposes a minimum partnership period of 
five years.
12 Useful references can be found in trade journals such as Buses. Bus Business. Bus Fayre and Coachinart.
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4 .6 .3  P r e d a to r y  P r ic in g
Predatory pricing can be defined as the use of price reductions by the dominant 
incumbent operator (or group of operators) so that an entrant cannot make a profit i.e. the 
post-entry price will be below the entrant's average cost. The incumbent sacrifices short- 
run profit in order to force the entrant out of the market: after exit, the incumbent raises 
price and earns a long run profit greater than that which would have been earned if the 
entrant had stayed in the market. Some definitions of predatory pricing emphasise that 
losses must be incurred by the incumbent firm. But the definition could also apply to any 
price reduction that reduces current profit in order to deter entry. On this criterion, even a 
post-entry profitable incumbent firm could be guilty of predatory pricing (Dodgson, 
Katsoulacos and Newton, 1991). As with all entry deterring strategies, it is the threat, 
rather than its execution, which is critical. Even if predatory pricing does not actually 
occur, the threat to use it may be sufficient to deter entry. If predatory pricing does occur 
in response to entry, it may serve a two-fold purpose: firstly, to force the exit of the 
current entrant(s); secondly, to build up the incumbent's credibility as a firm which is 
willing to carry out its threat, and thus deter future entry.
Models of predatory pricing can be classified into two broad groups: game-theoretic and 
non-game theoretic. The latter type of models (e.g. McGee, 1958,1980) tend to support 
the view that predatory pricing is unlikely to succeed, and thus unlikely to occur. These 
conclusions, however, depend on the assumptions of complete information and perfect 
capital markets. In addition, the essentially static nature of these models implies that an 
important element of strategic behaviour, namely the cumulative creation of a reputation 
for carrying out threats, is not considered.
Game-theoretic models have been widely used in the analysis of predatory pricing (e.g. 
Selten, 1978, Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a, 1982b, Benoit, 
1984). In general, these models also show that the likelihood of predatory pricing 
depends on the nature of the assumptions made about information and capital markets. 
Given the existence of imperfect information, the likelihood of predatory behaviour
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increases since incumbents (even weak ones) may have an incentive to build up a 
reputation for such behaviour (Krepps and Wilson, op. cit.).
An important feature of some game-theoretic models played over a finite number o f time 
periods is the chain store paradox (Selten, op. cit.). In an n-period game, the incumbent 
will have no incentive to cut price in the nth period since there is no further period in 
which to raise price and offset the loss in profit incurred in period n. Entry in period n 
will not be opposed by the incumbent, and entry will occur as long as the post-entry price 
remains above the entrant's average cost. But if entry is never opposed in the final period, 
entry will also occur in period n-1, since the entrant knows that retaliation from the 
incumbent will not occur in period n. By a process of backward induction, entry will 
always be unopposed by the incumbent i.e. predatory pricing will not occur. But the 
logical unassailabity of this result is at variance with actual business behaviour, where 
significant post-entry price reductions are observed ': hence the "paradox". Once again, 
this result hinges on the assumption of complete information: if incomplete information is 
introduced, the chain-store paradox is resolved (Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982b).
A variant of the chain store paradox is where entrant and incumbent have complete 
information, but the entrant is subject to a financial constraint (Benoit, op. cit.). In this 
situation, the incumbent is always able to deter entry, so that a "reverse" result for the 
chain store paradox is obtained. If the assumption of complete information is relaxed, 
however, then the incumbent may not be able to deter entry even if the entrant is 
financially constrained. The financial constraint may involve the entrant paying a higher 
risk premium for borrowed funds than the incumbent. This is likely to occur when the 
incumbent is a long-established firm with a reputation for solvency, but the entrant has no 
such financial pedigree (Williamson, 1974). 13
13 The airline industry provides a well-known example: llic collapse of Laker Airways in 1982. following 
alleged predatory' pricing from other transatlantic carriers including British Airways, and the prompt 
increase in fares following Laker's exit.
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The overall conclusion from these models is that the greater the degree of incomplete 
information, the more likely predatory pricing is to occur. It seems reasonable to assume 
that information in the initial stages of UK local bus service deregulation was particularly 
incomplete, since operators were in transition from a highly regulated system that had 
lasted for more than fifty years to a new environment in which they, not the Traffic 
Commissioners, could set fares and service levels. Entrants would not have prior 
experience o f how incumbents would respond to entry, and this lack of information gives 
incumbents an opportunity to establish a reputation for predatory pricing. This strategy 
may work even where the incumbent is weak ((Kreps and Wilson, op. cil.). With the 
passage o f time, however, one would expect that operators gain a greater knowledge of 
the deregulated market, particularly the likelihood and credibility of rivals' responses. 
Given an increase in such knowledge, the incidence of predatory pricing would reduce.
This conclusion is supported by a number of examples from the deregulated bus service 
market. In the Trial Areas, which were the first areas to experience local bus service 
deregulation, about 80 per cent of incumbents either matched or reduced their fares in 
response to entrants' fare reductions. In the Hereford trial area the National Bus Company 
ran a free bus service in response to competition. The National Bus Company also 
instructed its subsidiaries to adopt a policy of "fare matching". There were even 
suggestions that money from the rates was used to reduce fares on Cardiff City Transport 
(Savage, 1985, p.38). After the initial price wars, however, predatory pricing became the 
exception rather than the rule. This pattern was also evident in the post-1986 period, 
where price competition in any case has tended to be limited (Evans, 1990).
This is not to argue that predatory pricing has become non-existent in the deregulated 
industry. Mackie and Preston (1993) give examples of its occurrence, and also details of 
the OFT's approach to deciding whether pricing is predatory or not. The approach is 
firstly to identify whether predation is feasible: evidence for this could come from the 
incumbent's market share. Secondly, the relationship between price and costs is 
examined: if the incumbent prices below short run marginal or short run variable cost, 
this is considered to be clear evidence of predatory pricing. Thirdly, the motives and
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intentions o f the incumbent are scaitinised: in the case of Highland Scottish, for example, 
its Business Plan indicated a willingness to sustain losses and thus a possible intention to 
engage in predatory pricing. It should also be noted that since deregulation there have 
been a number of free bus services operated. Whatever the difficulties involved in 
defining and identifying predatory pricing, the provision o f free services in response to 
entry is a pricing strategy that is clearly predatory.
Table 4.2 below shows a breakdown of complaints concerning anti-competitive 
behaviour made to the OFT. The official recording of such a complaint does not in itself 
imply that the complaint is investigated. Of the 541 complaints made to the OFT from 
1987 to end 1994, only nine complaints were investigated under section 3 of the 
Competition Act - eight of these alleged predatory behaviour, and one concerned bus 
station access. Six of the investigations found evidence of anti-competitive practices, and 
two o f these were referred to the MMC. During this period, two other references were 
made by the OFT to the MMC under the monopoly provisions of the Fair Trading Act 
(House of Commons Transport Committee First Report, 1995, Volume II, p. 98, and also 
Annex 1, pp. 102-3 of same).
Table 4.2: Number of complaints made to the OFT about anti-competitive practices 
by bus operators 1986-94
Year Bus Stations
a )
Subsidised 
Services (2)
Predatory
Pricing
Other (3) Total
1986 4 4 16 4 28
1987 9 7 23 18 57
1988 11 13 24 10 58
1989 7 15 19 12 53
1990 4 6 23 18 51
1991 7 4 39 18 68
1992 6 16 52 16 90
1993 10 7 51 40 108
1994 2 1 36 17 56
Total: 60 73 283 153 569
Source: 1986 data provided to the author by the OFT. 12.5.95.
1987-94 data from House of Commons Transport Committee First Report. 1995. Volume II. Table 
l.p . 98.
140
Notes: 1. Complaints about bus station access and pricing.
2. Complaints concerning re-registration of commercial services by the incumbent on a route 
previously considered unprofitable, but where an entrant had won a tendered contract to operate 
subsidised services.
3. Other complaints including the running of duplicate sendees.
The largest number of complaints concerns predatory pricing. Although price 
competition has not been widespread in the deregulated industry, the figures show that 
the number of predatory pricing complaints has generally risen since 1986, and that it 
forms on average almost half the total complaints. But the figures themselves may 
understate the problem, since the threat of predatory pricing may also create a significant 
entry barrier14. A possible solution to the problem of predatory pricing would be to 
construct a simple pricing rule that would be made explicit to operators and would 
unambiguously rule out such extreme cases as zero fares. Although the OFT uses 
information about the price-cost margin in cases of alleged price predation, there is no 
standard guideline made available to operators which would determine the minimum 
acceptable level of fares. If such information were made available, the OFT could 
undertake a more proactive, rather than its currently reactive role. The author has 
developed a pricing rule that might assist the OFT in this role (see Appendix two). A 
discussion of the roles which the OFT (and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission) 
could play in the deregulated system is also contained in Appendix two.
4.7 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has developed alternatives to the market failure framework of Chapter three. 
The idea that market failure should be corrected by regulation is, from these alternative 
viewpoints, overly simplistic for two reasons. First, the public choice school emphasises 
that regulatory failure may occur, so that the cure may be worse than the disease: second, 
the Austrian School argues that markets p e r  se do not fail, but that failure is essentially 
the result o f entry barriers to the market and an inadequate property rights system. 
Austrian School economists view (temporary) monopoly as a necessary reward for risk­
14 The author telephoned the OFT 28.02.00 to try to obtain complaints data for 1995 onwards. This data is 
not yet processed in the form of Table 4.2. and so is not readily available. It appears, however, that the
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taking in a dynamic competitive process. Similarly, mergers are not necessarily anti­
competitive, but may be a means of competing via increased cost efficiency. The crucial 
question is not market structure, but whether the market is contestable. In a perfectly 
contestable market, even a natural monopoly must set price and output at levels 
associated with perfect competition.
The re-emergence of local monopoly, together with increased market concentration via 
mergers in the deregulated bus industry, is thus not incompatible with a competitive 
market outcome. The formation of fewer but larger firms may also encourage the 
provision of more services via network effects. If the bus market is perfectly contestable, 
regulation is unnecessary.
In terms of actual entry to the deregulated market, the total number of licensed operators 
increased continuously between 1989 and 1994, from 6,415 in 1989/90 to 7,193 in 
1993/94, an increase of 12%. This increase, in conjunction with the analysis of this 
chapter, is evidence that operators can enter the market with relative ease:
"UK local bus operation is a very easy business to enter with very low legislative, capital 
or market obstacles to entry ... It is far easier to become a bus operator than, for instance, 
a street corner grocer in most instances."
(Transport Advisory Service Report, in: Transport Committee First Report, 1995, Vol.
Ill, p. 307)
However, ease of market entry is one thing: coping with post-entry predatory behaviour 
by the incumbent is another. The Buses White Paper claims that the local bus service 
market is "highly contestable". In the case of non-strategic entry barriers the evidence 
provides strong support for this view. Sunk costs are low, and the multi-output 
characteristics of the industry increase the opportunities for cross-entry and thereby the
overall number of complaints has fallen from 1995 onwards. Since complaints about predatory pricing tend 
to move in line with total complaints in Table 4.2. it is likely that they also have tended to fall.
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degree of contestability o f specific markets. For strategic entry barriers the evidence is 
less clear: predatory behaviour has been a problem not only where it has actually 
occurred, but also in terms of the threat to use it. Since threatened use is virtually 
impossible to quantify, it is difficult to gauge the extent of the problem. Such problems 
are not uncommon in other markets, however, and could in principle be reduced by 
appropriate public policy, such as intervention by the OFT or some similar body.
The effectiveness of OFT intervention in cases of alleged predatory behaviour could be 
increased by the following measures: first, specification of clear guidelines as to what 
constitutes predatory behaviour (see Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.3); second, the introduction of 
financial penalties if the predatory pricing guideline is infringed; third, a more proactive 
approach, such as interim powers to order a return to the original fare in alleged predatory 
pricing cases that are under investigation. These measures would, in all likelihood, not 
have to be used very often. Operators would know the ground-rules and the penalties of 
infringing them.
The development of quality partnerships and contracts may act to reduce contestability, 
particularly for small operators. But much will depend on the exact type of partnership or 
contract arrangement, and at the time of writing there are a number of proposals in the 
Transport Bill (Dec. 1st, 1999) that may or may not pass into law. Again, however, there 
seems no reason why the OFT cannot be given appropriate powers to intervene in cases 
of alleged anti-competitive practices.
Given these changes, the influence of strategic entry barriers would be reduced and 
contestability increased accordingly. The industry would not be perfectly contestable, 
however, so entry barriers such as economies of scale could produce situations where 
some degree of monopoly power is exploited. Mergers could also create monopoly 
power. Given a situation of imperfect contestability, market structure becomes a factor 
that should be taken into account when determining whether a monopoly or merger is 
against the public interest. There is thus a continuing role for the MMC in the deregulated 
bus industry.
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Overall, the evidence does not support the claim of the Buses White Paper that the local 
bus service market is highly contestable, but neither can the market be regarded as having 
low contestability. The weight of evidence tends to tip the balance somewhat towards 
high rather than low, so perhaps the fairest conclusion would be to regard it as 
“relatively” contestable. In conjunction with the public choice emphasis on the costs o f 
regulation, the finding of relative contestability suggests that the introduction of 
competition through deregulation is an appropriate policy for local bus services in 
Britain. But there would still be a need for residual regulation, operating mainly through 
the Traffic Commissioners, the OFT and the MMC.
Before any firm conclusions can be reached on the deregulation issue, however, a number 
of other factors need to be considered. First, there is the actual experience o f the 
deregulated local bus service market in Britain. Second, there is the empirical issue of 
how subsidy reduction affected the deregulated market. These factors are discussed in 
Chapters five and six respectively. Third, there is the issue of whether a system of 
competitive tendering for both profitable and unprofitable services might be preferable to 
the deregulated system. Competitive tendering is discussed in Chapter five (Sections
5.1.2 and 5.3.7).
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CHAPTER 5
Deregulation of Local Bus Services
The 1985 Transport Act marked the demise of the highly regulated system introduced in 
the 1930 Road Traffic Act. Following the removal o f quantity licensing in the Trial Areas 
and the long distance coach sector in 1980, the 1985 Act extended deregulation to the 
local bus service sector in Britain (excluding London). The legislation was designed to:
"... make major changes to arrangements for the bus industry, so that it is set free to give 
a better service to the passenger at less cost to the ratepayer and taxpayer."
(Buses White Paper, 1984, p. 3)
Chapters three and four discussed in some detail the general arguments for and against 
regulation, together with a number of specific examples from the local bus service 
industry. This chapter focuses these arguments on the deregulation of the industry, and 
deals with a number of issues within an analytical framework that distinguishes between 
the short, medium and longer term effects of deregulation. It is important to bear in mind 
that the deregulation of local bus services was accompanied not only by their 
privatisation, but also by a considerable reduction in subsidies to the industry. Section 5.1 
presents the background to the deregulation of local bus services, and provides an 
evaluation of the main arguments discussed in Chapters three and four in the context of 
local bus service deregulation. Section 5.2 develops a chronological framework within 
which to analyse qualitatively the dynamics of the deregulation process. Section 5.3 
discusses the short to medium term effects of the 1985 Transport Act, whilst the longer 
term effects are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides a summary and 
conclusions.
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5.1 Local Bus Service Deregulation in Britain: the background
5 .1 .1  The C ase f o r  D eregu la tion
The case for deregulation o f the industry is argued in a number of publications, notably 
the Buses White Paper (1984), Beesley and Glaister (1985) and Hibbs (1985). The main 
arguments concern the static and dynamic efficiency losses associated with the regulated 
system. This system resulted in the formation o f protected local monopolies that created 
allocative and technological inefficiencies (see Chapter three). It also resulted in dynamic 
inefficiencies because of the lack of innovation. In addition, there were the costs 
associated with regulatory failure (see Chapter four).
The difficulties the industry was experiencing by the 1970s are illustrated by the 
following figures. Between 1972 and 1982 there was a 30% real increase in fares 
compared with a real increase of only 3% in the cost of running a car. Over the same 
period, subsidies to the industry (i.e. revenue support and concessionary fare schemes) 
increased in real terms by 1,112%. Even allowing for increases in unit costs caused by 
decreases in passenger density (see Section 4.5.2), the increase in subsidy is very large.
One plausible explanation is that lack of competition created technological or "X- 
inefficiency”, so operators needed increased subsidies to cover the cost increases. Only 
8% of pre-deregulation local bus service mileage in Britain was run by private operators, 
but the Buses White Paper (1984) argues that their costs were significantly lower than 
those o f public sector operators. It cites the results of a Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory (TRRL) study based on two traffic areas, which concluded that private 
operators' costs were about 30% to 40% below those of public sector operators providing 
a similar type of service (Tunbridge and Jackson, 1980).
Further evidence is provided from a study o f private urban bus operators in Australia
where, after allowance is made for differences in the types of services, their average costs
per vehicle mile were generally between half and two-thirds those o f their public operator
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counterparts (Wallis, 1980). These results are similar to those of Hensher (1988), who 
finds that unit driver costs for public sector operators in seven major Australian cities 
were over twice as much as those for private sector operators in Sydney. Operating costs 
per bus km. were 66% higher.
Within the British public operator sector there was considerable variation in operating 
costs: in 1979/80 cost per vehicle mile varied from 84p to £1.88 around an average of 
£1.22 (Higginson and White, 1982). These figures do not allow for special circumstances, 
so that it is unclear whether or not this range of unit costs indicates the existence of 
significant "X-inefficiency” on the part of (at least) some public sector operators. Using 
figures from four operators investigated by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(1982), another study of British operators concluded that, after adjustments are made for 
differences in average operating speed and "peakiness", the differences between 
operators' costs per vehicle mile almost disappear (Mackie and Nash, 1982).
Cost reductions from competition were an especially important point for supporters of 
deregulation, since the cost reductions were needed to offset the fall in external and 
internal subsidy associated with deregulation:
"Government policy dictates that subsidy to the bus industry must fall substantially. If 
nothing else were to change then this would have serious consequences for the public. 
Fortunately, there is scope for substantial cost reduction. But this can only be achieved 
through competition ... deregulation will produce an instant response."
(Beesley and Glaister, 1985)
Critics of regulation also argued that lack o f competition had made the industry 
unresponsive to changing patterns of consumer demand, especially in the provision of 
increased bus frequencies, different fare structures and different types o f service such as 
taxis, minibuses and midibuses. This dynamic inefficiency restricts consumer choice and 
represents another source of welfare loss. A competitive market would stimulate
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innovation and increase consumer choice (Hibbs, 1975, Walters 1982, Roth and Wynne, 
1982).
Finally, the regulatory system may be subject to "regulatory capture", insofar as the 
regulators become excessively influenced by the views of those whom they are 
supposedly regulating, or by sectional interests within the regulated group. Additionally, 
the costs expended by producers in achieving and maintaining the regulated system may 
represent a considerable loss of welfare to society (see Section 4.1). Mulley (1983) 
argues that the provisions of the 1930 Road Traffic Act were excessively influenced by 
incumbent operators. A more recent example is where, shortly after the licensing changes 
in the 1980 Act, the Traffic Commissioners tended to uphold the objections of existing 
operators to new operators, even though "the supporting evidence was often meagre." 
(Buses White Paper, 1984, p. 73). This bias was subsequently reduced when the Traffic 
Commissioners began to take a wider interpretation of the term "public interest" (see 
Section 2.5.1.4).
5 .1 .2  The C ase aga in st D eregu la tion
The government did not issue a Green Paper prior to the publication of the Buses White 
Paper of 1984. Consequently, the White Paper was published without the benefit of a 
formal consultation process. The proposals in the White Paper generated considerable 
debate, and the proposals in the subsequent Transport Bill were given a generally critical 
response by the House of Commons Transport Committee (Bell and Cloke, 1990, p. 44). 
Although there was a broad agreement that change was necessary in the bus industry, 
and that the aims of the White Paper were appropriate to the type of change required, 
there was considerable disagreement as to whether the means contained in the White 
Paper would produce the desired end. The case against deregulation is succinctly 
articulated in the following comments:
"The analysis o f the White Paper rests on four straightforward propositions: deregulation 
will produce a competitive market, competitive pressures will reduce costs, competition
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will improve resource allocation and will not cause significant adverse side effects. We 
reject all of these propositions."
(Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie, 1985a, p. 130)
The rejection of propositions one and two is based on the view that the UK local bus 
service market is not contestable. The evidence discussed in Chapter four, however, 
suggests that the market is “relatively contestable”. The presence of competition, both 
potential and actual, is manifested most clearly by the large fall in bus operating costs in 
the two-year period after deregulation. Heseltine and Silcock (1990) estimate that there 
were average cost reductions per bus km of 30 per cent between 1985/86 and 1987/88 
outside London. Mackie, Preston and Nash (1995, p. 238) concede that "From the 
Government's point o f view, this is a spectacularly successful result, ...", although some 
part of the fall in costs may be due to factors not associated with competition. This 
decline in costs continued over the longer term: between 1985/86 and 1993/94 operating 
costs per bus kilometre (including depreciation) fell by 41 per cent in real terms outside 
London (Bus and Coach Statistics, 1996/97).
It is generally agreed that actual competition has not been widespread in the post­
deregulation period, and that it has been less than the supporters of deregulation expected 
(Glaister, 1993). But the absence of widespread actual competition should not be used to 
infer that the deregulated market is not competitive. In conjunction with the large fall in 
unit operating costs, it strengthens the case for assuming that the UK local bus service 
market is contestable. If actual competition has not been widespread, then potential 
competition must be a significant force in exerting downward pressure on operating 
costs.
The rejection of proposition three is based on the view that market failure is significant in 
the UK local bus service industry. The conclusions of Chapter three are that the likeliest 
sources of market failure in the industry occur through wasteful competition and 
externalities, primarily unfair competition. Unfair competition arises because o f the
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failure to price car use at its marginal social cost. This situation results from government 
policy towards car users, and has existed in both the pre and post-deregulation periods.
As such, it is not relevant to the arguments concerning the merits or demerits of the 
deregulation of bus services.
Wasteful competition may arise from the natural monopoly characteristics o f the industry 
and the provision of sub-optimal fare and frequency combinations in an unregulated 
market (see Section 3.3.3). The problem with the wasteful competition argument is that it 
is based on a static view of competition. If the dynamics of the competitive process are 
taken into account, as in the approach of the Austrian school, the concept of wasteful 
competition becomes increasingly problematic. Competition that is considered wasteful 
from a static perspective may be interpreted as beneficial in a dynamic context (see 
Section 4.2). There is the further problem that a regulatory solution to wasteful 
competition may involve as much, if not more failure, than the market solution (see 
Section 4.1).
In terms o f adverse side effects, it was argued that deregulation might result in lower 
safety standards, increased congestion, and loss of services (Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie, 
op. 67/.). Safety standards have not declined in the post-deregulation period, however, and 
congestion has not generally caused serious problems (Mackie, Preston and Nash, op.
67/.). It is more difficult to evaluate the loss of service argument, since data for vehicle 
kms will incorporate some element of schedule matching. Where schedule matching 
occurs there is likely to be a reduction in load factors, so that some buses may run with 
few, if any, passengers. In this case, it can be argued that the increase in vehicle 
kilometres does not represent a corresponding increase in service levels.
There is also the problem that increases in vehicle kilometres may arise through the use 
of smaller buses scheduled at increased frequencies. There has been a considerable 
degree of service innovation in the post-deregulation period, particularly with respect to 
the use of mini and midibuses (Mackie, Preston and Nash, op. 67/.). It may be the case
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that in terms of vehicle sea tin g  capacity, service quality actually fell. This issue is 
discussed in detail in Section 5.3.2.
Bus kilometres in Britain (outside London) increased by 24 per cent between 1985/86 
and 1993/94 (Department of Transport, 1994). It is most unlikely that an increase of this 
size could be accounted for solely in terms of schedule matching. The increase has 
occurred mainly in the commercial service sector, with the subsidised sector remaining 
broadly constant. In terms of vehicle seating capacity, there was a slight increase between 
1985/86 and 1988/89 for local bus services, with the rise in the non-metropolitan areas 
outweighing the decrease in the metropolitan areas and Scotland (see Section 5.3.2).
These aggregate figures obviously conceal spatial and temporal variations in service 
quality. Where service cuts took place, it is important to bear in mind that they might also 
have occurred in the regulated system as part of a desire to reduce the rapidly increasing 
network subsidy. Overall, it is not unreasonable to infer that loss of services, whether 
measured in terms o f vehicle kilometres or vehicle seating capacity, has not in general 
been a major problem in the post-deregulation period.
Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie (1985a) argue that deregulation policy should have 
encouraged competition "for the market", rather than competition "in the market" (or "on- 
the-road" competition). Their recommendation is to introduce competitive tendering for 
unprofitable a n d  profitable services. Local authorities would invite operators to tender for 
the franchise to run a service. The highest bidder in the case of a profitable service, or the 
bidder requiring the lowest subsidy in the case of an unprofitable service, would be 
awarded the sole right to operate the service for a fixed time period, and the contract 
could specify the minimum service and the maximum fare. At the end of the allotted 
time period the service would be put out to tender again. In this way competition would 
be encouraged without the possibilities sometimes associated with "on-the-road" 
competition, such as schedule matching and "cream skimming".
Beesley and Glaister (1985) argue that competitive tendering for profitable services is 
undesirable for a number of reasons: first, collusion in the tendering process is likely to
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occur between the larger incumbent operators; second, local authorities will in practice 
tend to implement competitive tendering in a gradual way over small parts of the 
network, so that the potential for collusion will increase: third, the tender contract will in 
practice only allow bidders to compete on price and possibly one other quality variable, 
so that competitive tendering will prevent bidders from competing in other ways e.g. 
season discounts, bus size, quality of vehicle; fourth, the difficulties of recontracting may 
enable the franchisee to "capture" the franchisor, perhaps by providing a lower service 
quality than originally specified. Large firms could also reduce competition for the 
market by block-bidding for route networks (Glaister and Beesley, 1991).
In a study of the competitive tendering system for London bus services, Glaister and 
Beesley {op. c it .) conclude that, for the period 1985 to 1988, public sector operators had 
systematically higher costs than private sector operators, indicating that the system was 
not in equilibrium. In a similar study, however, Kennedy (1995) found no cost 
differences between public and private sector operators for the period 1985 to 1993, 
indicating that the tendering system had moved to a competitive equilibrium. The study 
also found cost savings from the competitive tendering process of 20 per cent, a result 
consistent with that of Domberger et al. (1986) for refuse collection. This does not, 
however, preclude the possibility that cost savings would have been greater if on-the-road 
competition had been allowed for London's profitable routes. Domberger et al. have also 
been criticised on the grounds that their cost equation is mis-specified, that they have 
measured the gains from privatisation without including the losses, and that service 
quality declined following the tendering process (Ganley and Grahl, 1988).
The arguments for competitive tendering in the commercial network, like those for 
regulation generally, are based on the static efficiency losses resulting from market 
failure and the belief that regulatory failure, particularly regulatory capture, is not 
significant. The discussion of Chapter four emphasises that this traditional or public 
interest approach is not sufficient to evaluate the benefits and costs of the regulation- 
deregulation debate. By omitting the public choice and Austrian school approaches, it 
biases the outcome of the debate towards regulation. When these other approaches are
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taken into account, the arguments in favour of deregulation and "on-the-road" 
competition are stronger.
More recently, another argument against deregulation has been emphasised. This is the 
view that deregulation creates a loss of public control of bus services, so that local 
authorities cannot use public transport policy as an instrument to achieve social and 
environmental aims (Mackie, Preston and Nash, op. c it ., Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP), 1994). The view of the RCEP depends on the argument 
that local authorities can integrate fares and services in an optimal way. The Transport 
Act 1985, having removed the powers of local authorities to provide and integrate 
services, means that:
"It is not therefore possible for them [local authorities] to ensure the most cost-effective 
implementation of the measures which they adopt in pursuit of land-use and 
transportation strategies."
(Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1994)
The arguments concerning integration have been discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 4.5.4. 
Their overall conclusion is that integration can be provided by market forces, although 
the degree of integration is likely to be less than that in a regulated system. There is also 
no particular reason why a local authority can provide transport services more cost- 
effectively than the market, particularly if the costs of regulatory failure are taken into 
account. As far as land use is concerned, the biggest single problem associated with 
transport is the underpricing of car use (see Section 3.3.3.5). The first best solution to this 
problem is to charge car users more, rather than allow local authorities to subsidise public 
transport. Indeed, the use of public transport subsidy to achieve land-use aims appears to 
be a questionable practice:
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"... it would appear that in general transport subsidy policy is a possible instrument of 
long-term land-use strategy, but is likely to be a weak and relatively expensive means of 
achieving any objective."
(Gwilliam, 1987, p.13)
To conclude, the theoretical case against deregulation, as argued by Gwilliam, Nash and 
Mackie (1985) is based firmly on the public interest model. This model is useful for 
identifying static welfare losses, but does not take into account the dynamic benefits of 
competition, the costs of regulatory failure or the importance o f potential competition. As 
such, it provides an incomplete framework for the evaluation of deregulation. The large 
fall in unit operating costs provides firm evidence for the emergence of a competitive 
industry, in contrast to the predictions of Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie {op. c it.).
5 .1 .3  P riva tisa tio n
Privatisation formed a cornerstone of the supply-side policies o f the 1979 Conservative 
government. In the words of Mr. Nicholas Ridley (then Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury):
"It must be right to press ahead with the transfer of ownership from state to private 
enterprise of as many public sector businesses as possible ... The introduction of 
competition must be linked to a transfer of ownership to private citizens and away from 
the State. Real public ownership - that is ownership by people - must be and is our 
ultimate goal."
(Treasury Economic Progress Report, May, 1982)
Privatisation is based on the belief that ownership affects economic performance. It is a 
wider term than denationalisation and can take a number of forms, ranging from the sale 
of council houses, the introduction of competitive tendering, and the sale of shares (either 
wholly or partly) in public corporations. Proponents, using the experiences of the post-
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war U K  nationalised industries, argue that state-owned enterprises were producer 
oriented and unresponsive to the needs of consumers. In particular, they were a bastion 
for restrictive Trades Union practices. They were also "X " inefficient because of the lack 
of capital market discipline, since (Labour) governments tended to write offlosses rather 
than suffer the political unpopularity associated with rationalising "lame duck" industries 
(Polanyi and Polanyi, 1974). It was argued that the transfer of assets from the public to 
the private sector would increase consumer sovereignty and allocative efficiency, 
decrease "X " inefficiency, and also provide management and employees with an 
opportunity to buy shares in their companies. The alternative view, that nationalised 
industries performed better than the private (manufacturing) sector, is supported by Pryke 
(1971), although this conclusion was subsequently modified (Pryke, 1981).
The National Bus Company was privatised in 1986. It was not privatised en b loc, but 
split up into free-standing subsidiaries which were gradually sold off to the private sector. 
This fragmentation began with the management buy-out of Devon General in August 
1986 and was completed in April 1988 with the sale of London Country Buses (North 
East) to Parkdale. The decision not to privatise en bloc was because:
"The Company's size and financial strength might deter other operators from competing 
with it particularly in view of the strong position from which it will start."
(Buses White Paper, p.17-18)
This view is supported by a number of considerations, both general and specific. British 
Telecom, which enjoyed a monopoly of the U K  telecommunications market, was 
privatised en bloc. Ten years after privatisation, British Telecom still retained at least 85 
per cent of the overall market. Its success was due in part to price-cutting, innovation and 
improved service, and also to "sheer muscle”1. In the specific case of the bus market, it is 
supported by the experience of the Trial Areas, where N B C  used its size to deter entry:
1 The Times, 11.1.95, p.29.
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"N B C  had a policy of fighting new entrants in the Courts together with a policy of 
subsequently reducing fares to match competitors' prices and refusing access to N B C -  
controlled bus stations as a means of running them off the road."
(Mulley and Wright, 1986, p. 18)
It should be noted that, even after the privatisation of individual N B C  subsidiaries, the 
average size of a subsidiary's fleet was about 500 buses. This is in sharp contrast to the 
private operator sector prior to deregulation, where 93 per cent of the 5,848 private 
operators owned less than fifteen buses (Transport Select Committee, 1985, p. 172). The 
size of ex-NBC subsidiaries relative to private operators may be a reason why actual 
competition after deregulation has been less than anticipated. On the other hand, the form 
of privatisation did encourage competition between ex-NBC subsidiaries. Ideally, the 
government could have encouraged buy-outs to take place at sub-subsidiary level, 
although this would have complicated the privatisation process.
5.1 .4  Subsidy
This section reviews the arguments for and against subsidy in the context of the bus 
industry, and examines the legislative changes introduced by the 1979 Conservative 
government to control expenditure on subsidy. Subsidy can be divided into two types: 
external and internal (i.e. cross-subsidy). The former is provided by local and central 
government to operators. The latter is provided by the operator when part of the revenue 
from profitable services is used to subsidise the running of unprofitable services.
5.1.4.1 External Subsidy
The case for subsidy depends on the existence of market failure. If  markets fail to 
maximise social welfare, then there may be a case for the provision of subsidy to offset 
the market failure, provided that the benefits of the subsidy outweigh any undesirable 
side effects (Gwilliam, 1987). Market failure is here taken to include equity, as well as
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economic efficiency considerations. It should be noted that it is not the desire to promote 
equity which creates a market failure, but rather the violation of the Pareto-efficiency 
conditions through the non-lump sum transfers which are often used to achieve this aim.
Chapter three concluded that the main sources of market failure in local bus services are 
likely to be wasteful competition and externalities. Although a lack of equity was not 
considered as a form of market failure, it obviously provides an important justification for 
subsidy in terms of social policy. Low income groups make significantly more use of 
buses than other income groups, and subsidising bus travel would be one method of 
income redistribution.
Ruling out subsidy as an appropriate form of intervention in the case of wasteful 
competition, the economic efficiency argument in favour of subsidy to local bus services 
depends mainly on the existence of externalities. Although economies of scale are often 
given as a justification for subsidy under marginal cost pricing, the weight of evidence 
suggests that there are no significant scale economies in bus operations (see Section 
4.5.1).
There are two forms of externality that justify the provision of subsidy. First, the 
existence of unpriced congestion and pollution costs from car use implies that subsidy to 
public transport could be used as a second best solution to the externality problem (see 
Section 3.3.3.5). In general, buses use road space twenty times more efficiently than cars, 
and energy four times as efficiently. It is also the case that bus passenger deaths per 
passenger kilometre are one eighth those for car occupants (House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 1985, Second Report, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 2). The theoretical 
problems of calculating the benefits of a subsidy to reduce congestion are considered by 
Jackson (1975) and Shilony (1981). Second, the existence of unpriced benefits accruing 
from the "Mohring effect", whereby existing bus users gain from the provision of 
increased service frequencies (Mohring, 1972),
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In a study of the effectiveness of urban public transport subsidy, Glaister (1987) 
concludes that, outside London, subsidies to reduce traffic congestion have limited effect. 
On the other hand, the "Mohring effect" was more important than expected, although this 
was estimated in the context of a reduction in both fares and service frequencies. In a 
study of major Australian cities, however, Dodgson (1987) concludes that, once the extra 
costs of operating more vehicle kilometres are taken into account, there are disbenefits 
from subsidising increased service frequencies. Both studies find that subsidy is generally 
more effective if it is used to decrease fares rather than increase services. This is not to 
argue that subsidy is justified, however, since neither study takes into account the 
problems of subsidy "leakage" or the appropriate shadow price of public funds.
Subsidies can also be provided for unremunerative services deemed "socially necessary". 
Hibbs (1971) has questioned this policy, arguing that " If  people are not prepared to pay 
for it then there is at least a prim afac ie  case for saying it is not required." But this is a 
dubious argument, since lack of demand for a service may arise because of an inability 
rather than an unwillingness to pay. In effect, this is the equity argument for subsidy. 
Generally speaking, it is the desire to promote equity, rather than reduce market failure, 
which has been the dominant influence in determining local authorities' policies towards 
public transport subsidy. The method of promoting greater equity has been the provision 
of concessionary fares for eligible groups, mainly the elderly, visually impaired, disabled 
and school children. As noted in Mackie and Preston (1996, p. 179), concessionary fares 
are a form of price discrimination and may also promote greater efficiency by reducing 
fares towards marginal costs.
The two main components of local authority subsidy to bus operators are revenue support 
and reimbursements towards the cost of concessionary fare schemes. Other sources of 
non-fare income include grants towards capital expenditure and fuel duty rebates (the 
latter being paid direct from central government). Between 1972 and 1982 expenditure on 
revenue support and concessionary fares increased from £22 million to £725 million, a 
real increase of 1,112%2. Prior to the 1985 Transport Act external subsidy was paid on a
2 Figures are based on Tables 17 mid 18 of the Buses White Paper (1984).
158
"blanket" basis i.e. to a service network rather than to individual services within that 
network. The amount of subsidy paid was determined by negotiation between the local 
authority and the operator. In 1982/83 fares and other receipts, revenue support and 
concessionary fare scheme payments formed 62%, 28% and 10% respectively of bus 
operators' income (House of Commons Transport Committee, 1985, Second Report, Vol. 
II, p. 177).
Table 5.1 below shows the considerable differences in the regional distribution o f these 
subsidies. These differences reflect the tendency of Labour controlled metropolitan 
counties to use transport subsidies as a means of achieving equity objectives. The low 
fares policy of the now defunct Greater London Council is a well known example. The 
abolition of the metropolitan county councils, together with tighter controls on public 
sector spending, would be expected to reduce the regional subsidy differential.
Table 5.1: Bus subsidy to consumers (£ per capita) 1982/83
Revenue
Support
Concessionary
Fares
G LC 29.7 7.3
Metropolitan Counties 19.9 7.2
English and Welsh non­
metropolitan counties and 
districts 3.0 1.6
Scottish councils 7.4 7.9
Average 10.2 4.0
Source: K.M. Gwilliam, Local Transport Subsidy 1973-85, in: Transport U.K. 1985
It is interesting to consider the subsidy figures in an international context: for example, 
the subsidy per capita3 in 1980 for New Zealand, Britain and Sweden was £2.3, £8.0 and 
£28.8 respectively (Webster, 1986). Taking into account both population and gross
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domestic product, Britain has a higher level of subsidy than most other European 
countries covered in the above survey. The conflict between local authorities' desire to 
provide services and central government's desire to control public spending was 
illustrated in 1984/85, when local authorities’ budgeted spending on public transport 
subsidy was £8.1 million, or 34% above the government's planned spending.
Given this background, the "blanket" subsidy system described above was criticised in 
two ways. Firstly, it did not encourage incumbent bus operators to improve their 
efficiency: on the contrary, efficiency improvements might have tempted the local 
authority to reduce the subsidy in a subsequent round of negotiations. It is possible that 
the provision of a blanket subsidy may have encouraged operators to become less 
efficient. Bly and Oldfield (1985), analysing subsidy data from over a hundred cities in 
selected countries, estimated that, on average, between 40 and 60 per cent of any increase 
in subsidy was associated with higher average costs, particularly wage increases. This 
process of subsidy "leakage" is corroborated by studies using American data (Anderson, 
1983, Pucher et. al., 1983, Windle, 1988). Although it could be argued that the direction 
of causation was from higher average costs to increases in subsidy, empirical tests by B ly  
and Oldfield (op. cit.) do not support this view4. Nevertheless, there are problems with 
the methodologies used in these studies, and the importance of subsidy leakage, if it does 
exist in Britain, may be overstated (Gwilliam, Nash and Mackie, 1985a).
Secondly, the system meant that subsidy was paid to a service network, so that losses on 
individual services were not made transparent to outside parties. Thus it was generally 
not possible for an outside party to ascertain the underlying structure of external subsidy 
across services. In the extreme case, a given network loss could arise from a large loss on 
a single service, or from small losses on a large number of services. It might be of 
interest to rate and taxpayers to know the destination and degree of subsidy to which they 
contribute, but under the blanket system this information was not available. 3
3 The figures refer mainly to stage carriage bus services, but also include subsidies to cover urban rail 
services of the Underground or Metro types (but not mainline rail services).
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5 .1.4.2 Internal Subsidy
The Traffic Commissioners administered the 1930 Road Traffic Act on the basis that 
operators were expected to provide unremunerative (but socially necessary) services in 
return for monopoly power on the profitable routes. Thus cross-subsidy was an integral 
part of this system. Ponsonby has defined internal or cross-subsidisation as a policy 
which:
" ... involves deliberately and knowingly providing services or parts of services at a loss 
so that, if the undertaking as a whole is to pay its way, more than normal profits (i.e. 
monopoly) must be made from its other services."
(Ponsonby, 1969)
The practice of cross-subsidy, whilst enabling a network of profitable and unprofitable 
services to be maintained, is open to objections which can be summarised in terms of 
efficiency, equity and accountability. Firstly, in the absence of both demand and cost 
interdependencies there will be a welfare loss because price will not equal marginal cost 
on either the profitable or unprofitable service. The subsidised services may also become 
subject to the problem of “X ” inefficiency. Secondly, the direction of cross-subsidy may 
be from low to high income groups (Posner, 1975). In this respect the White Paper cites 
the example of low income car-owning groups who make frequent use of urban bus 
services and high income car-owning groups who make infrequent use of (subsidised) 
rural services. Finally, the amount and direction of cross-subsidy is determined by bus 
operators rather than elected representatives accountable to their electorate.
Cross-subsidy occurs both spatially and temporally, although in practice its measurement 
is problematic because services may be related on the demand or cost side or both. 
Faulhaber (1975) recommends appropriate tests for the determination of cross-subsidy. 4
4 The study concluded, on the basis of introducing lime lags into the regression analysis, that "the overall 
tendency was for change in subsidy to precede the changes in cost and output per employee, rather than 
vice versa". (Bly and Oldfield. 1985, p. 19).
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Glaister and Mulley (1983) argue that, contrary to the usual view, peak bus users are 
generally subsidised by off-peak users because peak capacity can only be used 
productively for a relatively short time period. To give a rough indication of the 
importance of cross-subsidy, the N B C  estimated that deregulation might force it to 
withdraw approximately £122 million of cross-subsidies5. This is about twice the amount 
it received from external subsidies (Institute for Transport Studies 1984). The Institute 
study indicates that inter-urban routes support rural and, to a lesser extent, intra-urban 
routes. Temporally, the direction of subsidy depends on the method of cost allocation. 
Using a "preferred" allocated cost system, the study concludes that the general temporal 
direction of cross-subsidy was from weekday inter-peaks and Saturdays to weekday 
peaks and Sundays.
Cross-subsidy arises not only because of the desire to maintain a service network of 
profitable and unprofitable services, but also because of the practice of adopting uniform 
fare scales, usually on a pence per mile basis. This practice was favoured by the Traffic 
Commissioners because of its intrinsic simplicity for administrative purposes, and also as 
a means of establishing "proper" competition between operators. Given that different 
services will tend to have a different cost per mile, and given a break-even constraint, 
such a practice will inevitably lead to cross-subsidy between those services.
The introduction of competition reduces the ability of operators to cross-subsidise 
because the entry of new operators into profitable services decreases the profits available 
to cross-subsidise. In a situation of perfect competition, or perfect contestability, cross­
subsidy would be completely eliminated.
5.1.4.3 Legislation and Subsidy Control 1983 - 88
Given the large increases in public expenditure on subsidies to public transport 
throughout the 1970's, together with a desire to reduce public spending generally, the
5 As with all estimates of cross-subsidy, this figure should be treated with some caution. In this particular 
case, it is also open to the charge of special pleading.
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1979 Conservative government introduced a number of legislative changes designed to 
restrict the spending power of local authorities, particularly the metropolitan authorities. 
Between 1979 and 1989, for example, there were around twenty Acts passed that affected 
local government finance. This section describes the main features of those Acts that had 
most influence on subsidy to the bus industry. The issue of subsidy and the direction of 
causality with bus fares is an important topic analysed in more detail in Chapter six.
The 1983 Local Government Act introduced "Protected Expenditure Levels" set by the 
relevant Secretary of State. If  Passenger Transport Authorities exceeded the level set by 
the Transport Secretary, they could be subject to legal challenge. In the same year the 
Transport Act required the PTAs to submit three-year financial plans to the Department 
of Transport, in order that proposed PTA spending could be more closely scrutinised. It 
also introduced the possibility of tendering for services on a limited scale. The 1984 
Rates Act introduced "rate capping", whereby limits were imposed on the local taxes 
which local authorities could set to pay for services such as public transport. In 1985 the 
Local Government Act abolished the metropolitan counties and established the PTAs as 
joint-boards composed of elected district council members from within the metropolitan 
area. These new boards were also subject to rate capping. Finally, the 1988 Local 
Government Finance Act replaced the rating system with the Poll Tax (later the 
Community Charge). Business rates were replaced by a national non-domestic rate, so 
that local authority spending in excess of central government limits had to be financed by 
increases in the community charge.
The effect of these legislative changes was to place a much tighter financial constraint on 
local authorities. This was particularly evident in the PTAs such as South Yorkshire, 
where the changes forced the abandonment of low fare policies.
5.2 Effects of the 1985 Transport Act: a framework for analysis
The 1985 Transport Act deregulated local bus services and introduced a process of 
privatisation to the industry. The details of the Act are described in Appendix one. In
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order to analyse the effects of the 1985 Act, it is convenient to distinguish between the 
short, medium and long term effects. This section provides an explanation of these 
concepts in the context of the bus industry, and a justification for the preferred 
chronological structure. Most of the fundamental changes in the industry took place in the 
short and medium term, and these changes are discussed in Section 5.3. Discussion of the 
longer term effects are dealt with in Section 5.4. The key issue of subsidy reduction and 
the long term effects of deregulation are dealt with in Chapter six, where an econometric 
model is specified and estimated.
The short to medium term effects of the 1985 Act are defined as those effects occurring 
within the two and a half year period after deregulation on October 26 1986. The attempt 
to define the difference between the economic concepts of short, medium and long run 
periods in terms of chronological time will always depend, to a greater or lesser extent, 
on the nature of the market involved and the judgement of the analyst. Financial markets 
adjust relatively quickly, and the short run may be a matter of days or even hours. 
Employment contracts are relatively flexible, redundant computers and company cars can 
be resold fairly easily, and interest rates can be adjusted at very short notice.
The bus industry, on the other hand, faces a number of constraints on its ability to adjust. 
The bus industry is labour intensive (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1982), and 
for this reason alone is likely to adjust more slowly than less labour intensive industries6. 
Trade union influence, although reduced by the effects of deregulation, still exists 
(Pickup et a l, 1991). There is also the point that regulation of local services lasted for 
fifty years, engendering a set of values amongst many operators which deregulation 
would take time to modify. Given these considerations, it seems reasonable to assume 
that full adjustment to the effects of the 1985 Transport Act will take years, rather than 
months. Since the 1985 Act took effect on 26 October 1986 ("Deregulation Day"), the 
following sections often refer to the pre and post deregulation periods for convenience. It 
should be remembered, however, that the 1985 Act introduced deregulation of local
6 Sec. for example. Economics. 1994. 4lh ed.. Bcgg. Fischer and Dornbusch. McGraw-Hill, p.561.
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services and privatisation. Other legislation also introduced subsidy reduction for the 
industry (see Section 5.1.4).
The adjustment process is specified as follows. The short term effects are those occurring 
over the financial year periods 1985/86 - 1986/87. Data for financial years are used, since 
this is the method by which they are presented in the Bus and Coach Statistics, and 
Transport Statistics, publications from 1985/86 onwards. The change from calendar to 
financial year data causes two problems. Firstly, strict comparisons of time series data up 
to and including 1984 with those from 1985/86 onwards are made more difficult because 
calendar year periods do not coincide completely with financial year periods. Secondly, 
and more importantly for this section, the period 1986/87 covers both pre and post 
deregulation periods (7 and 5 months respectively). In comparing 1985/86 with 
1986/87data, more weight will be given to the pre-deregulation period so that the short 
term effects of the 1985 Act will tend to be understated.
A  more equally weighted comparison could be obtained by comparing the 1986 and 1987 
calendar year periods, but this is not possible using the published data. Another 
possibility is to compare the pre and post-deregulation periods within the 1986/87 period, 
namely the period 1 April 1986 to 25 October 1986 with that for 26 October to 3 1 March 
1987. Bus and Coach Statistics, however, only gives this information for the vehicle 
mileage variable7. Using this information, there is a fall in total local service vehicle 
mileage of 22.4%: using the data for 1985/86 to 1986/87, however, there is an increase of 
4%. This shows clearly the sensitivity of the results to the choice of comparison periods. 
Another possibility is to use quarterly data to compare the pre and post deregulation 
periods within the 1986/87 period, but quarterly data is less reliable than annual data8 and 
is not readily available for most of the variables required for a comprehensive 
comparison. Given these difficulties, it seems appropriate to retain the 1985/86 - 1986/87 
comparison, but to bear in mind that it will tend to underestimate the short term effects.
' Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain. 1986/87. (88) 29. Feb. 1988, p. 11.
8 Data is collected by the Department of Transport from a sample of operators who are obliged to provide 
annual, but not quarterly, returns. Consequently, quarterly data tends to be less reliable.
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Even so, some of the changes that occurred in this period are fairly dramatic, as Table 5.2 
in Section 5.3.1 demonstrates.
The medium term effects are defined as those occurring over the periods 1986/87 - 
1988/89. This chronology is designed to capture the "settling down" process after the 
initial changes caused by the 1985 Act. In comparing the changes between 1986/87 and 
1987/88 there will be a tendency to overstate the effects of the Act, for reasons analogous 
to those given in the previous paragraph. In fact, some of the changes during this period 
are greater than those in the short term period. Nevertheless, by the period 1987/88 - 
1988/89, the rate of change generally becomes much lower than in previous periods.
Thus the short to medium term effects of the 1985 Act occur over the period 1985/86 - 
1988/89 (see column 5 of Table 5.2).
It follows that the long term effects of the 1985 Act fall within the period from 1988/89 
onwards. There are two advantages associated with this chronology. Firstly, the long term 
is often defined in economic theory, in so far as the theory is concerned with the 
dynamics of the adjustment process, as the period during which the industry reaches, or 
approaches, an "equilibrium". Equilibrium in this sense implies a steady-state or stable 
situation. This corresponds fairly well with the pattern of the data observed for the bus 
industry. The settling down process begins in the medium term, and continues into the 
long term9. Secondly, the long term can also be defined as the period during which 
fundamental changes take place in the structure of the industry. In the context of the bus 
industry, such a change began to occur sometime after 1989 when companies started to 
merge with or take over other companies:
"Since 1989, the industry has begun a further phase of adjustment. A  process of 
concentration has begun based on the policy that market entry is most profitable by 
company merger and takeover rather than competition on-the-road or through tenders. 
This process is, in some areas, producing local monopolies and is likely to continue with
9 Long term changes are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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the expansion of holding companies and with small operators retaining a significant 
though limited role."
(Pickup et al., 1991, p. 65)
This is a significant change since the move towards greater concentration, particularly 
amongst the larger companies, represents the beginning of a process that reverses the 
trend towards smaller, more independent companies initiated by the 1985 Act.
5.3 Short to Medium Term Effects of the 1985 Transport Act
The purpose of this section is to provide a discussion of the short to medium term effects 
of the 1985 Act on the local service bus industry, using the analytical framework 
developed in the previous section. Following deregulation there was a considerable 
amount of research on these effects, and more detailed accounts can be found in a large 
number of sources including Balcombe et al. (1987), Hopkin and Perrett (1987), 
Meadowcroft and Pickup (1987), Cahm and Guiver (1988), Rickard et al. (1988), White 
(1988), Perrett et al. (1989) and Pickup et al. (1991). The Transport Research Laboratory 
(TRL) published forty-six reports between 1983 and 1992 on deregulation and 
competition in the bus and coach industries10. Table 5.2 below summarises some o f the 
major trends following the 1985 Act in terms of a selection of indicator variables: column 
2 captures the short term changes, columns 3 and 4 the medium term changes, and 
column 5 the changes occurring over the short to medium term. The changes are for the 
English metropolitan areas and the rest of Britain (excluding London and Strathclyde).
5.3.1 O verall Changes 1985/86 - 88/89
It is clear from Table 5.2 overleaf that changes in the (English) metropolitan areas were 
generally significantly different to those in the rest of Britain excluding London. This is
10 See Annex 1 of the House of Commons Transport Committee. 1993. (Fourth Report. Vol. Ill, pp. 378-9) 
for a complete list of the reports.
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particularly evident for fare increases, where the 30.5% fare increase in the metropolitan 
areas contrasts with a negligible increase in the non-metropolitan areas.
Table 5.2: Short to medium term effects of the 1985 Transport Act
1
Indicator
Variable
2
%  Change 
85/86-86/87
3
%  Change 
86/87-87/88
4
%  Change 
87/88-88/89
5
% Change 
85/86-88/89
Met (a) Non- 
Met
Met Non- 
Met
Met Non-
Met
Met Non- All 
Met
Passenger
Journeys
-12.5 -2.1 -4.3 -0.9 -2.2 -1.7 -18.1 -4.7 -10.9
Passenger 
Receipts (b)
+0.5 -4.0 +0.3 -2.4 -2.2 -2.7 + 1.4 -8 .8  -5.5
Fares (b) +24.8 +1.5 +4.1 +0.9 +0.3 0.0 +30.5 +1.2 +8.3
Vehicle
Kilometres
-3.0 +7.8 + 10.6 +9.3 +2.8 + 1.3 + 10.3+19.4 +16.5
Vehicle 
Stock (c)
-5.5 +4.3 -2.3 +4.3 0.0 +0.3 -7.7 +9.1 +6.7
Operating 
costs (b) (d)
-10.4 -14.3 -19.2 -11.1 -9.5 0.0 -34.5 -23.8 -26.1
Operating 
costs (b) (e)
-13.0 -7.6 -10.7 -2.8 -7.0 + 1.3 -27.8 -9.0 -6.4
Staff (c) 
Employed
-15.6 +0.4 -12.8 +0.4 -1.1 -0.3 -27.2 +0.6 -6.1 
(-27.l)(+7.5) (-2.8)
Revenue 
Support (b)
-19.9 -10.4 -34.2 -20.6 -16.9 -1.6 -56.2 -30.1 -46.5
Source: derived from Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain 1990/91. Department of Transport. 1991.
Tables 2.1. 5.1. 3.1. 1.1,6.1. 4.1. 4.2. 7.1. 5.6.
Notes:
(a) "Met" refers to data for local services operated within the English metropolitan areas. Although 
this classification excludes the Strathclyde metropolitan area, it is chosen because it enables direct 
comparisons to be made between most of the indicator variables in Table 5.2. "All" refers to data 
for local services operated in Britain, excluding London. "Non-met" is equal to "All" minus "Met".
(b) Figures are inflation adjusted: 1985=100 for fares and passenger receipts. 1990/91=100 for 
other nominal variables.
(c) Figures are for bus and coach services i.e. they refer to the provision of local and non-local 
services. They are also based on metropolitan PTCs (rather than English metropolitan areas) and 
London Buses Ltd. (rather than London). Figures in rounded brackets in column 5 represent the 
estimates for staff employed in the provision of local serv ices only. They arc derived bv using the 
proportion of local to total vehicle kilometres giv en in Table 1.3 of Bus and Coach Statistics (op. 
cit.) for the appropriate years as a weighting factor.
(d) Operating costs per vehicle kilometre, excluding depreciation.
(e) Total operating costs, excluding depreciation: data derived by grossing up from Tables 1.1 and
4.1 of Bus and Coach Statistics (op. cit.).
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This difference was caused by the ending of low fares policies in the English 
metropolitan areas and the consequent sharp increase in fares, especially in South 
Yorkshire and Merseyside, although fares had started to rise before deregulation both as a 
result of rate capping and a desire to partially pre-empt the anticipated fare increases. The 
increase in fares may be understated because of a failure to adjust fare index weightings 
in a period of rapid change (Mackie, Preston and Nash, 1995). There was also a 
considerable amount of change in the Strathclyde metropolitan area where, in addition to 
fare increases, the PTC initially experienced strong competition from Scottish Bus Group 
subsidiaries and Stagecoach.
There was a substantial fall in operating costs per vehicle km in both metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan areas. The size of this fall matches the predictions made in the White 
Paper, and supports the view that there was considerable X-inefficiency in the regulated 
industry. The source of these cost reductions was mainly from increased labour 
productivity and decreased unit labour costs, although there may also have been a pure 
privatisation effect (Heseltine and Silcock, 1990).
The biggest change was the reduction in revenue support in both metropolitan and non­
metropolitan areas. Revenue support is significantly greater than concessionary fare 
payments in these areas, and also for public sector operators. For private sector operators 
revenue support is less important than concessionary fare payments. Although the data is 
for areas rather than operators, from the limited evidence available there would appear to 
be a not unreasonable correlation between the two. For the metropolitan areas, about 80%  
of revenue support paid by the metropolitan counties in 1982/83 went to their Passenger 
Transport Executives (House of Commons Transport Committee, 1985, Second Report, 
op. c it., Table 2.8, p. 177).
The relationship between reductions in revenue support (subsidy) and fare increases can 
be interpreted in two ways: firstly, subsidy reduction can act as a cause of the increase in 
fares; secondly, it could be caused by the increase in fares (together with the reduction in 
operating costs). On the first interpretation, subsidy reduction is an exogenously
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determined change to which the industry must react by increasing fares. On the second it 
is endogenously determined as a result of the ability of operators to force up fares and 
push down costs in the post deregulation period. The issue of causality between subsidy 
reduction and fare increases is discussed in the context of an econometric model in 
Chapter six. Whatever the exact status of the causality relationship it will be associated, 
ceteris paribus, with fare increases and a decrease in passenger journeys. Table 5.2 shows 
that this is what happened, although the changes in the non-metropolitan areas were 
comparatively modest given the two-and-a-half year period over which they occurred.
The change in passenger journeys must also be considered in the light of the long term 
decline occurring before deregulation: some of the change shown in Table 5.2 will be 
attributable to this long term decline, rather than to the effects of the 1985 Act p e r  se.
This issue is also examined within the econometric analysis of Chapter six.
The exception to these broad movements was the independent operator sector (excluding 
N B C  or ex-NBC operators), which experienced an increase in local service passenger 
journeys from 173 million to 339 million over the period 1985/86 to 1987/88. This is a 
very large increase of 96%, albeit from a very small base. In 1985/86 this sector 
accounted for approximately 4%  of local service passenger journeys outside London. A  
similar picture emerges for non-local services, although the increase was smaller at 
14.5%. Unfortunately it is difficult to track the performance of these operators after 
1987/88, since official statistics do not distinguish between them and ex-NBC operators 
after this date.
Given the continued overall fall in demand, as measured by passenger journeys, it is 
likely that the industry would respond by contracting, or at least not increasing, its labour 
and capital stock. This observation is supported in the case of the metropolitan areas, 
where local service work forms a large proportion of the total local and non-local 
services. The evidence for the non-metropolitan areas is more difficult to assess, since the 
data in Table 5.2 does not distinguish between the vehicles and staff used for local and 
non-local services. The increase in vehicle stock may have occurred because of the 
upward trend in non-local service work since deregulation, particularly for the
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independent operators for whom this type of work is extremely important. It may also 
have occurred because of the change to midi and minibuses over the period: a minibus 
will still count as one vehicle in the data above, even though its seating capacity will be 
much less than that of a double decker. It is possible for capital stock to increase on one 
measure (total vehicle stock) but to decrease on another (total vehicle seating capacity). 
The issue of capital stock change is discussed in the next section.
5.3.2 Vehicle Seating Capacity and Trends in Vehicle Size
In an attempt to test the hypothesis that vehicle seating capacity may have fallen in the 
non-metropolitan areas over the period, information on vehicle size as well as vehicle 
stock is taken from Table 6.3 of Bus and Coach Statistics 1990/91. This shows that the 
total public service vehicle stock in Britain outside London rose from 62,700 in 1985/86 
to 66,900 in 1988/89, an increase of 6.7%. Within this overall total, the stock of small to 
medium size single decker vehicles rose from 9,600 in 1985/86 to 17,000 in 1988/89, an 
increase of 77.1%. By far the biggest user of these vehicles is the independent operator 
sector (which is now defined to include N B C  or ex-NBC operators). Although neither the 
metropolitan nor the municipal PTEs used any small single deckers over the period, their 
use of medium single deckers increased from 200 to 1,700. This is a very large increase, 
albeit from a very small base.
The corresponding figures for large single and double decker vehicles are 53,000 and 
49,400, a decrease of 6.8%. The use of large single deckers is concentrated 
overwhelmingly in the independent operator sector, but there was no significant change 
in their stock over the period. The biggest users of double deckers are the metropolitan 
PTCs and the independent operator sector (particularly the N B C  and ex-NBC operators), 
with both sectors having fleets in the 7 to 8 thousand range in 1985/86. Over the period 
there was a significant difference between the sectors in terms of their double decker 
stock: in the independent operator sector it increased by 8%, but fell by 20% for the 
metropolitan PTCs.
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Inspection of the figures for changes in the size distribution of vehicle stock can only 
reveal part of the picture, however, since they do not give any precise measure of the 
change in vehicle seating capacity. Assuming maximum seating capacities of 16, 35, 50 
and 77 for small, medium, large single and double deckers respectively, total vehicle 
seating capacity rose over the period from 3,415,600 seats to 3,459,700, a fairly 
negligible increase of 1.3%. The distribution of this change across operator type and 
vehicle size is shown in Tables 5.3(i) and 5.3(ii) overleaf. Estimates for local and non­
local service seating capacity are derived by allocating total seating capacity according to 
the number of local and non-local vehicle kilometres run by each operator type given in 
Table 1.3 of Bus and Coach Statistics 1990/91. Thus the change in total local service 
seating capacity is from 2,125,200 seats to 2,197,600 seats, an increase of 3.4%. For non­
local services there is a decrease of 2.2%.
Table 5.3(i): Vehicle seating capacity (000s) 1985/86
Vehicle 
Size (a)
Metropolitan
PTCs
Municipal
PTCs
SBG Independent Total
(b)
Small 0.0 0.0 0.0 104.0 104.0
Medium 3.5 3.5 0.0 101.5 108.5
Large 45.0 60.0 120.0 1415.0 1640.0
Double 623.7 292.6 77.0 569.8 1563.1
Total: 672.2 356.1 197.0 2190.3 3415.6
Local 648.8 336.3 158.5 981.6 2125.2
Non-local 23.4 19.8 38.5 1208.7 1290.4
Source: derived from Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain 1990/91. Department of Transport. 1991.
Tables 6.3 and 1.3.
Notes:
(a) The terms "small", "medium" and "large" refer to the different sizes of single decker public 
service vehicles and are based on the distribution of seating capacities given in Bus and Coach 
Statistics i.e. up to 16 seats. 17-35 seats and 36 plus seats respectively: "double" refers to a double 
decker. Note that the figures in column 2 are for metropolitan PTCs. rather than English 
metropolitan areas.
(b) Totals refer to total estimated public service vehicle seating capacity provided in Britain, 
excluding London Buses Ltd.
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Table 5.3(ii): Vehicle seating capacity (000s) 1988/89
Vehicle
Size
Metropolitan
PTCs
Municipal
PTCs
SBG Independent Total
Small 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 121.6 1 2 1 .6
Medium 38.5 17.5 10.5 255.5 322.0
Large 35.0 65.0 80.0 1350.0 1530.0
Double 500.5 284.9 84.7 616.0 1486.1
Total: 574.0 367.4 175.2 2343.1 3459.7
Local 555.1 338.2 143.0 1161.3 2197.6
Non-local 18.9 29.2 32.2 1181.8 1262.1
Source and notes: as for Table 5.3(i) above.
Taking Tables 5.2 and 5.3 together, a number of comments can now be made on vehicle 
stock and seating capacity. Table 5.2 shows that total vehicle stock for all services (i.e. 
local and non-local) rose by 6.7%, but Table 5.3 shows that total vehicle seating capacity 
rose by only 1.3%. The inference is that, for the bus and coach industry as a whole, there 
was a slight trend away from the use of larger towards smaller vehicles. The next step is 
to determine whether the trend applies to both local and non-local services, and the 
strength of the trend in each sector. For local services only, the trend can be observed by 
noting that the 16.5% increase in vehicle kilometres given in Table 5.2 is matched by the 
much smaller increase in seating capacity of 3.4% implied in Table 5.3. On the basis of 
these figures, it would appear that there was a significant trend towards the use of smaller 
vehicles for local services. Given that the overall trend for the bus and coach industry is 
not as significant, the conclusion is that for non-local services the trend is less 
pronounced, or possibly non-existent.
Having established that the trend towards smaller vehicles is more likely to have occurred 
in the local service sector, further inspection of Table 5.3 shows how this trend is 
distributed between operator types. In order to measure the degree of vehicle size 
"concentration" (V SC ) across operator types, the V SC  is defined in terms of vehicle 
seating capacity as
V SC  = [(Large + Double)* 100]/Total
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In 1985/86 the V SC s for the metropolitan, municipal, SBG  and independent operator 
sectors were 99.5%, 99%, 100% and 90.6% respectively. By 1988/89 they had fallen in 
all sectors to 93.2%, 95.2%, 94% and 83.9%. This is not to say that all these decreases 
were fully accounted for by local services, since some part of the decrease may have 
occurred in non-local services, but given the discussion in the preceding paragraphs it is 
likely that m ost of the decrease occurred in local services.
Although total local service seating capacity increased by a modest 3.4%, the 
metropolitan PTCs had a decrease of 14.4% whilst the independent operators had an 
increase of 18.3%. This is consistent with the contraction of the metropolitan local 
service industry noted earlier in relation to Table 4.2, since the metropolitan PTCs 
account for most of the metropolitan area local services. Excluding the metropolitan 
PTCs, the increase in local service seating capacity rises from 3.4% to 11.3%. The only 
operator type to experience an increase in both local and non-local seating capacity was 
the municipal operators, where the 47.4% increase in non-local seating capacity was in 
sharp contrast to the rest of the non-local sector.
To conclude, the implications of the preceding analysis are that, for the local service 
sector in the short to medium term after the 1985 Transport Act, there was a clear trend 
towards decreasing vehicle size for all types of operator. Overall, there was a slight 
increase in the number of local service vehicle seats provided. In other words, reductions 
in the number of large single or double deckers were broadly offset (in terms of seating 
capacity) by increases in the number of medium to small single deckers. But there was a 
difference between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas: local service vehicle 
seating capacity decreased for the metropolitan PTCs, but increased elsewhere. The 
exception to this was the Scottish Bus Group, where local service vehicle seating capacity 
fell by 9.8%, although this operator forms a relatively small proportion of total seating 
capacity. Thus the hypothesis that the capital stock used for local services, as measured 
by local service vehicle seating capacity, fell in the non-metropolitan areas after the 1985 
Act is not supported by the evidence. As far as non-local services are concerned, vehicle
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seating capacity fell by 19.2% in the metropolitan PTCs, and by the much smaller amount 
of 1.9% for other operators combined.
5.3.3 Profit Margins
The second biggest change in Table 5.2 is for operating costs per vehicle kilometre. This 
is partly because of the large increase in vehicle kilometres travelled. The change in 
operating costs per passenger journey is much less because of the fall in passenger 
journeys. Although the change in total operating costs is not given explicitly in Bus and 
Coach Statistics, it is possible to derive an estimate of this figure by using the formula:
[(Operating costs per vehicle kilometre * vehicle kilometres) +
(Operating costs per passenger journey * passenger journeys)] /2.
In theory, grossing up from either vehicle kilometres or passenger journeys should give 
the same figure for total operating costs, but in practice there is a small difference. Hence 
the final figure is derived from the average of the upper and lower values. The results are 
given in Table 5.4, along with figures for total revenue and operating profit:
Table 5.4: Costs, revenues and operating profit 1985/86-1988/89
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
Met fa) Non- 
Met
Met Non-
Met
Met Non-
Met
Met Non-
Met
Total Operating 
Costs (£mill)(b)
831 1286 725 1211 645 1177 606 1 163
Total Revenue 
(£mill)(c)
875 1361 820 1295 758 1236 719 1204
Operating
Profit
(£mill)(d)
44 75 95 84 113 59 113 41
Operating
Profit
Margin %  (e)
5.0 5.5 11.6 6.5 14.9
(9.5)
4.8
(-4.9)
15.7
(5.7)
3.4
(-2.5)
Source: derived from Bus and Coach Statistics Great Brilain 1990/91. Department of Transport. 1991. 
Tables 1.1. 4.1. 2.1. 4.2. 5.1 and 5.6.
Notes:
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(a) "Met" refers to data for local services operated within the English metropolitan areas. "Non- 
met" refers to data for local services operated in Britain, excluding London and the English 
metropolitan areas. Figures are inflation adjusted (1990/91=100).
(b) Costs exclude depreciation and are net of fuel duty rebate.
(c) Total revenue consists o f passenger receipts, concessionary fares mid revenue support.
(d) Operating profit = Total revenue - Total operating costs.
(e) Operating profit margin % = (Operating profit* 100)/Total revenue. Figures in brackets are the 
profit margins with depreciation included. Data for operating costs including depreciation are not 
available in Bus and Coach Statistics {op. cit.) prior to 1987/88.
Once again, there is a marked difference in performance between the metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan areas for most years. Between 1985/86 and 1988/89 total operating 
costs in the metropolitan areas fell by 27.1% in real terms, whilst total revenue decreased 
by 17.8%. In the non-metropolitan areas, the corresponding figures were 9.6% and
11.5%. The large reduction in operating costs enabled the metropolitan areas to generate 
a much higher profit margin than in the non-metropolitan areas. In the latter areas the 
profit margin after the inclusion of depreciation costs is negative for the years of 1987/88 
and 1988/89. Taking the two areas together, the overall profit margin (including 
depreciation costs) for these years is 0.7% and 1.9%. Since these figures represent pre-tax 
profits, it is not clear whether even the metropolitan sector made sufficient post-tax 
profits to cover long run costs.
The figure of 1.9% overall pre-tax profit margin for 1988/89 contrasts with the 3.2% 
figure (excluding coach operators) implied in the Bus and Coach Industry Monitor (1991) 
and the figure of 5% given in the Price Waterhouse report (TRRL, 1990, p. 16). All three 
figures are based on very large samples, and there is no reason to assume that one figure 
is more reliable than the others. The financial year 1988/89 is the only one covered by all 
three sources. Different accounting practices between operators should have a similar 
effect on all three figures. The accounts of SBG  subsidiaries, for example, are prepared 
on a current cost replacement basis, which will tend to reduce their profit margins below 
that of other operators. The Price Waterhouse report (PWR) figure excludes depreciation 
costs, but whether their inclusion would reduce it nearer to 1.9% or 3.2% is difficult to 
determine.
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A  feature of the Bus and Coach Industry Monitor (BC1M) results for 1988/89 is that there 
is no major difference between the profit margins of the metropolitan PTCs and other 
operators. The figure for the metropolitan PTCs (excluding London Buses Ltd. from the 
B C IM  results) is 3.8%, compared with the overall figure of 3.2%. This contrasts with the 
conclusions based on the Bus and Coach Statistics (BCS) figures in Table 5.2, although 
these relate mainly to metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas rather than companies. 
The PW R  does not distinguish between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas or 
companies, so that no comparison is possible from this source.
To conclude, comparison with the profit margins achieved in a range of other industries 
shows that the bus and coach industry has one of the lowest profit margins in the sample 
over the period 1986/87 to 1987/88 (PWR, op. ev7., p. 24). Although there is some 
evidence of a recovery in 1988/89, there seems little doubt that profit margins in the local 
service industry as a whole were too low in the short to medium term after the 1985 
Transport Act to ensure long run financial viability. Government statistics imply a 
significantly different profit margin performance between the metropolitan and non­
metropolitan areas, but this difference is not evident from the B C IM  figures.
5.3 .4  Return on C apita l Em ployed
The performance of the bus and coach industry is even worse if the return on capital 
employed is used as a performance indicator (PWR, op. c it., p. 24). From 1985/86 to 
1988/89 the return on capital employed was by far the lowest amongst a range of other 
industries, and well below the rate of return from risk-free government securities. Strictly 
speaking, it is the rate of return on capital employed, rather than the profit margin, which 
determines long run industry viability. A  persistently low return implies that the industry 
will not attract sufficient funds to ensure long term survival. There are problems in 
calculating the rate of return on capital employed, however, because of significant 
variations in company accounting practices in relation to "returns" and "capital 
employed".
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The PW R  uses a linear multiple regression model to estimate the influences on rates of 
return in the bus industry for 1987/88. The model and estimation results are as follows:
P  =  .84.0 - 0.086* + 139.0C-250.0M -  1.8SB + 0 .0 \P D  + 5X A P R - 44.9G  
(52.7) (0.36) (64.8) (87.6) (52.2) (0.86) (15.3) (15.5)
where: P
S
C.
M
SB
PD
PR
G
profits per seat (before interest and tax) 
total seats
market concentration
proportion of minibuses in bus fleet
subsidised miles run
population density
private ownership
group ownership
Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
Sample size = 109
R 2= 0.3
^(7.101) 6.18
The dependent variable P i s a  proxy for return on capital employed, with total seats 
acting as the measure of capital employed. Four of the seven explanatory variables are 
statistically significant: market concentration, proportion of minibuses, private ownership 
and group ownership. Surprisingly, the minibus variable has a negative influence on rates 
of return whilst population density, although it has the expected positive coefficient, is 
statistically insignificant. The/7 value of 6.18 is higher than the critical F  value for 7 and 
101 degrees of freedom, so that the null hypothesis that all the true regression coefficients 
are simultaneously zero can be rejected.
The R~ value is low, however, and implies that the model explains only 30% of the 
variation in rates of return. In addition, there is a simple, but potentially serious, problem 
in the specification of the model. The dependent variable is defined as profits divided by 
total seats, and this is regressed on a number of explanatory variables including total 
seats. The point of dividing by total seats is to remove the effect of changes in capital 
stock on profits, in the same way that using income per capita removes the effect of 
changing population on incomes. Having done this, it makes little sense to include total 
seats as an explanatory variable in the model. If  total seats is used as an explanatory 
variable, then the appropriate dependent variable is simply profits, not profits divided by
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total seats. The consequence of including total seats on both left and right-hand sides of 
the equation will be a higher R 2, and lower standard errors, than would otherwise be the 
case. In other words, criteria such as goodness of fit and parameter significance will be 
overstated in the model above.
5.3.5 Labour Productivity
There was a large decrease in the number of staff employed in the metropolitan PTCs 
over the period 1985/86 to 1988/89, particularly in the short run. The reduction was most 
pronounced in the area of maintenance staff where the number employed fell from 10,300 
to 5,900, a decrease of 42.7%. For the non-metropolitan operators outside London the 
number of staff employed stayed roughly constant over the period: broadly speaking, the 
municipal and SB G  operators shed 2,100 jobs, whilst the N BC  and independent operators 
gained 2,800. This latter total consisted of an increase of 6,900 platform staff (ie drivers, 
conductors and other on-vehicle staff) and a decrease of 4,100 in maintenance and other 
staff. The decrease in maintenance staff across both metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
operators reflects in part the move towards the contracting out of maintenance work.
Since the data in B C S  does not distinguish between local and non-local service staff, an 
estimate of the number of staff employed in local service work is derived by using the 
appropriate split between local and non-local vehicle kilometres to allocate staff between 
the two service categories. The resulting adjusted figure for metropolitan operators 
between 1985/86 and 1988/89 is a decrease of 27.1%, compared to the unadjusted figure 
of 27.2%. The corresponding figures for non-metropolitan operators are +7.5% and 
+0.6%. These (adjusted) changes in staff employed of -27.1% and +7.5% are broadly 
consistent with the changes in total vehicle seating capacity of -14.4% and +11.3% 
estimated in Table 5.3. If  labour productivity is measured as staff employed per vehicle 
seat, then it is clear that it rose significantly in the metropolitan PTCs and less 
significantly amongst the non-metropolitan operators.
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5 .3 .6  C o m m e rc ia l a n d  S u b s id ise d  S erv ice s
The 1985 Transport Act requires operators to register the local bus services they wish to 
provide. In general, these services will be commercial services, although there may be 
instances where unprofitable services have been registered or re-registered in order to 
deter entry. Given the importance of cross-subsidy in the regulated industry, and the 
decrease in operators' ability to cross-subsidise in the deregulated industry, it was widely 
expected that registered vehicle mileage would be significantly less than the vehicle 
mileage run before deregulation.
This expectation was confirmed. Using the pre-deregulation N BC  (which provided about 
one-third of Britain's bus services) as an example, the pattern of its registrations before 
28th February 1986 can be seen in Table 5.5:
Table 5.5: Registration of NBC services (000s bus miles)
Original
Mileage
Registered
Mileage
%  Change
Conventional bus 448,876 312,758 -30.0
Minibus 23,630 79,658 +237.0
Urban 293,144 167,242 -8.5
Rural 162,667 105,127 -35.4
Main day (Mon-Sat) 321,812 293,433 -8.8
Early morning (Mon-Sat) 29,756 18,670 -37.2
Evening (Mon-Sat) 50,406 28,599 -43.3
Sunday 21,906 10,356 -52.8
N B C  Total 472,506 392,416 -16.9
Source: "Bus Special". No. 6. June 1986. TGWU Passenger Services Group. 
Note: Figures not available for Southern Vectis.
The only case where registered mileage exceeded the original mileage was for minibus 
operations, and the extent of the increase indicates the potential for innovation in this 
area. In fact, the N B C  had already been experimenting with minibus services on urban 
routes from 1984, introducing services in housing estates and a "hail stop" system (Birks 
et a l, 1990). Elsewhere, registered rural and off-peak vehicle mileage (especially
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Sundays) was significantly below the pre-deregulation mileage. In total, N B C  registered 
mileage was 17% lower than its pre-deregulation mileage.
Local authorities can subsidise the provision of non-registered services via the 
competitive tendering system. It appears that, in the short term, local authorities chose to 
maintain these services at "broadly" their pre-deregulation level (Balcombe etcil., 1987,
p. 10).
Frequency reductions did occur in certain areas, particularly on off-peak and Sunday 
services, because local authorities decided that the required subsidy did not produce 
sufficient benefit. In Greater Manchester, frequency reductions were initially made 
which amounted to a loss of 20% of bus mileage and an estimated subsidy saving of 
some £10 million (although the PTE subsequently replaced some lost services). Whilst 
this was an extreme case it serves to focus attention on the distributional effects of the 
1985 Transport Act. Although the Government made extra money available to maintain 
vital rural services, cuts that do occur may seriously harm the quality of life for those 
who lack access to a car. Guiver and Hoyle (1987) provide an account, on the basis o f the 
"Buswatch" survey, of the social and economic problems caused by the loss of services.
Nonetheless, the proportion of subsidised to total vehicle mileage remained at around 
16% in the short to medium term. Since total vehicle mileage followed an upward trend 
over this period, it follows that the subsidised network did not in aggregate decrease. The 
figure of 16% subsidised total vehicle mileage is highly consistent with that implied for 
the N B C  in Table 5.5 above.
5.3 .7  Com petitive Tendering
The system of competitive tendering set up by the 1985 Transport Act is generally 
perceived to have worked successfully in the post-deregulation period (Glaister, 1993, 
Nash, 1993). Balcombe et al. (1987) estimate that subsidy (net of costs such as company 
restructuring and additional administration) fell in the short run from about £95m to
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£73m in non-metropolitan counties in England (at 1985-86 prices), from £24m to £18m 
in Scotland, and from £9m to £6m in Wales. This estimate may be subject to downward 
revision in the medium to longer term if operators misjudged market conditions. On the 
other hand, restructuring costs will be a one-off cost so that the estimated figure may be 
subject to upward revision for the medium to longer term. In general, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the competitive tendering system reduced subsidy by approximately 20 to 
30%. The average number of tenders per contract was estimated to be between two and 
three, although there were a significant number of single tender cases, especially in rural 
areas. Lack of competition may cause the subsidy requirement to increase in these areas.
Some operators were apparently willing to cross-subsidise their tendered network from 
their commercial services, either to deter new entrants or gain a foothold in a rival's 
market (Gwilliam, 1989). One example occurred in Tayside, where tenders were invited 
for the evening and Sunday operation of two services in Dundee. For the first service, the 
tenders were: Strathtay Scottish (a member of the Scottish Bus Group) £6,500,
Greyhound Luxury Coaches £36,140, and Tayside Public Transport Co. Ltd. £37,960: for 
the second service, the respective tenders were £26,260, £61,672 and £73,645. This 
prompted an official complaint to the Scottish Office from the Roads and Transport 
Convener of Tayside region about the "predatory policy" operated by the Scottish Bus 
Group. The contract was eventually awarded to Strathtay Scottish.
It is sometimes argued that the tendered market is more contestable than the commercial 
market (Gwilliam, 1989, Mackie, Preston and Nash, 1985). The main reason given is that 
reaction times in the tendered market are longer than those in the commercial market, so 
that strategic entry deterrence cannot be implemented quickly. If  a tender is lost, it will 
typically be three years time before the losing operator can compete for the tender again. 
There are two comments in order here: first, competition can still occur in the form of 
registering (or reregistering) services which compete with those operated by the tender 
winner; second, and more important, the ability of the tender winner to exit the market is 
constrained to a much greater extent than in the commercial market, where only 42 days 
notice of service withdrawal is normally required. In practice, an operator wishing to exit
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from the tendered market may be allowed to exit before the contract expiry date, although 
this is by no means a certainty. For these reasons, it is not clear that the tendered market 
is more contestable than the commercial market.
5.4 The Longer Term Effects of the 1985 Transport Act
This section reviews some of the longer term effects of deregulation and is based on 
information given in the Transport Committee First Report (TCFR) in November 1995.
5.4.1 Changes in M arket Structure
Since deregulation there have been two major phases of consolidation in the local bus 
service industry. The first, roughly from 1988 to 1991, concerned the weakest of the ex 
N B C  companies. The second, from 1993 to 1995, concerned the ex PTE and ST G  
companies as well as other ex N B C  companies. The main reason for this consolidation is 
the force of competition in the deregulated market, where the search for cost savings 
created considerable structural adjustments in the market. Table 5.6 shows the changes in 
market share associated with different types of operator since 1989:
By 1995 the industry was dominated by the "big three" i.e. Stagecoach, First Bus 
(Badgerline/GRT) and British Bus. A  second tier of smaller, but still substantial groups, 
had also developed i.e. West Midlands Travel, Go-Ahead Group, Cowie Group and M T L  
Trust Holdings. The rest of the industry is made up of smaller groups (two or three 
companies each) and single units. These single units are owned either by local 
authorities, company managers or company employees. The independent sector (defined 
as operators owning less than 50 vehicles each) has seen a small, but steady growth in 
market share despite the consolidation amongst the larger operators.
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Table 5.6: Changes in market share (%) by turnover in the bus industry 1989-95
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
First tier groups:
Stagecoach Holdings 3.9 3.7 4.9 4.9 6.9 13.4 13.4
Badgerline 3.1 4.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 9.3 9.3
GRT 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.8 3.3 *■>
British Bus 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.9 7.9 9.8
First tier total: 10.4 12.6 14.6 14.5 17.6 34.0 35.9
Second tier total: 2.3 2.3 8.3 8.2 12.5 22.0 22.1
First and second tier: 12.8 14.9 22.9 22.6 30.1 56.0 58.0
Smaller groups 8.1 8.9 9.1 9.2 7.1 5.5 4.3
Employee owned 1.7 1.7 3.8 4.2 6.6 3.5 3.7
Management owned 13.8 16.6 17.2 16.8 17.8 13.0 1 1.9
Publicly owned 30.4 25.4 18.8 18.1 9.2 7.5 7.5
Scottish Bus Group 5.7 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
London Transport 15.5 15.5 15.4 15.2 15.2 0.0 0.0
Independent Operators 12.0 12.2 12.9 13.9 14.1 14.6 14.6
Source: Bus Industry' Monitor (TAS Partnership) for House of Commons Transport Committee First
Report: The Consequences of Bus Deregulation. 1995, Volume III, Table 2, p. 271. 
Note: Where data for 1995 was not available, it is based on 1994 data.
Overall, even allowing for the emergence of the big three, the structure of the industry 
remains reasonably diverse in terms of market share. It also appears to be the case that 
ownership in geographical terms is reasonably diverse (Transport Committee, First 
Report, op. c it., Vol. Ill, p. 271).
5.4.2 Profitability
Pre-tax profit in the bus industry fell and then improved between 1988/89 and 1993/94. 
There are wide variations in profitability within the industry according to the type of 
ownership, but the major groups have maintained a significantly better profit 
performance overall. Table 5.7 summarises this profit performance according to type of 
ownership:
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Table 5.7: Pre-tax profit (as % of turnover) by operator type 1988-94
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Ownership type:
Major groups 6.08 9.62 6.53 9.50 9.10 10.19
Second tier groups 1.55 -4.02 2.08 3.19 8.51 11.79
Small groups 4.88 5.92 5.44 5.23 6.57 5.73
Management
owned
5.24 5.34 4.85 5.61 6.53 7.03
Employee owned 4.16 7.25 5.41 2.28 3.40 2.89
Publicly owned 4.60 3.19 2.07 1.94 3.05 4.81
Scottish Bus Group 2.54 0.53 -0.34 6.37 0.00 0.00
London Buses -32.26 -22.67 -25.01 -37.14 -25.07 -18.89
All operators 4.4 3.3 2.8 4.0 5.3 6.8
Source: Bus Industry Monitor (TAS Partnership) for House of Commons Transport Committee First
Report, 1995, Vol. III. adapted from Figure D and Table 4. p. 274.
Note: No data available for independent operators i.e. those owning less than 50 vehicles each.
The fall in profitability from 1988 to 1991 was undoubtedly a factor in encouraging 
further consolidation in the industry. Although profitability increased after 1991, it seems 
likely that only the larger companies made sufficient profit to provide adequately for long 
term needs such as investment. Nonetheless, the pre-tax profit figure of 6.8% for 1993/94 
represents the industry's best performance since deregulation.
5.4.3 Costs and Employment
Operating costs have fallen significantly since deregulation. Between 1986 and 1994 
operating costs per vehicle kilometre (excluding depreciation) fell by 41% in England. 
Part of these cost savings were from reductions in the number of people employed, 
particularly in management and administrative staff, and part were from reductions in the 
real wage paid to drivers. Table 5.8 shows the changes in average earnings of bus (and 
coach) drivers from 1975 to 1994:
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Table 5.8: Average earnings of bus and coach drivers (£ per hour at April 1994 
prices)
Bus and Coach 
drivers (1)
All Manual 
Workers (1)
Bus and Coach 
as %  of Manual
1975 5.51 5.38 102
1983 5.58 5.59 100
1984 5.48 5.61 98
1985 5.48 5.60 98
1986 5.70 5.80 98
1987 5.34 5.91 90
1988 5.44 6.08 89
1989 5.27 6.07 87
1990 5.18 6.09 85
1991 5.08 6.18 82
1992 5.17 6.29 82
1993 5.09 6.37 80
1994 5.03 6.31 80
Source: Employment Gazette August 1995. Bus and Coach Statistics 1993/94. New Earnings Survey
1975-83. reproduced as Table 3 in Transport Committee First Report (op. cit.). Vol. I. p. xxxvi. 
Note: l. Males on adult rates since 1984 and full-time men over 21 in earlier years.
It is clear from Table 5.8 that the pre-deregulation real wage for bus and coach drivers 
was generally somewhat below that of all manual workers, whereas in the post­
deregulation period it fell by a substantial margin. Table 5.9 shows how labour costs per 
employee varied according to sector, together with the changes in number of employees 
over the period 1989/90 to 1993/94:
Table 5.9 shows that there are significant variations in labour costs per employee between 
different sectors. Particularly striking are the figures for the PTA/Ex-PTA sector, where 
there is a large differential between this sector and the independent sector. This is an 
important factor in explaining why the PTA sector, particularly the ex-PTAs, has been so 
vulnerable to new entrants to the market.
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Table 5.9: Labour costs per employee (£) and employment changes
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Sector:
Independents 11,483 12,929 12,282 11,138 11,236
London Buses 14,701 16,603 17,256 17,239 16,601
Local Authority owned 11,820 12,470 13,319 14,025 14,236
Ex-National Bus 10,736 11,356 12,119 12,613 12,276
PTA/Ex-PTA 13,867 13,211 14,156 14,952 15,235
Ex-Scottish Transport 9,944 11,880 12,222 12,619 12,988
All Companies 11,750 12,718 13,562 13,441 13,389
Annual changes (% ) in:
Labour costs - +8.2 +6.6 -0.9 -0.4
All employees - -1.7 -1.2 -2.9 -0.8
Management and 
admin staff
- -6.6 -6.2 -6.1 -3.9
Source: House o f Commons Transport Committee First Report, 1995, Vol. Ill, Table 6, p. 275.
Although wages have fallen, this does not necessarily imply that net pay has also fallen. 
Stagecoach claims that average net pay for its employees has actually increased through 
the introduction of profit-related pay schemes and share participation schemes. The 
purpose of these arrangements is to encourage employees to create a long term career in 
the industry and thereby reduce costly labour turnover. It is uncertain, however, whether 
these arrangements are typical of the industry as a whole.
5.4.4 Vehicle Seating Capacity and Trends in Vehicle Size
Given the increase in product differentiation in terms of vehicle types since deregulation, 
measuring the supply of the industry by vehicle kilometres is not an ideal indicator of 
local service bus supply. Vehicle size ranges from the minibus, with a capacity of 16 
seats or less, to the double decker with a capacity of 80 seats and above. Although vehicle 
kilometres have increased substantially since deregulation, a better indication of supply is 
the number of seat miles which operators have delivered. Vehicle kilometres are not 
disaggregated by the Department of Transport by type of vehicle, so it is not possible to 
provide a direct figure for seat miles from official statistics. A survey of local bus
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operators (49+ vehicles) shows that seat miles have in fact fallen by around 5% since 
1989/90. The changes are summarised in Table 5.10:
Table 5.10: Bus supply by bus and seat miles
Bus miles 
(mill)
Average bus 
size
Seat miles 
(mill)
(% ) change on 
previous year
1989/90 1516 58 87928 -
1990/91 1519 57 86585 -1.5
1991/92 1539 57 87710 + 1.3
1992/93 1562 54 84340 -3.8
1993/94 1574 53 83441 -1.1
Overall change 58 -5 -4487 -5.1
Source: House o f Commons Transport Committee First Report, 1995. Vol. III. Table 23, p. 285.
The change to smaller vehicles, which was noted for the short to medium term in Section 
5.3.2, has continued in the long term. This has outweighed the increase in vehicle miles, 
so that seat miles have declined. Since the number of passenger journeys for all operators 
fell by 13.5% over the period, however, there is still evidence of over-capacity in the 
industry in this period.
5.4.5 Investment in the Bus Industry
There was a severe shortage of investment in the British bus industry from 1985 to 1992, 
when the age profile of the bus fleet worsened considerably and pre-tax profit as a 
percentage of turnover never exceeded 4.5%. Investment began to recover from the early 
1990s onwards. These trends were reversed for London. Capital investment (i.e. new 
vehicles and other new equipment) is shown in Table 5.11:
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Table 5.11: Capital investment in the bus industry (£m) 1989-94
Britain exc. 
London (£m)
London Buses 
(£m)
Total (£m)
1989/90 155.34 24.76 180.10
1990/91 127.49 26.01 153.50
1991/92 116.82 37.08 153.90
1992/93 122.28 45.82 168.10
1993/94 168.70 20.66 190.60
Source: Bus Industry Monitor, The TAS Partnership, in House of Commons Transport Committee First 
Report, 1995, Vol. Ill, Table 8. p. 276.
The improvement in profitability (see Table 5.7) provided a considerable stimulus to the 
recovery in investment. In general, the larger groups invested more per unit of turnover 
than the rest of the industry. During 1993/94, for example, the larger groups invested £12 
per £1000 turnover in new vehicles and equipment compared to an average of £9 per 
£1000 turnover for the rest of the industry.
Investment in new buses by vehicle type is shown in Table 5.12 below. The figures in 
Table 5.12 show the decline of the double decker from the late 1980s onwards and, 
somewhat surprisingly, the supermini and the minibus. In the case of these latter two 
vehicle types, the reduction in investment may arise as a result of operators having 
achieved their desired levels of stocks of these vehicles, so that investment is no longer to 
expand vehicle stocks and replace existing vehicles, but mainly replacement investment. 
The midibus appears to be the vehicle which operators have favoured most since their 
introduction in the early 1990s. Apart from the recession years of 1990/91 and 1991/92, 
the big three operators had the highest capital investment as a proportion of turnover.
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Table 5.12: Investment in new buses (number) 1988-94
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Double deck 529 797 543 317 223 275 178
Single deck 342 606 607 390 322 502 487
Super low floor 0 0 0 0 0 8 90
Midibus 0 0 211 277 546 529 830
Supermini 1711 1341 1194 922 589 990 941
Minibus 975 575 377 271 296 205 294
Total: 3557 3319 2932 2177 1976 2509 2820
Source: Adapted from Bus Industry Monitor, The TAS Partnership, in: House of Commons Transport
Committee First Report. 1995. Table 9. p. 277.
Note: Typical number of seats for each vehicle type is 74, 50, 47, 36, 27 and 19 respectively.
5.4 .6  M arket Entry and Contestability
The 1985 Transport Act requires operators of local bus services to obtain an Operators 
Licence (or "O" Licence). This licence is the main qualitative entry constraint to the bus 
service industry, and was issued subject to three conditions. First, applicants must be of 
good repute; second, applicants must have appropriate financial standing i.e. capital and 
reserves of the lower of 3000 ECUs (approx. £2,450) per vehicle or 150 ECUs (approx. 
£122) per passenger seat; third, applicants must be "professionally competent".
The capitalisation requirements are very modest and may have encouraged too high an 
entry level from operators who have little chance of long term viability. The 
capitalisation of the larger groups is much greater than the minimum figures above e.g. 
Stagecoach had a capitalisation of around £12,500 per bus (Transport Committee, First 
Report, Vol. Ill, p. 286). The total number of licensed operators increased continuously 
from 6,415 in 1989/90 to 7,193 in 1993/94, an increase of 12%. Only around 1% of new 
applicants for "O" Licences were refused, and only about 0.5% of existing "O" Licences 
were suspended or revoked. Thus the "O" Licence did not appear to be a significant 
barrier to market entry.
New entrants to the market are generally attracted to local authority tendered operations, 
where their income is usually guaranteed, and to high frequency urban routes where
190
"cream-skimming" can take place. In a survey of 76 new service registrations in four 
different Traffic Areas, these two types of entry formed 47% and 43% respectively of the 
total entries. In general, new entrants did not offer new routes or higher quality services 
(Transport Committee, 1995, First Report, Vol. Ill, p. 287-8).
The continuous increase in "O" Licensed operators over the period 1989-94 supports the 
view that the local bus service market is contestable. The attractiveness of entry for new 
and small businesses in particular is enhanced by a very fast cash flow from customer to 
producer. Service frequency has increased on many existing routes, although new 
entrants do not generally appear to develop new routes. In fact, the low capitalisation 
requirements may be attracting a number of low quality operators with irregular time­
keeping and low quality vehicles and facilities. A 1994 survey of customer perceptions 
found that 69% of bus passengers had a more frequent service compared to ten years 
previously, although 86% thought that bus services could be improved. The most 
important non-frequency service characteristic desired by passengers was good time­
keeping (Transport Committee, 1995, First Report, Vol. Ill, p. 288). On the other hand, 
vehicle maintenance standards do not appear to be falling. There was a 40% increase in 
vehicle inspections between 1989/90 and 1993/94, and the proportion of immediate and 
delayed bans on vehicles to total vehicles inspected decreased over this period.
5.4 .7  Subsidy
The term subsidy here refers to public transport support from the government to the local 
bus service industry. It excludes concessionary fare reimbursements, fuel duty rebates 
and rural and new bus grants. Between 1984/85 and 1994/95, total subsidy fell in real 
terms by 61% in Britain (excluding London) and by 86% in London. This overall fall is 
somewhat misleading, however, since London has the highest subsidy per passenger in 
comparison to other areas (see Table 5.13):
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Table 5.13: Subsidy per passenger (pence, current prices) by area
London Mets English
shires
Scotland Britain 
exc.London
1987-88 8.95 7.39 4.58 3.40 5.61
1988-89 9.57 6.72 5.26 3.25 5.52
1989-90 7.15 6.13 5.76 1.96 5.46
1990-91 9.59 6.33 6.51 3.42 5.72
1991-92 13.83 7.37 7.35 3.50 6.74
1992-93 14.79 7.88 7.11 3.77 6.92
Increase (%) 65.3 6.6 55.2 10.9 23.4
Source: The TAS Report, in: House of Commons Transport Committee First Report. 1995. Vol. III. Table 
22, p. 284.
The figures in Table 5.13 show that London bus services are heavily subsidised in 
comparison to other areas. These subsidies are directed into the Travelcard scheme, 
where 70% of the subsidy is spent on peak services, and 30% on off-peak. This allocation 
of subsidy is reversed outside London. Thus the low rate of decline in passenger journeys 
within London relative to areas outside London has been achieved at a high cost in 
subsidy. This is an important point, since the regulated London local bus service system, 
where contracts are awarded by a tendering system, is often cited as an improvement on 
the deregulated system outside London. Given the differences in subsidy per passenger, 
however, the comparison is biased in favour of London.
The problem of subsidy levels, and changes in them, is a general problem for the analysis 
of passenger journey trends. This problem is analysed in the next chapter.
5.4.8 Bus Travel D em and Factors
The TAS model of bus travel demand factors (TCFR, Vol. Ill, p. 285) estimates that an 
overall reduction of 7.63% passengers might have been expected over the period 1987- 
93. The actual loss is 17.32% over the period, a significantly higher amount than the 
model estimate. The variables used, together with their relative influences on bus travel 
demand, are shown in Table 5.14:
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Table 5.14: Effects of bus travel demand factors 1987-93
Factor Influence Effect(%)
Car ownership and Each 1% growth in car use reduces bus -7.50
use travel by 0.4%
Economic activity Each 1% growth in GDP increases 
demand for bus travel by 0.15%
+0.99
Employment Each 1% change in number of persons 
employed (full time equivalents) 
increases/decreases demand for bus travel 
by 0.36%
-0.27
Population Each 1% change in resident population 
increases/decreases demand for bus travel 
by 0.3%
+0.36
Service reliability Each 1% of scheduled bus mileage not -0.19
operated reduces demand by 0.15% and 
each \%  of mileage operated seriously 
late (>10 minutes) reduces demand by 
0.03%
(est.)
Real fare changes A price elasticity of demand of -0.3% is 
assumed
-3.06
Service level changes A service elasticity of demand of +0.2 is 
assumed
+2.04
All factors: Overall effect -7.63
Actual: Reduction of passengers in period -17.32
Source: TAS in: House of Commons Transport Committee First Report, 1995. Vol. III. Table 
24, p. 285.
This large difference is possibly accounted for by model misspecification. One of the 
objectives of the next chapter is to develop a model that provides a better fit to the data.
In particular, the model in Chapter six estimates a long-run own-price elasticity of around 
unity for bus travel.
Different (implicit) price elasticities have been estimated by Stagecoach, who argue that 
estimates (prior to this study) tend to be out-of-date and based on the experience of fare 
increases rather than decreases. Stagecoach experience of fare decreases is shown in 
Table 5.15:
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Table 5.15: Stagecoach fare decreases
Discount to fares Increase in passengers
-50% + 100%
-33% +50%
-20% +25%
-10% +4%
Source: House of Commons Transport Committee, First Report, 1995, Vol. Ill, p. 358.
Although the first two of these price elasticities seem very high by historical standards, 
the third value is broadly in line with the long-run results obtained from the econometric 
model estimated in Chapter six.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the short to medium term effects of local bus service 
deregulation. The issue of the long run welfare effects of deregulation is discussed in 
Chapter six, where an econometric model is specified and estimated.
The experience of the metropolitan areas in the short to medium term since deregulation 
was significantly different to that of the non-metropolitan areas. This is primarily because 
of the large reduction in revenue support for the metropolitan areas, which resulted in 
large fare increases and a large fall in passenger journeys. Only the independent operator 
sector (excluding NBC and ex-NBC operators) managed to achieve an increase in 
passenger journeys.
Overall, operating costs per vehicle kilometre fell significantly after deregulation. The 
extent of the fall, together with other evidence, provides support for the view that the 
deregulated local service bus industry is relatively contestable and thus competitive. The 
fall in operating costs was not matched by fare reductions because of the loss of revenue 
support. If revenue support had not been reduced so dramatically in the metropolitan 
areas, fare increases would not have been so large. Indeed, it is possible that fares might 
have fallen, and this issue is the focus of the next chapter. In spite of fears that the service
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network would reduce after deregulation, neither commercial nor non-commercial 
vehicle mileage fell in the short to medium term. Some of this mileage may have been 
wasteful duplication but, in a competitive industry, this is not a sustainable strategy (see 
Section 4.6). Overall, the competitive tendering system for non-commercial services has 
worked well and delivered significant cost savings.
Profitability in the industry was very low, and fundamental adjustment in the long run 
was inevitable. This adjustment has taken the form of mergers. Increased market 
concentration was accompanied by an increase in profitability and investment, 
particularly for the large operators. There was a trend towards the use of smaller vehicles. 
The reduction in vehicle size tended to outweigh the increase in vehicle kilometres so 
that, overall, seat miles supplied fell, although this fall was not large.
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CHAPTER 6
Subsidy and Local Bus Service Deregulation in Britain: a re-evaluation
Bus vehicle kilometres increased after local bus service deregulation in October 1986, but 
passenger journeys fell and bus fares increased in real terms. The inability to reverse the 
long-run decline in passenger journeys and the increase in bus fares is often cited as 
evidence of the failure of deregulation to promote greater competition in the industry.
This evaluation is not clear-cut, however, since government macroeconomic policy 
caused significant reductions in subsidy to the bus industry concurrent with deregulation. 
It can be argued that it is the reduction in subsidy, rather than the lack of competition, 
which caused fares to increase. If this is the case, then the evaluation of deregulation 
should allow for the effects of subsidy reduction. This chapter specifies and tests an 
econometric model in which the role of subsidy reduction is explicitly incorporated in a 
price-markup equation. The model can be used to generate forecasts of bus fares and 
passenger journeys after allowing for subsidy replacement. These forecasts are compared 
with those for the continuation of the regulated system. A cost-benefit analysis calculates 
that the net present value of the welfare gains from deregulation per se in Britain 
excluding London for 1986-97 is £90 million. If the external effects of bus for car 
substitution are included, this figure rises to £117 million or £9.7 million per annum. A 
similar analysis is also conducted for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of 
Britain.
This chapter is structured as follows. An introduction to the background of the 
methodological problem is given in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 discusses the data, 
methodology and model specifications. Section 6.3 describes the estimation methods and *
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results, and Section 6.4 uses these results to forecast what would have happened to 
subsidy, bus fares and passenger journeys if deregulation had not been accompanied by 
subsidy reduction. Section 6.5 uses univariate time series modelling to generate forecasts 
for these variables on the assumption that the regulated system was allowed to continue. 
The welfare changes associated with the transition from the regulated system to a 
deregulated system (with subsidy replacement) are identified and calculated in Section
6.6. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.1 Introduction
Considerable academic debate preceded the deregulation of local bus services in Britain 
(excluding London) in October 1986. The arguments for and against deregulation have 
been discussed in the preceding chapters. Other reviews of the deregulation debate and 
developments since 1986 are contained, inter alia , in Mackie et a l  (1995), Fairhurst and 
Edwards (1996), Mackie and Preston (1996), Glaister (1997) and White (1997). It is 
important to bear in mind that when we refer to “deregulation” there are three distinct 
changes that occurred: deregulation per se, which removed the quantity controls 
established by the Road Traffic Act of 1930; privatisation, which split up the nationalised 
undertakings and sold them, along with the local authority undertakings, to the private 
sector; and subsidy reduction, which followed from the desire of the Conservative 
government to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR).
Glaister (1997, p. 146) comments that deregulation was “primarily a result of a 
determination to reduce overall government expenditure -  both central and local 
authority”. It is difficult to argue against this view, given the Conservative government’s 
emphasis on PSBR reductions and the continuous large overruns of local authority bus 
subsidies relative to planned expenditures in the five annual Public Expenditure White 
Papers between March 1980 and March 1984. From 1972 to 1982 revenue support in 
Britain increased from £10 million to £529 million at current prices: even after allowing 
for inflation, this represented a hefty increase of 1300 per cent. Over the same period 
local bus service passenger journeys fell by 30 per cent. The spiralling costs of revenue
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support made the local bus service sector a prime target for the privatisation policies of 
the incoming 1979 Conservative government and, after the 1980 Transport Act 
deregulated the long distance (or express coach) market, the publication of the Buses 
White Paper (Department of Transport, 1984) signalled the end of the regulated local 
service market.
The implication of these changes from the perspective of econometric modelling is that 
subsidy reduction can be regarded as an exogenous or “driver” variable in any model 
specification for evaluating deregulation. In particular, causality should run primarily 
from subsidy reduction to changes in bus fares, thereby avoiding any simultaneity 
problem that might have existed between the two variables. It also provides a benchmark 
for the proper specification of the model: if the model is properly specified, causality 
tests should confirm the direction of causality from subsidy reduction to bus fares. Failure 
to confirm this would indicate model misspecification.
Although privatisation is not a necessary adjunct to deregulation, it is an integral part of 
the proposals in the Buses White Paper. In this sense both are part of the same policy 
package, and henceforth this chapter uses the term “deregulation” to include 
privatisation. It is the subsidy reduction that causes particular problems for the evaluation 
of deregulation. It is conceivable that if subsidy reduction had not occurred then bus fares 
might have fallen and passenger journeys increased. Combining these hypothetical 
outcomes with the cost reductions that actually occurred might give a more favourable 
picture of the effects of deregulation.
Mackie and Preston (1996, p. 56) observe that “What is clear is that any review of 
deregulation comes up against the intractable problem of disentangling the effects of 
deregulation itself from those of the cuts in revenue support”. The aim of this chapter is 
to show that the problem is difficult rather than intractable. By specifying an appropriate 
econometric model it is possible to identify the influence of subsidy reduction on bus 
fares and, by estimating what subsidy would have been in the absence of reductions, to 
estimate the demand for bus travel in the “counter-factual” situation.
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6.2 Data, Methodology and Model Specification
6.2.1 D ata
The data set consists of forty-five annual observations for the years 1953 to 1997 on 
passenger journeys by local bus, bus fares, motoring costs, personal disposable income, 
vehicle kilometres, fleet structure, operating costs, subsidies, consumer prices and 
population. Since London bus services are not deregulated, the data is for Britain 
excluding London. This exclusion creates a (small) number of problems in obtaining the 
data for some variables, as does the fact that transport data tends to be collected for 
Britain rather than the UK whilst income and price data are collected for the UK rather 
than Britain. Details of the data and variable definitions are provided in Appendix four.
The effects of these differences in data collection should not be exaggerated, however. 
For example, inflation in Northern Ireland has been broadly similar to that in the UK, so 
that the UK consumer price index will be a close proxy for that in Britain. The author 
collected data on house prices in the South-east of England (mainly London) and the UK 
and used these two series as a measure of differential demand pressure in order to 
determine whether consumer prices might have risen faster in London than in the rest of 
the UK. In fact, between 1969 and 1995 house prices rose in current terms by 1259 per 
cent and 1224 per cent in the two areas respectively, a very similar increase. Thus 
changes in the UK consumer price index seem a reasonable approximation to changes in 
the consumer price index for Britain excluding London.
The data on subsidy to the bus industry requires particular comment. Subsidy reduces 
operating costs and, ceteris paribus, allows the operator to set a lower fare for bus travel. 
Subsidy began in 1969, when revenue support (now called public transport support) was 
paid to bus operators, as well as reimbursement for participation in concessionary fare
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schemes1. The effect of the definitional change from revenue support (RS) to public 
transport support (PTS) can be seen in the figures for Britain from 1977-79 inclusive, 
where the former is 16 per cent higher than the latter in all three years. The RS data for 
1969-77 is thus adjusted upwards by the same percentage and spliced into the PTS data 
for 1977-97. No data is available for PTS in or outside London prior to 1977, but 
inspection of the data after this period shows that PTS for Britain is on average one-and- 
a-half times greater than that for PTS outside London for 1977-86, with a small margin of 
fluctuation in each of these years. This ratio is used to derive the data for PTS outside 
London for 1969-76. The same procedure is used to derive the data for concessionary 
fares (CF) outside London for 1969-76.
Operators of most local bus services also receive a fuel duty rebate from central 
government. This rebate is not included in the operating cost calculations, where diesel 
prices are measured net of fuel duty. A rural bus grant was also paid to operators between 
1 April 1986 and 31 March 1990 to support rural bus services in the transitional period 
following deregulation. This grant is a very small amount in both absolute and relative 
terms, however, and is not included in the calculations.
6.2.2 M ethodology
Economic theory suggests that local bus service deregulation should reduce fares and 
increase demand if there is an increase in competition. But between 1985/86 (the 
financial year immediately preceding deregulation) and 1996/97 bus fares increased in 
real terms by an average of 24 per cent and passenger journeys fell by 31 per cent2. 
Although it is possible to argue that the fare increase was caused by a lack of
1 Concessionary fare payments are actually a subsidy to the passenger, rather than the bus operator. For 
convenience, however, they are included with public transport support under the general heading of subsidy 
to the bus industry.
2 Unless stated otherwise, data refer to Britain excluding London. It should be noted that the real fare 
increase in the English metropolitan areas was 58% between 1985/86 and 1996/97. much higher than the 
national average. This was not a steady increase since fares increased by 23% between 1985/86 and 
1986/87 alone, mainly because low fares policies in some areas prior to deregulation had kept fare changes 
well below inflation. Thus the subsequent analysis deals not only with Britain excluding London but also 
the different experiences of the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.
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competition, it is hard to see how the deregulated system created a reduction in 
competition sufficient to produce such a fare increase. The most plausible explanation for 
the increase in fares is the reduction in subsidy, which was 59 per cent in real terms over 
the same period. Given that subsidy forms about one-quarter of passenger and 
concessionary fare revenue, it does not seem unreasonable to hypothesise that, if subsidy 
reduction had not occurred, the increase in bus fares might have been significantly lower. 
Taken in conjunction with the decrease in operating costs per vehicle kilometre of one- 
third in real terms between 1985/86 and 1989/90, it is conceivable that bus fares might 
actually have fallen below those that would have occurred in the regulated system.
Figure 6.1 shows the actual and possible outcomes. The actual price/quantity 
combination after deregulation and subsidy reduction is given by point A. Point B shows 
the price/quantity combination which might be observed if the regulated system had 
continued in operation. Point C shows the price/quantity combination which might be 
observed if subsidy reduction had not occurred i.e. deregulation with subsidy 
replacement. Given the demand curve ABC, the triangle BCD can then be interpreted as 
the welfare gain from deregulation with subsidy replacement (see Section 6.6).
Bus
fares
Pb2
Pbl
Pb3
A \ Point A: actual price quantity combination after 
deregulation and subsidy reduction (Pb2,D2) 
Point B: forecast price quantity combination with 
regulation (Pbl.D l)
Point C: forecast price quantity combination after 
deregulation and subsidy replacement (Pb3,D3)
Passenger journeys
Figure 6.1: Bus fares with subsidy reduction, subsidy replacement and regulation
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6 .2 .3  M o d e l  S p e c if ic a tio n  a n d  E stim a tio n  M e th o d o lo g y
In order to find points A, B and C it is necessary to estimate the demand function for bus 
travel for 1953-97 after allowing for changes in bus fares and other explanatory variables. 
The demand curve ABC can be interpreted as the long-run demand curve for bus travel, 
showing price/quantity combinations after adjusting for shifts in the short run demand 
curves. The bus fare is assumed to be cost-determined. The initial model specification is 
as follows:
D t -  a 0 + a,}7, + a 2Pb, + a 3P c , + a 4Vt + a sFt + a 6D U  + //, (1)
Pht = f l 0 + p xP S t + p 2CFt + P 3O Ct + P 4F  + p sD U  + u2 (2)
where D -  demand for bus travel (passenger journeys per person)
Y -  personal disposable income per person (real)
Ph = bus fare index (1953 = 100, real)
Pc -  motoring cost index (1953 = 100, real)
V = service frequency (vehicle kilometres per person)
F  = bus fleet structure (ratio of double-deckers to total bus fleet)
OC  = bus operating costs (pence per vehicle kilometre, real)
PS = public transport support (pence per vehicle kilometre, real)
CF = concessionary fare revenue (pence per vehicle kilometre, real)
D U  = bus deregulation dummy variable (D U  = 0 , 1953-86: D U  -  1, 1987-97) 
ui = a normally and independently distributed error term with zero mean and
constant variance cr2 for / = 1,2.
Equation (1) is the demand function for local bus service travel, which is hypothesised to 
depend on own-price, cross-price and income variables. Bus travel is also influenced by 
service frequency and other variables such as comfort. In the absence of reliable and 
consistent data on factors such as comfort, the model specification relies on vehicle 
kilometres travelled to proxy service frequency. A difficulty with this measure is that it 
may overstate service frequency if network size is increasing. This effect is not tested for. 
Another difficulty with using vehicle kilometres as a measure of output is that it does not 
take account of changes in the structure of the bus fleet. Since deregulation there has been 
a significant degree of substitution of single-decker buses for double-deckers, so that the
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number of vehicle seat kilometres has not increased at the same rate as vehicle 
kilometres. Using vehicle kilometres as a measure of supply may thus overstate the 
quality of service being offered and thus the number of passenger journeys. On the other 
hand, the trend towards smaller vehicles may have increased passenger journeys if, for 
example, a single-decker such as a minibus can access housing estates that a double- 
decker cannot. Thus the effects of changes in fleet structure on passenger journeys are 
somewhat ambiguous. An attempt is made to determine the significance of this effect by 
incorporating the variable F  into the model specification.
Equation (2) is a price-markup equation. Following the seminal paper by Hall and Hitch 
(1939), a large amount of empirical evidence has accrued to suggest that many firms set 
prices on the basis of a markup on costs, or cost-plus pricing. More recently Hall et al. 
(1996) in a major survey of the pricing policies of 654 UK companies confirmed this 
view, finding that over 47 per cent of them regarded cost-plus pricing as “important”. The 
PS  and CF  variables are included as (negative) costs, whilst F is included in order to 
control for changes to the structure of the bus fleet.
The advantage of the price-markup specification is that it is general enough to cover bus 
operator pricing policies before and after deregulation. In the pre-deregulation period 
covered by this study (1953-1985), the bus industry was largely a nationalised 
undertaking. Profit maximisation was not considered an appropriate objective, although 
the industry was generally expected to behave commercially i.e. total revenue should 
cover total cost subject to achieving a target rate of return on capital employed. Nash 
(1978) discusses possible management objectives given this overall requirement.
Setting price as a markup on costs is one way of achieving this target. But such pricing is 
not incompatible with the more market oriented environment resulting from deregulation, 
since the profit markup can be adjusted in line with changes in market conditions 
(Hawkins, 1973). Indeed, some authors argue that cost-plus pricing is a rule of thumb for 
setting a profit-maximising price. Thus Equation (2) can be regarded as a reasonably
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flexible specification which encompasses price setting behaviour in both the pre- and 
post-deregulation periods.
Both equations contain a dummy variable to allow for the effects of bus deregulation 
which are not explicitly modelled. These effects include instability, loss of information 
and lack of integration in the demand equation and changes in the markup in the price- 
markup equation. Other dummy variables are included in at least one of the equations, 
although they are not reported above in order to keep the specifications concise. These 
dummies account for events such as the oil price shocks of 1973/74, low fares policies 
(and their termination) in the metropolitan areas, and the initial period of non­
privatisation in Scotland. In general, these other dummy variables are found to be 
insignificant.
6.3 Model Estimation
6.3.1 Estim ation M ethodologies
Choosing an appropriate estimation methodology is not straightforward. Time series 
analysis has developed an extensive literature following the realisation that regressions 
containing trended variables may be subject to the problem of spurious relationships. 
Within this literature there has been a growing emphasis on system rather than single­
equation estimation, and on the specification of the short-run dynamics (via the error 
correction mechanism) and the long-run equilibrium properties of the system (via 
cointegration relationships). System estimation has a number of advantages over single­
equation estimation. It makes full use of the data, it can allow and test for 
endogeneity/exogeneity amongst the variables without implicitly imposing coefficient 
restrictions, and it can be used to determine the dynamics of the system.
For example, service frequency can be regarded as a supply variable and there is a 
possibility of simultaneity between 73 and V: passenger journeys are partly determined by 
service frequencies, whilst service frequencies may be adjusted by operators in response
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to changes in passenger journeys. There are other potential feedback mechanisms 
between the variables in equations (1) and (2), such as simultaneity between D and Pb . 
It also seems reasonable to assume that decisions to use bus services are subject to time- 
lags, since travel-to-work patterns in particular are often well-established and difficult to 
vary at short notice. Similarly there is likely to be some degree of inertia in changing 
service frequencies, since such changes involve alterations to timetables, fleet schedules, 
driver hours and so on. This implies that appropriate specification of variable lag orders 
is an important part of the modelling process. For these, and other reasons, system 
estimation of the above model has significant advantages.
But system estimation requires a relatively large number of observations. Although the 
number of observations (= 45) in the data set is large in comparison to that of most time 
series transport studies, it is small relative to the typical data set used for system 
estimation. Using the now widely established Johansen maximum likelihood (JML) 
estimation method in small samples, for example, is likely to lead to tests of low power 
and a tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (Reimers, 1992, 
Cheung and Lai, 1993). Additionally, it may be very difficult to identify some of the 
multiple cointegration relationships often detected by the JML method, particularly 
where economic theory has nothing specific to say about the coefficient values in the 
cointegrating vector. The approach taken in this paper is to use both single and system 
equation methods to determine the properties of the data, and to determine the 
appropriate model specification(s) by means of the model diagnostics and the plausibility 
of the coefficient estimates.
6.3.2 M odel Estimation
The starting point for estimation is the general to specific approach advocated by Hendry 
and others (c f  Hendry and Richard, 1982), together with the now standard procedures for 
testing for cointegrating relationships. These are: first, to determine whether the variables 
contain stochastic and/or deterministic trends; second, to use the JML approach to 
determine the number of cointegrating relationships; third, to estimate the implied vector
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error correction model (VECM); fourth, to determine which variables are endogenous or 
(weakly) exogenous and thereby obtain a parsimonious model specification. Given the 
remarks in the preceding sub-section, steps two to four are also conducted within a single 
equation framework using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimation method.
In terms of capturing all the possible interactions between the variables in equations (1) 
and (2), it would be preferable to include them all in a single vector autoregression 
(VAR). Given the sample size, however, the loss of degrees of freedom in response to 
increased VAR lag orders is prohibitive. Accordingly, the demand and price-markup 
equations are modelled within separate VAR systems. The equations are estimated in 
both linear and log-linear form, although the latter generally gives better estimation 
results than the linear form and tends to reduce problems of heteroscedasticity. The log- 
linear form also has the convenient property that the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables can be interpreted as constant elasticities with respect to the dependent variable. 
Consequently, the remainder of this paper refers to estimation procedures conducted with 
the variables in logarithm form.
6.3.3 Unit Root Tests
The variables from equations (1) and (2) are tested for unit roots using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) equation with a time trend:
p
Ay, = + o -  p )a ,r  -  fjy,., + J^r,Ay,-, +»,
where is the time series of interest, T is a linear deterministic time trend, p is the order 
of augmentation of the test, and //, is a white noise error term. The /;th order ADF test 
statistic is given by the t-statistic of p . There are four possibilities: first, y, is stationary 
with no time trend (a ] = 0, p & 0); second, y t is stationary with a time trend i.e. trend 
stationary (a, * 0,p  * 0); third, y, is non-stationary with no time trend ( a ] = 0,p  = 0);
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fourth, y, is non-stationary with a time trend (<2 , * 0, p -  0) . The lag order of the ADF
test, up to a maximum of four, is chosen with reference to three model selection criteria: 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) and the 
Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQC). The lag order is determined with reference to the value 
chosen by at least two of the criteria. Where the criteria all give different values, the 
lowest lag order is selected. The ADF test statistic is compared with the 95 per cent 
critical values given in MacKinnon (1991, Table 1).
The results from the ADF test should be treated with some caution since it lacks power in 
finite samples where p  is close to zero. There is also a constraint on the maximum size 
of the lag order of the ADF test, since there is a size-power trade-off. Rather than 
increasing the size of the lag-order to eliminate serial correlation in the regression 
residuals, the Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988) test can be used to carry out a non-parametric 
correction to the ADF statistic. Thus the PP test is particularly useful when it is difficult 
to eliminate serial correlation from the ADF regression residuals. Another problem is the 
presence of a structural break in the y, series. Perron (1989) shows that there is a
tendency to over-reject the null of non-stationarity when the series contains a structural 
break, and provides adjusted critical values for the ADF test in this situation. The Perron 
break (PB) test used in this paper is the innovational outlier test (Perron, op. ciL, p. 1380) 
which allows for changes in both the intercept and the slope of the ADF regression:
A y t = a o + ( ^ ~ p ) a J  ~  p y t~\ +  2 / , - A j v ,- + +
where D1 =1 if T TB (zero otherwise) and TB is the time of the structural break, 1)2 = T 
if T TB (zero otherwise) and D3 =1 if T = TB~ 1 (zero otherwise). This general 
specification nests the “unit root with a break” null hypothesis (p = a ] -  /?, = 0) with the 
“trend-stationary around a breaking trend” alternative (p, a , , /?,,/?, * Oand /?, -  0). The 
t-statistic of p  is compared with the critical values given in Perron {op. cit., Table VLB,
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p. 1377). If the unit root null is rejected, then hypothesis tests on the remaining 
coefficients can be carried out using the conventional t and F tests.
The series are first tested for stochastic and/or deterministic trends using the ADF and PP 
tests. In a number of cases the tests give the contradictory result that the series are non- 
stationary with and without a deterministic trend. This is an indication that the series may 
contain a structural break. The PB test (along with the PP equivalent) is then used to test 
the unit root null hypothesis against the trend-stationary alternative in the presence of a 
structural break. Although the date of the structural break can be determined using a 
recursive, rolling or sequential approach (Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock, 1992), the 
finite-sample properties of these tests are uncertain. The determination of the break date 
is also a purely statistical process, with no reference to actual economic shocks. The 
approach of this paper is to determine the break date visually, or if no break date is 
visually apparent, in the light of the economy’s history. The series may be subject to one 
or more possible breaks (oil price shocks and bus deregulation, for example). If this is the 
case, each break is tested individually.
The results from these test procedures can be summarised as follows. All the series are 
non-stationary in levels form, either with or without a deterministic trend. The non- 
stationarity result is consistent with a visual inspection of the series plots, where all the 
plots display evidence of trending. The first differences of the series are all stationary. In 
the case of In D , In OC- and In F the first differences are stationary with a deterministic 
trend. For the other series, the first differences are stationary without a deterministic 
trend. All the series are thus integrated of order one, or /(1). The presence of 
deterministic trends in some of the first differenced series has important implications for 
the cointegration analysis in subsequent sections.
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6.3.4 Model Estimation: the demand equation
6.3.4.1 System Estimation: Johansen maximum likelihood
The variables In D , In Y , In Ph , In P c , In F , In F from equation (1), plus the dummy 
variable and an intercept, are first estimated in terms of an unrestricted VAR model to 
determine the appropriate lag order. Setting the initial lag order to five, the maximum 
allowable given the number of variables and observations, eliminates serial correlation 
from each of the VAR equations. The lag order chosen by the SBC and A1C is 5, which is 
too high for practical estimation purposes given the small sample size. The next lag order 
chosen by the SBC is 1. Using this lag order for the unrestricted VAR gives no serial 
correlation in five of the six equations. The equation for In F shows serial correlation at 
the 5 per cent level, but not at the ten per cent level. Given the lack of serial correlation, 
this VAR can be used as the basis for cointegration testing.
Using the JML test for cointegration, the maximal eigenvalue and trace tests find two 
cointegrating vectors, as does the SBC. In view of the deterministic trend found in In D , 
a time trend (= T) is included in the cointegrating regressions. The first vector appears to 
be the demand function given by equation (1), with In Y , In Pb , In V and T significant at 
the 5 per cent level, but In Pc and In F insignificant. Various sets of restrictions are 
imposed to identify both vectors, but identification of the second vector is problematic. In 
addition, the underlying VECMs for the various restrictions give poor results in terms of 
R 2 and coefficient significance.
One reason for the poor performance may be that the VECM’s are not conditioned on the 
(weakly) exogenous variables. Inspection of the VECM for each variable shows that 
neither error correction term is significant in the VECMs for In Y and In P c , so that they 
can be regarded as the weakly exogenous variables in the system. Conditioning on these
3 The dummy variable is not normally included as pari of the cointegrating regrcssion(s) in the JML 
approach., but as part of the VECM. The justification is that dummy variables capture the short-run 
“shocks” to the system, but this is a somewhat restrictive use of dummy variables. In the present case, it is
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variables (i.e. adding them to the VECMs for the endogenous variables) does not 
noticeably improve the performance of the endogenous variable VECMs, however.
6.3.4.2 Single Equation Estimation
In view of the inconclusive results from the JML cointegration tests, another possibility is 
to use single equation estimation in the form of the ARDL estimation method. This is 
preferred to the Engle-Granger two-stage (EG2S) method, since the latter may be subject 
to small-sample bias (Wickens and Breusch, 1988). The appropriate lag order can be 
determined by testing down from the general to the specific model specification or, more 
conveniently, using the AIC, SBC and HQC. The latter method gives the following 
ARDL( 1,0,0,0,1) model:4
InDt = 1.414-l-0.630InDt_x + 0.2261nT, -0.3801n/7>, +0.166/7:, 
(1.567) (7.069) (2.224) (-4.226) (2.489)
+ 0.526 In Vt -0.417InFM -  0.05 \DU -  0.0097' (3)
(3.683) (-3.720) (-2.533) (-2.467)
R 2 = 0.999 XscO) = 0.126 *>(!) = 0.044 X;m(2) = Z.700 Z/;( l)  = 2.296
where the t-statistics are in parentheses, and the x 2 -statistics (with degrees of freedom in 
parentheses) are Lagrange multiplier tests for serial correlation, functional form, 
normality of residuals and heteroscedasticity respectively. This specification performs 
well. All the coefficients (apart from the intercept) are significant at the 5 per cent level, 
and they have the signs generally expected by economic theory. In the case of the income 
coefficient, the positive sign implies that the increase in demand for public transport
likely that deregulation has long-mu as well as short-run effects, so it is included in the coinlegrating 
regrcssion(s).
A The maximum lag order for the computations is set at 2 and the final lag order is determined by the SBC. 
which gives the most parsimonious model specification. Given that there arc six variables in the ARDL 
model, higher lag orders cause very large increases in computing lime. Further tests show that In F can be
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induced by economic growth outweighs the inferior good aspect whereby increasing 
incomes cause car use to rise and bus use to fall. The R 2 is close to unity and there are 
no problems with serial correlation, functional form and heteroscedasticity. Although 
there is evidence of residual non-normality at the 5 per cent level, this is not the case at 
the 10 per cent level. The coefficients on In Y , In P , In Pc and In V are the short-run 
elasticities with respect to In Db, and have plausible magnitudes. The dummy variable
captures the effects of deregulation and subsidy withdrawal. Its negative coefficient 
implies that the latter effect outweighs the former. The negative coefficient on the time 
trend captures the decline in bus use caused by the increase in car ownership from the 
1950s onwards.
Furthermore, the F-test procedure (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997, p.304) shows that there is 
a significant cointegrating relationship between the five 7(1) variables in equation (3), and 
that it is only significant in the equation for which In D is the dependent variable. This is 
an important result, since it implies that, apart from In D , the other 7(1) variables are 
weakly exogenous.* 5 Thus it is valid to include the current values of these exogenous 
(differenced) variables in the corresponding error correction model (ECM). Based on the 
underlying ARDL (1,0,0,0,1) model, the estimated ECM is:
A In Dt = 1.414 + 0.226A In Y, -0.380A7J/>, + 0.166A Pc, +0.526AE,
(1.567) (2.224) (-4.226) (2.489) (3.683)
-  0.009AT -  0.051ADIJ -  0.370(C7?)M (4)
(-2.467) (-2.533) (-4.145)
where CR is the cointegration relationship. All the variables in the regression are now 
7(0), so there should be no problem with spurious relationships. The regression results 
are the same as those for equation (3), apart from the introduction of the lagged
omiltcd from the model specification: its coefficient is not significant cither individually or jointly, and its
omission docs not affect the performance of the model.
5 It is perhaps more precise to use the terminology of Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and refer to them as the 
“long-nin forcing variables”.
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cointegration relationship. The coefficient on the lagged CR is negative and highly 
significant, and implies that passenger journeys adjust in a given time period by 37 per 
cent towards their long run equilibrium value. The long run equilibrium relationship 
embodied in the cointegration relationship is estimated as:
In Dt = 3.825 + 0.61 1 In Y( - 1.028 In Pbt + 0.450 In Pc, +0.3001nF, -0 .025T-0A 31D U  
(1.806) (2.033) (-3.558) (2.022) (1.700) (-3.611) (-2.473)
(5)
All the coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at the 5 per cent level, apart 
from the coefficient on In V which is significant at the ten per cent level. This seems 
another good result given that there are seven regressors specified but only 45 
observations over which to estimate the respective coefficient values. The coefficients on 
In Y , In Pb , In Pc and In V represent the long-run constant elasticities of demand for bus 
travel with respect to income, bus fares, motoring costs and service frequency 
respectively. These long-run values should be compared with their short-run counterparts 
in equations (3) or (4). They are determined by the speed of adjustment coefficient (= 
0.370) according to the formula: long-run elasticity = short-run elasticity * (1/0.307), 
where the short-run service frequency elasticity is given by 0.526-0.417= 0.109. The 
short-run bus fare elasticity (= -0.38) is fairly close to the “accepted wisdom” value of - 
0.33, whilst the long-run elasticity of around (negative) unity is also in line with other 
studies (Button, 1993, p. 41, Goodwin, 1992).
6.3.5 Model Estimation: the price-markup equation
Estimation of the price-markup equation is more problematic than that of the demand 
equation for the following reasons. First, public transport support and concessionary fare 
payments do not begin until 1969, so that the number of observations available for
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estimation falls from forty-five to twenty-nine6. This makes estimation of the five 
variable model in equation (2) a difficult proposition. Second, the period 1969-1984 is 
distinctly different from that of 1985-1997. In the first period, bus fares, public transport 
support, concessionary fares and operating costs rise together. From 1985 onwards, bus 
fares continue to increase but public transport support and operating costs start to fall. 
This difference is compatible with the expected effects of both deregulation and the 
reduction in public transport support in the second period, but from an econometric 
viewpoint it is difficult to satisfactorily estimate a model which explains the data over the 
period 1969-1997, even after the inclusion of dummy variables allowing for these effects. 
The non-linearity of public transport support and operating costs is taken into account by 
including quadratic terms in some of the model specifications, but this also fails to give 
satisfactory results. Finally, the estimation difficulties are compounded by a 
multicollinearity problem, since operating costs and public transport support move fairly 
closely in line with each other over the period 1969-1997.
In order to resolve these problems, the following modelling strategy is adopted. Public 
transport support and concessionary fare payments are combined into a single subsidy 
variable (= SUB), and the relationship between Pb, SUB and OC is estimated for the 
period 1985-97. Since there is a multicollinearity problem between SUB and OC, the 
latter variable is dropped from the model specification. The final specification is a simple 
log-linear bivariate model which, using OLS with a second order autoregressive error 
specification to remove serial correlation, yields the following results:
In Pb = 5.406 -  0.252 In SUB (6)
(117.279) (-4.334)
R 2 = 0.878, DW= 1.922
6 A possible way to overcome the shortage of observations is to assign zero values to public transport 
support and concessionary fares from 1953 to 1968. and to use the whole of the sample from 1953 to 1997 
for estimation of the price-markup equation. The results of this strategy arc discussed in Appendix five.
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The estimated equation has a high R 2 and the SUB coefficient is significant and has the 
expected sign. It also has a plausible value, given that subsidy per vehicle kilometre is 
around a third of operating costs per vehicle kilometre for the 1980s and 1990s. If price is 
determined mainly by subsidy and operating costs, then a bus fare elasticity of 25 per 
cent with respect to subsidy is not unreasonable. The estimated residuals all lie within the 
two standard error band, and most of them fall within just one standard error band. 
Inspection of the autocorrelation function for the estimated residuals confirms they are 
stationary, although this conclusion must be tempered with caution given the small 
sample size.
The small sample size also implies that it is not advisable to test for causality between the 
variables in equation (6). It is possible to make a quantitative evaluation, however, since 
the estimation results for equation (6) for the period 1969-1984 give a positive SUB 
coefficient. This is consistent with the view that in the pre-deregulation period it is bus 
fares and public transport support which rise together, caused by the shift from bus to car 
use and the resulting loss of revenue for bus operators. The negative SUB coefficient in 
the 1985-97 period implies that it is the decrease in public transport support that is 
causing the increase in bus fares. The issue of causality is discussed further in Appendix 
five, where Granger causality tests strongly support the hypothesis of uni-directional 
causality from subsidy to bus fares.
Equation (6) provides a baseline estimate for the whole of Britain excluding London. The 
next step is to disaggregate the data between the English metropolitan areas and the rest 
of Britain excluding London (or the “non-metropolitan” areas), since there are significant 
differences in the amount of subsidy withdrawal and fare increases between these two 
areas. The same modelling strategy is adopted as for equation (6), and yields the 
following results:
Metropolitan areas: In Pb -  5.548 -  0.519In SUB + 0.150DU 
(147.757) (-16.813) (4.883)
(7)
Non-metropolitan areas: In Pb = 4.718 -  0.159 In SUB 
(234.091) (-3.555)
(8)
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Both equations have a very high R 2 equal to 0.962 and 0.886 respectively. The 
coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level and have the expected sign. Equation 
(7) is estimated by OLS, with the dummy variable (DU = 1 for 1986, zero elsewhere) 
included to account for a single residual lying just outside the two standard error band. 
Equation (8) is estimated by OLS with a third order moving average error specification to 
remove serial correlation. All the residuals in (7) and (8) fall within the two standard 
error band, and the corresponding ACFs indicate stationarity of the residuals. Given the 
large reduction in public transport support in the metropolitan relative to the non­
metropolitan areas, the higher (absolute) value of the metropolitan SUB coefficient 
compared to the non-metropolitan SUB coefficient is what one would expect. These 
coefficient values are also broadly consistent with the value in equation (6), given the 
relative weightings between the two areas7.
6.3.6 Model Estimation: a summary
Cointegration single-equation modelling for the demand equation yields a set of 
coefficient estimates that are plausible and statistically significant for both the short-run 
disequilibrium and long-run equilibrium processes. Similar procedures for the price- 
markup equation are not possible given the smaller number of observations and. the 
nature of the data. Even in the latter case, however, it is possible to derive a plausible 
relationship between subsidy and bus fares for the deregulation period. Taken overall, 
these results suggest that it is sensible to proceed to the next stage of the analysis.
6.4 R eplacing the “ Lost” Subsidy.
This section provides an answer to the crucial question “what would have happened to 
bus fares and patronage if subsidy had not been reduced?” To do this requires some 
estimate of the level of subsidy that would have occurred in the absence of subsidy
7 Although the price-markup equation (2) is disaggregated between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas, the demand equation (1) is not. The justification for this is that consumer behaviour with respect to 
bus travel is assumed to be unaffected by geographical area e.g. the own-price elasticity with respect to bus 
travel will be the same in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.
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reduction. One possibility is to use estimates made by the author. This runs into the 
legitimate objection that the author may be tempted to use an estimate which gives 
“good” results. Clearly, it would be better to have an independent estimate to preclude 
this possibility. Fortunately, such an estimate exists. In a response to the Transport Select 
Committee in 1995, Peter Bottomley stated that if pre-deregulation increases in subsidy 
(i.e. public transport support) had continued then the subsidy bill would have risen to £2 
billion by that date (Hibbs and Bradley, 1997, p. 3)8. Inspection of the data shows that 
subsidy reduction began in 1985, so that it is necessary to estimate an equation which 
provides a good fit to the subsidy data from 1969 to 1984 and generates a forecast of £2 
billion by 1995.
After some experimentation, the specification which provides the best match to these 
criteria is given by maximum likelihood estimation of an AR(4) model with PS as the 
dependent variable, combined with an AR(3) error specification. The model has an 
R 2 = 0.953 for 1969 to 1984, and generates a forecast of £1.97 billion for 1995 which is 
very close to that made for the Transport Select Committee. This forecast compares with 
the actual subsidy figure of £388 million for 1995, so that the forecast for Britain for 
subsidy in the absence of subsidy reduction (PSGBP) is around five times the actual 
figure for subsidy {PSGB). Since the estimate is for Britain, rather than Britain excluding 
London, it is assumed that the forecast values for public transport subsidy in London 
from 1985 onwards (PSLTF) increase in the same ratio as that for Britain i.e. PSLTF = 
(PSGBF/PSGB)*PSLT. Thus the forecast values for public transport support in Britain 
excluding London (PSP') are derived as PSF = PSGBF-PSL7F. The forecast values for 
public transport support are then added to the actual concessionary fare values to generate 
a forecast for total subsidy to the bus industry (= SlJBb').
The SUBF variable contains actual subsidy data for 1969 to 1984, and forecast values for 
1985 to 1997. This variable is substituted for SUB in equation (6) to generate forecasts of 
Pb from 1985-97 (= PbF). The PbF variable is then substituted for Pb in equation (5) to
8 From other information given by Hibbs and Bradley (op. cit.) ii is clear that the subsidy forecast is for 
public transport support in Britain in current terms.
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generate forecasts of D from 1985-97 (= DP). Thus the variables SUBF, PbF and DF 
represent the values which would have occurred in the deregulation period if subsidy had 
not been reduced. The actual and forecast values are shown in Table 6.1. Note that 
PbFR and DFR refer to forecast values for the continuation of the regulated local bus 
service system, and their derivation is explained in the next section.
Table 6.1: D eregulation (with and w ithout subsidy reduction) and regulation: actual 
and forecast values for Britain excluding London
Subsidy Bus Fares Passenger
Journeys
SUB SUBF Pb PbF PbF„ D DF d f r
1985 3.41 4.18 164.01 155.36 164.01 92.83 93.19 92.83
1986 2.92 4.46 175.81 152.82 167.99 86.11 94.48 89.53
1987 2.29 4.21 178.45 155.10 170,43 83.94 83.61 86.35
1988 2.15 4.18 178.77 155.31 173.30 81.97 84.71 83.28
1989 2.03 4.42 178.44 153.17 176.12 79.28 84.68 80.32
1990 1.97 4.15 179.38 155.66 179.02 74.67 79.33 77.47
1991 1.92 3.93 184.23 157.82 181.95 71.17 77.33 74.72
1992 1.85 4.02 187.19 156.90 184.93 67.72 77.94 72.06
1993 1.74 4.09 191.31 156.23 187.97 65.85 79.33 69.50
1994 1.70 4.21 194.84 155.09 191.05 65.34 79.26 67.03
1995 1.68 4.42 196.96 153.14 194.18 63.62 78.34 64.65
1996 1.64 4.56 202.59 151.99 197.37 62.08 79.32 62.36
1997 1.60 4.86 207.85 149.57 200.60 60.60 80.32 60.14
Notes: Data is presented in calendar rather than financial years for convenience. Thus 1985 data is for the
financial year 1985/86. The forecasts begin in 1985 because this is when subsidy reduction starts. 
SUB = public transport support plus concessionary fare payments, pence per vehicle km., real.
Pb = local bus service fare index. 1953 = 100. real.
D = local bus service passenger journeys per person.
SUBF = forecast of SUB with deregulation and subsidy replacement
PbF = forecast of Pb with deregulation and subsidy replacement (similarly for DI7)
PbFR = forecast of PbF with continuing regulation (similarly for DFH)
Table 6.1 shows that by 1997 forecast subsidy is around 200 per cent higher than actual 
subsidy. Given the model parameters in equations (5) and (6), this implies that forecast 
bus fares are around 30 per cent lower, and forecast passenger journeys are around 30 per 
cent higher, than their respective 1997 actual values. In fact, forecast passenger journeys 
stabilise at around 80 passenger journeys per person, in contrast to the continuing decline 
in actual passenger journeys.
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These aggregate figures do not distinguish between the metropolitan and the non­
metropolitan areas. Equations (7) and (8) are used to forecast bus fares in the two areas 
respectively, and these values are then used in equation (5) to generate forecasts of 
passenger journeys in both areas. The results are shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.39. Forecast 
passenger journeys for the metropolitan areas decline sharply at first, although from a 
higher level than the actual values, and then begin to increase and stabilise at around 160 
passenger journeys per person. The sharp decline is consistent with the “instability” 
effects identified by White (1990) and Fairhurst and Edwards (1996) in the metropolitan 
areas for the period 1985/86 to 1988/89. By 1997, the forecast value for metropolitan area 
passenger journeys is 47 per cent higher than the actual value for that year. In the non­
metropolitan areas, the forecast values for passenger journeys decline and then stabilise at 
a value of around 57 passenger journeys per person which, for 1997, is 25 per cent higher 
than the actual value.
These results imply that, if subsidy reduction had not occurred, deregulation would have 
halted the long-term decline in bus patronage in both the metropolitan and non­
metropolitan areas. It would not, however, have reversed the trend, since the 1997 
forecast values for passenger journeys are still below the actual values for the first few 
years of deregulation. Nonetheless, the results do appear to vindicate the White Paper’s 
claim that deregulation would end the “spiral of decline”.
9 The values obtained for the metropolitan areas from equation (5) must be weighted by the proportion of 
total metropolitan population to total British population excluding London, and by analogy for the non­
metropolitan areas in Britain excluding London. These weighted values arc the ones shown in Tables 6.2 
and 6.3. Given that the population weights arc around 0.24 and 0.76 respectively, it can be checked that the 
sum of the forecast passenger journey values in Tables 2 and 3 arc close to those given for Britain 
excluding London in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.2: D eregulation (w ith and without subsidy reduction): actual and forecast 
values for the English m etropolitan areas
Subsidy Bus Tares Passenger Journeys
SUB SUBF Pb PbF D DF
1985 6.21 7.72 100 88.87 184.61 199.80
1986 5.56 8.68 122.38 97.15 162.11 178.32
1987 4.14 7.74 127.61 88.76 155.41 177.02
1988 3.74 7,23 129.38 91.96 152.37 172.61
1989 3.46 7.20 129.96 92.11 148.00 169.85
1990 3.33 6.69 131.91 95.74 138.83 153.46
1991 3.21 6.23 139.22 99.34 133.07 149.29
1992 3.05 6.33 143.41 98.54 123.67 151.07
1993 2.86 6.37 148.04 98.19 119.38 152.07
1994 2.75 6.43 149.99 97.73 119.02 151.22
1995 2.76 6.83 152.70 94.71 115.53 155.45
1996 2.73 7.34 157.05 91.21 111.46 162.56
1997 2.56 7.26 161.38 91.76 110.65 162.45
Notes: See Table 6.1 for variable definitions.
There are no bus fare indices for the metropolitan areas prior to 1975. The metropolitan area bus 
fare index is rebased to 1985 = 100.
Table 6.3: D eregulation (with and w ithout subsidy reduction): actual and forecast 
values for the non-m etropolitan areas
Subsidy Bus "ares Passenger Journeys
SUB SUBF Pb PbF D DF
1985 2.11 2.53 100 96.57 65.16 65.42
1986 1.81 2.69 101.30 95.64 63.38 66.46
1987 1.49 2.70 101.92 95.56 62.71 59.62
1988 1.48 2.87 101.86 94.66 61.21 61.11
1989 1.41 3.20 101.66 93.00 59.08 61.30
1990 1.37 3.04 101.86 93.77 55.90 58.09
1991 1.36 2.90 103.61 94.49 53.22 56.64
1992 1.31 2.98 104.83 94.09 51.38 56.91
1993 1.24 3.07 106.48 93.65 50.25 58.12
1994 1.22 3.19 108.77 93.06 49.79 58.00
1995 1.21 3.36 109.51 92.28 48.65 56.84
1996 1.17 3.45 112.61 91.89 47.88 57.38
1997 1.16 3.79 115.48 90.54 46.27 57.81
Notes: See Table 6.1 for variable definitions.
There are no bus fare indices for the non-metropolitan areas prior to 1975. The non-metropolitan 
bus fare index is rebascd to 1985 = 100.
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6.5 Forecasts for Regulated Local Bus Services
So far the forecasts have focused on how deregulated local bus services would have 
responded if subsidy had not been reduced. It is also of interest to make some estimate of 
what would have happened to passenger journeys and bus fares in the absence of both 
subsidy reduction and deregulation or, equivalently, the continuation of the regulated 
system. One strategy is to build a structural model analogous to equation (5), but this 
would imply having to forecast vehicle kilometres as well as bus fares and subsidy levels 
in the regulated system. Another strategy is to note that from 1953 to 1981 there is a 
continuous and steady decline in the number of passenger journeys per person for Britain 
excluding London. If one assumes that the future would have been similar to the past, 
then there is no need for structural modelling since forecasts for passenger journeys could 
be made from their previous values. This can be achieved either by identifying the trend 
for passenger journeys within a deterministic framework or by allowing for stochastic 
variation in the series and modelling it in terms of the Box-Jenkins ARIMA methodology 
(Box and Jenkins, 1970).
The estimation period is from 1953 to 1981, with the four observations from 1982 to 
1985 used for comparing forecasting performance. Since In D is first-difference 
stationary, the ARIMA models are specified with Ain D as the dependent variable. 
Sixteen ARMA models are specified for Ain D both with and without a deterministic 
trend, ranging from ARMA (0,0) to ARMA (3,3). Model selection is based on the AIC 
and SBC, together with Theil’s inequality coefficient (“U”) to evaluate forecasting 
performance. The best overall performance is given by an ARMA(0,0) without a trend. 
Inspection of the ACF indicates residual stationarity, and this result is confirmed by an 
ADF test on the residuals. This ARMA specification is then re-estimated for 1953 to 
1985, and forecasts generated for 1986 to 1997 for 1). These forecasts for passenger 
journeys under the assumption of the continuation of the regulated system are shown as 
DFr in Table 6.1. The results are quite similar to those for deregulation with subsidy 
reduction, declining gradually from 90 to 60 passenger journeys per person over the 
period 1986 to 1997.
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Given the good performance of the zero order ARMA model, it is also possible that a 
simple regression of In D on a time trend is an appropriate characterisation of the data 
generating process. This is indeed the case and, following the forecasting procedure in 
the preceding paragraph, passenger journeys per person decline from 81 to 51 over the 
same period. The statistical advantage of the ARMA specification, however, is that it 
gives more weight to the turning point associated with the interruption in the decline of 
passenger journeys in the 1982-85 period, which is why its forecasts are higher than those 
of the simple time trend regression for 1986-97. Another advantage of the ARMA 
specification results is that they imply a rather simple and intuitively appealing policy 
outcome: if the actual passenger journeys associated with deregulation and subsidy 
reduction are slightly below those forecast for the regulated system, then overall the 
positive effects on bus patronage from deregulation must be slightly outweighed by the 
negative effects of subsidy reduction10. In a nutshell, deregulation and subsidy reduction 
have tended in practice to cancel each other out as far as bus patronage is concerned.
Apart from a “spike” in 1976, there is a fairly continuous and steady increase in bus fares 
over the period 1953-85 so that In Pb can be forecast in a similar way to In D . A total of 
thirty-two ARMA models are evaluated according to the AIC, SBC and Theil’s U 
criterion, together with a check for residual stationarity. The selected model for Ain Pb 
is an ARMA(1,0) specification without a time trend. The forecasts for bus fares under the 
assumption of the continuation of the regulated system are shown as PbFR in Table 6.1. 
These forecasts are slightly lower than the actual values (= Pb), a result consistent with 
the forecasts for regulated passenger journeys (=DFR ) being slightly higher than actual 
passenger journeys (= D).
10 This conclusion is reinforced by the negative sign and relatively small coefficient value of the dummy 
variable in equations (4) to (5). where DU  captures the effects of both deregulation and subsidy withdrawal.
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6.6 A W elfare Evaluation
6.6.1 Methodology
Table 6.1 contains forecasts for the continuation of the regulated system ( PhFR , DFR ) 
and for the deregulated system with subsidy replacement (PhF, DF). Referring back to 
Figure 6.1, these price/quantity combinations are associated with points B and C 
respectively. The movement from B to C occurs because of the change from the regulated 
system, characterised by territorial monopolies, to a deregulated system where there is 
greater competition and a reduction in bus fares (after subsidy replacement). The increase 
in competition is not through actual competition, which has been fairly limited in the 
deregulated market, but through potential competition. Chapter four concluded that the 
local bus service market is relatively contestable, so that the increase in industry 
concentration after deregulation does not imply an absence of competitive pricing.
Given certain assumptions, the standard measure of the change in welfare is given by the 
area BCD. The first assumption is that the long-run average cost curve is horizontal 
between Pb3 and C. This assumption is reasonable, given the generally accepted view 
that there are no significant scale economies in bus operation. Second, increased 
competition is likely to have resulted in a reduction in the X-inefficiency associated with 
the regulated bus industry. White (1990, p. 322) estimates that the increase in physical 
productivity was up to 20 per cent in the metropolitan areas for 1985/86 to 1988/89. This 
efficiency gain is permanent and applies to all years in the deregulation period. The 
welfare gain from reduced X-inefficiency, however, is offset by the losses associated 
with instability effects, reduced integration and reduced passenger information about bus 
services. If these gains and losses are assumed to cancel each other out, then area BCD 
can be used as a measure of the annual change in welfare over this period.
These conclusions are reached within the framework of the public interest theory of 
regulation discussed in Chapter three. The public choice approach discussed in Chapter 
four draws attention to the possibility that the costs of monopoly may be higher than the
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deadweight loss of area BCD because of “Tullock-Posner” costs. These are the costs 
associated with producers expending resources to achieve and maintain regulation. If 
these costs are significant, then area BCD may understate the welfare gain from 
deregulation.
6.6.2 Britain excluding London
Area BCD is calculated for each year over the period 1986 to 1997 for Britain excluding 
London using the bus fare and passenger journey data in Table 1. The bus fare indices are 
converted to actual fares paid by using the mean bus fare figure of 32.7 pence for 
1985/86 given by Mackie and Preston (1996, p. 124) in their welfare analysis. The 
resulting annual welfare gains11 represent the “internalities” associated with the 
movement from B to C in Figure 6.1. These gains are then discounted using a discount 
rate equal to the average real rate of return on UK Treasury Bills over the period (= 4.67 
per cent). The net present value (NPV) for 1986 of these welfare gains from deregulation 
with subsidy replacement is £92.087 million, or an average of £7.674 million per annum 
over the period.
The movement from B to C is also associated with a shift from car to bus travel because 
of the fall in the price of bus relative to car use. The reduction in car use creates various 
cost changes that are not generally taken account of in the private decision to substitute 
bus for car travel. In this sense, these cost changes can be regarded as the externalities 
associated with the movement from B to C. Romilly (1999) considers the unpriced cost 
changes arising from changes in traffic congestion, air and noise pollution, global 
warming, fuel savings, road accidents and road damage caused by the shift from car to 
bus travel in urban areas. The annual overall cost reductions range from £639.5 to 
£1234.1 (1995 prices) for each car no longer on the road because its occupants have
11 For the non-metropolitan areas, the Devalues arc below those for the regulated system for 1987 and 
1988, even though the PM7 values are also below the regulated values. This implies cither an upward 
sloping demand curve over the period or a shift inward of the demand curve. In both cases measurement of 
the welfare change is problematic. The approach taken is to set the welfare gain (or loss) equal to zero for 
these years.
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transferred to bus travel (Romilly, op. cit., p. 123). A possible external benefit not 
considered in Romilly {op. cit.) is the user benefit arising from increased bus service 
frequencies, since increasing service frequencies in response to increased demand will 
reduce waiting times for existing bus users (Mohring, 1972). To the extent that these 
benefits are significant, the above procedure will understate the welfare gains from bus 
for car substitution.
The reduction in car travel is estimated by using the results of cointegration methodology 
applied to car ownership and use (Romilly, Song and Liu, 1998). The cointegrating 
equation (9) is derived from an ARDL specification, although EG2S estimation produces 
similar figures for the reduction in the number of cars owned.
In CO = -1.580 + 2.393 In Y -  1.300In Pc + 1.926In Pb -  0.0727’ (9)
(-0.553) (3.998) (-4.409) (3.743) (-4.050)
where CO = car ownership per capita. The total reduction in cars owned is obtained by 
substituting PbF and PbFR in turn for Pb in equation (9), and multiplying the results by 
the population of Britain excluding London. The total reduction in cars owned is then 
multiplied by the conservative external cost saving estimate of £639.5 per car per annum 
(rebased from 1995 to 1986) to give the total reduction in external costs for each year. 
These annual cost savings are discounted to a NPV for 1986 using the discount rate of 
4.67 per cent. The resulting figure is £25.463 million. Combining the internal and 
external welfare gains from deregulation with subsidy replacement yields a NPV equal to 
£117.6 million, or an average of £9.796 million per annum over the period (see Table
6.4).
6.6.3 Metropolitan and Non-metropolitan Areas
The bus fare index in the regulated system is more difficult to forecast for the 
metropolitan areas than for Britain excluding London. It is more volatile, and there are 
fewer observations on which to base a forecast since bus fare data for the metropolitan 
areas is only available from 1975 onwards. It is possible to derive an index by noting that
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the forecasts for the regulated system in Britain excluding London are similar to (in fact, 
slightly below) those which are actually observed for the deregulated system with subsidy 
reduction. It is assumed that this relationship holds for the metropolitan areas, so that an 
index can be derived by taking the actual metropolitan fare index for 1986 and 
multiplying it by the ratio of the forecasts for the regulated system fare indices to the 
actual fare indices for Britain excluding London.
A similar procedure is used to forecast passenger journeys per person for the regulated 
system in the metropolitan areas. The regulated and deregulated fare indices for the 
metropolitan areas are converted to actual fares by using the figures given in White 
(1990, Table 3) and Mackie and Preston (1996, p. 124). The reduction in cars owned for 
the metropolitan areas is derived from the figure for Britain excluding London multiplied 
by the ratio of metropolitan area population to that of Britain excluding London. Using 
the welfare methodology above, the NPV for the internal and external adjusted welfare 
gains is £47.515 million and £5.753 million respectively12. Corresponding estimates of 
bus fares and passenger journeys are also derived for the non-metropolitan area, giving a 
NPV for the internal and external adjusted welfare gains in this area of £44.572 million 
and £19.710 million respectively13. The overall results are summarised in Table 6.4:
12 The unadjusted internal welfare gain for the metropolitan areas is £123.025 million, but this must be 
weighted by the ratio of metropolitan to non-metropolitan area passenger receipts, since the actual fare for 
Britain excluding London is a weighted (by passenger revenue) sum of the constituent areas. The passenger 
revenue ratio is fairly constant at around 35 per cent, giving an adjusted internal welfare gain for the 
metropolitan areas of £ 123.025*0.35=£43.059 million. This figure is then adjusted slightly upwards by an 
aggregation factor (see next footnote).
13 The sum of the passenger revenue weighted internal welfare gains (equal to £83.45 lmilion. consisting of 
£43.059 and £40.392 million for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas respectively) falls slightly 
short of the total for Britain excluding London (equal to £92.087 million). To maintain consistency 
between the aggregate and disaggregate totals, the latter are scaled up by a factor equal to 92.087/83.451.
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Table 6.4: W elfare gains from deregulation (with subsidy replacem ent) (£m )
Britain excluding 
London
Metropolitan areas Non-metropolitan
areas
Internal welfare gains 92.087 47.515 44.572
External welfare gains 25.463 5.753 19.710
Total welfare gains 117.550 53.268 64.282
Notes: The figures represent the welfare gains derived from comparing the forecast values for the
regulated bus system with those for the deregulated system with subsidy replacement for the 
period 1986-97.
The figures are net present values derived bv discounting the welfare changes from 1986-1997 
using a discount rate of 4.67 per cent.
The preceding analysis assumes that subsidy replacement is associated with an overall 
increase in the forecast level of subsidy from 1985 to 1997 (see values for SIJBF in Table 
6.1). Another possibility is to assume that subsidy is frozen at its 1984 level for the period 
1985 to 199714. This is similar to one of the scenarios considered by Mackie and Preston 
(1996, p. 123, p. 127), although their analysis does not account for externalities or the 
split between the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Actual subsidy in 1984 was
3.54 pence per vehicle kilometre, and the bus fare index was 166.69. These values are 
used for the whole of the period 1985 to 1997 to generate forecasts of passenger journeys 
for Britain excluding London using the methodology developed above. Passenger 
journeys per person fall from 91 in 1985 to 81 in 1987, and stabilise at around 75 by 
1997. The associated internal and external welfare gains are £63.526 million and £13.752 
million respectively, giving a total welfare gain of £77.277 million or an average of 
£6.440 million per annum over the period 1986 to 1997. Thus the total welfare gains 
from the “frozen” subsidy are two-thirds those of the “replacement” subsidy case.
White (1990, Table 9) estimates the welfare changes from deregulation, excluding 
externalities, for the period 1985/86 to 1988/89. These are a welfare gain of £10-£40 
million for the metropolitan areas, and a welfare loss of £63 million for the English shire 
counties and Scotland. The estimates do not allow for the effects of subsidy replacement, 
however. Mackie and Preston (1996, Table 6.17, Table 9.8) provide a number of 
estimates for Britain excluding London which do allow for the effects of subsidy
H The author is grateful to Professor David Starkic for this suggestion.
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reduction. Taking their scenario that corresponds most closely to the “frozen” subsidy 
case above, there is an estimated welfare gain of £7 million per annum for the period 
1985/86 to 1987/88 (excluding externalities). This is not dissimilar to the author’s 
“frozen” subsidy internal welfare gain estimate of £63.526 million, or £5.294 million per 
annum for the period 1986 to 1997.
Comparison between these studies and the present paper, however, may not be 
appropriate. The welfare change estimates in the above studies are based on fewer years 
and tend to capture the short to medium-term effects of deregulation. This contrasts with 
the present paper, where the welfare changes are estimated over the twelve-year period 
1986-97 and are thus associated with the long-run deregulation effects. The above studies 
estimate the welfare changes on the basis of elasticity values which are taken from 
external sources and may not be representative of the true values for the time period 
under consideration. This paper uses the long-run elasticity values estimated directly 
from the data set. Although the Mackie and Preston (1996) study allows for the effects of 
subsidy reduction, the method used is to determine the increase in fares necessary to 
make up for the lost revenue from subsidy reduction. This is different to the methodology 
of the present paper, which forecasts the reduction in fares after subsidy replacement by 
explicitly specifying and estimating the relationship between costs and fares.
Additionally, the Mackie and Preston {op. cit.) study does not distinguish between 
welfare changes in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, and consequently may 
be subject to aggregation bias.
6.7 Conclusions
Using an econometric model for 1953-97 in which the effects of subsidy reduction and 
replacement are determined with reference to coefficient values derived directly from the 
data, this chapter concludes that the discounted “internal” welfare gains from local bus 
service deregulation with subsidy replacement in Britain excluding London are in the 
region of £92.1 million, or £7.7 million per annum for the period 1986-97. If the change 
in externalities from bus for car substitution is also taken into account, this figure rises to
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£117.6 million or £9.8 million per annum. If the forecast subsidy is assumed not to 
increase but to remain at its 1984 level, then the total welfare gain is reduced by one-third 
to £77.3 million, or £6.4 million per annum.
These values are derived on the basis of fairly cautious assumptions concerning the 
discount rate, external costs and the projected behaviour of the regulated system for the 
period 1986-97. If the welfare losses from instability effects, lack of integration and 
information are assumed not to outweigh the gains from increased efficiency, then these 
estimates can be regarded as being at the lower end of the possible values for welfare 
gains. These gains should not be over-emphasised, however, since they are small relative 
to total passenger receipts for the industry, which were around £1,340 million in 1985/86 
for Britain excluding London.
Metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas gain from deregulation with subsidy 
replacement, although the gain per person is greater in the metropolitan areas. The total 
net present values of the internal welfare gains are roughly similar between the areas 
(£47.5 and £44.6 million respectively, or £4.0 and £3.7 million per annum). Adjusting for 
population size, the total net present values of the internal welfare gains for the 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas become about £4.2 and £1.2 per person 
respectively.
Based on the results of univariate time series estimation, the actual outcome of 
deregulation with subsidy reduction in terms of passenger journeys per person and bus 
fares is very similar to the forecasts made for the regulated system for 1986-97. In other 
words, the positive effects of deregulation per se on fares and passenger journeys are 
broadly cancelled out by the negative effects of subsidy reduction. It is possible, 
however, that deregulation with subsidy replacement and a system of competitive 
tendering would yield greater benefits than those calculated above. This possibility is not 
explored in this chapter, however, and represents an avenue for further research.
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CHAPTER 7
Substitution of Bus for Car Travel: 
external benefits and costs*
Previous chapters have tended to focus on the local bus service market itself, rather 
than the relationship between bus and car travel. This chapter addresses the issue of 
the externalities arising from bus and car travel, and the monetary changes arising from 
the substitution of bus for car travel following deregulation with subsidy replacement. 
The role of externalities as a source of market failure was discussed in Chapter three, 
although no attempt was made to quantify their impacts. In principle, externalities in 
the road passenger transport sector can be internalised through first best pricing 
policies such as increased taxation of motorists or, in the absence of first best pricing, 
through second best policies such as the subsidisation of bus travel. In practice, fiscal 
policies in the UK and elsewhere have not tended to allow for the internalisation of 
externalities, and there is a perception that the bus (and rail) sector suffers from unfair 
competition from underpriced car use (see Section 3.3.3.5). It is important, therefore, 
that any welfare evaluation of deregulation with subsidy replacement should include at 
least some of these externalities.
The aim of this chapter is to estimate a monetary value for some of the external 
benefits and costs associated with bus for car substitution. These estimates are used as 
part of the social welfare evaluation of local bus service deregulation in Chapter six.
* This chapter has been published in a revised form in Transportation Research Part D: Transport 
and the Environment, Substitution of bus for car travel in urban Britain: an economic evaluation of 
bus and car exhaust emissions and other costs, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 109-25, 1999.
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Increasing car use is associated with a number of problems including traffic congestion, 
air and noise pollution, road accidents, loss of countryside from new roads, community 
severance and global warming. A switch from car to bus use is generally thought to 
increase social welfare because of a reduction in these costs. This view is generally 
correct, although there are some exceptions.
The focus of this chapter is on the air pollution and global warming costs associated 
with bus for car substitution. This is because more reliable data has recently become 
available with respect to emissions of petrol and diesel engines, and also because 
existing research concentrates on the overall costs of transport emissions rather than 
the specific costs associated with bus for car substitution. The effects of substituting 
bus for car travel in urban areas are simulated by specifying a spreadsheet model 
incorporating two types of car (petrol and diesel engine) and three types of bus (mini-, 
midi- and large bus). Six types of exhaust emission are considered for each vehicle type 
for the years 1992, 1995 and 1999: carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, 
nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, (small) particulate matter and carbon dioxide. The 
chapter provides a synthesis of monetary estimates of these exhaust emission and other 
costs.
The other costs considered are traffic congestion, fuel consumption, noise pollution, 
road accidents and road damage. These costs are discussed within the context of a 
sensitivity analysis that allows for changes in parameters such as load factors, emission 
factors and the individual exhaust emission cost estimates.
Section 7.1 examines the environmental and health effects of petrol and diesel fuel 
exhaust emissions, while Section 7.2 develops a framework for the analysis of these 
emissions. Section 7.3 quantifies the effects on air pollution and global warming of 
substitution of bus for car travel. Section 5.4 reviews the literature on the monetary 
costs of air pollution and global warming and estimates the change in these costs 
resulting from a substitution of bus for car travel. A sensitivity analysis of these results 
is conducted in Section 7.5. Other cost changes are discussed in Section 7.6, and 
Section 7.7 concludes.
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There are two main types of vehicle engine: petrol and diesel. A mixture of fuel and air 
is drawn into the cylinders of a petrol engine, and is then compressed and ignited by a 
spark. No spark is needed in a diesel engine, since fuel is injected into air already made 
very hot by compression. The more efficient combustion process of the diesel engine 
means that its fuel consumption is at least 25% less by volume and 15% less by mass 
than a petrol engine of the same power (Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (RCEP), 1994). The average rate of fuel consumption for petrol and diesel 
cars has been estimated at 28.8 and 41.4 miles per gallon respectively (National Travel 
Survey, 1989/91, Table 5.3.8). Buses are generally powered by diesel engines, 
although some operators have introduced engines powered by alternative fuels. Cars 
are mainly petrol engined, although there has been an increasing trend towards the use 
of diesel engines because of their higher fuel efficiency and, to a lesser extent, their 
perceived environmental benefits. In 1986, only 4% of new private car registrations 
were for diesel engines: by 1994 this figure was 23%.
There are different health and environmental costs associated with the exhaust 
emissions from petrol and diesel engines. These emissions include: carbon dioxide 
(CO2 ), carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter (PM), 
volatile organic compounds (VOC), sulphur dioxide (SO2 ) and lead (P5 ). A switch 
from car to bus travel implies that less petrol and more diesel fuel is consumed, with 
corresponding changes in health and environmental costs. A brief description of these 
costs is given below.
Carbon dioxide is the main "greenhouse gas", probably accounting for more than half 
the total man-made greenhouse effect. Although it has a relatively harmless direct 
effect on human health, its contribution to global warming is likely to cause, along with 
other greenhouse gases including methane, significant long term environmental effects 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1990; Cline, 1992). Carbon monoxide is 
produced as a result of incomplete combustion of the carbon contained in the fuel. 
Diesels are more efficient in their combustion process than petrol engines, and 
consequently produce significantly less CO emissions than equivalent petrol engines.
7.1 Environm ental and H ealth Effects o f Petrol and Diesel Exhaust Fum es
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Although CO soon oxidises to CO2  when released into the atmosphere, it is a highly 
poisonous gas that interferes with the absorption of oxygen by red blood cells. It can 
affect the central nervous and cardiovascular systems, and is fatal in large doses. Even 
at the relatively low concentrations typically found in city centres, it can cause sore 
throats and drowsiness.
VOCs are a complex group of carbon compounds of sufficient volatility to exist as 
vapour in the atmosphere. The main constituent of VOC is hydrocarbons (HC), which 
are formed mainly from the incomplete combustion of petrol. Methane is the lightest 
hydrocarbon. Other organic compounds include benzene, formaldehyde and 
polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAH). HC may be emitted as a gas or in solid form as 
particulate matter. Diesel engines emit fewer hydrocarbons than equivalent petrol 
engines because of their better fuel combustion, although incomplete combustion of 
diesel fuel creates a wide variety of polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) which may have 
important synergistic adverse effects on health. PAH can become absorbed onto 
particulate matter and carried deep into the lungs. HC contain several carcinogenic 
organic compounds, including benzene which is known to cause leukaemia. They also 
react with NOx to form ozone (O3 ) at ground level. Ground-level ozone is the main 
component of photochemical smog.
Particulate matter consists of small solid or liquid particles suspended in the 
atmosphere. They are conglomerates of carbon (soot) and other pollutants including 
sulphur and hydrocarbons. Vehicle use is generally the main source of PM in 
industrialised countries, arising from exhaust gases, wear and tear of tyres and brakes, 
and from road dust caused by vehicle use. High concentrations of carbon particles 
become visible as black smoke, a problem particularly associated with the diesel 
engine. The small particles can penetrate deep into the lungs, aggravating respiratory 
problems. Those particles less than 10  \xm in diameter (PM10) penetrate the lung fairly 
efficiently and are the most harmful to health. Diesel particulate emissions may also 
have potential carcinogenic effects. A study of US railroad workers suggests that the 
possibility of developing cancer may be 42% higher in individuals exposed to diesel 
exhaust than in those who are not (OECD, 1988). The link between PAH and cancer is
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disputed, however (Grace, 1994). Diesel engines emit higher levels of PM than 
equivalent petrol engines.
Nitrogen oxides are created when oxygen combines with nitrogen in the air and, to a 
lesser extent, nitrogen in the fuel. The amounts of nitrogen oxides in exhaust gases 
increase as combustion temperature increases, so that they are highest at high speeds 
and during rapid acceleration. Some of the nitrogen is oxidised into nitric oxide (NO) 
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2 ) which together constitute NOx. More than half the NOx 
emissions in the UK are from road transport. NOx has significant direct adverse effects 
on human health in the form of respiratory problems, even when the exposure time is 
relatively short. It also reacts with other pollutants in the atmosphere to create indirect 
effects including acid rain and smog. NO2  combines with water vapour in the form of 
rain, mist, fog or dew to produce a weak nitric acid. In conjunction with weak 
sulphuric acid from sulphate emissions, their depositions help to create acidity in lakes 
and stunt the growth of vegetation. In the presence of strong sunlight, NOx combines 
with other pollutants such as CO and HC to form photochemical smog. It is NO2  
which helps to give smog its brown colour.
Sulphur occurs naturally in crude oil, and becomes more concentrated in diesel fuel. 
Sulphur dioxide (SO2 ) emissions from the transport sector are a relatively small part of 
total SO2  emissions, and are produced by the combustion of fuel containing sulphur. 
They oxidise to form sulphur trioxide (SO3 ) which combines with water vapour (H2 O) 
to form sulphuric acid (H2 SO4 ). Sulphur compounds constrict air passages and can 
thus cause particular problems for asthmatics. In 1952, sulphur emissions from 
domestic coal burning caused a smog in London which killed around 4000 people in 
two weeks (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 1994, p. 1). Sulphur 
dioxide, although colourless, is an irritant with a particularly strong and unpleasant 
smell. As noted earlier, sulphur dioxide also reacts with nitrogen oxides to form acid 
rain. Both SO2  and NOx emissions also contribute to secondary particulate formation: 
this indirect effect appears to be more important for human health than the direct 
effects (Small and Kazimi, 1995, p. 8 ). Ostro (1994, p. 23, p. 51) concludes that SO2  
emissions do have significant direct effects on human health, although these effects per 
unit of emission are much smaller than those from particulate matter and
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(tropospheric) ozone. On the other hand, Ball et al. (1991) and Kageson (1993) 
consider SO2  emissions to be relatively unimportant.
Lead is used in petrol to enhance its performance, although it cannot be used in 
conjunction with a three-way catalytic converter (TWC). Diesel fuel is lead-free. Lead 
is known to have a number of adverse effects on health, including damage to the 
kidney and liver, the reproductive system, blood formation, bone marrow and the 
brain. Children are particularly affected by lead poisoning, and a number of studies 
suggest that it causes behavioural problems, lower IQs, and a reduced ability to 
concentrate in children (OECD, op. cit.). There is also a possibility that lead may have 
carcinogenic effects.
Substitution of unleaded for leaded petrol has occurred because of differential tax 
treatment, but unleaded petrol contains aromatics, particularly benzene, which are used 
instead of lead to maintain octane values. If a car using unleaded fuel does not have a 
catalytic converter, which is generally the case for older vehicles, then lead pollution is 
simply replaced by pollution from aromatics. Although exhaust gases produce only 
trace quantities of benzene, concentrations are much higher at petrol pumps because of 
evaporation. These concentrations enter the vehicle interior and remain for some time 
after refuelling. It has been estimated that "the levels [of benzene] inside cars are 
higher than those outside, even in the most polluted areas" (House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 1994, Vol. 1, p. xxix).
The amount of pollutants emitted by a given vehicle depends not only on the type of 
engine and the conditions under which it is driven, but also on the age of the engine 
and the extent to which it has been maintained properly. Newer engines comply with 
more stringent emissions standards. As a new engine becomes older, however, it will 
emit more pollutants unless it is maintained properly. Differences in vehicle age and 
degree of maintenance can cause significant differences in the distribution of emissions 
across a vehicle stock: for example, around 1 0  percent of goods vehicles account for 
some 90 percent of particulate emissions within this vehicle category. The following 
section describes the analytical framework used to deal with some of these issues.
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7.2 Substitution of Bus for Car Travel: an analytical framework for the 
determination of exhaust emission changes
Increasing car ownership and use in Britain and elsewhere has contributed to a number 
of well-publicised problems, including traffic congestion, air and noise pollution, road 
accidents, community severance and loss of countryside because of road-building. 
These problems are acknowledged in the recent White Paper on transport (Department 
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 1998), which sets out 
proposals to constrain car use and promote alternative forms of transport, particularly 
the bus.
A switch from car to bus use is generally thought to reduce many, if not all, of these 
problems. But there are difficulties in trying to present a detailed case for encouraging 
road users to transfer from their car to a bus. First, in spite of an extensive literature on 
the monetary valuation of transport related costs such as air pollution, the empirical 
results tend to be at a highly aggregate level: it is usual to see monetary estimates for 
the environmental costs of all road passenger and freight travel, for example, but not 
for sub-categories such as bus and car travel. This makes it difficult to estimate the 
specific monetary effects of substitution between these modes, and even more so if one 
wants the substitution to be disaggregated across different types of bus and car.
Second, the estimated aggregate values are often very different from each other, 
having been derived from different methodologies or local conditions. Third, there is 
some uncertainty over the emission factors for individual exhaust emissions. In short, 
there is a need to develop a consistent set of values that can be used in a cost-benefit 
analysis of bus for car substitution.
This chapter identifies six exhaust emissions and discusses their monetary costs using 
research results primarily from the UK and the USA. In order to place the exhaust 
emission costs in context, it also considers the monetary valuations of fuel savings, 
road congestion, noise pollution, road accidents and road damage. To check the 
robustness of the results to different scenarios, a sensitivity analysis is conducted 
within a spreadsheet simulation model called “CarBus”. An example of such a 
simulation is given in Appendix three.
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Given the different fuel and vehicle technologies associated with bus and car travel, 
substitution between these modes will cause changes in the amounts of exhaust 
emissions. This is true not only at the aggregate level, but also at a more disaggregate 
level. The air pollution and climate change effects of a road user switching his or her 
journey from a petrol engine car with a three-way catalyst (TWC) to a large bus are 
different to those where the switch is from a diesel engine car to a minibus. Vehicle 
distribution is modelled in terms of two types of car (petrol and diesel) and three types 
of bus (mini-, midi- and large bus), and this distribution is allowed to change over time 
in response to changes in consumer preferences and exhaust emission regulations.
Substitution of bus for car travel is assumed to occur in urban areas, where around 75 
per cent of bus travel by distance takes place. The focus on urban areas seems 
appropriate since this is where car users are most likely to switch to buses: bus service 
frequencies are higher than in rural areas, people are likely to be nearer a bus stop, and 
journey to work distances are shorter (so that the inconvenience of bus relative to car 
travel is less important). Buses are assumed to be powered by diesel engines although a 
small, but increasing, number of operators have introduced engines powered by 
alternative fuels including liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and compressed natural gas 
(CNG). Cars are mainly petrol engined, but the analytical framework allows for the 
increasing use of diesel engined cars.
Exhaust emissions are disaggregated into six constituents: carbon monoxide (CO), 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen oxides (NOx), small particulate matter 
(PMio), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (C02). The analysis does not include 
lead exhaust emissions, which now form around 14% of their 1975 levels in the UK 
and are likely to fall further. A detailed description of these emissions and their effects 
can be found in, inter alia, RCEP (1994) and Maddison el al. (1996, ch. 4). Past and 
future trends in road transport emissions, as well as strategies for achieving reductions 
in air pollution, are set out in the United Kingdom National Air Quality Strategy 
(Department of the Environment (DOE), 1996).
The calculations are based on the scenario of a reduction in the number of cars by 100, 
a figure chosen for expositional simplicity. Using the 1994/96 National Travel Survey
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(DETR, 1997b) estimate of 1.6 for the average car occupancy rate, there will be a 
reduction of 160 in the number of car users. It is assumed that all these car users 
substitute bus for car travel. A realistic expectation of load factors for both small and 
large buses is about 45 per cent (Glaister, 1985a, p.69)1. Given these load factors and 
the actual distribution of cars and buses, it is then possible to estimate the increase in 
the number and type of buses required to accommodate the 160 former car users, as 
well as the decrease in the number of petrol and diesel engine cars. In 1992, for 
example, the number of petrol cars without a TWC, the number with a TWC, and the 
number of diesel cars fall by 92, 3.5 and 4.5 respectively, whilst the corresponding 
increases for mini-, midi- and large buses are 3.73, 1.93 and 2.67 respectively2. Full 
details of these calculations are contained in Appendix three. The load factors assumed 
for car and bus travel are critical parameters in determining the outcome of this modal 
substitution, and the effects of changing load factors and other parameters are 
examined in the sensitivity analysis of Section 7.5.
Research in the areas of exhaust emissions and their monetary costs is continuously 
evolving. The conclusions reached in this chapter are necessarily tentative, not only 
because of the uncertainties involved in the estimation of the main parameters but also 
because some important issues are not considered within the CarBus model. This is 
primarily because of the lack of data, particularly for greater levels of disaggregation, 
and there is a need for research into these issues. For example,
□ to what extent are the impacts of exhaust emissions on mortality and morbidity 
rates non-linear rather than linear, as is generally assumed?
□ to what extent do mortality and morbidity rates differ with age? How are these 
rates affected by road dust particles rather than those emitted directly from vehicle 
exhausts?
1 This figure is an average for urban peak period bus travel, and may not be the same as the marginal 
value for substitution of bus for car travel: hence the need for a sensitivity analysis of load factor 
assumptions. The paper assumes that, for marginal changes in the off-peak, the resulting load factor 
will be the same as that in the peak. The rationale is that spare capacity in the off-peak can be used to 
increase bus load factors up to the peak value for marginal passenger increases.
2 A small proportion of petrol cars in 1992 conformed to Stage I emission limits, which were effective 
from 1.7.92. This proportion was around 3.5 per cent of the total car stock in 1992. The proportion of 
diesel cars was about 4.5 per cent.
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□ how are load factors and other parameters affected by journey purpose, type of 
road user and the geographical area under consideration?
□ how does the method of reducing car travel affect the consumer surpluses (or 
“internalities”) of bus and car users? Who are the people likely to transfer from car 
to bus in response to specific government policies?
□ how far will the degree of competitiveness in the local bus service market affect 
bus load factors in urban and rural areas?
□ where substitution occurs on a significant scale, to what extent will the reduced 
congestion and increased traffic speeds affect emission factors?
7.3 Bus and Car Urban Exhaust Emissions
The results in this section are derived from studies commissioned by the DETR, 
including those by Gover et at. (1994) and Salway et al. (1997), as well as from recent 
unpublished data revisions3. Table 7.1 shows urban emission factors for cars and buses 
based on three sets of emission regulations: Pre-stage I, Stage I and Stage II (or Euro I 
and Euro II). Broadly speaking, Pre-stage I vehicles are those registered before 19934: 
in particular, petrol cars were not required to have TWCs. Stage I vehicles are those 
registered from 1993 to 1995 inclusive: the Stage I regulations required all new petrol 
cars to be fitted with TWCs, as well as tightening emission limits for all diesel engine 
vehicles. In general, there are substantial reductions in the emission factors of CO, 
VOCs, NOx and PMio between the Pre-stage I and Stage I sets of regulations. Further 
reductions are achieved under Stage II from the beginning of 1996. The limit values 
for these emissions are agreed by European Union member states and applied 
throughout these states. The exceptions are for SO2 and CO2, where emissions are 
determined mainly by fuel consumption.
3 The author would like to thank Tim Murrells of AEA Technology and Chris Mcgaincy of DETR for 
their assistance in providing the revised data. This data will eventually be published in the tenth 
National Atmospheric Emissions Inventor)' produced by the National Environmental Technology 
Centre as part of the Air Quality Research Programme of the DETR.
4 The exact dates are dependent on whether the vehicles are diesel or petrol engined, the type of diesel 
engine, and whether or not the vehicle is a new model.
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Table 7.1: Urban exhaust em issions (gm per km) from buses and cars in B ritain
CO VOCs NOx S02 PMio C 0 2
Petrol car:
Pre-I 13.599 2.318 1.788 0.029 0.036 174.2
I 3.134 0.296 0.382 0.031 0 . 0 1 0 188.5
II 2.195 0.130 0.169 0.031 0 . 0 1 0 188.5
Diesel car:
Pre-I 0.781 0.187 0.725 0 .111 0.207 193.6
I 0.472 0.079 0.523 0 .111 0.057 193.6
II 0.331 0.055 0.377 0 .111 0.025 193.6
Minibus:
Pre-I 1 . 2 0 1 0.315 2.236 0.151 0.348 263.3
I 0.252 0.103 1.952 0.151 0.141 263.3
II 0 . 2 0 1 0.096 1.394 0.151 0.087 263.3
Midibus:
Pre-I 2.360 0.804 6.354 0.253 1.652 441.0
I 0.503 0.263 5.562 0.253 0 . 6 6 8 441.0
II 0.402 0.245 3.973 0.253 0.412 441.0
Large Bus:
Pre-I 15.565 4.574 15.094 0.594 1.391 1037.7
I 3.169 1.496 13.205 0.594 0.563 1037.7
II 2.535 1.396 9.432 0.594 0.347 1037.7
Source: Gover et at. (1994), Salway et ol. (1997) and unpublished DETR data (see footnote 4). 
Notes:
Pre-I = Pre-stage I emissions, I = Stage 1 emissions, II = Stage II emissions.
Emissions for petrol and diesel cars include hot and cold running driving conditions.
Bus seating capacities: minibus -  up to 16 seats; midibus -  17-35 seals; large bus -  over 36 seats 
VOCs do not include methane emissions.
The emission factors are dependent on a number of parameters, including vehicle type, 
engine fuel, vehicle speed and the emission regulations in force when the vehicle is 
registered. Test results for exhaust emissions show considerable variability, even for 
the same model of vehicle. No two vehicles are ever identical, and driving conditions 
cannot be exactly replicated over different tests. Thus the emission factors in Table 7.1 
are not the legislative limits set for each Stage, but are the mean values from tests 
covering a sample of different vehicle types within each Stage. The emission factors 
are based on urban driving conditions and include cold starting conditions for petrol 
and diesel cars. These cold start emissions are estimated to form 33.8% of total 
journey distance by car (Eggleston et ctl., 1991). Following Gover et a/. (1994) and 
Salway et al. (1997) there is no allowance for bus cold starts. Data is not available for
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bus cold start emissions, and in any event these are likely to form a very small 
proportion of total journey distances by bus.
Two approaches are used to measure the exhaust emission effects of substituting bus 
for car travel. First, three years are chosen (1992, 1995 and 1999) such that each of 
these years represents the last year in which a particular set of emission regulations are 
in force (Pre-stage 1, Stage I and Stage II respectively). Other choices can be made, 
but this particular choice of years allows as much time as possible for a given set of 
regulations to influence vehicle distributions before the introduction of a new set. The 
corresponding vehicle distributions and distances travelled, as well as a number of 
other parameters, are derived for each of these years. The most significant change in 
vehicle distribution over these years is in the number of cars fitted with TWCs, which 
rises from a very small proportion of the total car stock in 1992 to nearly one half in 
1999. The data for 1999 is estimated using the forecasts of car and bus use made in the 
National Road Traffic Forecasts (Great Britain), (DETR, 1997a).
The second approach is based on the observation that emission regulations tend to 
change every three or four years, but vehicle life expectancy is generally much longer 
than this period. Given the relatively long life expectancy of a large bus, for example, 
the vehicle distribution in 1999 still contains a significant number of Pre-stage I as well 
as Stage I and Stage II large buses. As Table 7.1 shows, emissions from Pre-stage I 
buses are significantly higher than those from Stage I and Stage II, with the exception 
of SO2 and CO2. Any estimate of exhaust emissions in 1999 is affected by this residual 
bloc of high emission vehicles, even though Stage II regulations are in force. Rather 
than focus on the actual emissions of a technologically disparate vehicle stock in a 
given year, therefore, one might wish to know what the exhaust emission effects would 
be from substituting bus for car travel if all vehicles in a given year conformed to the 
most recent set of emission regulations for that year. Using this second approach, the 
effects on exhaust emissions of changes in fuel and vehicle engine technology over 
time are evaluated using a criterion which is not affected by differences in vehicle life 
expectancy.
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Table 7.2 shows the effects on exhaust emissions of car to bus transfer given these two 
approaches. For the years 1992, 1995 and 1999 the changes in emissions are calculated 
firstly on the basis of the emission characteristics of the actual vehicle stock for these 
years (the “actual emissions” case), and secondly assuming that all vehicles conform to 
Pre-Stage I, Stage I and Stage II emission limits for 1992, 1995 and 1999 respectively 
(the “emission limits” case). In general, the results depend not only on the absolute 
changes in emission regulations, but also on the rate at which emission regulations are 
tightened for cars relative to buses over time, the changes in vehicle distribution 
(particularly the absolute and relative increase in the number of cars with TWCs), and 
changes in distances travelled.
Table 7.2: Changes in urban exhaust em issions (kg) from a reduction o f 100 cars
CO VOCs NOx S02 PM10 C02
Actual emissions case:
1992 -8345 -1214 507.8 50.9 196.1 -4382
1995 -6985 -960 705.9 49.3 174.9 -5726
1999 -3879 -412 979.3 45.1 125.8 -6141
Emission limits case:
1992 -8634 -1270 469.1 50.9 195.3 -3988
1995 -1986 -62.3 1342 48.2 87.1 -13991
1999 -1213 57.2 1040 44.5 52.1 -10255
Source: Table 7.1 and assumptions in text.
Notes:
Actual emissions case based on the emission characteristics of the actual vehicle stocks for 1992, 1995 
and 1999 respectively.
Emission limits case based on the assumption that all cars and buses in 1992, 1995 and 1999 conform 
to Pre-stage I, Stage I and Stage II emission regulations respectively.
Results based on a car occupancy rate of 1.6 persons and a bus load factor of 45 per cent.
For the actual emissions case, the upper half of Table 7.2 shows that substitution of 
bus for car travel decreases the emissions of CO, VOCs and CO2, but increases the 
emissions of NOx, SO2, and PM10. This is because buses have high emission factors for 
NO\, SOx and PM]0 relative to cars. The reductions in CO and VOCs become smaller 
over time because of the tightening of emission regulations, which also accounts for 
the increases in PM)() emissions becoming smaller. As previously noted, these limits do
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not apply to SO2 and CO2 emissions. The reductions in C02 become larger over time 
because of the increase in the ratio of diesel to petrol cars, since diesel cars have higher 
CO2 emissions than petrol cars. On the other hand, the increases in SO2 emissions 
become smaller because of the increase in the ratio of mini- and midibuses to large 
buses. Finally, the increases in NOx emissions are becoming larger over time because 
the reductions in NOx emission limits for cars are significantly higher than for buses. In 
1995, for example, people are transferring from petrol cars, where NO\ emissions have 
become relatively low, to buses where these emissions are still relatively high.
Similar remarks apply to the emission limits case in the lower half of Table 7.2 between 
1992 and 1995, although the changes are generally much greater. This is to be 
expected, given that all buses and (most) cars in 1992 are assumed to conform to Pre­
stage I limits, and all buses and cars in 1995 to conform to Stage 1 limits. In 1999, 
however, the change in VOC emissions becomes positive rather than negative because 
bus VOC emission limits fall only slightly between 1995 and 1999, whilst the limit for 
petrol cars falls by over 50 per cent. This reduces the scope for VOC emission 
reductions from petrol cars, so that overall there is a rise in VOC emissions for 1999. 
The reduction in CO2 emissions becomes smaller in 1999 because of a (slight) fall in 
the average distance travelled by car and a (slight) increase for buses. Even though the 
change in average distance travelled by car is small, the total reduction in distance 
travelled by car is large because of the high proportion of cars to buses in the vehicle 
stock, so that the reduction in CO2 emissions becomes significantly smaller. Finally, 
NOx emission changes in 1999 are still positive but smaller than for 1995. This is 
partly caused by the change in average distances for cars and buses, but also by the 
relatively large decrease in bus emission factors for NOx between Stage I and Stage II 
regulations.
To summarise, substitution of bus for car travel has a diverse impact on the total 
amount of exhaust emissions. Although CO, C02and VOC emissions are generally 
reduced, the total emissions of NOx, SO2, and PMi0are increased. The next section 
discusses ways of placing a monetary valuation on these emissions, and determines 
whether or not there is a net increase or decrease in the total monetary costs of exhaust 
emissions resulting from the substitution of bus for car travel. It is important, however,
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to place these results in the context of the assumptions made. Accordingly, Section 5.5 
conducts a sensitivity analysis for changes in parameters such as load factors, emission 
factors and monetary costs.
7.4 T he M onetary Costs o f Bus and Car Exhaust Emissions
There are a number of ways in which the monetary costs of exhaust emissions from 
road passenger vehicles can be estimated. They can be estimated directly by tracing the 
links between emission sources and their effects on health, and placing a value on these 
effects. Alternatively, indirect estimates can be made through techniques such as 
hedonic pricing, where emission costs are inferred from observed price differentials in 
markets such as housing, or the revealed preferences of policy-makers, where the 
inference is based on the costs of meeting emission regulations. In practice, data 
limitations mean that studies of emission costs tend to use a variety of estimation 
methods e.g. Small (1977), Krupnik and Portney (1991), Hall et al. (1992), and Small 
and Kazimi (1995).
In spite of the extensive literature on the monetary costs of air pollution and climate 
change, many empirical results are not appropriate for the purpose of this chapter 
because they are insufficiently disaggregated. The study by Tinch (1995), for example, 
uses PMio as a proxy for all the health effects of urban air pollution. Although this 
avoids the problem of double-counting the health effects of individual pollutants, sole 
use of PMio as the measure of health effects would bias the results of this chapter in 
favour of petrol engine cars since PMio emissions from road passenger vehicles are 
mainly from buses and diesel engine cars.
This chapter uses the work reported by Pearce (1993), Small and Kazimi (op. cit.) and 
Maddison et al. (1996) to calibrate the simulation model CarBus. These studies are 
chosen because they are at a relatively disaggregated level and deal with similar 
exhaust emissions. They contain, however, differences in approach and empirical 
results that require some discussion. Pearce (1993) gives estimates for the 1991 unit 
and overall monetary damage costs of air pollution from UK road transport, where 
these estimates are revisions of those in Pearce et al. (1992). Further revised figures
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(updated to 1993) given in Maddison et al. show significant differences in the damage 
costs. The estimates are shown in Table 7.3:
Table 7.3: E m ission costs from UK road transport 1991 and 1993
Pollutant Emissions
(tons)
1991
Unit Value 
(£/ton) 
1991
Damage Costs 
(£m)
1991
Damage Costs 
(£m)
1993
CO, 30,000,000 13.33 400.0 110.1
c h 4 10,000 70.00 0.7 N/A
SOx 58,000 220.69 12.8 3,760.0
NOx 1,400,000 190.00 266.0 6,150.0
CO 6,000,000 10.43 62.6 N/A
VOCs 970,000 N/A N/A 2,870.0
PM 208,000 9,778.84 2,034.0 5,550.0
Pb 1,800 N/A N/A 280.0
Total: 2,776.0 18,720.1
Source: Data for 1991 from Table 10.4 in Pearce (1993), data for 1993 from Box 3.7 and Box 4.10 in 
Maddison et al. (1996).
Notes:
N/A = data not available.
Monetaiy values are at current prices. Metric tons are assumed here and elsewhere in the paper. 
Damage cost figures for 1991 and 1993 are not strictly comparable.
Individual values may not sum to the corresponding total because of rounding error.
Small and Kazimi (SK) (op. cit.) use Los Angeles data on road vehicle exhaust 
emissions. Their focus is on the effects of particulate matter and ozone formation, 
which SK assume to be the forms of air pollution most damaging to human health. 
This assumption is supported by the results of Ostro (1994, p. 51). Although no 
estimates are made in the SK study for the direct health effects of ambient SO2 and 
NO2 emissions, estimates are made for their indirect effects via their role in particulate 
formation. The emission cost estimates are shown in Table 7.4.
Using the findings of a number of previous studies, SK derive the monetary costs of 
mortality from particulates, and morbidity from particulates and ozone, based on a 
value of life of $4.87 million (US dollars, 1992 prices) or £2.77 million. This value is 
the geometric mean of the range of values given in Fisher et al. (1989) and is very 
close to the figure used in Hall et at. (1992). It is, however, considerably higher than 
the 1994 Department of Transport (DoT) “official” figure of £744,000 used in road
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accident and safety project valuations. In relation to this latter value, Tinch (1995, 
p. 124) notes that "There is substantial evidence that this value is rather low and 
Pearce et al. (1992, p. 4-5) comment that "A valuation of £1.5 million would seem 
fairly conservative". The value of £1.5 million is used by Pearce and Crowards (1996) 
in their study of the links between human health and particulate matter.
T able 7.4: Em ission costs for the Los Angeles (1992, £000s per ton o f em ission)
VOCs NOx SOx PMI0 C02 Total
Mortality from 
Particulates
0.96 4.80 59.55 55.23 - 120.53
Morbidity from 
Particulates
0.05 0.24 2.95 2.73 - 5.97
Morbidity from 
Ozone
0.65 1.03 0 0 - 1.68
Climate
Change
- - - - 0.035 0.035
Total 1.66 6.06 62.44 57.95 0.035 128.2
Source: adapted from Small and Kazimi, op. cit., Table 5. p. 22.
Notes:
Estimates based on a $4.87 million value of life, the geometric average of the high and low particulate 
mortality coefficients, the geometric average of two ozone morbidity figures with costs allocated 
equally to NOx and VOCs, and the particulate morbidity costs used by Hall et al. (1992) and Kmpnik 
and Portney ( i 991).
CC>2 estimate based on Manne and Richels (1992) and information in SK {op. cit., p. 28, footnote 22). 
Individual values may not sum to the corresponding total because of rounding error.
Conversion from US$ to UK£ on the basis of £1 = $1.76 in 1992.
SK argue that there is little quantitative information on the health costs of CO, and 
what little information there is tends to suggest that they are less important than either 
particulates or ozone in costing motor vehicle emissions (SK, op. cit., p. 16). For these 
reasons, they do not include the costs of CO emissions. The effects of including 
different values for the monetary costs of CO and other emissions are explored in the 
sensitivity analysis of Section 7.5, although the results of this analysis suggest that 
changes in CO costs do not have a significant impact on the overall cost changes.
Of the emissions accounted for in Table 7.4, by far the biggest single source of exhaust 
emission costs per unit of emission is mortality from particulates. This result is 
consistent with the finding of Bown (1994) who claims that PM)0, mainly from car 
exhausts, is responsible for up to 10,000 premature deaths a year in England and
Wales, a figure also used in RCEP (1994, p. 31)5. The mortality costs are split roughly 
equally between SOx and PMio.
CO2 emissions have indirect effects on health and the environment via the induced 
change in global temperatures. A detailed account of the methodological problems 
involved in the quantification of CO2 emissions costs, and the results of empirical 
studies, is contained in Cline (1992). Although estimates of the monetary costs of C 02 
emissions are subject to considerable uncertainty, three early studies (Nordhaus and 
Yohe, 1983, Edmonds and Barnes, 1990, Manne and Richels, 1992) provide monetary 
valuations which are of approximately the same order of magnitude i.e. between $100 
and $300 per ton of carbon at 1990 prices (Cline, op. cit., p. 188). Manne and Richels 
{op. cit., p.59) estimate a cost of about $208 per ton of carbon (1990 prices), based on 
the costs of reducing CO2 emissions to sustainable levels i.e. stabilisation at 1990 levels 
up to the year 2000, followed by a gradual 20 per cent reduction over the next decade, 
and then a permanent continuation of these reduced emission levels. Updated to 1992 
prices, the cost of C02 emissions becomes about $225 per ton of carbon, equivalent to 
about £130 per ton6. More recent research by Fankhauser and Tol (1996) suggest 
much lower climate change costs, somewhere in the region of $20 to $28 per ton of 
carbon, although these estimates are highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate7.
Small (1977, pp. 123-4) suggests that Los Angeles is likely to have six times as many 
days as twelve other USA cities outside California on which climatic conditions 
combine to form a "trap" for air pollutants, so that the estimates for Los Angeles may 
not be representative of other cities. In order to apply these exhaust emission cost 
estimates to the UK, it is assumed that the SK figures for Los Angeles exhaust 
emission costs represent the worst case and thereby an upper limit to UK exhaust
5 Pearce and Crowards (1996) argue that this figure is likely to be an overestimate, although their 
central estimate of 6,668 premature deaths still implies total mortality costs of £7 billion (1994 prices) 
from anthropogenic PM emissions.
6 One ton of carbon is equivalent to 3.67 tons of carbon dioxide. Thus the figure of £130 per ton of 
carbon is equivalent to £35.4 per ton of carbon dioxide, which is the figure implicitly given in the SK 
study and the one used in Table 7.5 of this chapter.
7 These lower climate change cost estimates are of a similar order of magnitude to those used in 
Maddison et at. (1996).
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emission costs. UK costs will thus lie somewhere between the best case i.e. zero costs, 
and the worst case.
In the absence of any firm evidence to indicate where to draw the line between the best 
and worst case costs, it is initially assumed that UK exhaust emission costs are one-half 
those of the SK figures for Los Angeles (SK*0.5), which is roughly equivalent to 
assuming a value of life of $2.35 million dollars, or £1.34 million. This value of life is 
still about twice that of the official UK figure, but is of a similar order of magnitude to 
the preferred value of £1.5 million used in Pearce and Crowards (op. cit.). Another set 
of estimates is then generated by halving again the SK figures (SK*0.25), so that the 
SK*0.25 value of life is roughly the same as the official UK figure. These scaling down 
factors are applied to all exhaust emissions except CO2, because global warming 
occurs in the stratosphere and is unlikely to be affected by climate conditions in the 
troposphere. UK costs from CO2 emissions are thus assumed to be the same as those 
for Los Angeles. The no-change assumption for CO2 is later relaxed for the sensitivity 
analysis of Section 7.5.
Table 7.5 summarises the unit costs (£000s per ton of exhaust emission) of bus and car 
transport using the different cost assumptions associated with the SK, SK*0.5,
SK*0.25, Pearce (1993) and Maddison etal. (1996) studies. For ease of reference, the 
unit cost values for the SK, Pearce and Maddison cases are the same as those in the 
original studies. The net change column shows the change in monetary costs (£000s, 
adjusted for inflation up to 1995) from a reduction of 100 cars, and is based on the 
actual emissions case for 1995 from Table 7.2. Finally, the total cost column shows the 
total exhaust emission costs (£billion, adjusted for inflation up to 1995) arising from 
urban bus and car travel, also based on the actual emissions case for 1995 from Table
7.2.
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T able 7.5: Bus and car urban exhaust em ission costs 1995: unit, net change and  
total costs.
Study:
CO VOCs NOx S02 PM,o C02 Net
change
(£000)
Total
Cost
(£bn)
SK 0 1.66 6.06 62.44 57.95 0.035 16.90 4.43
SK*0.5 0 0.83 3.03 31.22 28.98 0.035 8.34 2.81
SK*0.25 0 0.42 1.52 15.61 14.49 0.035 4.06 2.00
Pearce 0.01 N/A 0.19 0.22 9.78 0.013 1.84 0.61
Maddison N/A 2.96 4.39 64.83 26.68 0.004 8.72 3.04
Source: Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, and assumptions in text.
Notes:
Figures for unit exhaust emissions are for cost per ton of emission (£0()0s).
Figures for Pearce (1993) unit costs are 1991 current values. Figures for Maddison et al. (1996) unit 
costs are 1993 current values. Figures for SK, SK*0.5 and SK*0.25 unit costs are 1992 current values. 
The Pearce VOC and Maddison CO unit costs are set to zero in the calculations.
Since the main constituent of PM is PMU), the unit costs of PM emissions given in the Pearce and 
Maddison et al. studies is used to proxy the corresponding PM|„ costs in Table 7.5. S 0 2 unit cost 
values are proxied by the SOx values given in the SK, Pearce and Maddison et al. studies.
Figures for the net change and total cost columns are based on the unit cost values updated to 1995 
values, actual emission values based on 1995 vehicle distributions and distance travelled, a reduction 
of 100 cars, a car occupancy rate of 1.6 persons, and a bus load factor of 45 per cent.
The net change column in Table 7.5 shows that urban exhaust emission monetary costs 
increase as a result of switching from car to bus travel. The reason is the relatively high 
monetary cost values given to S02 and PMio emissions. Table 7.2 shows an increase in 
these emissions (as well as those of NO\ ), and the net change column in Table 7.5 
implies that the increase in their monetary costs outweighs the decrease in the 
monetary costs of CO, VOCs and C02. PMio exhaust emission costs are always the 
largest single cost change in the net change column, whilst around 90 per cent of the 
total urban exhaust emission costs are from petrol and diesel cars. Similar results for 
net change and total costs are obtained when the same calculations are performed for 
the actual emissions case for the 1992 and 1999 vehicle distributions and distances 
travelled.
It should be noted that the similarity in the net change and total cost figures for the 
SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. estimates does not imply similarity in the cost changes for 
the individual exhaust emission categories. SK*0.5 gives cost changes (£000s) of -  
0.86, 2.30,1.66, 5.45 and -0.22 for CO, VOCs, NO\, S02, PMio and C02 emissions 
respectively, whilst the corresponding figures for Maddison et al. are -3.06, 3.34,
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3.44, 5.02 and -0.02. Thus the SK estimates tend to give a much greater weighting to 
the monetary costs of PMio relative to the CO, VOCs, NOx and S02 emissions.
Apart from the SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. results, however, there are considerable 
differences in the net change and total cost estimates in Table 7.5. Which, if any, of 
these estimates are comparable to other estimates made for UK car and bus exhaust 
emission costs? One point of comparison is with the total cost estimates given in 
RCEP {op. cit., Table 7.2) for both road freight and passenger transport air pollution 
and climate change costs. RCEP estimates that these costs range from £3.54 bn to 
£8.26 bn. Assuming that road freight transport accounts for roughly 25 per cent of 
these costs (a figure consistent with RCEP, Table 7.3), then the total air pollution and 
climate change costs from road passenger transport range from £2.66 bn to £6.20 bn 
for 1994/95. Given UK GDP at factor cost was £579.14 bn in 1994, these costs form 
about 0.5 per cent to 1.1 per cent of UK GDP. The total (urban) costs given in Table
7.5 imply that the SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. urban exhaust emission costs are 
around 0.5 per cent of UK GDP for 1995. If the non-urban costs are assumed to be 
around one-half to one-third of the urban costs (a figure based on the non-urban 
distances travelled by cars and buses), then the SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. national 
estimates would fall well within the 0.5 to 1.1 per cent range derived from RCEP. The 
SK*0.25 national estimates would fall just inside the lower part of this range if the 
ratio of non-urban to urban costs is assumed to be one-half.
A corresponding analysis is performed for the emission limits case given in Table 7.2, 
although the detailed results are not reported here. The net change values are generally 
similar to those for the actual emissions values given in Table 7.5, although total costs 
are lower for 1995 and 1999, as one would expect. In terms of the individual net 
changes for 1995 and 1999, however, the largest single net cost change occurs for 
NOx rather than PMi0 emissions because of the large increase in the former relative to 
the latter (see Table 7.2). But overall the results are comparable: in particular, the net 
change in urban exhaust emission costs is always positive. The next section discusses 
the robustness of this result in relation to changes in some of the assumptions made 
earlier.
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7.5 Substitu tion  o f Bus for Car Travel: a sensitivity analysis
This section explores the effects of changing a number of the parameter values 
associated with the results in Section 7.4. The sensitivity analysis is based on the actual 
emissions case for 1995 although other cases, including the effects of Stage III and 
Stage IV regulations, are considered. Following the discussion in Section 7.4, the 
sensitivity analysis is confined to the SK*0.25, SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. estimates. 
The full CarBus spreadsheet model contains over sixty parameters, so that the number 
of possible permutations in these parameter values is extremely large, even when the 
changes are restricted within reasonable bounds. The results reported below are some 
of the more realistic and relevant simulations performed by the author.
7.5.1 Changes in Load Factors
It can be argued that the assumed bus load factor of 45 per cent is too conservative, 
since any transfer of car users to bus could be accommodated by allowing bus load 
factors to increase rather than using extra buses to maintain the existing load factor. Of 
particular interest is the bus load factor at which the change in exhaust emission costs 
begins to decrease (or break-even bus load factor), ceteris paribus. Using the 
SK*0.25, SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. unit cost estimates from Table 5.5, these load 
factors are 66, 76 and 75 per cent respectively. These load factors are much higher 
than the historically observed urban peak value of 45 per cent. The emission limit case 
for 1995 implies even higher load factors of 70, 89 and 150 per cent respectively. This 
latter value occurs because the NO.\ and SO2 emission factors do not fall very much (if 
at all) for buses between Pre-stage I and Stage I regulations (see Table 7.1). Since the 
Maddison et al. estimates give very high unit costs for NO\ and SO2 emissions, their 
total monetary costs are relatively large so that a high (in fact, impossible) bus load 
factor is required to achieve the break-even point.
It is also of interest to determine the corresponding break even car occupancy rate. For 
a bus load factor of 45 per cent, the respective values are 1.1, 0.9 and 1.0 persons per 
car, which are well below the values typically assumed for European driving
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conditions8. In the emission limit case for 1995, the values are 1.0, 0.8, and 0.5 persons 
respectively.
7.5.2 Changes in the M onetary Costs o f  Individual Exhaust Emissions
Another possibility is to consider whether changes in the costs per ton of the exhaust 
emissions cause any significant change in the net change costs associated with a 
reduction of 100 cars. One possibility is to change the cost per ton of CO2 in the SK 
estimates, since these are considerably higher than those used in the Maddison et al. 
estimates. But changing the SK*0.25 cost per ton of emission figures for CO2 from 
£35 to £4 (the figure used in the Maddison et al. estimates) causes the net change in 
emissions costs to increase from £4,060 to £4,250. Thus a decrease of almost 90 per 
cent in CO2 unit emission costs results in a relatively small increase of 4.7 per cent for 
the net change figure. For SK*0.5, the corresponding increase is also small, rising from 
£8,340 to £8,530. It is also possible that the Maddison et al. CO 2 unit cost estimate is 
too low. Substituting the SK unit cost estimate for CO2 into the Maddison et al. 
estimates gives a small decrease in the net change costs from £8,720 to £8,520.
CO emissions are generally given a value of zero in Table 7.5. The exception is the 
Pearce study, which estimates the damage costs of CO emissions at £10 per ton. 
Substituting this value into the SK*0.25, SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. estimates gives a 
very small decrease in the net change costs of 2.0, 0.8 and 0.9 per cent respectively.
The net change figures in Table 7.5 are for the actual emissions case and are dominated 
by the change in the cost of PM10 emissions, particularly for the SK estimates. Suppose 
it is assumed (somewhat arbitrarily) that there is a margin of error of 50 per cent 
around the estimates given in Table 7.5 for the unit costs of PM 10 emissions. Halving 
the unit costs of PMm emissions causes the net change costs to fall by around 30 per 
cent for the SK*0.25, SK*0.5 and Maddison et al. estimates, a fairly substantial 
decrease. For the emission limit case, however, the biggest single cost change is that
8 For example, the National Travel Survey 1994/96 gives an average car occupancy rate of 1.6 
persons, whilst de Borgcr et at. use a figure of 1.7 for urban peak and urban off-peak driving 
conditions in Belgium.
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for NOx emissions. Halving the unit costs of NOx emissions in the emission limit case 
causes net change costs to fall by around 27 per cent cent for the SK*0.25, SK*0.5 
and Maddison et al. estimates, another substantial decrease. In comparison, halving 
other exhaust emission unit costs has less of an impact on net change costs. In all cases 
the changes are less than 20 per cent, and in most cases the changes are well below this 
figure.
7.5.3 Looking Ahead: Stage III and Stage IV regulations
From the year 2000 more stringent exhaust emission regulations for road freight and 
passenger transport are introduced in Europe to continue the process initiated by 
Stages I and II: Euro III starts in 2000/1, and Euro IV in 2005/6. The reductions in 
exhaust emissions for Euro IV relative to Euro II are substantial: it is envisaged that 
most car and light goods vehicle (LGV) exhaust emissions will fall by around 55 to 70 
per cent, with somewhat lower reductions for buses and heavy goods vehicles (HGVs). 
As far as PMio emissions are concerned, however, there are no reductions for petrol 
cars and petrol LGVs whilst those for diesel vehicles fall significantly (about 70 per 
cent for diesel cars and diesel LGVs, and 50 per cent for buses and HGVs)9.
To determine the difference such reductions would make to the results obtained 
previously, these PMio emission reductions for diesel cars and buses are substituted 
into the 1999 actual emissions case. This causes the net change in urban exhaust 
emission costs to fall by 29, 25 and 18 per cent in the SK*0.25, SK*0.5 and Maddison 
et al. results respectively, another substantial decrease.
To summarise, the general conclusion from this sensitivity analysis10 is that the positive 
net change in urban exhaust emission costs resulting from the substitution of bus for
9 The PMio exhaust emission reductions for diesel vehicles occur because of the introduction of ultra- 
low sulphur diesel fuel and new technologies such as the Continuously Regenerating Trap (CRT) 
which can remove up to 90 per cent of particulate material from diesel exhaust emissions.
10 The effects of bus for car substitution were also analysed in terms of a model based on national 
averages for emission factors, load factors and so on. Although this model is based on earlier work by 
the author and contains unrevised data for a number of emission factors as well as a different 
analytical framework, the results are qualitatively similar to those of the urban model. The net change 
in exhaust emission costs remains positive, although the net change and total cost values are higher 
because of the inclusion of relatively low mral bus load factors in the simulations.
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car travel is relatively insensitive to reasonable changes in nearly all the parameters. An 
important exception is for PMh> emissions where changes in monetary costs or 
emission factors do have a relatively large impact on the net change figure for urban 
exhaust emission costs. A policy of developing improved fuel and bus technologies in 
order to satisfy (or go beyond) Euro III and IV regulations for particulate reductions 
will significantly reduce the net change figure. Policies relying on increasing bus load 
factors appear less likely to succeed in reducing total exhaust emission costs, since the 
load factors required are very high by historical standards, although higher load factors 
will generate other important cost reductions (see next section).
7.6 Substitu tion o f Bus for Car Travel: other cost changes
This section deals with a number of other cost changes arising from the substitution of 
bus for car travel, namely fuel consumption, traffic congestion, noise pollution, road 
accidents, and road damage. A number of these cost changes are traditionally regarded 
as externalities arising from market failure, but Nash (1997) shows that the concept of 
an externality is much more complex than is generally thought. Nonetheless, the 
concept is a useful starting point for the subsequent analysis. The range of costs 
considered is by no means comprehensive, but is determined by two factors: first, data 
availability, and second the likelihood that they will not be internalised through market 
or other transactions. Monetary estimates of these cost changes are numerous but, as 
in the case of air pollution, often highly aggregated and sometimes unsuitable for the 
type of analysis conducted in this chapter. The following estimates are based on a 
literature review by the author and are customised for a welfare analysis using the 
CarBus model. Like most, if not all estimates in this area, they are subject to 
considerable uncertainty.
For expositional convenience, the following description of the derivation of the 
estimated values is mainly for 1992, but the CarBus model also calculates values for 
1995 and 1999. The estimated values are calculated in terms of vehicle kilometres 
travelled. Once the overall changes in bus and car vehicle kilometres are known, the 
overall change in the external costs can be calculated. Estimation of the changes in 
vehicle kilometres for each of the six vehicle categories is not a straightforward
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process: details are given in Appendix three. An example of the CarBus simulation 
used to derive the values in Table 7.6 is also given in Appendix three.
7.6.1 Fuel Cost Savings
Oil is a non-renewable resource. The more we use today, the less there is available for 
tomorrow. This may not be of great concern to current generations, but future 
generations may feel very differently. As we run out of new reserves to exploit, 
increasing scarcity will increase oil prices and encourage the use of substitute forms of 
energy, both renewable and non-renewable. Unless renewable energy sources can 
compensate for the loss of non-renewable resources, future generations will suffer. The 
problem is that the market mechanism is an inherently defective process for 
determining prices that adequately reflect the utility of future generations (Dasgupta 
and Heal, 1979).
This market failure is a form of intergenerational externality. Current generations use 
resources at prices that do not fully incorporate the costs imposed on future 
generations. The difficulty lies in establishing a monetary value for this externality. The 
approach used in this paper is to use the current (pre-tax) price of fuel as a measure of 
this discounted value. Some may object that this is too high a value, on the grounds 
that the scarcity problem may be exaggerated, whilst others that it is too low. But in 
the absence of any knowledge concerning the likely deposits of undiscovered oil or the 
utility functions of future generations, this value seems as reasonable as any other.
Given the six vehicle categories in Table 7.1, the urban fuel consumption (in litres per 
100 kilometres, starting with petrol car without TWC) is 8.3, 7.8, 6.2, 10.92, 18.94 
and 44.26 respectively (Gover et al, op. cil., Tables 5.1 and B. 12). In 1992 about 50% 
of motorists (excluding diesel cars) normally bought unleaded petrol (Transport 
Statistics Great Britain (TSGB), 1995, Table 2.2). It is assumed that half the petrol 
cars without TWC run on leaded, and the other half on unleaded petrol. It is also 
assumed that all petrol cars with a TWC run on unleaded petrol only. Excluding duty 
and VAT, the prices of 4 star leaded petrol, unleaded petrol and diesel fuel were 50.6,
46.1 and 44.6 pence per litre respectively in 1992 (TSGB, 1995, Table 2.4). These
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parameter values can then be incorporated in the CarBus spreadsheet to find the value 
of fuel saved as a result of bus for car substitution.
7.6.2 Reductions in Congestion Costs
The amount of congestion caused by a vehicle can be measured in terms of passenger 
car units (PCUs). These values are used by the DETR in conjunction with other 
measures of road use to allocate the capital costs of the road network between 
different vehicle classes. The rationale for this procedure is that congestion causes new 
roads to be built, or existing ones to be upgraded, thus incurring capital expenditure. 
The DETR assigns PCU values of 1, 1.2 and 1.4 to cars, minibuses and midibuses 
respectively. PCU values of 1.6 and 1.7 are given to 36 to 60 seat buses and over 60 
seat buses respectively. Since this study does not distinguish between these latter two 
types of large bus, a weighted PCU value is calculated for a single large bus category 
on the basis that there are approximately 1.5 times as many 36-60 seat buses as there 
are over 60 seat buses (BCSGB, various). This gives a PCU value of 1.64 for the large 
bus category. An overall weighted average bus PCU value can be derived by using 
vehicle stock as a weight, where the weights are taken from Bus and Coach Statistics 
(BCSGB) (1992/93). This gives a PCU value of 1.54.
These PCU values provide a very approximate guide to the amount of congestion 
caused by different types of vehicle. Newbery (1990) estimates that the average 
congestion cost across all roads in 1990 was 3.4 pence per PCUkm, although there is 
considerable variation around this average: urban central roads at peak periods, for 
example, have an average congestion cost of 36.37 pence per PCUkm. Inflation 
adjusting this national average figure to 1992 figures gives a value of 3.7 pence per 
PCUkm.
In order to derive a value for urban areas, the six main categories of urban road type 
congestion costs given in Newbery (1990) are weighted according to their 
categorisation as either peak or off-peak values, where the weightings are based on 
those given in Glaister (1985a). The resulting weighted average congestion cost for
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urban areas is 15.04 pence per PCUkm for 1990. Inflation adjusting this figure to 1992 
values gives a value of 16.36 pence per PCUkm.
Assuming that the occupants of 100 cars all transfer to bus travel, and using the figures 
on vehicle kilometres travelled in 1992, there is a reduction of 1,690,591 PCUkm for 
car travel, and an increase of 768,182 PCUkm for bus travel, yielding an overall 
reduction of 922,409 PCUkm. Using the value of 16.36 pence per PCUkm, the CarBus 
spreadsheet can then compute the reduction in urban congestion costs.
7.6.3 Reductions in Noise Costs
Tinch (1995) provides a review of monetary estimates of noise costs from different 
types of motor vehicle. The preferred figures used in the Tinch study {op. cit.) are 
£5.5 and £10.9 per 1000 kilometres for cars and buses respectively. These figures are 
based on a weighting of 3:2:1 for the relative noise nuisance from heavy goods 
vehicles, buses and cars (Peirson, Skinner and Vickerman, 1994). This weighting 
appears to be based on the noise from large buses. Since no weightings are available 
for the three main types of bus, it is necessary to make an estimate of their relative 
noise nuisance value (NNV). Given a car NNV equal to one, the suggested values for 
a large bus, midibus and minibus are 2, 1.6 and 1.2 respectively. These figures are 
based broadly on the relative vehicle weights within the bus categories on the 
assumption that vehicle noise is roughly proportional to vehicle weight. The problem 
with this procedure is that the average gross vehicle weight of a large bus is about nine 
times greater than that of a car, yet the Tinch estimates assume that large buses have a 
NNV only twice that of a car. Nonetheless, given the lack of any reliable data for 
NNVs amongst these vehicle categories, the values above may not be too unreasonable 
to serve as a starting point for the subsequent analysis.
Assuming the Tinch {op. cit.) values are for 1994, and inflation adjusting them to 
1992, a set of noise costs is derived using the NNV weightings above. These costs are 
£5.3, £10.5, £8.5 and £6.4 per 1000 kilometres for cars, large buses, midibuses and 
minibuses respectively.
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7 .6 .4  R e d u c tio n s  in  R o a d  C a su a lty  C o sts
Although road casualty costs can be partly internalised through the payment of 
insurance premiums, there is reason to believe that these payments do not fully account 
for all the effects of road casualties (Jansson, 1997). In the case of a fatal accident, for 
example, compensation is paid to all the affected parties except the deceased. Whilst 
the compensation may provide a monetary measure of the deceased's concern for his or 
her dependants, it does not generally provide a measure of the value of the deceased's 
life.
There is a large literature on the monetary valuation of a human life. Mishan (1988) 
provides a review of the techniques commonly used, and also a highly critical appraisal 
of the work in this area {op. cit., p.352). A  survey of studies for the UK, US and 
Sweden, using mainly stated preference techniques (Jones-Lee, 1990), concludes that 
the distribution of the value of life in 1989 has mean and median values of $3.4 million 
and $1.1 million respectively.
The personal injuries resulting from road accidents are classified by the Department of 
Transport into three broad groups: fatal, serious and slight. Accidents concerning 
vehicle damage only are not included in the Department of Transport's Road Accidents 
Great Britain: the Casualty Report. It is estimated that the total cost-benefit value of 
road accidents in 1995 was £13,280 million, of which £9,500 million is attributable to 
personal injury accidents, with damage-only accidents accounting for the remainder 
(Road Accidents Great Britain 1995, 1996, p.22). One accident may give rise to 
several casualties. The average cost of a casualty (at 1994 prices) in each of these 
groups is estimated to be £784,090, £89,380 and £6,920 respectively (Road Accidents 
Great Britain 1994, 1995), although these valuations appear to be substantial 
underestimates (see Section 7.4). These costs include lost output and pain, grief and 
suffering caused by the accident, but exclude the direct accident costs such as police 
work and property damage. In effect, they represent a measure of the external costs 
associated with road accidents.
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The procedure is to calculate the average car and bus casualty costs per thousand 
kilometres, and use these values to estimate the reduction in total casualty costs 
resulting from a substitution of bus for car travel. Casualty figures are given in T SG B  
(1995, Table 4.14). One problem is that bus and coach casualty data is not given 
separately. The solution adopted is to allocate casualties on the basis of vehicle 
kilometres travelled, although this procedure may be somewhat unfair to bus travel 
since it is likely that bus travel has a lower accident rate than coach travel. Another 
problem is that some accidents occur on motorways, where local bus services do not 
generally operate, so that inclusion of motorway casualty costs will bias the casualty 
cost savings of car to bus transfer in favour of bus travel. Nonetheless, road accidents 
on motorways in 1992 formed only 3 per cent of all accidents (TSGB, 1995, Table 
4.15), so that the bias is likely to be small.
Adjusting the casualty costs above to 1992 prices, the total casualty costs associated 
with car accidents in 1992 were £4.206 bill., and £73.058 mill, for bus travel. The 
average casualty cost per thousand kilometres for car and bus travel is £12.44 and 
£27.30 respectively. No differentiation is made between petrol and diesel cars in 
respect of these casualty costs, since it is unlikely that the casualty cost per petrol car 
is significantly different to that of diesel cars.
7.6.5 Increases in Road Track Costs
The U K  road network is provided by the government, which sets a price for the use of 
this network based on the costs of provision. These costs (sometimes referred to as 
road track costs) are divided into current and capital costs. Current costs include 
maintenance, policing and administration, whilst capital costs cover the building and 
improvement of roads. These costs are allocated to different vehicle categories on the 
basis of various measures of road use and wear such as vehicle kilometres, vehicle 
weight, standard axles and PCUs. Details are given in the annual publication "The 
Allocation of Road Track Costs" (Department of Transport).
This section shows that road track costs increase as a result of substituting bus for car 
travel. Strictly speaking, these cost increases are not externalities since the government
258
could in principle charge bus users for them. It could also reduce the amount paid by 
car (and commercial vehicle) users. In practice, however, it is not obvious that the 
government would follow a policy of increased bus use charges since it may conflict 
with more fundamental environmental objectives such as encouraging a shift from 
private to public transport. It follows that, for practical purposes, the evaluation of 
bus for car substitution should treat these costs as external and include them in the 
same way as the other externalities discussed earlier. Given the size of these costs (see 
Table 7.6 below), however, it should be noted that this procedure is substantially 
disadvantageous to bus use on the baseline assumption of a 45 percent load factor.
A  critical determinant of road track costs is road-wear. The standard axle parameter is 
a measure of the relative road-wear caused by each vehicle. Road-wear increases 
exponentially with respect to vehicle weight for a given number of axles. A  ten ton two 
axle vehicle will cause more than twice the road wear associated with a five ton two 
axle vehicle. Thus a car is given a standard axle value of 0.00002 whilst a 60+ seat bus 
has a value of 0.306, over 15,000 times greater than that of the car (Allocation of 
Road Track Costs, op. cit). These values include an allowance for passenger loadings.
The procedure is to calculate the average road cost per vehicle kilometre for each 
vehicle category i.e. cars, minibuses, midibuses and large buses. Individual parameter 
values for the three bus categories are those for 1993/94, since no individual values are 
given prior to this year. Taking the total road costs allocated in 1993/94 to each of the 
vehicle categories, and dividing by the number of vehicle kilometres travelled, the 
following figures (adjusted to 1992/93 prices) are obtained for cost per vehicle 
kilometres: £0.009, £0.015, £0.021, and £0.080 for cars, minibuses, midibuses and 
large buses respectively. Thus a large bus creates nearly nine times the road costs per 
vehicle kilometres associated with a car, the reason being the relatively high levels of 
road wear caused by the large bus.
7.6.6 O verall Cost Changes: a synthesis and simulation
The calculations have so far been made on assumptions which incorporate an average 
bus load factor of 45%. It may be argued that at the margin many of the 160 car users
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who transfer to bus could be accommodated by existing bus services, given the 
observed spare capacity which exists in much of the local bus service network in 
Britain. Table 7.6 summarises the results of a simulation based on the actual emissions 
case for 1995 using the SK*0.5 unit cost estimates, and takes into account a range of 
bus load factors (from 35 to 55 per cent). As in the preceding sections, the simulation 
is based on urban conditions.
Table 7.6: Overall urban cost changes at different bus load factors (£000s)
35% 40% 45% 50% 55%
Type of cost:
Exhaust emissions 14.29 10.95 8.34 6.26 4.55
Fuel consumption -4.14 -9.14 -13.03 -16.14 -18.68
Congestion -74.85 -83.96 -91.04 -96.71 -101.35
Noise -2.00 -2.32 -2.57 -2.78 -2.94
Accidents -2.68 -3.69 -4.48 -5.10 -5.62
Road damage 5.43 3.78 2.50 1.47 0.63
Overall cost: -63.95 -84.39 -100.29 -113.00 -123.41
Source: Assumptions in text and (for exhaust emissions) Tables 7.2 and 7.5.
Notes:
Results based on 1995 actual emissions case, SK*0.5 unit cost exhaust emission estimates, a car 
occupancy rate o f 1.6 persons, and bus load factors ranging from 35 to 55 per cent. A ll values are 
inflation adjusted to 1995 values.
Fuel consumption figures based on data in Gover e t  a l .  (1994) and valued at the retail price o f fuel 
excluding fuel duty and value added tax.
Congestion costs based on measures o f congestion caused by different vehicle types in 'T he  Allocation 
o f Road Track Costs”  (Department o f Transport (DOT), 1993), and valued using cost estimates from 
Newbery (1990).
Noise costs based on estimates in Tinch (1995) and Peirson c l  a l .  (1994).
Accident costs based on data in "Road Accidents Great Britain: the Casualty Report” (DOT. 1995) 
and "Highways Economics Note No. 1" (DOT. 1996),
Road damage costs based on data in The Allocation o f Road Track Costs ( o p .  c i i . ) .
When all the above costs are taken into account, substitution of bus for car travel in 
urban areas decreases the overall costs. The decrease is dominated by the fall in 
congestion costs. Overall costs only start to increase at bus load factors below 25 per 
cent, which is lower than the historically observed bus load factors of around 45 to 30 
per cent for peak and off-peak bus travel respectively. It could be argued that this 
simulation is unduly favourable to bus travel, since it is based on urban areas where bus 
load factors and congestion costs are higher than on a national basis (i.e. including
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rural as well as urban travel). Using national data11, the overall cost change figures are 
substantially lower than those above, but still positive for bus load factors greater than 
33 per cent. As noted in Section 7.5.1, exhaust emission costs do not start to decrease 
until a bus load factor of 76 per cent is reached.
7.7 Conclusions
Substitution of bus for car travel in urban areas yields significant monetary gains when 
a number of costs (exhaust emissions, fuel consumption, traffic congestion, noise 
pollution, road accidents and road damage) are considered. The most important gain is 
the reduction in congestion costs, although fuel savings also become substantial at 
higher load factors. For load factors in the range of 35 to 55 per cent, the monetary 
cost reductions vary from £63,950 to £123,410 per annum (1995 prices) for every 100 
cars ceasing to travel. Within these totals, however, exhaust emission and road damage 
costs increase. The increase in exhaust emission costs occurs because buses have 
relatively high emission factors for those emissions that have the highest health costs, 
particularly PMio. Because of this, policies which reduce emission rates (for PMio in 
particular) through the introduction of new fuel and bus technologies are likely to be 
the most effective way of reducing the exhaust emission cost changes arising from 
substitution of bus for car travel.
Changes in exhaust emission regulations over time do not tend to have a significant 
qualitative effect on these results, since emission limits are progressively tightened for 
both buses and cars. An exception is for PM j0. where the introduction of Euro III and 
Euro IV  regulations from 2000 onwards will give further PM |() reductions for buses 
(and diesel cars) and a substantial decrease in the exhaust emission costs associated 
with substituting bus for car travel.
These conclusions are based on an evaluation framework that does not take into 
account a number of costs associated with car use. Road building causes a loss of 
countryside, community severance and a pattern of land-use (e.g. out-of-town
11 See previous footnote.
26J
shopping centres) which encourages car-dependency and discriminates against those 
without access to a car. These costs are not included because of a lack of information 
concerning their monetary magnitude. This is not to imply, however, that they are 
unimportant. I f  quantifiable, inclusion of these costs would strengthen the case in 
favour of substituting bus for car travel. Other areas for research are identified in 
Section 7.2.
Finally, the estimates used in this chapter are subject to considerable uncertainty and 
should not be considered definitive. Hopefully they will stimulate further research in an 
area which has received limited quantitative attention at the disaggregate level. They 
also have two important policy implications for any transport strategy that has 
environmental objectives. First, improvements in fuel and bus vehicle technologies 
designed to reduce particulate emissions will yield important reductions in exhaust 
emissions costs. Second, transport policies aimed at increasing bus load factors yield 
substantial overall cost savings, even if the increase in the load factor is modest.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
8.1 Opening Remarks
This thesis began with a description of the lightly regulated local bus service market that 
existed before the introduction of the 1930 Road Traffic Act, continued with a discussion 
of the highly regulated system which evolved after 1930, and then moved on to discuss 
the deregulation of the market. Viewed from this historical perspective, one might be 
forgiven for thinking of a wheel that has turned full circle. In some ways, this view is not 
unreasonable. Reading Garcke’s (1923) account of the behaviour of different types of bus 
operator in Section 2.1, it is hard not to be struck by the similarities with some of the 
facets, actual or alleged, of the deregulated market after 1986.
In other ways, however, much has changed. Perhaps the biggest change in the context of 
this thesis has been in the development of economic theories used to understand both the 
outcome and process  of competition, as well as the outcome and process  of regulation. 
Accordingly, this thesis devotes two chapters (three and four) to a discussion of these 
theoretical perspectives and their application to the local bus service market. The 
evaluation of deregulation is further complicated by the considerable reduction in 
external subsidy to bus operators that took place between 1985/86 and 1996/97: over this 
period, external subsidy fell by nearly 60 per cent in real terms. Some commentators have 
argued that it was a lack of competition after deregulation that caused bus fares to 
increase, but one could also argue that bus fares increased because of the subsidy 
reduction rather than a lack of competition. Finally, the transport sector is one that 
generates a number of externalities. Much work has been done on the monetary valuation 
of these externalities, but less appears to be published on the externalities generated by 
substitution between transport modes such as bus and car.
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To recapitulate, the aims o f  this thesis have been to:
• Develop the theoretical perspectives necessary for the evaluation of local bus service 
deregulation in Britain (excluding London)
• Establish the outcome of deregulation without subsidy reduction
• Estimate the externalities associated with substitution of bus for car travel.
This final chapter structures the overall conclusions of the thesis around these aims. 
Section 8.2 provides conclusions relating to the choice of theoretical perspective and the 
implications for the evaluation of deregulation. Section 8.3 comments on the results of 
the econometric modelling of external subsidy reduction and replacement, and draws 
conclusions about the changes in social welfare that might have occurred if subsidy had 
not been reduced. Section 8.4 provides conclusions about the monetary valuation of 
externalities arising from bus for car substitution. Finally, Section 8.5 gives an overview 
of the chapter and concluding remarks.
8.2 Theoretical Perspectives
The P u b lic  In terest A pproach
The highly regulated local bus service system inaugurated by the 1930 Road Traffic Act 
was a response to problems over safety, “unfair” competition and lack o f co-ordination 
between road, rail and tram interests. Unfair competition was equated with unregulated 
competition. These problems can be regarded as instances of market failure which, in the 
public interest approach, can be remedied by regulators acting to increase social welfare. 
Drawing also on the experience of the post-1986 deregulated market it is possible to 
identify other instances of market failure that characterise local bus services to varying 
degrees. These are monopoly, externalities, wasteful competition, unstable competition, 
unfair competition, loss of integration, public goods and common goods. Unfair 
competition is here interpreted more narrowly to mean the underpricing of car use.
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Regulation on safety grounds is a relatively uncontentious issue. The question is whether 
there are other instances of market failure that might justify some form of regulation. 
Chapter three discussed in detail the instances of market failure, both from a theoretical 
and empirical perspective, and concluded that deregulation per se has not resulted in 
significant instances of market failure. Even if it were the case that significant market 
failure exists, however, this may still not be sufficient to justify regulation.
For example, the prevalence of merger activity in the deregulated local bus service 
market is often cited by opponents of deregulation as an indicator of a lack of 
competition and thus a source of market failure. Using the public interest approach, it can 
be argued that some form of regulation is preferable to the deregulation outcome. Mackie 
and Preston (1996) favour a quasi-regulated system in the form of competitive tendering 
for both profitable and unprofitable services. In other words, competition “in the market” 
should be replaced by competition “for the market”.
But this emphasis on market structure and market failure is not sufficient to encompass 
the complex historical development of the local bus service market. In particular, two 
key points about this historical development should be emphasised. First, deregulation 
was preceded by a regulated system that lasted for over fifty years. Any evaluation of the 
deregulated system has to take into account the defects of the regulated system that it 
replaced. This regulatory failure may not be specific to the local bus service market, but 
may be inherent in any system of regulation. Second, deregulation has been a process 
characterised by merger activity. To focus on an outcome of deregulation i.e. increased 
concentration, may run the risk of paying insufficient attention to the process that 
generated the outcome. Merger activity may be the result of an ongoing process of 
competition, rather than an impediment to it. These two features of the historical 
development of the local bus service market necessitate analysis in terms of other 
theoretical frameworks, namely the public choice, Austrian School and contestability 
approaches.
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The P u b lic  C h o ic e  A p p ro a c h
A  key question is not whether market failure exists, as stressed by the public interest 
approach, but whether its costs outweigh those associated with regulation. The public 
choice approach emphasises the process of decision making and the concepts of 
regulatory capture and regulatory failure. In particular, it stresses that the welfare costs 
arising from the monopolies created by regulation may be much higher than those 
associated with the static allocative inefficiencies identified in Chapter three. It follows 
that the removal o f the protected local monopolies that developed in the regulated local 
bus service market may give substantial welfare gains.
The costs of regulatory capture and failure are difficult to quantify, but there is evidence 
to suggest that the regulated local bus service market suffered from a number of 
deficiencies, particularly “X-inefficiency” and a lack of innovation. Between 1953 and 
1980 bus fares increased by 86 per cent in real terms to offset the decline in bus use 
caused by increasing car ownership, but costs managed to increase faster. External 
subsidy became necessary, and from 1969 to 1980 total subsidies and grants to the 
industry jumped from £24 million to £570 million, an increase of over 500 per cent in 
real terms. If  one uses changes in bus fleet structure as a measure of innovation, then the 
structure of the bus fleet used by operators changed fairly slowly before deregulation, but 
rather more quickly afterwards. Using the proportion of double deckers to total bus fleet 
(1953 = 100) as a proxy for changes in bus fleet structure, the index fell by 24% from 
1953 to 1986. After deregulation, the index fell by 37% in the much shorter period from 
1986 to 1997. The trend towards smaller buses also enabled operators to provide new 
services in areas such as housing estates that were previously inaccessible to larger buses.
Although “off the road” competition in the form of competitive tendering for unprofitable 
and profitable services is sometimes advocated in preference to “on the road” competition 
for local bus services, this solution is also a form of regulation that may be susceptible to 
the regulatory costs identified by the public choice school. It is unclear how high these 
costs would be, and the debate about regulatory costs in a competitive tendering
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framework is one that would benefit from further research. It is argued by Mackie et a i
(1995) and Mackie and Preston (1996) that competitive tendering has worked well in 
London and that “what is good for London is good for the country” (1995, p. 249; 1996, 
p. 206). This seems an over-optimistic view, however, given the very different nature of 
the London local bus service market to the rest of Britain.
The Austrian School an d  Contestability Approaches
Another fundamental critique of the market failure and public interest paradigm is that of 
the Austrian School approach. The Austrian School argues that it is not markets p e r  se 
that fail, but rather that failure is the result of entry barriers to the market and an 
inadequate property rights system. Competition is regarded as a dynamic process in 
which a Darwinian struggle for survival takes place. Temporary monopoly is a necessary 
reward for risk-taking in this competitive process. Similarly, mergers are not necessarily 
anti-competitive, but may be a means of competing via increased cost efficiencies. The 
key indicator of market competitiveness is not market structure, but market contestability. 
In a perfectly contestable market, even a natural monopoly must set price and output at 
levels associated with perfect competition.
An important implication of this view is that the re-emergence of local monopoly, 
together with increased market concentration via mergers in the deregulated local bus 
service market, is not incompatible with a competitive market outcome. The actual trend 
towards fewer but larger firms may also encourage the provision of more services via 
network effects. Thus a lack of actual competition, which was a feature of the deregulated 
market, is not necessarily a good indicator of market competitiveness. The key 
determinant of competitiveness is not actual competition (or the lack of it) but p o ten tia l 
competition.
Thus the critical question is the contestability of the local bus service market. I f  it is 
contestable, then market structure is of secondary importance. If  it is not contestable, then 
market structure is of crucial importance. The issue of contestability is dealt with in some
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detail in Chapter four. The Buses White Paper regards the deregulated local bus service 
market as “highly contestable”. In the case of innocent or non-strategic entry barriers 
such as economies of scale and scope, this is probably a fair assessment. Sunk costs tend 
to be low, and the multi-output nature of the industry (firms operating both local and 
long-distance services, for example) increases the possibility of cross-market entry and 
the degree of contestability.
For strategic entry barriers, particularly those created by predatory pricing, the evidence 
is less conclusive. In the period 1986 to 1994 the largest number of complaints to the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) about anti-competitive practices in the deregulated market 
concerned actual predatory pricing. This may understate the problem, since there may 
also have been threats to use predatory pricing which were not reported to the OFT. Also, 
market entry is not made easier by the requirement to give 42 days notice of a new 
service to the Traffic Commissioners: this gives the incumbent operator a reasonable 
period of time in which to prepare any entry-deterrence response.
The general conclusion from the theoretical literature on predatory pricing, however, is 
that it is likely to occur under conditions of incomplete information. As time passes and 
information becomes less incomplete, one would expect the incidence of predatory 
pricing to reduce. This appears to be the case both in the post-1986 period and the Trial 
Areas introduced by the 1980 Transport Act. Bus operators engaging in predatory pricing 
also run the risk of investigation by the OFT. Nonetheless, predatory pricing must be 
considered an obstacle to market entry, particularly where attempted entry is by smaller 
operators. The development of quality partnerships and contracts in the deregulated 
market may also create strategic entry barriers for smaller operators, although much 
depends on the specific form of the partnership or contract between the local authority 
and the operator(s). The possibility of strategic behaviour by incumbent operators implies 
a continuing role for the OFT (or a similar body) in preventing anti-competitive practices 
in the provision of local bus services.
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To summarise the discussion on entry barriers and contestability, the local bus service 
market is not highly contestable as the Buses White Paper claimed. This is because o f the 
existence of strategic entry barriers, primarily predatory pricing. It would be wrong, 
however, to leap to the opposite conclusion, namely that the local bus service market has 
low contestability. Strategic entry-deterrence is probably not sustainable in the long-run, 
particularly where attempted entry is by large operators with a “long purse”. For these 
reasons, the market could best be described as relatively contestable. One key piece of 
evidence that supports this view is the performance of the industry in terms of reducing 
operating costs. In the decade following deregulation, operating costs per vehicle 
kilometre fell by forty per cent in real terms. Although some of these cost reductions can 
be attributed to structural and other changes not related to productivity increases, there is 
little doubt that productivity related costs “...fell by a large amount” (Mackie et a l, 1995, 
p. 239).
Given this relative contestability, deregulation p e r  se should result in a fall in bus fares 
and a net welfare gain. The econometric analysis of Chapter six confirms this view, 
although the welfare gains are not large. Since the industry is not perfectly contestable, 
however, even non-strategic entry barriers such as economies of scale could produce 
situations where some degree of monopoly power is exploited. Mergers could also create 
monopoly power. Given a situation of relative contestability, market structure becomes a 
factor that should be taken into account when determining whether a monopoly or merger 
is against the public interest. There is thus a continuing role for the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (M M C ) in the deregulated bus industry.
8.3 Subsidy and Deregulation
The single most important issue that confounds any economic evaluation of local bus 
service deregulation is the large reduction in public transport support to bus operators that 
accompanied deregulation. If  subsidy had not been reduced, it is conceivable that bus 
fares might have fallen, rather than increased, in the post-1986 period. The results of the 
econometric analysis in Chapter six show that, with deregulation and subsidy
269
replacement, bus fares in Britain excluding London would have fallen slightly (see Table 
6 .1). Given this fall in bus fares, it is possible to calculate the welfare gain from 
deregulation p e r  se. On the basis of a fairly cautious set of assumptions, the welfare gain 
(including externality effects from bus for car substitution) is £9.8 million per annum in 
real terms for the period 1986-97. If  the forecast subsidy is assumed not to increase but to 
remain “frozen” at its 1984 level, then the total welfare gain is reduced to £6.4 million 
per annum. These gains are small in relation to the total passenger receipts of the 
industry, but they are gains nonetheless. The annual welfare gains are likely to be higher 
than £6.4 to £9.8 million, because the calculations in Chapter six do not include the 
benefits arising from the reduction in Tulloch-Posner costs associated with the demise of 
the regulated system. The magnitude of these costs is another area in need of research, 
similar to that mentioned in the previous section.
It is important that the evaluation of deregulation takes into account the very different 
experiences of the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Further econometric analysis 
shows that both areas experience a similar welfare gain (excluding external effects) from 
deregulation with increasing subsidy replacement, with gains of £4.0 million and £3.7 
million per annum for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas respectively. There is 
a clear difference between the areas in terms of gain per person, however, with figures of 
around £4.2 and £1.2 per person for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas 
respectively.
The analysis also forecasts what would have happened to bus fares and passenger 
journeys per person if the regulated system had been allowed to continue. The forecasts 
are based on the Box-Jenkins A R IM A  methodology rather than the econometric 
structural modelling used earlier. The results imply that bus fares and passenger journeys 
in the continuing regulated system would be similar to those that actually occurred with 
deregulation and subsidy reduction. In other words, the positive effects of deregulation 
p e r  se are broadly cancelled out by the negative effects of subsidy reduction.
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8.4 External Costs and Benefits o f Deregulation
It is a commonly held belief that promoting bus use at the expense of car use has 
desirable economic consequences. This belief is generally valid, although there are some 
exceptions. The exceptions identified in Chapter seven include a number of vehicle 
exhaust emissions that tend to increase rather than decrease as people transfer from car to 
bus.
The previous section summarised the welfare gains from deregulation p e r  se. Most of 
these welfare gains arise because bus fares fall and demand increases when the “lost” 
external subsidy is replaced. These gains can be characterised as the “internalities” 
associated with deregulation p e r  se. Part of the increase in demand for bus travel occurs 
because some people substitute bus for car use in response to the change in the relative 
price of bus to car use. This substitution generates changes in a number of externalities, 
the main change being the reduction in traffic congestion costs. Although there is an 
extensive literature on the monetary valuation of transport related externalities, it tends to 
focus on the overall costs of these externalities rather than the changes that occur as 
people transfer from one transport mode to another. The effect of modal transfer on total 
external costs and benefits is not straightforward to establish since, in the case of transfer 
from car to bus travel, it depends on parameters such as car occupancy rates and bus load 
factors. In the case of air pollution the situation is more complex, because petrol and 
diesel engines have different exhaust emission characteristics which are subject to 
legislative limits that change over time.
The analysis of Chapter seven considers the externalities associated with exhaust 
emissions, fuel consumption, traffic congestion, noise pollution, road accidents and road 
damage. It finds that for bus load factors in the range of 35 to 55 per cent, the total 
monetary cost reductions arising from changes in these externalities in urban areas vary 
from £639.5 to £1,234.1 per annum (1995 prices) for every car ceasing to travel. The 
single largest cost reduction is for congestion, although fuel savings also become 
substantial at higher load factors. Within the 35 to 55 per cent bus load factor range,
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however, exhaust emission and road damage costs increase. The increase in exhaust 
emission costs may surprise some people, but the result is robust to a number of 
sensitivity tests. The reason for the increase is that bus engines emit relatively large 
amounts of particulate matter, and this emission has particularly high health costs. The 
policy implication is that bus for car substitution should be encouraged, but particulate 
emissions from bus engines reduced by improved engine design and the use of new low- 
sulphur fuels.
The results above do not take into account a number of costs associated with car use. 
These include loss of countryside from road building, community severance and the 
development of land-use patterns that encourage further car dependency. These costs 
cannot be included because of a lack of research on them. It is possible that they are 
substantial and, if so, would encourage further the case for promoting bus travel.
Finally, a health warning is in order. Much of the research in this area (if it exists at all) is 
subject to considerable uncertainty, and the author’s is no exception. Hopefully, the 
analysis of Chapter seven provides a basis on which further research can build, 
particularly for the monetary valuation of the benefits and costs of transferring from car 
to bus travel.
8.5 Overall Conclusions
The local bus service market is a complex one, not only because of the special 
characteristics of local bus service provision, but also because of its historical 
development. This complexity means that the welfare gains and losses from local bus 
service deregulation must be carefully analysed from a number of theoretical 
perspectives, rather than a single one. Each perspective has its uses and limitations.
The public interest approach focuses on market outcom es, and uses the neoclassical 
framework of equilibrium and comparative statics to determine the extent of the welfare 
loss arising from market failures such as monopoly. This approach has conceptual clarity
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and empirical applicability, and is the basic foundation of the quantitative welfare 
evaluation of deregulation in Chapter six. But the approach does not consider market 
processes, and may give misleading conclusions if used in isolation. The strength of the 
public choice and Austrian School approaches is that they focus on regulation and 
competition respectively as processes evolving over time. Public choice theory 
emphasises that regulatory capture and failure may be just as much a problem as market 
failure, whilst the Austrian school highlights the importance of (temporary) monopoly 
and mergers as a legitimate part of the competitive process. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on market process as opposed to outcome means that these approaches are not 
as amenable to the type of quantitative welfare analysis used in Chapter six.
Contestability theory is a more recent development, although its emphasis on entry and 
exit barriers places it in the Austrian School tradition. In particular, it predicts that even 
natural monopolies will price competitively if they are in a contestable market. It is the 
entry and exit barriers to the market, rather than the structure of the market itself, which 
determines whether or not the monopolist sets competitive prices.
The evidence surveyed in Chapter four suggests that local bus services comprise a market 
that is relatively contestable. The degree of contestability is not high or low, but 
somewhere between these extremes, probably nearer the “high” end of the contestability 
spectrum rather than the low. This conclusion is reinforced by the large fall in bus 
operating costs per vehicle kilometre after deregulation, in spite of the absence of 
widespread actual competition.
The welfare evaluation of local bus service deregulation is made more difficult by the 
concurrent reduction in external subsidy to bus operators. If  this lost subsidy is replaced, 
then econometric analysis shows that there are welfare gains from deregulation p e r  se. 
The welfare gains arise because bus fares fall and demand for bus travel increases in 
comparison to the actual outcome associated with deregulation and subsidy reduction. 
These welfare gains accrue to both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, although the 
gains are small in relation to the total passenger receipts of the industry.
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It is likely that these welfare gain estimates err on the side o f caution, since they are 
based on the public interest approach and do not include the gains from the reduction in a 
number of costs associated with the demise of the regulated system. These are the 
regulatory costs emphasised by the public choice school. The public interest approach 
also views monopoly as an instance of market failure, so that the increase in industry 
concentration after deregulation would be regarded as a source of welfare loss. The 
Austrian School, on the other hand, would regard the merger activity as a legitimate 
consequence o f the process of competition. Indeed, temporary monopoly for the Austrian 
School could be regarded as a welfare gain. These remarks emphasise the importance of 
setting the deregulation debate explicitly within the context of these different analytical 
frameworks, rather than solely within the public interest approach.
It is possible, however, that competition “for the market” (i.e. a competitive tendering 
system for both unprofitable and profitable services) might have produced greater welfare 
gains than the deregulated system introduced by the 1985 Transport Act. This possibility 
is not explored in detail in this thesis.
The welfare analysis takes into account a number of externalities associated with the 
substitution of bus for car travel. This substitution causes a large fall in traffic congestion 
costs, and also falls in the costs of fuel consumption, noise pollution and road accidents. 
On the other hand, exhaust emission and road damage costs increase. The main culprit for 
the increase in exhaust emission costs is particulate matter, which has high health costs 
and is emitted in relatively large quantities by bus diesel engines Overall, however, 
external costs decrease as a result of bus for car substitution. Policy makers should seek 
to continue to encourage people to travel by bus instead of car, but ensure that particulate 
emissions are reduced to much lower levels.
Finally, the discussion of the previous sections has drawn attention to the need for further 
research in a number of areas. First, the regulated local bus service system in Britain was 
subject to regulatory failure. At least one study has been made of the monetary costs of 
regulatory failure in other transport related markets, but no estimates have so far been
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made for the local bus service market in Britain. Given the importance attached by the 
public choice and Austrian School paradigms to the problems of regulation, this area of 
research is worth pursuing in the context of a system that lasted for over fifty years. 
Second, and on a related theme, there is a need for research into the costs and benefits of 
competitive tendering systems for profitable services in the context o f the deregulated 
local bus service market. The avoidance of wasteful competition by encouraging “off the 
road competition” through competitive tendering is an appealing idea, and could result in 
welfare gains greater than those achieved from deregulation with “on the road” 
competition. But this is a speculative view, and a proper evaluation should take into 
account the monetary costs, as well as benefits, of a competitive tendering system. Third, 
there is considerable scope for refining and developing existing research work on the 
externalities associated with bus for car substitution. Given the emphasis by policy 
makers on the need to reduce externalities such as traffic congestion, air pollution and 
global warming, there is a surprising lack of detailed research on the monetary values that 
should be used in the evaluation of bus for car substitution.
To summarise, the main conclusions of this thesis are that:
• Local bus service deregulation cannot be fully evaluated in terms o f the public 
interest approach alone
• The deregulated local bus service market is relatively contestable, although there is 
still a need for supervision by the OFT and the MMC
• Deregulation resulted in a welfare gain in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas, although the gain is relatively small
• Broadly speaking, the positive effects of deregulation p e r  se  have been cancelled out 
by the negative effects of subsidy reduction
• Policies to promote bus for car substitution will result in an overall increase in 
welfare
• Further research is desirable in three areas: the costs of regulating bus services, the 
costs and benefits of competitive tendering, and the monetary valuation of 
externalities.
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